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Summary
This thesis focuses on three key areas of research interest: the way in which agency 
workers  are  managed,  the  impact  of  heterogeneity  in  agency  work  (particularly  in 
relation to job security and the opportunity to act in response to problems at work) and 
the opportunity for representative voice. It offers insight in these areas that have, to 
date, been under-explored.
The research examines two case studies, focusing on agency workers within the social 
care workforce.   This primarily qualitative study has engaged with agency workers, 
managers  and local  and national  union representatives  using interviews as the main 
method of data collection.
This study concludes that the management of agency workers is fragmented and that 
control is divided between agencies and user organisations. It contributes to a growing 
literature around agency workers, advancing the view that agency workers are diverse 
and  heterogeneous.  Variations  between  agency  workers  affect  their  perceptions  of 
different types of job security, and have a significant influence on their opportunity to 
act in response to problems at work. This thesis reviews the legal position of agency 
workers and concludes that equal treatment legislation is likely to increase the ability of 
some agency workers to mobilise,  but  that  the absence of  protection from arbitrary 
dismissal is likely to limit  the ability of many agency workers to act in response to 
problems at work. It reviews the engagement between agency workers and trade unions, 
finding workplace indifference and rejection coupled with political lobbying for greater 
legal protection, and that should such protection be enacted it is likely to provide a 
stimulus for unionisation. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
This  thesis  investigates  the  nature  of  the  triangular  relationship  between  agency 
workers, temporary work agencies and user organisations and its impact on how these 
workers are managed, how they experience work and how it influences their ability to 
participate in decisions affecting their working lives whether through trade unions or 
otherwise.  While the orientation of agency workers to work, and within this the reasons 
for  taking  agency  work  rather  than  a  more  traditional  form  of  employment  are 
important,  so  are  the  opportunities  to  participate  offered  by  the  state  (enshrined  in 
labour law), their dual employers and trade unions.  The imprecise state of labour law in 
relation  to  agency  workers  offers  these  workers  few  concrete  employment  rights, 
essentially  denying  them a  foundation  of  minimum  entitlements  and  obscuring  the 
'opportunity  to  act'  for  some  agency  workers.   For  agency  workers  the  risk  of 
unemployment associated with exit are reduced by their relationship with the agency 
and  its  position  as  a  labour  market  intermediary  assisting  them  in  obtaining  new 
employment.  This thesis will argue that the more ready availability of exit, coupled 
with the difficulty agency workers experience utilising voice at work means that many 
of these workers make use of exit strategies rather than voice at work.  This presents a 
challenge to the foundation of worker representation and this thesis explores the impact 
of the triangular relationship on the exit-voice dynamic and on interest recognition and 
definition using mobilisation theory to identify the role for unions. 
This  thesis  presents  a  study  of  agency  workers  in  two  local  authority  Social  Care 
departments. Social care provides an ideal setting for such a study because of its diverse 
workforce,  with  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  agency  workers  located  in  both 
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professional and non professional roles throughout, and because it is relatively highly 
unionised.  
In the UK there has been a growth of managerial and professional workers entering part 
time and other atypical work.   Far from conceptions of the atypical workforce as a 
marginalised  and  vulnerable  group  some  authors  have  suggested  that  some  such 
workers as 'free agents'  can have greater control over their  working lives than their 
traditional  counterparts.   Whilst  the  growth  in  managerial  and  professional  workers 
amongst the atypical workforce has been a broadly acknowledged trend there is limited 
discussion of the implication of the broader range of workers engaged in atypical work. 
There is little consideration of the differences between atypical workers and the affect of 
those differences on the workers’ experience of work.  This research focuses on the 
experience of agency work and the many factors that may affect it, both personal and 
work related.  By offering a categorisation of agency workers that moves beyond binary 
categories, I seek to explore the effect of their heterogeneity on their experience of work 
and access to voice.  This study considers the impact of these differences on interest 
definition and the drive of different types of agency workers to make use of voice at 
work rather than exit from it.  This leads into a discussion of the role for unions both in 
terms  of  their  current  interaction  with  agency  workers,  and  also  the  potential  for 
unionisation of different categories of agency workers.  
The key themes of this thesis engage with a variety of industrial relations literature.  It is 
framed within the growing body of work on atypical workers broadly, and particularly 
agency workers, on the nature and effects of agency work.  The literature identifying the 
labour market position of agency workers and their characteristics informed the location 
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of  the research and is  used to  position the workers in  this  study.  The dichotomies 
presented in the literature of vulnerable vs. free agent agency workers, of agency worker 
as a bridge to permanent employment or a trap and of voluntary vs. involuntary agency 
work provide the basis of a discussion of heterogeneity of agency work.  This thesis 
moves beyond the binary categories outlined in the literature to present a more nuanced 
categorisation that recognises differences in the orientation to work
In  addressing the  ability  of  agency workers  to  act  on problems at  work this  thesis 
intersects with the debate about the legal status of agency workers.  Agency workers are 
amongst  the  least  protected  workers  in  the  UK labour  market.   The  difficulties  in 
establishing employee status will be outlined leading to a discussion of the implications 
of the lack of employment protection for the exercise of voice at work.  The particularly 
problematic nature of a triangular employment relationship will be explored and links 
will be made with other, larger groups of workers (like contracted out workers) who 
experience similar employment relationships. 
The  exit/voice  literature  founded  by  Hirschman  (1970)  provides  a  foundation  to 
investigate the effect of the triangular relationship that agency workers have with their 
dual employers on their propensity to use voice and exit.  The extent to which different 
agency workers desire a voice in relation to the arrangements over their own working 
lives and the organisations that they work for will be discussed.  Some authors have 
argued that the exit choice for agency workers may be illusory; this study in contrast 
argues that for some agency workers the costs associated with exit may be lower than 
for  their  permanent  counterparts  and  that  this  may  change  their  perceptions  of  the 
relative merit of voice vs. exit.  If some categories of agency workers find exit a more 
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satisfactory means of dealing with problems at work this presents a challenge to the 
ability of trade unions to organise such workers.  This thesis also presents the idea that 
agency  workers  do  not  have  the  same  exit/voice  choices  as  permanent  staff.   The 
triangular  employment  relationship  offers  agency  workers  the  ability  to  exit  one 
organisation while retaining ties with the other, or to access representative voice by 
engaging one organisation in representing them to the other about a problem at work. 
The framework of union engagement with agency workers laid out by Heery (2004) is 
explored.  This  thesis  concludes  that  accounting  for  both  national  policy  and  local 
practice within the  typology presented is problematic.  Where a policy of exclusion 
from membership is coupled with political level advocacy it is difficult to characterise 
the trade union response to agency workers within the framework. 
Another area of industrial relations literature that is important to this research is around 
trade union decline and renewal.  The significant trade union decline of the last three 
decades has provoked a variety of trade union strategies to address this.  One renewal 
strategy has been to attempt to unionise groups of workers previously excluded.  In 
some cases this has involved lobbying for legislative change and using legislation as a 
lever to organise workers and increase unionisation.  In the context of union decline and 
changes in the composition of the workforce the response of trade unions to agency 
workers is of interest because it illustrates the willingness of trade unions to respond to 
a  particularly  challenging  type  of  atypical  type  worker.   Recruiting  new  types  of 
workers  has  required  unions  to  address  new issues  in  order  to  effectively  represent 
them.  In the public sector, where union density is higher, agency workers make up a 
proportionally larger  section of the workforce than in the private  sector.  This may 
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increase their attractiveness to trade unions, particularly as consolidated procurement of 
these  workers  means  that  fewer  labour  market  intermediaries  are  involved  in  their 
supply to any one local authority.  
Mobilisation  theory  informs  my  analytical  framework  linking  the  issues  of 
heterogeneity,  voice/exit  and  trade  union  renewal.   Exploring  the  diversity  in  the 
management of agency workers and their experience of work provides the foundation 
for a discussion of how the triangular employment relationship affects the opportunity 
of workers to act in response to problems at work.  How workers come to define their 
interests,  and make the  move from dissatisfaction  to  injustice is  discussed,  and the 
impediments  to  doing so.   The triangular  relationship also affects  the attribution of 
issues to the employer because many areas of management are shared and it may be 
problematic to apportion blame, and agency workers may feel that it is their status as 
agency workers that is responsible rather than an employer.  The opportunity to act in 
response to problems at work is reviewed.  If some agency workers, because of their 
labour market position or relationship with their agency, are able to use exit to resolve 
perceived problems at  work what of those workers for whom exit is not an option? 
Some workers are not in a privileged labour market position.  For these workers the 
insecurity  associated with their  agency status  and their  labour  market  position  may 
make it impossible for them to act. So, it may be the case that agency workers fall into 
three groups; one with the ready availability of exit for whom resolving problems at 
work (individually or collectively) is not seen as necessary, one with a weak position in 
the labour market where voice may jeopardise employment and exit is not an option, 
and one where the relationship with either the user organisation or the agency offers a 
means of resolving issues with the other, or failing that the opportunity to exit only the 
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other. 
Research themes
This  thesis  is  concerned with  three  main  themes:  inside  the  triangular  relationship; 
understanding heterogeneity in agency work; and opportunity for voice in agency work. 
These  themes  are  themselves  linked  by  the  underpinning  theoretical  framework  of 
mobilisation theory. 
The first  research theme looks inside the triangular relationship to see how the two 
'employing' organisations manage agency workers.  The literature talks about division of 
employer function between the agency and the user organisation.  Where workers have 
two  employing  organisations,  who  takes  responsibility  for  which  elements  of  the 
employment relationship must affect the experience of organisational life.  Beyond the 
question of  who manages these workers is the question of  how they are managed.  I 
explore how the unusual triangular employment relationship affects how these workers 
are managed day to day, which policies are used and how they are treated at work.
Research questions:
1. Who manages agency workers and how are they managed?
2. How do agency workers experience agency work?
The second theme – heterogeneity - looks in more detail at the varied experience of 
15
different  agency  workers  and  the  reasons  for  this.   The  literature  outlines  two 
contrasting types of agency workers, vulnerable workers and 'free agents', with many 
authors arguing that neither characterisation is entirely accurate.  This theme develops 
this  point,  investigating  how  agency  workers’  experience  is  affected  by  different 
situations  and different  reasons  for  accepting agency work.   It  goes  on to  consider 
whether those differences affect the need and desire for protection and voice in agency 
work.  It looks at how difference in agency workers with respect to their orientation to 
work, their characteristics, their labour market position and their relationship with both 
the agency and user contribute to different outcomes in terms of how they come to 
define, articulate and act upon their interests. 
Research questions:
3. What is the impact of heterogeneity on the experience of agency work?
4. Are agency workers able to act in response to problems at work?
The final theme – opportunity for representative voice - looks at how agency workers in 
the study have engaged with trade unions and professional associations.  It looks at the 
space for unions in the triangular relationship.  It considers the role of the union as laid 
out  in  mobilisation  theory  as  leaders,  framing  issues  in  a  collective  way  and 
encouraging workers to see that collective resolutions can be effective in remedying 
perceived  injustice.   It  explores  the  implication  of  the  conviction  of  many  agency 
workers in this study that exit would be a primary way of resolving problems at work on 
their perception of the utility of unions. It also investigates the workplace and political 
engagement with agency workers and the implications of union decisions on the access 
that agency workers have to representative voice.   
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Research Questions
5. Is there a need and desire for representative voice?
6. How are trade unions engaging with agency workers in this setting?
Structure of the thesis
The next chapter presents an overview of key debates covering the literatures indicated 
above. It provides a brief survey of the field and describes the theoretical frameworks of 
mobilisation and voice/exit that underpin this thesis.  Chapter 3 outlines and justifies the 
methods used in this study and provides a rationale for the selection of research sites. 
Chapter 4 outlines the local government sector and the use of agency workers in local 
government.  It places the primary research into context by offering a brief history of 
the sector and detailing the position of agency workers within the social care workforce. 
Chapter  5  introduces  the  research  sites,  giving  a  broad  background  to  both  local 
authorities, identified as ‘City’ and ‘Met’.  It begins the presentation of the substantive 
findings of the research by investigating the drivers that have led to the use of agency 
workers  within  City  and Met.   The different  approaches  to  procurement  of  agency 
workers at each authority are described and the implications of the choices that they 
have made for managers within the local authorities are considered.  This provides the 
background to the setting within which agency workers, agencies and managers within 
the user organisation act. 
Chapter 6 explores the management of agency workers at the two local authorities.  It 
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highlights the importance of the workplace line manager in determining the treatment of 
agency workers by looking at the impact of the manager on agency worker training, 
recruitment  and how problems at  work are  dealt  with.   It  demonstrates  the lack of 
formal arrangements for dealing with disciplinary or capability problems, and the varied 
approaches to the management of these workers.  The involvement of both the user 
organisation and the agency in the management of these workers is discussed and the 
difficulty  in  identifying  which  is  responsible  for  which  aspects  of  management  is 
highlighted.  The research offers insight into the areas in which agency workers are able 
to have influence on the organisation of their working lives, such as negotiating pay, 
flexible working and taking leave at short notice.  It also reveals those areas where they 
have little access to voice such as where disciplinary or competency problems arise, in 
accessing  the  grievance  policy,  the  lack  of  appraisals,  being  excluded  from  team 
meetings and briefings and staff surveys.  This discussion provides the background to 
understanding how agency workers come to view issues at work and their ability to 
participate in organisational decision making.  This chapter argues that managers foster 
divisions  between workers  by underscoring  differences  in  status  with  differences  in 
treatment.    This  has  a  counter  mobilising  effect  challenging  the  ability  of  agency 
workers to socially identify with their colleagues. 
Chapter 7 looks at agency workers' experience of agency work.  It explores the reasons 
why workers in the research have decided to undertake agency work and how their 
decision impacts on their experience.  It reports how workers themselves view agency 
work, its advantages and disadvantages, the implications for training and their ability to 
raise workplace issues.  It reviews the traditional construct of job security and concludes 
that  it  is  not  sufficiently  nuanced  to  adequately  describe  the  varied  experiences  of 
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different types of agency workers.  It presents a more detailed discussion of different 
types of job security that agency workers experience.  A typology of agency workers is 
developed in this chapter to explain how different workers experience agency work in 
diverse ways, and to explore the implications for voice and exit.   This feeds into a 
discussion of the ways in which agency workers identify their interests, and whether 
they  do  so  in  a  collective  or  individual  way.   The  way  in  which  the  triangular 
relationship and other factors affect the ability of workers to act upon their interests is 
considered, together with the relative utility and viability of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’.  
Chapter  8  focuses  on the  interaction between trade  unions and agency workers.   It 
reviews the desire of different types of agency workers to unionise and how the trade 
unions in the sector interact with workers at workplace level.  It goes on to discuss the 
political level lobbying that has been undertaken by Unison, GMB and Unite to enhance 
legal protection for agency workers.  It engages with Heery's (2004) matrix of union 
engagement  with  agency  workers  and  argues  that  categorisation  of  union  policy 
nationally as well as local practice is difficult.  It moves on to look at the engagement of 
the British Association of Social Workers (BASW) with agency workers and concludes 
that its structure outside the workplace, coupled with the services that it offers that are 
particularly attractive to agency workers mean that agency workers are less resistant to 
joining. 
Finally, Chapter 9 looks at the bigger picture around the potential for agency workers to 
act in response to problems at work.  It expands on the heterogeneity theme intersecting 
with the literature on agency work to discuss the binary categories and demonstrate how 
the typology of different agency workers apply to workers studies in other contexts.  It 
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moves on to discuss the capacity of agency workers to act in response to problems at 
work using mobilisation theory to demonstrate the difficulties and opportunities that the 
triangular employment relationship offers.  It then reflects on the changing legal status 
of agency workers and the likely implications of the introduction of equal treatment 
legislation.  It concludes that in the absence of protection from arbitrary dismissal in the 
event of raising problems at work, the prospects for offering workplace voice to more 
agency workers is limited.  The prospects for engaging with these workers as part of 
union renewal is discussed and it is argued that legislative change is likely to provide 
stimulus for workplace level engagement with these workers.  
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Chapter 2 – Locating the research
Change within the labour market has been well documented over recent years.  The 
move from standard full  time permanent  employment for a single employment to a 
plethora of subcontracted and atypical working arrangements has been the subject of 
much academic interest (On subcontracting see amongst others Supiot 2001, Rubery et 
al 2005, Grimshaw and Hebson 2005, on atypical work see below).  A variety of authors 
have pointed to the less favourable treatment and conditions experienced by atypical 
workers generally (McGovern et al 2004, Nienhüser and Matiaske 2006, amongst many 
others) and temporary workers more specifically (Stanworth and Druker 2004, Burgess 
and Connell 2004, Casey 2004, Forde 2001 2005 2006, Kirkpatrick and Hoque 2006, 
amongst many others).  
Temporary agency workers can be defined as: 
“Workers  with  a  contract  of  employment  or  employment  relationship with a  
temporary agency with a view to being posted to a user undertaking to work  
under its supervision” (DTI 2003: 3)
They are atypical in that the duration of their placement is generally short and they have 
a  complex  triangular  relationship  with  two  employers.   Temporary  agency  workers 
make up a distinctive part of the atypical worker group because their arrangements are 
not only contractually different, they also lack the single direct relationship with one 
employer that most employees and workers experience. 
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Agency work is one example of atypical work but the boundaries between agency work, 
self employment, contracting, and even casual and outsourced work are blurred.  There 
are distinctions to be drawn between these arrangements; however even the workers 
themselves are often unclear as to their relationship.  Some workers set up their own 
limited companies through which to offer their services, often to gain tax advantages or 
at  the behest of agencies;  some such workers consider  themselves to be contractors 
while  others  view  themselves  as  agency  workers.   The  triangular  relationship  that 
agency workers have with their two employers is not the only example of triangular 
employment  relationships.  Edwards  (2006)  points  to  outsourced  workers  who  have 
similar work experience of tripartite employment relationships as they are employed by 
one organisation to carry out functions on behalf of another.  
Within the local authorities there are many examples of this, including the outsourcing 
of domiciliary care where many workers that were previously employed directly by the 
local authority are outsourced to private companies to carry out the same duties.  These 
workers will be working for a service user on behalf of a local authority, to standards set 
by  the  local  authority  but  for  a  third  party  company.   Such  arrangements  are 
increasingly common with over half of all workplaces outsourcing four or more services 
(Edwards  2006).   The  Supiot  report  (1998)  notes  the  difficulty  for  subcontracted 
workers as no legal arrangement exists between them and the user organisation but 
decisions made by the user organisation are likely to determine how many jobs exist and 
many  of  the  conditions  of  employment.   As  with  agency  workers,  the  triangular 
relationship for outsourced workers presents problems in accessing most  labour law 
provisions  particularly  in  terms  of  representation  and  bargaining  with  the  user 
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organisation (Supiot 1998). 
This thesis focuses specifically on agency work, however the issues affecting agency 
workers  are  relevant  to  atypical  workers  more  broadly,  and  other  workers  with 
triangular  employment  relationships  even  where  they  are  employed  in  open  ended 
permanent employment.  Agency work is emblematic of new forms of work involving 
triangular relationships between the parties involved.  It involves the transfer of risk 
from the enterprise to the individual worker and leaves the worker on the outskirts of 
employment protection.  
What follows is a description of agency work in the UK and EU labour markets. It 
places the research into context. It establishes the diverse nature of agency work which 
is  carried through the  thesis,  but  particularly  considered within the second research 
theme looking at heterogeneity amongst agency workers. 
The number of  agency workers  in  the  UK labour  market  is  difficult  to  quantify  as 
estimates  vary  greatly.   BERR (2008)  argue  that  the  most  accurate  measure  of  the 
number  of  agency  workers  in  the  UK  labour  market  come  from  the  Recruitment 
Industry Confederation (REC) and the Survey of Recruitment Agencies (SORA). This 
places the number of agency workers at between 1.1 and 1.5 million workers.  The 
Labour Force Survey (2007, see Fig 2.1 and 2.2) indicates a total of almost 1.5 million 
atypical  workers,  around  20%  (300,000)  of  these  workers  are  temporary  agency 
workers.  The main source of information on patterns of atypical employment is the 
Labour Force Survey; it provides quarterly information on the level of atypical work in 
the labour market divided into fixed period contracting, part time, seasonal, casual and 
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agency work.  Some authors (Arrowsmith 2006, Edwards 2006, BERR 2008) argue that 
it underestimates the level of atypical work in the UK because respondents define their 
jobs as permanent even when they work in some non-standard arrangement.  Edwards 
(2006)  notes  that  12%  of  the  Labour  Force  Survey  sample  were  unclear  about 
employment status even after detailed questioning, and his suggestion is that this means 
that  the  boundaries  between standard  and non-standard  work  are  blurred  and some 
forms  of  non-standard  working  may  not  be  captured  in  the  Labour  Force  Survey. 
Nonetheless  the  time  series  data  are  helpful  because  they  offer  some  indication  of 
changes in the number and proportion of agency workers within the workforce. 
Fig 2.1 Atypical workers in the UK by quarter
Labour Force Survey 2007
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Fixed
period Agency Casual Seasonal
contract temping work work Other
(000s) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Year Quarter
1997 Q2 1,740 50.1 13.5 20.3 6.2 9.9
Q4 1,807 50.0 13.2 18.5 7.5 10.8
1999 Q2 1,623 49.0 15.9 21.1 5.5 8.5
Q4 1,715 46.6 17.3 19.0 6.6 10.5
2001 Q2 1,663 48.0 16.2 19.2 4.6 12.1
Q4 1,630 46.6 17.9 18.0 6.1 11.4
2002 Q2 1,533 46.8 18.3 20.1 4.9 10.0
Q4 1,621 46.5 17.6 19.4 6.2 10.2
2003 Q2 1,436 48.2 17.3 19.0 5.0 10.6
Q4 1,558 45.9 16.4 20.5 6.4 10.8
2004 Q2 1,452 46.7 16.2 20.5 4.9 11.7
Q4 1,526 44.4 17.6 19.5 7.2 11.3
2005 Q1 1,382 47.2 18.1 18.8 4.2 11.7
Q2 1,393 45.8 18.5 19.0 5.2 11.5
Q3 1,543 43.0 17.2 20.1 9.2 10.6
Q4 1,408 45.5 17.5 19.7 6.4 10.8
2006 Q1 1,404 46.8 17.8 19.5 4.2 11.7
Q2 1,408 45.1 17.7 21.3 4.8 11.2
Q3 1,513 40.9 17.7 21.8 8.5 11.1
All2,3
Fig 2.2 Agency workers in UK labour market
Labour force survey 2007
Labour force survey data (see fig 2.1) suggests that the level of agency working in the 
UK grew in the period between 1997 and 2002 before a steep fall in 2002-2003. Since 
2003 there has been steady growth in the number of agency workers. 
Unison (2007) suggests that the difference between the official Labour Force Survey 
statistics  and  the  recruitment  industry's  own  figures  suggests  that  there  are  a  large 
number  of  agency  workers  that  do  not  show up  in  official  surveys  and  that  these 
workers are likely to be vulnerable workers such as migrant agency workers.  
Within  the  UK,  most  agency workers  work  in  settings  where  the  majority  of  their 
colleagues are directly employed on open ended contracts (Stanworth and Druker 2005, 
Olsen 2006).  BERR (2008) reports that  agency workers are most likely to work in 
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transport, financial services and manufacturing, though the ETUC found that  80% of 
these agency workers are employed within the public and service sectors (ETUC 2005). 
WERS (2004) found that most agency workers worked in the public sector, however 
BERR (2008) found that proportionally less agency workers worked in the public sector 
than the labour market.   Like most EU countries the gender of agency workers is fairly 
balanced  in  the  UK  with  men  accounting  for  just  over  half  of  agency  workers 
(Arrowsmith 2006, BERR 2008).  Assignment length varies a great deal, BERR (2008) 
reports that 18% of assignments last under 1 week, with 55% lasting under 3 months 
and 11% lasting over a year.  
The number of agency workers has grown in almost every EU15 (and Norway) country 
in the last two decades.  Although they make up only 1-2% of employment in most 
countries, this is the equivalent of 2.5-3 (Arrowsmith 2006, see Fig 2.3).  The UK has 
the highest level of agency work in the EU  with agency workers making up around 5% 
of the working population (BERR, 2008; Arrowsmith, 2006). Most of the growth in the 
number of agency workers was concentrated in the 1990s and slowed in the 2000s.  
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Fig 2.3 Agency workers in the EU15 & Norway
Country Number of employees Proportion of total workforce (%)
Austria 44,125 1.4
Belgium 75,131 2.2
Germany 399,789 1.2
Denmark 6,341 0.3
Greece 3,503 Not reported
Spain 150,000 0.8
Finland 14,000 0.6
France 569,314 2.1
Ireland 25,000 Not reported
Italy 153,000 0.6
Luxembourg 7,135 1.6
Netherlands 157,000 2.5
Norway 22,784 1
Portugal 45,000 0.9
Sweden 35,000 1
UK (a) 600,000  (b) 1,434,098 (a) 2.6 (b) 5.1
Arrowsmith (2006)
The sectoral distribution of agency workers varies over the EU15, Arrowsmith (2006) 
reports on data from twelve countries and identifies three groups; the first where agency 
work is predominantly located within the manufacturing sector (Austria,  France,  the 
Netherlands and Portugal); the second where higher levels exist in the service sectors 
(Spain,  Sweden and the UK); and a final  group where the sectoral  profile is mixed 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands).   The  public  sector  is  a 
significant user of agency workers in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. 
The UK reports the highest level of agency worker use in the public sector (Arrowsmith 
2006: 7).  
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The typical duration of agency worker placements varies across the EU.  Arrowsmith 
(2006) reports that the differences in available data across the countries reporting on 
duration of placements make it  difficult  to draw meaningful  comparisons.   In  some 
countries, like France and Spain, the vast majority of agency workers work in very short 
assignments.  In other countries, like Ireland and the UK, assignment duration varies 
more widely from very short assignments of a few days up to those lasting over a year. 
BERR (2008) reports that agency workers are more likely to be younger workers, and 
almost twice as likely as the labour force in general to be from black and minority 
ethnic groups.  Fewer people with disabilities are agency workers.  The level of work 
ranges from clerical, care and manual jobs paid at the level of the minimum wage to 
professional roles in teaching, social work and senior management appointments.
Recruitment agency sector
The  nature  of  the  recruitment  agency  sector  is  important  to  the  research  contained 
within this  thesis.  The temporary  agency industry  is  characterised by heterogeneity. 
This heterogeneity is likely to impact on the management of agency workers and their 
experiences of agency work.  The following section offers a discussion of the sector in 
general which provides the background to the detail of the agencies used in the case 
study authorities provided in Chapter 5. 
As Burgess and Connell (2004: 1) note, diversity in the industry applies to the size and 
scale of operations, ownership, motivation, the size and range of services provided, the 
industries  and  occupations  serviced,  and  the  locality  of  operations.   BERR (2008) 
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reports  that  54%  of  agencies  are  single  site  agencies  with  57%  of  all  agencies 
employing between 1 and 5 branch staff. only 1% of agencies employ over 200 staff.
In most other European countries the employment agency sector is dominated by a few 
large players; in the UK this is not the case.  Rather the sector is diverse, encompassing 
a large number of small firms, a few major players and a small number of well-known 
medium-sized agencies.  
The two largest temporary work agencies are Adecco and Manpower.  Adecco operates 
7000  offices  in  sixty  countries  and  has  a  worldwide  branch  workforce  of  37,000 
servicing up to 150,000 clients with 700,000 staff on assignment each day (Adecco 
Website, 18.2.08).  Manpower operates 4,400 branches in seventy three countries with a 
worldwide  branch  staff  of  30,000  that  placed  4.4  million  people  in  temporary, 
permanent  or  contract  positions  in  2006  (Manpower  website,  18.2.08).   These  two 
companies  dominate  the  worldwide  temporary  agency  work  market.   Both  market 
themselves as ethical employers with detailed corporate social responsibility policies 
(Adecco  website,  18.2.08,  Manpower  website,  18.2.08).   They  dominate  the  global 
temporary agency work market and Manpower's 4.4 million placements eclipses the 1.9 
million worldwide employees of the world’s largest company, Walmart.
The larger  companies  in  the  UK, including Manpower and Adecco,  have  sought  to 
distance  themselves  from less  reputable  agencies  where  there  have  been  significant 
reports  of  abuses.   They  have  undertaken  a  range  of  measures  including  signing 
recognition  agreements  with  various  trade  unions,  sponsoring  the  Trades  Union 
Congress (TUC) campaign to improve information about employment protection for 
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agency workers and directly employing agency workers to promote a respectable soft 
Human  Resources  (HR)  image  (Stanworth  and  Druker  2004,  Heery  et  al  2005). 
Nonetheless,  the  agency  sector  as  a  whole  is  vocally  opposed  to  ‘regulation  set’ 
minimum  employment  standards  and  the  UK  is  marked  out  from  its  European 
neighbours by its relative lack of regulation governing temporary work agencies and 
temporary agency work (Arrowsmith 2006).  
Current UK regulation of 'employment businesses'  covers firms supplying temporary 
agency  workers.  Legislation  regulating  the  sector  is  the  Employment  Agencies  Act 
1973,  and  the  Conduct  of  Employment  Agencies  and  Employment  Businesses 
Regulations  1976 & 2003 (amended).  Regulations  are  enforced by the Employment 
Agency  Standards  Inspectorate,  which  is  part  of  the  Department  for  Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. While these regulations offer neither definition of 
agency  workers,  nor  suggestion  of  employment  status  they  provide  some  basic 
standards with which agencies must comply. These include responsibility for health and 
safety,  restrictions on fees, guarantees of payment of wages irrespective of payment 
from user organisation, requirement to provide written details of placements amongst 
others.   Specific  provisions have been enacted to cover  some sectors of the agency 
workforce, such as modelling, HGV driving and agriculture. 
Adecco  and  Manpower  give  their  agency workers  employee  status,  albeit  on  ‘zero 
hours’ contracts.  This differentiates them from other agencies  as it protects the user 
organisation from becoming the legal employer and gives agency workers additional 
employment rights with the agency. 
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Compared  with  our  European  neighbours  the  agency  sector  in  the  UK  is  large, 
supplying 5% of the workforce. It encompasses a large number of small agencies, but is 
dominated by a small number of very large companies such as Adecco and Manpower.  
Legal protection for agency workers
The regulation of agency work is problematic within the UK. This section lays out the 
legal context in which agency workers and employers come to understand their rights 
and obligations.  It reviews the statute law and recent case law in the area of employee 
status. It concludes that in practice it is very challenging to determine whether a long-
term agency worker is likely to be considered an employee of the user organisation.  If 
employment tribunals struggle to determine with 'prefect predictability' the employment 
status of an agency worker what hope is there for workers and employers?
Rubery et al (2005) argue that employment and organisational relationships are shaped 
by  the  legal  context  and  that  the  legal  context  is  in  turn  shaped  by  organisational 
developments.  Despite the fact that a number of triangular employment relationships 
exist  in  contemporary  workplaces  the  legal  context  continues  to  see  long-term 
employment between a single employer and employee as the focus of regulation.  With 
few exceptions (such as TUPE and Health and Safety) there is little recognition of the 
changing forms of employment relationship. The growth of outsourcing and continued 
presence of agency work means that there are areas in which large numbers of workers 
are subject to control of non-employers, yet such workers rarely have the legal capacity 
to challenge decisions in these contexts. The law has as yet to recognise employment 
relationships that span organisational boundaries.
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The following section will first provide a brief outline of the regulation of agency work 
across the European Union. This is followed by a discussion of the legislative protection 
of agency workers within the UK including a discussion of case law. It is concluded by 
a discussion of the alternatives available for regulating agency work.
EU legal context
The  regulation  of  temporary  agency  work  across  the  European  Union  is  far  from 
uniform.  Agency workers are legally considered to be the employees of the agency in 
all European countries other than the UK and Ireland (Storrie 2002).  In Ireland the 
agency worker is considered an employee of the user organisation.  The UK is the only 
EU country  in  which  an  agency worker  is  considered  neither  the  employee  of  the 
agency  nor  the  user  organisation.   Arrowsmith  (2006)  notes  that  the  regulation  of 
temporary work generally has been a contentious issue at European level since the first 
directive was proposed in the area in 1982, and that the debates have intensified with 
the growth in temporary work.  Whilst agreement was reached in the area of fixed term 
contractors  in  1999  leading  to  the  Fixed  Term  Employees  (Prevention  of  Less 
Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 it was not until October 2008 that agreement 
was finally reached for a Directive on Temporary Agency Work (2008/104/EC). The 
concept of equal treatment for agency workers is more complex and difficult to regulate 
than for other workers because of their triangular employment relationship.  
Arrowsmith (2006) provides an overview of the regulation of temporary agency work in 
the European Union.  He offers a description of the positions of member states and then 
outlines the primary areas of statutory regulation as equal treatment, reasons for use, 
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limits on duration and sector/occupation restriction.  The UK is one of only four EU 
countries that regulate none of these areas.  Eleven of the EU15 have legislation in place 
to  ensure  some  kind  of  equal  treatment  between  agency  workers  and  permanent 
counterparts at the user organisation.  Equal treatment measures in these countries tend 
to revolve around either the requirement for them to be paid and/or treated equally with 
employees of the user organisation or with reference to having the terms of collective 
agreements applied equally to them.  The exception is Germany where agency workers 
are treated equally with permanent employees unless there is a collective agreement to 
the contrary.  
Legislative protection of agency workers in the UK
Davies  and  Freedland  (2007)  note  that  the  intention  of  the  successive  Labour 
governments between 1997 and 2007 was to pursue an agenda of managerial flexibility 
in their approach to labour law, in order to promote a policy of full employment and 
increased participation in the labour market.  With this policy objective in mind, the 
regulation of non-standard work presents particular difficulties.   The growth in new 
forms of employment outlined previously that may enhance business flexibility must be 
coupled with the government’s interests in widening participation in the labour market 
and protecting vulnerable workers.   The balance must  be struck between protecting 
workers  rights  in  the  workplace  set  against  minimising  the  regulatory  burden  on 
employers.  Dickens and Hall (2006) suggest that fairness and security do not have to be 
in  opposition  to  economic  efficiency  and  competitiveness,  and  that  the  Labour 
government  has increasingly sought  to  present  its  legislative changes in the area of 
employment law as pursuing complementary objectives of social justice and economic 
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efficiency.  This is exemplified by the announcement of additional rights for agency 
workers by John Hutton, Secretary of State for Business,  Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, when he said: 
“Today's agreement [on regulating agency work] achieves our twin objectives of  
flexibility for British employers and fairness for workers. It will give people a  
fair deal at work without putting their jobs at risk or cutting off a valuable route  
into employment” (Hall 2008)
Basic details of the deal were announced in a jointly agreed statement. The statement 
was careful in its use of terms and referred to workers rather than employees suggesting 
that agency workers are not to be considered 'employees' under the law after twelve 
weeks of a placement. While they may be entitled to equal treatment in many respects it 
appears unlikely that their employment status will be clarified by this legislation.  The 
Government has announced that it will seek to persuade the EU that the proposals are 
compatible with the proposed EU directive and if successful will attempt to introduce 
primary legislation in the autumn.  The transposition of the agreement into law is crucial 
to  the  employment  position  of  agency  workers.   It  will  determine  whether  agency 
workers will be defined in law as employees or workers and in which areas they are 
entitled to equal treatment, for example whether it is limited to pay and basic conditions 
or will include training and promotion opportunities. 
Rights at work for non-standard workers have been conferred in two main ways over 
the  last  decade.   Firstly  non-standard  workers  have  been  included  in  'mainstream' 
employment  legislation  where  it  has  been  enacted  to  cover  'workers'  rather  than 
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'employees'.  The National Minimum Wage Act and Working Time Regulations 1998 
introduced  the  new category  of  'worker'.   Davies  and  Freedland  (2007)  argue  that 
'worker'  is  an  intermediary  category,  recognising  that  some  working  people  were 
economically semi-dependant and that its application extends some limited protection to 
these  working  people  that  would  otherwise  fall  outside  the  scope  of  protective 
employment legislation.  The Employment Relations Act 1999 gave the government the 
power to vary the scope of other employment legislation i.e. to confer rights on workers 
rather than employees, however this power has not been exercised.  Secondly, specific 
legislation  originating  in  European  Community  directives  has  been  introduced  to 
achieve parity for certain types of non-standard workers.  Both part time workers (The 
Part Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000) and 
Fixed  Term Workers  (The  Fixed  Term Employees  (Prevention  of  Less  Favourable 
Treatment) regulations 2002) have been offered such protection.  These regulations have 
not been without criticism (see McColgan 2003 amongst others) particularly in relation 
to the restrictions to the parity principle and in the case of the fixed term regulations 
their restriction to the category of 'employees'.  However they have increased protection 
for some part time workers and fixed term employees.  The Directive on Temporary 
Agency Work was finally agreed by the European Parliament in October 2008 after 
many years of opposition of member states including vocal opposition from the UK 
(Davies and Freedland 2007).  
Within the current UK legislative framework some employment protection is offered to 
'workers', however "most key employment rights [are] conditioned upon the continual 
contractual  employment  relationship"  (Davies  and  Freedland  2007:  89).   If  agency 
workers are able to establish that they are indeed employees of either the agency or the 
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user organisation they gain access to additional employment rights including protection 
from unfair dismissal, the right to redundancy payment, the right to maternity, paternity 
leave and parental leave and emergency leave to deal with family crises, and the right to 
a statement of terms and conditions, amongst others.  However agency workers face a 
challenge in establishing their employment status.  Whilst it is clear that they legally fit 
within the categories of ‘worker’ (in relation to Working Time Regulations 1998 and the 
National Minimum Wage Act 1998 amongst others) and ‘employed person’ (in relation 
to discrimination legislation), whether they can be considered ‘employees’ is a matter of 
contention.  Legislation does not specify what the status of temporary agency workers 
should be;  rather it  is  left  to employment tribunals  to  determine employment status 
using common law tests.  UK courts have been reluctant to accept the existence of such 
employment relationships within the triangular relationship that agency workers have 
with their agencies and user organisations.  Case law in this area is complex and there 
appear to be conflicting authorities.  However there is agreement about the tests used to 
establish  whether  agency  workers  are  the  employees  of  the  agency  or  the  user 
organisation or not employees at all.  
The  legal  tests  were  intended  to  distinguish  between  economically  dependent 
employees and the genuinely self employed.  They are premised on the assumption of a 
singe employer and its relationship with individual employees.  Put simply to establish 
employee status an agency worker must prove that mutual obligations exist between 
themselves and their employer, that their employer has the power to direct them and 
control the work that they do, and that where a contract does not exist or does and states 
in writing that it is not a contract of employment that it is necessary to imply a contract 
to  reflect  the reality of the situation.  So,  the three key tests  currently in use to test 
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agency status are mutuality of obligation, control and the contractual test of necessity. 
Mutuality of obligation
Whilst  the  authorities  are  not  entirely  clear  about  the  precise  nature  of  the  mutual 
obligations that should be shown between and employee and their employer, they offer 
some guidance  as  laid  out  in  Cotswold  Developments  Construction  Ltd  v  Williams 
(2006).  Mutuality of obligation has two levels; the first is that the worker has to work 
and the employer has the obligation to pay them for doing so.  The second is that this 
arrangement must be an ongoing one with the employer offering promises to employ 
and the employee to be employed over time.  The mutuality of obligation test is most 
difficult  for  agency  workers  in  successive  short-term placements  because  they  will 
struggle to establish mutuality of obligation between placements where their contract 
with the agency is likely to explicitly state it has no obligation to provide work.  Such 
workers  may  attempt  to  suggest  that  there  is  an  over-arching,  umbrella  or  global 
contract that governs periods when they are not at work as well as those where they are, 
though  this  has  not  been  successfully  argued  at  employment  tribunal.   For  agency 
workers who are engaged on a single ongoing placement the problems associated with 
gaps in employment and the level of mutuality of obligation in such periods do not 
arise.   In most  cases,  agency workers have explicit  contracts with their  agency and 
generally no written contractual arrangement with the user organisation.  
Control
The control test rests on whether the organisation has the power to determine what work 
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should  be  done as  well  as  how, when and where  it  should  be  done (Ready Mixed 
Concrete (South East) Limited v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance, 1968). 
This test has been much criticised because it does not easily apply to workers that have 
a high degree of professional or occupational training or substantial discretion over the 
mode and location of work (Deakin and Morris 2006).  Nonetheless it has been invoked 
to argue that agency workers are employees of the user organisation.  This test presents 
agency workers with particular difficulty because the functions of the employer may be 
split between two employing organisations (the agency and the user organisation).  It 
can therefore be challenging to establish which organisation, if any, has control.  
Dacas v Brook Street Bureau (UK) Ltd (2004) is emphatic about the fact that the agency 
is  unlikely to  exhibit  sufficient  day to  day control  to  establish such a  contract.   In 
general, agency workers have tried to establish that it is the user organisation that has 
sufficient control to be the legal employer.  
The contractual test of necessity
Dacas (2004), confirmed by Cable & Wireless Plc v Muscat (2006), made it clear that it 
was necessary to look at the entire arrangements in determining whether there was a 
contract of employment rather than simply relying on the contractual documentation. 
Using this  approach,  employment tribunals  are  required  to  look beyond the  written 
contract  to  see  whether  they  contain  the  whole  bargain  between  workers  and  user 
organisations or whether it is necessary to imply a contract between agency workers and 
the user organisation because of their conduct.  Muscat (2006) identified that the agency 
worker was an employee because the express contractual arrangements did not reflect 
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the reality of the relationship between the worker and organisation and that therefore it 
was necessary to imply a contract of employment to reflect the reality of the situation. 
In  Muscat (2006) the court  found that the contractual position was a sham and was 
never truly born out by the actions of the parties. However, contracts may be implied 
where  the  parties  intend  the  arrangements  to  reflect  the  express  contract  but  their 
behaviour  over  time is  inconsistent  with the  express  contract.   James v. Greenwich 
Council (2006) sets  out  the  proper  way  tribunals  should  deal  with  the  question  of 
implied contracts focusing on limiting the circumstances where it may be necessary to 
imply a contract between the agency worker and the user.  
"If  there were no agency relationship regulating the position of these parties  
then the implication of a contract between the worker and the end user would be  
inevitable.   Work is  being  carried  out  for  payment  received  but  the  agency  
relationship alters matters in a fundamental way.  There is no longer a simple  
wage-work bargain between worker and end user."  (James 2006) 
The ruling in James (2006) suggests that the triangular relationship that agency workers 
have with their dual employers is likely to have the effect in most circumstances of 
denying them employee status.  The reason for this is twofold; firstly, the separation of 
employer function between two organisations changes the employment relationship and 
makes it difficult to identify an employer.  Secondly, the contract between the agency 
worker  and  the  agency,  as  well  as  the  contract  between  the  agency  and  user 
organisation, is likely to make it difficult for agency workers to establish that there is an 
implied contract between the worker and the user organisation, particularly in light of 
the guidance in James (2006): 
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"Provided  the  arrangements  are  genuine  and  the  actual  relationship  is  
consistent with them, it  is not then necessary to explain the provision of the  
worker's services or the fact of payment to the worker by some contract between  
the  end  user  and  the  worker,  even  if  such  a  contract  would  also  not  be  
inconsistent with the relationship." (James 2006) 
This ruling means that agency workers acting in accordance with the express contract 
between  themselves  and  their  agency  have  little  prospect  of  establishing  employee 
status with the user organisation even if it would be consistent with the relationship that 
agency workers had with the user organisation to imply a contract of employment.  It is 
not  sufficient  for  an  employment  relationship  to  be  consistent  with  the  relationship 
between the  user  organisation  and agency  worker,  it  must  be  necessary  to  imply  a 
contract because of the behaviour of the parties.  This ruling relies on Mitsui and Co Ltd  
v Novorossiysk Shipping Co.  (The Gudermes) (1993) by Staughton LJ when he said:
"It is not enough to show that the parties have done something more than, or  
different from, what they were already bound to do under obligations owed to 
others.  What they do must be consistent only with there being a new contract  
implied, and inconsistent with there being no such contract." 
The principle of necessity reduces the number of agency workers who will be able to 
claim  employee  status  because  if  the  contractual  agreements  between  workers  and 
agencies;  and  agencies  and  user  organisation,  reflect  the  nature  of  the  relationship 
between  workers  and  user  organisations  then  it  will  be  difficult  for  employment 
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tribunals to justify implying a contract of employment.  
The Employment Appeal Tribunal ruling in  James (2006) has been confirmed by the 
Court  of  Appeal  which has  ruled  that  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  Dacas  (2004) and 
Muscat (2006).  All three cases identify that for an agency worker to claim employee 
status  with  a  user  organisation  in  circumstance  where  there  is  an  express  contract 
denying employee status they must show that the real relationship is inconsistent with 
the  express  contract  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  imply  a  contract  of  employment  to 
properly reflect the reality of the situation.  
Case law
Some courts have implied contracts of employment between agency workers and user 
organisations as a mechanism for granting further rights.  In doing so, they pinpoint the 
user  organisation  as  the  bearer  of  employment  obligations  to  workers  who  may 
otherwise find themselves without employment protection.  That said, in the most recent 
case,  James (2006),  the  Employment Appeals Tribunal  decided that  there were  few 
circumstances where agency workers could be said to be the employees of the user 
organisation and that the case before it was not one of these.  They went on to say that:
“Many agency workers are highly vulnerable and need to be protected from the  
abuse of economic power by the end users.  The common law can only tinker with 
the problem on the margins.   That  is  not  to  say that  all  agency relationships  
simply have as their objective to defeat the rights of  the workers...   A careful  
analysis of both the problems and the solutions, with legislative protection where 
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necessary, is urgently required.” 
In  James  v  London  Borough of  Greenwich (2008) the  Court  of  Appeal  upheld  the 
decision that James was not an employee of the user organisation.  The Court of Appeal 
commented  that  it  is  not  always  possible  to  predict  with  certainty  whether  an 
employment tribunal will find a contract of employment between an agency worker and 
a user organisation, and that the nature of the judgement that the tribunal has to make 
“allows  for  a  degree  of  latitude  without  falling  into  legal  error”.   The  question  of 
employment status of agency workers is a mixed question of fact and law.  The Court of 
Appeal reminds us that appeals on this point must be confined to questions of law, and 
that “appellate bodies must not interfere with a decision of an ET that a worker is or is 
not an employee simply on the ground that it would not have decided the point that 
way.”
James  (2008)  appears  to  have  far-reaching  implications  for  agency  workers  in  two 
areas.   Firstly,  it  appears  to  reduce  the  number  of  agency  workers  that  may  be 
considered employees of the user organisation.   Secondly, the guidance to appellate 
courts appears to suggest that two tribunals sitting with identical facts on a case may 
reach opposite conclusions as to the employee status of an agency worker and it would 
be difficult to overturn either judgement on appeal as both would potentially be legally 
sound.  This means that the employment status of agency workers remains unclear in 
light of the judgement in James (2008).
The rulings in relation to Dacas (2004) and James (2008) are both of interest in relation 
to this thesis for two reasons.  The first is that both relate to agency workers engaged by 
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Local authority Social Care Departments and as such the workers worked in a similar 
setting  to  those  interviewed  for  this  research.   Secondly,  the  judgements  cast  very 
different lights on the employment status of the agency workers interviewed.  So whilst 
some of the agency workers interviewed may have been considered employees on the 
guidance offered by Dacas (2004), it is now highly unlikely they would be following the 
guidance in James (2006).  
If an agency worker is able to establish that they are indeed an employee they face the 
additional hurdle of establishing when they became an employee.  This is important 
because the right to claim unfair dismissal has a twelve month qualifying period so 
whilst an agency worker may establish that they were an employee at the end of their 
placement, when they became so will determine whether they are able to claim that they 
have been unfairly dismissed.  Royal National Lifeboat Institution v Bushaway (2005) 
tells us that the claimant was an employee from day one, and in  Dacas (2004) Lord 
Justice Sedley concluded that after twelve months a contract of employment would have 
arisen between an agency worker and the user organisation.  In contrast  James (2006) 
contends that the passage of time alone will not give rise to employee status.  So agency 
workers face not only difficulty in establishing  whether they are employees but also 
when they became employees before accessing some employment rights.  
Discussion
The lack of clarity in case law means that employment tribunals may have difficulty in 
establishing  whether  agency  workers  are  the  employees  of  the  agency  or  the  user 
organisation.  Employers and agency workers themselves have even greater difficulty in 
determining  the  legal  standing  of  their  relationship.   In  a  recent  response  to  the 
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consultation on agency workers public sector employers noted the uncertainty around 
agency worker status and pressed the government to clarify the position (BERR 2007).  
Agency  workers  are  treated  as  employees  for  PAYE purposes  but  nonetheless  are 
excluded from much protective  employment  legislation.   Whilst  a  small  number  of 
agency workers have successfully established employee status, they are the exception 
rather than the rule.  Following James (2006) it seems agency workers will face more 
challenges in the future in establishing that they are employees.  Agency workers often 
face working conditions that include poor pay, insecurity and intermittent work, despite 
the  important  role  that  they  plan  in  the  flexible  economy they  posses  none  of  the 
security attached to employee status (Wynn and Leighton 2006: 302).   Nonetheless, 
such  workers  do  have  some  employment  rights  in  relation  to  health  and  safety, 
discrimination, working time, holiday pay and state benefits such as maternity pay and 
statutory sick pay.  The problem with regard to these rights for agency workers is that 
they can be difficult for them to claim (Stanworth and Druker 2004). These workers 
have no protection from unfair dismissal, and making a complaint about one of these 
rights  when  they  are  dependant  on  an  employer  to  provide  future  work  may  be 
problematic. 
Whilst a minority of agency workers have contracts of employment with their agency, 
such  as  those  working  for  Adecco  and  Manpower,  the  additional  benefits  of  their 
employee status might not assist them in practice.  The Information and Consultation 
regulations provide an example of this;  they may give workers the ability to access 
information  and  consultation  with  their  legal  employer,  should  they  have  one.  For 
employees  of  Adecco  and  Manpower  these  rights  would  give  them  access  to 
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information  and  consultation  with  the  agency,  but  no  rights  with  the  workplace 
employer, even if they had been on placement with them for a matter of years. For 
subcontracted workers and agency workers the user organisation or client is likely to 
make the decisions about their continued employment but the regulations only extend to 
voice measures in the legal employer.  Even where they are covered by legislation, it 
can be challenging for  agency workers  to  access  their  statutory  rights;  for  example 
agency workers are entitled to be represented at grievance and disciplinary hearings. 
The ACAS code of practice for grievance and discipline suggests representation should 
be  by a  union recognised in  the  workplace  however,  there  may be  different  unions 
recognised  by  the  agency  and  user  organisation  and  it  may  not  be  clear  whether 
grievance and disciplinary issues are handled by the agency or user organisation.  These 
practical difficulties are typical of the triangular employment relationship that agency 
workers have with their employers and such matters are not easily overcome.
Present legislation is based on the assumption of direct employment and standard full 
time work.  The need to regulate new forms of employment has come from both the 
growth in different forms of employment like fixed term working, temporary agency 
arrangements and other 'semi-dependant' forms of self employment and also the rigidity 
of the scope of current employment legislation.  The Supiot report (2001) recognised the 
development of workers who are not wage dependant in the traditional sense but that 
are nonetheless financially dependant on an organisation.  It suggests that European law 
may have a role to play in formulating basic rules to ensure  basic protection for all 
financially dependent workers.  The rationale for this is based on an understanding of 
the purpose of labour law as ensuring social cohesion and to prevent a gulf forming 
between “employees protected under contract and persons working under other kinds of 
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arrangements that afford less protection”.  The report recognises the necessity for labour 
law to accommodate the changing forms of work organisation in order to achieve its 
purpose.  
Freedland (2003) argues that the concept of a single class of wage dependant employees 
has always been problematic but that it has been even more so with the changing forms 
of  employment from the mid 1970s.   The division between the employed and self-
employed in law is conceptually problematic because it is difficult to establish a clear 
boundary.  Freedland (2003) discusses the concept of the semi-dependant worker, that is 
workers that are currently not accepted as employees because they lack the required 
level  of  'mutuality  of  obligation'  to  give  rise  to  a  contract  of  employment  and  the 
additional  difficulties  faced  by  agency  workers  because  of  the  non  traditional 
multilateral  employment  relationships  that  they  have.   The  division  of  traditional 
employer functions over more than one organisation poses difficulties in ensuring that 
such workers have basic employment protection.  Both Freedland (2003) and Davies 
and  Freedland  (2007)  argue  that  mechanisms  exist  for  extending  protection  in 
multilateral employment relationships but that because of the fragmented nature of UK 
employment legislation would mean major statutory redrafting to divide responsibility. 
Both authors argue that the concepts of ‘employee’ and ‘worker’ are outdated and need 
to be replaced by an overarching 'personal employment contract'.  This concept would 
include workers that are currently not identified as employees but that are none the less 
semi-dependant  labour.  Such a  concept  could be used in labour law to redraw the 
boundary between the self-employed and employees in a way that reflects dependant, 
semi-dependant and independent employment positions more fairly.
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For agency workers, Davidov (2004) notes four options that are available in relation to 
employment status; temporary agency workers could be the employees of the agency, 
the user organisation, neither or both.  As previously discussed, examples of workers 
being employees of the agency, the user organisation and neither exist across the EU. 
Davidov (2004) argues that  the UK is  unique because of the absence of systematic 
legislation to prevent employers from avoiding responsibility for their  workforce by 
using temporary work agencies.  Nonetheless, he argues that there are problems with the 
alternative approaches available.  As previously mentioned, in the majority of the EU 
countries  agency  workers  are  considered  employees  of  the  agency.   Where  agency 
workers engage in frequent successive placements lasting only a few days each they 
will normally experience more enduring relationships with the agency than with any 
user  organisation.   In  such  cases,  a  worker  will  be  economically  dependant  on  the 
agency because it is the agency that will decide whether she is offered future placements 
when one has ended.  In these cases, taking the user organisation as the employer means 
that  workers  will  normally lack the service to gain many employment rights  and it 
ignores  the fact  that  workers may have a  longer  term relationship with the  agency. 
Taking the agency as the employer recognises the economic dependence and may allow 
such agency workers  to  amass  sufficient  service  for  some rights  and  potentially  to 
bargain collectively with the agency.  Davidov (2004) notes that increasingly agency 
workers are used by user employers for longer periods.  Where agency workers remain 
in a single placement for an extended period rights with the user organisation become 
more relevant.  It will be the user organisation rather than the agency that determines the 
duration of placement, the terms and conditions of employment, how work is done and 
the user organisation will have a strong influence on pay level.  Without the benefit of 
employee  status  with  the  user  organisation  agency  workers  will  be  without  the 
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protection  of  employment  legislation  in  relation  to  the  user  organisation.   Davidov 
(2004) argues that employers are increasingly using long-term agency labour precisely 
because it allows them to escape legal responsibility for these workers.  For agency 
workers  who  work  in  successive  short-term  placements,  employee  status  with  the 
agency  is  helpful,  however  with  the  increasing  use  of  long-term  agency  workers, 
employee  status  with  the  user  organisation  could  provide  workers  with  additional 
employment protection and voice mechanisms.  In the context of varied relationships 
between  agencies,  workers  and  user  organisation  employer  responsibility  is  most 
appropriately borne jointly rather than by one party of the other (Davidov 2004).  Rather 
than dividing areas of responsibility between the agency and the user organisation as 
Deakin (2001) does, Davidov (2004) suggests that across the board both the user and 
agency should be responsible.  
Davidov (2004), Freedland (2003), Deakin (2001) and Davies (2007) all conclude that 
the present state of UK labour law offers little protection to workers with triangular 
employment relationships.  They argue that greater consideration needs to be given to 
the  boundaries  between self  employment  and employment  for  dependant  and  semi-
dependant  workers,  including  those  that  have  triangular  or  multilateral  employment 
relationships.   All  three  authors  argue  that  a  joint  employer  solution  is  required  to 
remedy  the  difficulties  faced  by  workers  who  experience  multifaceted  employment 
arrangements.   Davies  (2007)  points  out  that  some  employment  legislation  already 
divides responsibility for workers across more than one organisation, like in the case of 
health and safety or discrimination, and that such provisions would enhance protection 
if extended to other areas of employment law.  
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Davidov  (2004)  argues  that  user  organisations  use  agency  workers  to  avoid  legal 
responsibility for their staff as agency workers are used to undercut directly employed 
staff  by  creating  a  lesser  class  of  workers  with  poorer  pay  and  conditions  of 
employment.  Such workers, he argues, present less of a threat to directly employed 
staff and as such to productivity and cooperation, because of their obviously inferior 
status.  He also argues that some firms employ agency workers to avoid legislation that 
applies  only  to  companies  with  over  a  fixed  number  of  employees,  where  agency 
workers are employees of the agency they will not count towards this number.  
While it is clear that the legal status and position of agency workers is important, it is 
possible to overestimate its importance to employers' labour use strategies.  Dickens 
(2004)  notes  that  strict  regulation of  standard employment  may provide  part  of  the 
explanation  for  changes  in  the  employment  relationship  as  employers  create  jobs 
outside the scope of protective legislation.  Rather than a desire for flexibility being the 
only driver towards greater use of atypical workers Dickens (2004) suggests that some 
employers use atypical workers because there are cost and other advantages that they 
accrue from these workers being excluded from some legal and social protection.  She 
argues  however  that,  whilst  labour  regulation  may help  to  shape  employer  strategy 
towards non-standard work more broadly, it is possible to overestimate the impact.  She 
cites the example of part time work, and the fact that there was no decrease in the level 
of part time work in the UK with the extension of mainstream employment legislation 
to part time workers (Dickens 2004).  Whilst legal factors appear to influence changing 
forms of employment they are only one of a number of influences both internal and 
external to the organisation.  The next section moves on to consider the drivers to the 
use of agency workers. 
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Why employers use atypical workers 
How agency workers are deployed and why they are used by employers is an important 
issue  because  it  determines  part  of  the  employers’ response  to  proposed  legislative 
change.  Atkinson (1995) argued that there would be increasing use of the flexible firm 
model with a core of workers on standard contracts and a periphery of non-standard 
workers that were strategically deployed to maximise productivity and in some cases 
reduce unionisation and union influence.  Traditionally, agency workers tended to be 
used to cover absence and to manage peaks in workload though some authors have 
argued  that  increasingly  agency  workers  are  found  in  roles  previously  done  by 
permanent  staff  and  that  new  reasons  for  using  agency  workers  are  increasingly 
important.  
Hunter et al (1993, see Fig 2.4) provide a review of the employer labour use survey 
(ELUS)  conducted  in  1987  supplemented  by  forty  case  studies.   They  review  the 
reasons  that  employers  choose  to  use  flexible  labour.   They  use  the  three  ELUS 
categories  for  rationales,  'traditional'  which incorporated usage for  short-term cover, 
'supply-side'  which  reflected  the  desire  of  employees  and  'new'  which  included 
employers responding to labour market uncertainty.  
Fig 2.4 Employers reasons for agency use
Reasons Part Time Temporary Agency 
Temporary
Self Employed
Traditional 81 78 89 73
Supply Side 16 1 6 14
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New 3 21 5 13
Hunter et al (1993)
Hunter et al (1993) found that across the board traditional rationales were cited as the 
reason for the use of non-standard workers and that agency workers were the most 
likely to be used for traditional reasons.  They note that the largest establishments and 
SME's are most likely to cite new reasons for the use of agency workers.  They found 
that  employers  for  the  most  part  did  not  have  strategies  with  only  1/3  of  survey 
respondents  suggesting  that  they had  a  strategy for  the  use  of  non-standard  labour. 
Rather most workplaces used such labour reactively.  With regard to the flexible firm 
model 1/9 of all respondents self reported that they divided their workforce into core 
and  periphery.   Hunter  et  al  (1993)  suggest  that  ELUS overestimates  the  extent  of 
strategic use of non-standard workers.  On the basis of their case studies they found 
little strategy in respect of manpower utilisation and little consideration of the staffing 
options  available.   They  also  found  little  evidence  of  differentiated  manpower 
management  techniques  for  core  and  peripheral  staff.   They  note  some  limited 
interaction  between  the  use  of  non-standard  workers  and  business  strategy  where 
pressure prompted employers to reduce labour costs or headcount or where employers 
tried to protect core workers from extreme fluctuations with the use of a periphery of 
non-standard workers.  
Hunter et al (1993) found that in local authorities agency workers and self-employed 
contractors were used to cover emergency gaps and in posts that could not be filled or 
where  there  were  recruitment  difficulties  because  of  the  rate  of  public  sector  pay. 
Temporary workers  were used  where future funding  was uncertain  or  in  relation  to 
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approaching compulsory competitive tendering.  They argued that spending constraints 
and compulsory competitive tendering were likely to be a feature of the public sector 
for the future and to affect decisions of manpower planning.  The next chapter will point 
to the way that funding pressure in the public sector has continued and the pressures that 
it has placed on staffing.
Stanworth and Druker (2006) provide a more recent review of rationales for the use of 
agency workers.  Based on in depth interviews within twelve companies they examine 
whether  there  has  been  a  radical  change  in  the  reasons  offered  for  using  agency 
workers.  They analyse the use of agency workers on two dimensions; whether their use 
is planned or ad hoc, and whether they supplement or substitute for permanent staff. 
They found a variety of practice across their case studies from 'traditional' agency users 
that tended to be ad hoc, using agency workers only intermittently, while other firms 
had moved towards a planned and in two cases procurement cost driven approach to use 
of agency workers.  They noted that several of their case studies were or had moved 
from supplementation towards substitution in their use of agency workers for a variety 
of reasons including as a buffer against uncertainty, because of resource constraints and 
because of headcount limitations.  They suggest that in contrast to the historical picture 
of agency work as a short-term manpower solution a number of their case studies were 
using agency workers in very long-term placements.  A contrast to the move towards 
substitution and long-term use was provided by several of their case studies who were 
committed to minimising the use of agency workers within their organisations.  They 
suggest  that  traditional  use  of  agency  labour  for  short-term  cover  and  to  meet 
fluctuations in demand are still important, however that in some sectors there has been a 
radical shift to planned use of long-term agency workers in roles previously carried out 
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by permanent employees.  
Purcell et al (2004) identified that while in the labour market as a whole agency workers 
tend to be used for traditional reasons such as short-term cover however within their 
study of the healthcare and IT sectors they found employers substituting agency workers 
for directly employed staff as part of a medium to long-term strategy.
There is evidence of the use of agency workers for both 'traditional' and 'new' reasons. 
Research shows increasing use of agency workers to substitute for permanent staff. This 
is likely to have implications for the response of employers to increased regulation in 
the area of agency work, and for the nature of agency roles which will be discussed in 
the following section. 
Understanding agency work
Agency  work  falls  within  the  ambit  of  non-standard  employment,  a  diverse  and 
heterogeneous category covering anything from part time permanent workers to fixed 
term employees,  home workers,  casual  workers  and agency staff.   McGovern  et  al 
(2004) argue that “the growth of non-standard forms of employment has fuelled the 
spread of bad jobs”. Other authors (e.g. Purcell and Cam 2002) have argued that there is 
little doubt that agency work has in the main offered workers less desirable terms and 
conditions  than  their  permanent  counterparts.   They  identify  the  lower  levels  of 
earnings,  less  job  security,  lower  union  representation  and  less  access  to  collective 
bargaining. 
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It has already been noted that the composition of the agency workforce is diverse.  This 
diversity  carries  through  to  the  reasons  that  agency  workers  themselves  gave  for 
undertaking agency work.  Whilst there is little detailed UK research into why agency 
workers select  agency working,  BERR (2008)  indicates  that  around 60% of agency 
workers would prefer a permanent job. 
A number of authors (see amongst others Guest 2004, Forde and Slater 2005, Davidov 
2004,  Dickens  2004)  refer  to  two groups of  agency workers;  one  being typified as 
vulnerable workers who are poorly paid with little access to training and no job security, 
and the other being described as 'free' knowledge workers with boundary-less careers. 
Whilst these categories are not always portrayed as exact and separate, analysis and 
discussion  often  centres  around  the  assumptions  that  workers  fit  in  one  of  the 
categories.  Even in sectors like social care and IT where both groups coexist research 
tends to focus on one group or the other.  Concern from the trade union movement 
focuses on lower level precarious jobs and issues of low pay, exploitation and insecurity 
(TUC 2007,  Unison 2007, CWU 2007).   The European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) (2005) argues that “compared to all other forms of employment, temporary 
agency  work  has  the  worst  record  for  working  conditions,  judged  on  a  number  of 
indicators”.  They argue that agency workers have less control over the work that they 
do, receive less training, are less well informed about safety and have more accidents at 
work, experience less job security and in general receive lower wages.  A number of 
authors also note areas of disadvantage such as low pay, economic insecurity, lack of 
access  to  training  and  career  development,  and  inferior  conditions  compared  with 
employees  (Stanworth  and  Druker  2004,  Heery  et  al  2004).   In  contrast  the 
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Confederation  of  British  Industry  (2001)  and  the  Recruitment  and  Employment 
Confederation (REC) (2002) argue that up to 60% of agency workers earn more than 
their  permanent  counterparts,  and  that  agency  work  acts  as  a  bridge  to  permanent 
employment. 
There has been limited UK research into the experience of agency work across the 
occupational spectrum with authors focusing on IT (Stanworth and Druker 2004, Purcell 
et al. 2004), nursing (Tailby 2005, Purcell et al. 2004) and recently social work (Hoque 
and  Kirkpatrick  2006).   Whilst  these  occupations  may  not  all  bring  to  mind  the 
entrepreneurial highly mobile and highly paid individuals described as 'free workers' or 
'free agents', they are all areas in which there have been tight labour markets requiring 
workers with professional qualifications or otherwise highly skilled workers.   These 
authors all  identified drawbacks with agency working even for 'knowledge'  workers 
suck as lack of benefits including sick pay, pensions and holiday entitlement, variable 
access  to  training  and  the  possibility  of  being  an  agency  worker  damaging  future 
promotion prospects.  
The  TUC  Commission  on  Vulnerable  Employment  (2008)  reported  on  vulnerable 
workers, the issues that they face and the steps that could be taken to assist them. They 
define vulnerable work as “precarious work that places people at  risk of continuing 
poverty and injustice resulting from an imbalance of power in the employer-worker 
relationship”.  This definition of vulnerable work means that many agency jobs would 
be described as vulnerable, including some in this study.  This is the image of agency 
work that is often discussed by trade unions and policy makers and portrayed by the 
media. What follows is a discussion of the position of agency workers within the UK.
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Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2003) reviewed Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 
data to consider the implications of non-standard working on access to training and 
development  in  the  workplace  and  consultation.   They  review  the  aforementioned 
arguments with respect to the potential for some workers escaping the drawbacks of 
non-standard  working  because  of  their  labour  market  position  and valued  skills  set 
against the arguments that such workers still experience the marginalisation related to 
non-standard work.  In terms of training, development and consultation they point to 
three  factors  that  are  cited  as  reasons  that  non-standard  workers  may  experience 
marginalisation.  Firstly, because managers adopt an instrumental approach, minimising 
investment in non-standard workers, and secondly, management decision making can be 
influenced  by  stereotypes  of  non-standard  workers  as  less  committed  and  reliable. 
Finally  the  practical  difficulties  with managing non-standard employees  can  present 
difficulties and add to their experience of marginalisation.  Their findings indicated that 
professional  and  managerial  non-standard  workers  find  it  more  difficult  to  access 
training and development and find it more difficult to access workplace consultative 
arrangements.  They note that the effect is particularly strong for female non-standard 
workers  with  respect  to  training  and  development,  while  for  some male  temporary 
workers it is almost negligible.  
While in general Stanworth and Druker (2004) found that disadvantaged groups were 
unlikely to gain access to the labour market through agencies, they did find them able to 
successfully sell the skills of older workers facilitating re-entry to the labour market for 
this group.
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While  for  many  workers  agency  work  is  taken  because  they  are  unable  to  find 
permanent jobs, this in not always the case.  For some people agency work is chosen as 
an alternative allowing flexibility and occasionally higher levels of pay.  Stanworth and 
Druker  (2004:  67)  argue  that  "the  element  of  respectability  and  choice  offered  by 
tempting work must  be set  against  the price paid at  one and the same time by the 
interviewees, in terms of the transitory nature of the assignment, the marginal position 
in their assigned firms, their lack of employment rights and generally poor pay levels."
Even where agency work has acted as an aid to re-entering the labour market it does so 
on  a  “disadvantaged  basis  compared  to  conventional  employees."  (Stanworth  and 
Druker 2004: 68).  It generally offers poor pay, little training, few benefits and very 
little opportunity for career advancement but it  does offer an entrance back into the 
labour market.   For agency workers,  their  precarious employment status gives them 
very little capacity to challenge the decisions of the hiring organisation and they are 
unlikely to be supported by a trade union as even where trade unions recruit agency 
workers, few are members.  (Druker and Stanworth 2001: 75) 
Tailby (2005) reviewed the position of agency (bank) nurses within the NHS based 
upon published survey data and case study based interview data.  She notes that agency 
work can be taken as a primary or secondary job and that 57% of nurses registered with 
agencies had no other nursing job.  She notes that Bank nurses may be able to more 
easily manage their non-work commitments than if they were engaged on a part time 
contract but that there are also significant disadvantages.  She suggests that, although 
pay rates may compare favourably, agency or bank nursing as a primary job is insecure, 
lacking in employment protection, and that workers may enjoy fewer benefits and less 
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training.  For staff taking on additional shifts through the bank or agency it offered the 
ability to supplement earnings, or work additional hours that suited the individuals non 
work  commitments.   Tailby  (2005)  notes  that  none of  her  interviewees  would  take 
agency-only nursing employment by choice because of the disadvantages of doing so.  
Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) consider the growth of agency work within professional 
roles in the public sector and look at the extent to which the growth is linked to the 'free 
agent perspective'.  Their research is based upon twenty eight interviews with agency 
social workers, Unison, BASW and social work and agency managers.  They recognise 
that the scarcity of qualified social workers in the labour market has generated a pull 
towards agency work.  Agency workers and managers in their study identified that they 
could be paid up to £5000 more per year than an equivalent directly employed social 
worker.  Their  respondents also noted the other benefits  of agency working such as 
being  able  to  build  up  varied  skills  and  being  able  to  flexibly  manage  work 
commitments.  Despite the advantages of agency work Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) 
found that their respondents did not see it as a long-term career option.  Like the agency 
nurses in Tailby's study (2005) there was a perception that permanent contracts were 
better despite the financial advantages of agency work.  The benefits of permanent work 
such  as  access  to  pension  schemes,  sick  pay,  service  related  additional  holiday 
entitlement  and  assistance  with  childcare  that  did  not  apply  to  agency  work  made 
workers question whether they were financially better off as agency workers.  
Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) identify the experience of marginalisation affecting some 
agency  workers  in  relation  to  access  to  training,  supervision,  workplace  support 
networks  and  that  many  agency  social  workers  reported  being  assigned  the  most 
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unpleasant work.  They identify that some of these difficulties may be remedied by 
agencies, though their informants suggested that “agencies were opportunistic, seeking 
to charge the highest fee possible while offering only minimal support.” (Hoque and 
Kirkpatrick 2006: 658).  They argue that some support was offered for the 'free agent' 
perspective as a draw to agency work for social workers; however they also identify 
factors pushing social workers away from permanent contracts.  The division of social 
work into specialisms where workers focus on a particular client group served to push 
new  social  workers  towards  agency  work  so  that  they  are  able  to  access  varied 
experience.  They argue that some agency social workers use agency work to escape the 
bureaucratic  rigidities  of  organisational  life  in  the  local  government  sector  where 
changing specialisms as a permanent employee is difficult.   They suggest that some 
agency workers use agency work to broaden their skill base.  They further argue that 
agency work is used as an escape when organisational demands become too great with 
workers being aware that they can exit the user organisation very quickly.  They suggest 
that some workers also use agency status as a mechanism to maintain distance between 
themselves and the user organisation.  Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) found that the 'free 
agent' perspective does not comprehensively explain the reasons for people becoming 
agency workers; they point to the degradation of permanent employment in a variety of 
settings and find that it is a factor pushing people to move to agency work.
Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002) looked at temporary jobs in Britain and consider 
whether  they  are  stepping  stones  to  permanent  employment  or  traps  into  which 
individuals fall.  They found that temporary jobs generally paid less, offer less work 
related training and in some areas were less satisfying.  They found that male workers 
suffered a 5% wage loss when starting in a fixed term contract,  while women fully 
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caught up with their comparators that had always had permanent contracts.  The wage 
differential was even starker for casual and seasonal work, even after ten years of full 
time experience there was a wage penalty of 12.3% for men and 8.8% for women who 
had held just one casual or seasonal job.  They conclude that fixed term contracts but 
not casual or seasonal employment, acted as a stepping stone to permanent work.  
Gray (2002) reviews the use of agency work as a bridge to employment for unemployed 
people.  She reports on data from interviews with job seekers, temporary work agencies, 
and job centre and job club staff.  She found that agency workers were sometimes used 
to cut payroll costs, to minimise recruitment lead time and cost, to reduce the need to 
train staff, to evade protective employment legislation, and to provide a buffer to protect 
permanent employees.  She found that agencies were willing to register and place job 
seekers who were unemployed, though some barriers existed in places that presented 
issues for certain types of workers.  She noted barriers were in place in some agencies 
for candidates with 'cockney', 'foreign', or 'black British' accents, particularly in respect 
of central  London office jobs, while other agencies tried to persuade their clients to 
consider workers on their 'real merits', rather than race or class.  She notes the business 
imperative for some agencies to practice good equal opportunities policies in light of 
labour  shortages  in  the  London region  and identified  one  that  offered  a  course  for 
migrant  workers  with  poor  English  but  others  that  turned  away  workers  with  poor 
English language skills.  Her findings suggest that agencies can assist some groups of 
'disadvantaged'  workers  such  as  those  with  criminal  records  or  the  long-term 
unemployed, and by withholding the home address of workers they can prevent those 
workers living in poor or disreputable neighbourhoods from discrimination.  She also 
found evidence of agencies promoting older candidates to users but “deplorably little 
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interest in helping candidates with disabilities” (Gray 2002: 669).  She argues that for 
some workers agency work offers easier access to some roles than direct recruitment. 
She suggests that this is primarily the case where there is a shortage of candidates and it 
is in the agencies interests to downplay or conceal factors like work history or age, and 
to resist  race discrimination by clients.  She argues that where competition between 
agencies and job seekers is fierce wages are driven down and work is characterised by 
poor pay and conditions but that in other areas agency work can provide workers with 
higher  pay  than  permanent  staff  and  offer  an  easier  route  into  employment  for 
unemployed people.
Forde and Slater (2005) reviewed the idea of agency work being a bridge to permanent 
employment using Labour Force Survey data.   They found 48% of  the sample had 
moved to permanent work, while 38% remained in temporary employment, 7% became 
unemployed and 7% left the labour force.  Less than half of all agency workers in the 
study made the transition from agency work to permanent work.  
Forde and Slater (2005) offer the most comprehensive quantitative review of agency 
work in the UK using the Labour Force Survey, looking at the characteristics of agency 
work and its consequences.  They found that 51% of agency workers were female, a 
relativity high proportion were between 16 and 24, and over 25% were recent labour 
market entrants.  In terms of occupation, 66% of agency jobs were found in secretarial 
or routine operative jobs, in contrast 'knowledge workers' made up a very small number 
of agency jobs.  Public sector professional workers are three to three and a half times 
more likely to be agency workers than sales workers (the base group in the study) but 
knowledge workers outside the public sector are less likely to be agency workers.  They 
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found the strongest links between agency work and low paid occupations as well as 
public sector occupations.  They paint a picture of agency work dominated by low pay, 
little choice and limited ability to move from agency work to permanent roles.  They 
identify that where agency jobs are taken involuntarily (because there are no other jobs 
or because they are the best available jobs) they are the most problematic with workers 
receiving the lowest pay.
The US literature around contingent  working and particularly  contracting or  agency 
work is more developed.  It is important to note the key differences between the UK and 
US systems before delving into this literature.  The differences between the provision of 
social welfare in the UK and US contexts affect the experience of insecurity. While 
within  the  UK  health  care  is  provided  by  the  state,  within  the  US  employers  are 
responsible for providing their permanent workers with it and other legally proscribed 
benefits. This means that the consequences of job insecurity for US workers are more 
far-reaching than their UK counterparts.
Kunda et al (2002) bring together the two opposing views on contractors and agency 
workers,  contrasting  the  'employment  relations'  and  'free  agent'  perspectives.   The 
employment relations thinkers,  they suggest,  see agency work as exploitative and a 
social problem with workers receiving fewer benefits and lower pay.  They warn that 
contingent employment exacerbates economic insecurity by lowering wages, abetting 
discrimination, eliminating access to benefits, undermining opportunities for collective 
action, and, ultimately, exposing people more directly to the whims of employers and 
the ravages of economic cycles” (Kunda et al 2002: 255).  Research in this area has 
largely been focused on the low paid end of agency work and contracting with workers 
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describing an array of problems and few benefits.   In  stark contrast,  the free agent 
perspective views agency work from the experience of highly skilled contractors.  They 
argue that entrepreneurial individuals are able to 'recapture' some of their previously lost 
surplus  value  from  their  employers  by  working  independently  or  as  agency 
workers/contractors.  “Free agents, they claim, have more autonomy, accumulate more 
wealth, and enjoy a more holistic lifestyle than employees” (Kunda et al 2002: 255) 
Kunda et al (2002) argue that neither perspective is sufficient to understand the diverse 
range of contractors because each focuses primarily on one type of worker and that even 
within these confines they do not explain the diverse experiences of these workers fully. 
In their  study on high skilled technical workers,  they found considerable difficulties 
with both the employment relations and free agent understanding of agency workers. 
They found that workers selected agency status for a variety of reasons and that workers 
had divergent experiences of work that were not captured by either perspective.  Some 
of the drawbacks of agency work which are acknowledged in relation to vulnerable 
workers  are  also  cited  by  the  highly  skilled  workers  in  Kunda's  (2002)  study;  for 
example insecurity, particularly in relation to access to healthcare and other employment 
related benefits and lack of access to company provided training.  
The UK and US literature seems to agree that the opposing views of agency workers as 
vulnerable on the one hand and privileged on the other does not paint a realistic picture 
of agency work in general.  Each provides a caricature of agency workers presenting 
them on the one hand as  victims bereft  of  the advantages of a  typical  employment 
relationship  and  on  the  other  as  opportunistic,  entrepreneurial  individuals  taking 
advantage of tight labour markets.  The literature does not present a nuanced view about 
how these workers differ and what affects their different experiences of agency work.  
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Summary
This section has provided an introduction to the literature related to the first two themes. 
It introduces the location of agency work in the UK labour market, its regulation, the 
position  of  agency workers,  and  the  diversity  of  the  sector  in  terms  of  the  agency 
workers themselves and their agencies. 
In  relation  to  the  first  theme  of  the  thesis  addressing  the  nature  of  the  triangular 
relationship  this  section  has  laid  out  the  legal  context  within  which  the  triangular 
employment relationship is set.   It outlines that the regulation of agency work in the 
UK is minimal compared with other EU countries. The employment status of agency 
workers  is  difficult  to  assess  which  means  that  access  to  employment  protection 
afforded by status is difficult to claim.  The recent adoption of the the Directive on 
Temporary Agency Work (Directive 2008/104/EC on Temporary Agency Work 2008) 
and its forthcoming transposition in the UK law will extend some protection to agency 
workers employed for over 12 weeks. These regulations will not affect the majority of 
agency workers that spend fewer than 12 weeks in a placement.
The second theme of the research looks at the heterogeneity of agency work. This is 
carried forward in this section with a discussion of the the context for agency workers in 
the UK labour market. It reports the difficulty in accurately assessing the number of 
agency  workers,  but  estimates  between  1.1  and  1.5  million  (BERR,  2008).  These 
workers are employed across the economy in a range occupations and industries and on 
assignments of varying length. The agencies that place these workers differ in size from 
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a few very large companies that dominate the sector like Adecco and Manpower to a 
large  number  of  small  agencies.   The  employment  position  of  agency  workers  is 
discussed concluding that there are typically 2 views of agency work. The first indicates 
that these workers experience low pay, lack of training, poor health and safety record, 
economic insecurity and inferior pay and conditions. The second identifies the role of 
agency work as a bridge to permanent employment,  and suggests  that some agency 
workers receive higher pay than their permanent counterparts. 
Agency workers, voice and exit
Hirschman (1970) lays out the fundamental choice that workers have when faced with a 
problems at  work, exit  or voice. He defines exit as simply leaving the organisation, 
while voice is the expression of dissatisfaction directly to management.  There is little 
research into the propensity of agency workers to exit in response to problems at work. 
Druker and Stanworth (2004) offer some insight into this area, they refer to frequent 
references  made  to  the  ready  availability  of  exit  by  the  agency  workers  that  they 
interviewed but also note that in practice it is an option of last resort that was rarely 
used.  They suggest that “the freedom to exit appears then to be limited—and maybe 
even illusory.” (Druker and Stanworth 2004: 71).  Most qualitative research into agency 
work cites  workers  discussing  the  ready availability  of  exit  (see  also  Tailby  2005); 
however there has been no systematic study of how agency workers deal with problems 
at work and whether exit is the most common solution.  Druker and Stanworth, (2004) 
talk about high levels of 'individual resilience' amongst agency workers, though they do 
not give examples.  This suggests that rather than making use of exit or voice at work 
these workers may simply 'tough it out'.  
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An alternative to exit from organisations is voice within them.  For Freeman and Medoff 
(1984) in the work context collective rather than individual voice is necessary, generally 
in the form of trade unions.  While in other areas of social and economic life voice can 
be effective on an individual level (for example dissatisfaction with a service can be 
dealt  with by individual  complaint),  in  the work environment collective rather  than 
individual voice is important.  Freeman and Medoff (1984) suggest two main reasons 
that, in the work context, collective rather than individual voice is necessary.  In the 
main, changes in work environment or conditions accrue to the work group and not just 
the individual.  They suggest that collective organisation is important to provide such 
changes.  Their second argument is that individual workers voicing problems at work 
may have their employment terminated whereas there is legal protection for workers 
who choose to be union members.  
In  addition  to  the  option  of  collective  voice  through  a  trade  union,  Druker  and 
Stanworth (2004) argue that the agency may offer some support to agency workers in 
raising problems at work.  Agency workers in their study suggested that small problems 
would be resolved at the workplace but that the agency would be in a position to assist 
if  there  were  serious  problems.   The  suggestion  was  that  the  agency  would  assist 
workers in resolving the problem by finding them another assignment.  However they 
note that of the three agency workers in their study who had left an assignment due to 
problems at work, two had changed agencies as well as user organisations.  Agency 
workers themselves noted the power of the relationship between the agency and their 
customer (the user organisation) and some argued that the agency would be unlikely to 
be willing to assist them if it meant sacrificing a client contract.
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This thesis is concerned with the concept of voice in both its collective and individual 
forms. It investigates the impact of the particular relationship that agency workers have 
with  their  two  employers  on  their  ability  to  have  their  voices  heard  at  work  both 
individually and via representative mechanisms. Debates around employee voice have 
been  numerous  in  both  the  Industrial  Relations  and  Human  Resource  Management 
literature and definitions differ both between and within the literatures.  While HRM 
literature tends to centre on voice as facilitating organisational commitment and offering 
employees a choice, IR literature tends to link voice to industrial citizenship (Wilkinson 
et al 2004). There is little agreement on what is meant by employee voice.  Wilkinson et 
al  (2004)  present  two continuums to  capture the complexity  of voice arrangements. 
These are direct to indirect (individual employees themselves to collective organisations 
such as trade unions) and shared agenda to contested agenda. They argue that these are 
two axes over which voice arrangements should be conceptualised.   These axes say 
nothing  about  power  or  the  relative  strength  (or  perhaps  loudness)  of  voice 
arrangements and are separate from their scope, impact and level.  Nothing is said about 
the relative efficacy of direct versus indirect voice. 
Freeman  and  Medoff  (1984)  identify  twin  strands  of  voice.  Firstly  they  noted  that 
participation could have a beneficial effect on productivity and quality, secondly they 
suggested  that  offering  workers  an  opportunity  to  express  problems  may  defuse 
situations that could otherwise have exploded.  They argued that to be effective voice 
should be both representative and independent of the organisation and that trade unions 
are the best voice agents. They further argued that the presence of trade union voice 
would reduce exit. 
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This thesis is primarily concerned with how agency workers are able to make use of 
voice at work to resolve workplace problems. The extent to which agency workers have 
the opportunity to act using voice mechanisms either provided by their employers, or by 
using representative voice where it is available. 
Union voice
Discussions of union voice must be set in the context of the present position of the 
union movement.  It is necessary to explore the extent of recent union decline and its 
impact in both the public and private sectors.  
Table 2.5 – Trade union density for public and private sectors
Year Density (%) Public sector 
Density (%)
Public sector Density 
(%)
1995 32.6 61.5 21.6
1996 31.7 61.1 20.9
1997 31 61.3 20.2
1998 30.1 61.0 19.5
1999 29.8 59.9 19.3
2000 29.7 60.2 18.8
2001 29.3 59.3 18.6
2002 29.2 59.7 18.2
2003 29.3 59.1 18.2
2004 28.8 58.8 17.2
2005 29.0 58.6 17.2
2006 28.4 58.8 16.6
Taken from Grainger and Crowther (2007)
Since its peak in 1979, when it stood at 55.8%, there has been a consistent downward 
trend in union density with the exception of a slight rise in 2005 followed by a greater 
drop in 2006 (see Fig 2.5).  While membership decline has slowed it continues to fall. 
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Union decline has been most severe in the private sector but has also occurred in the 
public sector.
The scale of union decline has prompted debates on the future of the trade unionism.  In 
particular the increasing participation of women in the labour market, the decline in 
manufacturing  and  growth  in  the  service  sector  and  changes  in  the  nature  of 
employment  have  prompted  questions  about  how  unions  can  remain  relevant  to  a 
changing work environment and changing workforce.  The growth in atypical workers 
and the challenges that they present to the union movement is one of the primary areas 
in which this debate has occurred.  Union density for atypical workers tends to be lower 
than for their typically employed counterparts, as shown in fig 2.6.
Fig 2.6 Trade union membership density for temporary and permanent workers
Sector Total Permanent Temporary
Private 16.6 17.1 8.0
Public 58.8 61.1 32.7
Taken from Grainger and Crowther (2007)
Fig 2.7 Trade union membership density for full time and part time workers
Sector Total Male FT Female FT Male PT Female PT
Private 16.6 20.7 14.8 7.2 11.0
Public 58.8 64.4 65.7 33.7 46.0
Taken from Grainger and Crowther (2007)
In  both  the  private  and  public  sectors  union  density  is  around  twice  as  high  for 
permanent  workers as  for temporary workers,  similarly membership density for full 
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time workers is far higher than for their part time counterparts. 
Agency workers rarely join trade unions and their terms of employment are rarely set by 
collective bargaining.  Delsen (1990) suggests that a cause of the continuing weakness 
of the labour market position of these workers may be their historical rejection by trade 
unions, as trade unions do not bargain for them.  In practice, as Erickson et al (2002) 
note, it is difficult for trade unions to organise workers when the 'employer' is elusive 
and where responsibility for them is shared between several labour market actors.
A number of authors (for example Meager et al 2002, Booth 2002, Healy et al 2004, 
Brown  1993)  have  established  that  unionised  workers  are  more  aware  of  their 
employment rights, enjoy higher pay, better health and safety records, higher levels of 
contractual security, greater access to consultation and employee representation than 
their non-unionised comparators.  For agency workers, this could be crucial as the case 
law on their employment status evolves but also in light of the recent agreement paving 
the way for equal treatment legislation covering agency workers.
New Understanding of European Work Organisation (NUEWO) (2003) considered the 
consequences of the use of agency workers and other contingent labour on trade unions. 
It  found  that  trade  unions  were  challenged  by  the  presence  of  contingent  workers 
because they could undermine trade union policies, compete with permanent workers to 
lower wages and are less likely to join trade unions.  Olsen (2005) suggests that the 
inclusion of atypical workers in the workforce can lead to segmentation which fractures 
collectivism and may weaken the position of the union.  She further argues that the 
levels  of  unionisation amongst  atypical  workers  in  general  and  workers  employed 
through employment intermediaries particularly is far lower than for their permanently 
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employed counterparts adding to the weakening of the collective identity and the union. 
Other  research  (Goslinga  and  Sverke  2003,  Delsen  1990)  suggests  that  temporary 
agency  workers  are  under-represented  in  unions  both  because  they  are  difficult  to 
organise and because unions traditionally have been reluctant to accept new forms of 
employment relationships.  Goslinga and Sverke (2003) compared permanent full time 
workers with temporary and part time workers in three European countries.  They found 
very limited differences in attitudes between these workers in terms of their attitudes to 
trade  unions.   They  postulate  that  an  explanation  for  the  low  levels  of  union 
membership amongst atypical workers, and in particular temporary workers, is that they 
may experience more changes in job and periods of unemployment which may affect 
their  likelihood  of  exiting  the  trade  union.   They  argue  that  the  structure  of 
representation (i.e. workplace, occupation or industry) may be important in determining 
unions’ ability to retain members who change jobs or companies.  
As  with  other  temporary  work  arrangements,  agency  workers  are  likely  to  find 
themselves in short-term placements.  The reluctance of most UK unions to organize 
unemployed workers means that membership is likely to lapse when workers become 
unemployed.  Also the structure of representation in the UK, which is generally based 
around  workplaces  and/or  geographical  branches,  may  make  the  unionization  of 
workers  who  change  jobs  and  frequently  experience  periods  of  unemployment 
problematic. 
The trade union objection to agency works, found in the previously mentioned research, 
was primarily directed at temporary work agencies, which they viewed as parasitic.  For 
some unions, it also extended to agency workers themselves whose interests were not 
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considered legitimate and who were considered to pose a threat to unionised workers 
(see also Heery 2000).  Over the course of the union decline of the 1980s and 1990s, the 
case was made for inclusion; pragmatically for reasons of survival and growth but also 
ideologically as they were recognised as victims of casualisation.  Heery (2000) notes 
the presence of debates over agency workers in trade union conferences through this 
period.   Some unions  (CWU & PCS amongst  others) have suggested that  for  some 
people  agency  work  can  be  both  legitimate  and  chosen,  that  these  workers  have 
different needs in terms of representation and that they are not victims or parasites.  In 
the main “flexible labour contracts are met with considerable reserve since they weaken 
the  position  of  the  individual  employee  and  reduce  the  ability  of  trade  unions  to 
negotiate secure wages and working conditions” (Delson 1990: 263).   An important 
challenge for trade unions is to analyze the competing pressures and decide whether to 
accept agency workers as part of their constituency or whether to try to exclude them 
both from the union itself and the job and labour market more generally  (Heery et al 
2004).  
Pragmatically, there are advantages to recruiting any group of unrepresented workers, 
bringing them into  membership may help the  trade  union movement  to  reverse the 
severe decline it has suffered over the last twenty five years.  Significant changes have 
occurred in the composition of the workforce over the last three decades coinciding with 
the decline of traditional industries and the rise of the service sector.  Related to this, 
there has been an increase in atypical work.  As such, trade unions had to contend not 
only  with  compositional  changes  in  occupation  and  industry  but  also  with  more 
challenging changes in the nature of employment.   The inclusion of agency and other 
atypical  workers  who  are  a  growing  part  of  the  economy  may  halt  and  reverse 
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membership decline.  
Ideological reasons also figure as a rationale for recruiting and representing this group 
of workers.  Some trade unions have recognised that “agency and other non-standard 
workers  were  owed solidarity  as  it  was  they  that  were  bearing the  brunt  of  labour 
market change” (Heery 2004: 445).  Whilst trade unions have not always effectively 
recruited and represented the most vulnerable workers within the labour market it is 
certainly ideologically within their remit.  Many trade unions have focused attention on 
the plight of migrant workers, many of whom are engaged through agencies at the low 
wage  end  of  the  spectrum.  Whilst  not  explicitly  linking  the  agendas  to  support 
vulnerable migrant workers and those to support agency workers, often migrant workers 
are working in agency roles (NUEWO 2003)
Whilst there are clear advantages to recruiting these workers, there are also challenges. 
“The  presence  of  non-standard  workers  may threaten  the  interest  of  existing  union 
members through the undercutting of negotiated terms of employment.” (Heery et al 
2004:  127).   If  parts  of  the  union  movement  are  ideologically  or  more  commonly 
practically  opposed  to  agency  work  then  it  is  difficult  to  justify  recruiting  agency 
workers into membership.  The recruitment, retention and servicing of agency workers 
is problematic and costly, particularly considering that they are a group that may not 
remain in membership for long due to the precarious nature of their employment.  Their 
insecure employment position may also prevent  them from taking part  in  collective 
action  and  may,  as  such,  undermine  union  solidarity.   Some  trade  unions  have  an 
introductory  period  before  people  that  have  joined  become  full  members.  As  such 
people that subscribe to a trade union may have to wait for a period before becoming a 
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member and becoming entitled to  representations.  Such rules may have a  particular 
impact  on  agency  staff  many  of  whom remain  with  one  employer  for  under  three 
months (Arrowsmith 2006).  If  agency workers are unable to take part  in industrial 
action and will not be represented when new members it may be that it is not in their 
interests to join as unions in their current form will be unable to meaningfully represent 
them.
Rubery et al (2005) argue that for outsourced workers union organising across different 
contracts  does  not  offer  leverage  for  new  recognition  or  bargaining  agreements. 
Similarly organising agency workers will rarely offer trade unions the opportunity to 
gain statutory recognition because they are dispersed through the organisation, are often 
employed by different agencies, and are often in post for short periods of time.
Other reasons that agency workers may be particularly challenging for trade unions to 
recruit and represent revolve around their lack of employment rights.  Heery (2004) 
notes that the extension of employment rights to groups of workers that were previously 
unprotected (fixed term contractors and  part time employees) has acted as a lever for 
collective bargaining.  Legislation has acted as a stimulus for the inclusion in the trade 
union agenda of these non-standard employees; however the case is more difficult for 
agency workers as they have neither employee status, nor the right to equal treatment. 
In  addition  to  its  role  in  offering  workers  the  option  of  legal  redress  legislation  is 
important for two key reasons; firstly, it provides a range of rights on which workers can 
be represented.  Secondly, it provides an incentive for employers to negotiate with trade 
unions around the treatment of atypical workers.  The lacuna in employment protection 
leaves temporary agency workers without a statutory 'floor of rights', and in so doing 
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without  the  lever  for  union  representation  that  those  rights  give  other  non-standard 
workers, making them a particularly problematic constituency for trade unions.  
The measures taken to recruit non-standard or atypical workers have varied between 
unions  and  the  particular  groups  of  non-standard  workers  involved.   As  previously 
discussed  the  term “atypical  work”  applies  to  a  wide  variety  of  working  situations 
ranging from home-working to contracting and, on the whole, the trade union response 
to  the different  types of  atypical  work  tends  to  link with how far  the  needs  of  the 
workers involved deviate from the perceived needs of the ‘traditional’ union member. 
Heery et  al  (2004:  148) found that  “variable  union responses to non-standard work 
reflect the degree of contingency of different forms and the consequent ease with which 
representation  of  non-standard  workers  can  be  integrated  with  that  of  workers  in 
standard  employment.” This  thesis  is  specifically  concerned  with  the  trade  union 
response to agency workers and their employers, where work is highly contingent and 
for  whom representation may be  problematic.   These  workers  have  presented  trade 
unions with a particular challenge.  
Heery  et  al  (2004)  comment  that,  for  agency  workers,  the  barriers  to  union 
representation and integration with existing union members may be higher and thus they 
appear a less attractive group to trade unions.  Heery et al (2004) suggests that there was 
a pattern of increasing engagement with most non standard workers with unions moving 
from a position of exclusion to one of inclusion and engagement.   However  of the 
groups they examined, exclusion was most prevalent for agency workers.  They found 
that  a  dual  strategy  had  been  undertaken  in  many  workplaces  with  representatives 
simultaneously restricting numbers of agency workers and insisting that those who were 
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allowed received equal pay and conditions to standard employees.  In this way the trade 
union can be seen to be protecting their core workers by preventing agency temps from 
undercutting  terms  and  conditions  but  also  giving  some  agency  staff  a  degree  of 
representation.  
In the 1980s a policy of resisting the use of agency labour was pursued but when the 
policy  proved  impractical  TUC  affiliates  agreed  that  a  policy  of  recruitment  and 
representation was the preferred option (Druker and Stanworth 2004: 230).  The policy 
agreed by TUC in 1987 of improving the pay and conditions of agency (among other) 
workers has proven to be difficult to implement in the case of agency workers (Ibid). 
Within  the  UK  the  organisation  and  representation  of  temporary  agency  workers 
continues to be problematic.  “The Trades Union Congress' agency workers’ campaign 
demonstrates an inability to turn the tide of insecure labour use” (Burgess and Connell 
2004: 15)
Agency  workers  are  experiencing  the  same  sort  of  rejection  by  the  trade  union 
movement  that  other  groups,  who  now  form  part  of  the  movement,  have  had  to 
overcome.   Unlike  other  groups  (notably  Black  and  Minority  Ethnic  and  female 
workers) they experience contractual and legal factors making them more difficult to 
organise  and  represent  within  the  system  of  workplace  unionism  in  the  United 
Kingdom.  The additional issues to representing this group may mean that they do not 
make the move from exclusion to inclusion experienced by women and  Black, Asian 
and Minority  Ethnic  workers  within  the  trade  union  movement  identified by Heery 
(2004).
76
Heery et  al  (2004)  found that  declining unions  have  sought  to  recruit  non-standard 
workers.  Some trade unions (Transport and General Workers Union (T&G) (now part 
of Unite), Communication Workers Union (CWU)) have publicly stated that they intend 
to  recruit  and  represent  agency  workers.   Action  ranges  from political  lobbying  to 
increase  the  regulation  of  agency  work,  such  as  putting  pressure  on  the  Labour 
Government to withdraw their objection to the Directive on Temporary Agency Work, 
to workplace representation.  The CWU has concluded a recognition agreement with 
Adecco to cover agency workers within BT’s workforce and represents them through a 
separate division of the trade union.  They considered that these workers had different 
needs to the majority of their  directly employed membership and as such sought to 
represent them differently.  Dromey (2005), at the time deputy general secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers Union,  in his address to the TUC on organising stated 
that “there should be no more workplaces where the directly-employed are organised 
but temporary, casual and agency workers are not”.  The emphasis on the recruitment of 
these workers will not necessarily lead to an identification of the different needs of this 
group,  the  different  collective  agenda  that  they  may  have  and  the  problems  with 
workplace representation when the workplace may change on a week by week basis. 
Barring  a  notable  few  (T&G,  CWU),  trade  unions  in  the  UK  have  not  sought  to 
represent agency workers as a constituency that may have specific needs.  They have 
not formulated a collective agenda that is tailored to this group.  
For a large number of agency workers, the trade union movement does not provide a 
channel  for  collective  voice  because  these  workers  are  either  ignored  or  explicitly 
excluded.  This has real implications for their  unionisation potential; if unions are not 
recruiting these workers, who is? Can agency workers have a collective voice? Is the 
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trade union movement imposing a  collective silence on these workers by failing to 
organise them?
Even where agency workers are  unionised and their employers have agreements with 
trade unions, the scope of these agreements is generally extremely limited.  Stanworth 
and Druker (2004) note the presence of collective agreements between trade unions and 
the  two largest  agencies  (Manpower and Adecco).   However,  they further  note,  the 
minimal coverage of these agreements with few extensions to statutory employment 
rights.  Heery et al (2005) discuses the long standing relationship between Manpower 
and the TGWU and the commitment of the company to the promotion of unionisation. 
They  argue  that  the  partnership  agreement  has  produced  only  modest  gains  for 
members.  Unionisation levels have been very low. Membership levels are higher and 
conditions better  where trade unionism in the client firm lent support to the agency 
workforce, but this relies on both agency and user organisation support.  Heery et al 
(2004) argue that TGWU wants to use its agreement with  Manpower to raise standards 
across the sector and squeeze out rogue agencies; a goal it also pursued by lobbying for 
greater regulation.  While TGWU's agreement with Manpower offers only modest gains 
with  no regular  wage bargaining and limited scope to  improve conditions  for  most 
workers it nonetheless offers an improvement on the statutory minimum.  For many 
agency workers, particularly working for the array of small agencies within the sector, 
access to their basic legal rights would be an improvement on the current position.  
Within the UK, we have a system of decentralised collective bargaining and workplace 
representation;  however  it  is  also  important  to  recognise  the  other  levels  of  union 
representation including  national  and sectoral  bargaining  and political  lobbying.   In 
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spite of the presence of other levels of representation, within the UK the workplace 
remains the focal point for worker representation and it  is at the workplace that the 
representation of agency workers is most problematic.  We have identified the potential 
difficulties of the triangular relationship in identifying which party is responsible for the 
management  of  these  staff.   Issues  of  capability,  discipline  and grievance  could  be 
managed by either the user organisation or the agency but for most organisations there 
is no clear agreement between the agency and user organisation as to who is responsible 
for the management of these issues.  Frequent changes in workplace and potentially 
which unions are recognised can prevent agency workers from identifying with a trade 
union and ultimately from becoming union members.  
Mobilisation theory
Mobilisation theory offers a means of analysing they ways in which workers respond to 
workplace problems, and in particular the way in which they collectively mobilise. It 
also offers explanations for how and why workers act on dissatisfaction at work.  It 
breaks down the process of resolving problems at work to offer insight into the process 
of mobilisation. 
Mobilization theory has its starting point in dissatisfaction.  Kelly (1997) argues that 
workers  must  feel  a  sense  of  injustice  at  their  current  circumstances  but  unlike 
dissonance  theories,  mobilisation  theory  has  a  number  of  other  important  elements. 
Employees must be able to attribute their dissatisfaction with work to their employer 
and must feel that there is a collective resolution to their situation.  “It is not enough for 
employees to feel aggrieved: they must also feel entitled to their demands and feel that 
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there is some chance that their situation can be changed by ‘collective agency’” (Kelly 
1998: 29).  In addition to injustice and attribution mobility theory relies on the presence 
of leaders as they play a critical role in collectivising workers and encouraging group 
cohesion.  
Kelly (1998) develops the idea of the importance of a collective agenda with his work in 
mobilization theory; which applies to unionisation as well as collective action.  It is 
critical that workers conceptualise a problem or issue as collective rather than individual 
and that they can envisage a collective solution.  It is important for union activists or 
leaders to construct a collective agenda that enables workers to recognise injustice and 
attribute  it  to  their  employer.   Kelly’s  (1998  1997)  work  moves  beyond  union 
instrumentality by refocusing attention on the reasons for collective organisation and 
action at injustice and attribution.  
“The logic of social movement theory is that the fortunes of labour movements  
rest  inter  alia  on  the  scale  of  injustice  at  the  workplace,  the  attitudes  of  
employees towards management and the effectiveness of union organisation and  
action.  People’s beliefs about these issues will in turn depend on the actions and 
rhetoric of union leaders and their opponents.  They will also be influenced by 
the  structural  conditions  that  shape  union  power,  in  particular  the  state  of 
labour and product markets and the forms of legal regulation of union activity.”  
(Kelly and Badigannavar 2004: 33-34)
One difficulty of mobilisation theory is its focus on ruling and subordinate groups; it 
does not take account of the differences within subordinate groups.  This means that the 
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needs and collective agendas of individuals are seen as homogeneous.  Generally this 
will result in the agenda of the dominant group being seen as the collective agenda of all 
members.  For most trade unions, this will be the interests of full time, permanently and 
directly  employed  white  male  members  and  of  those  groups  whose  interests  most 
closely align with this group.
Kelly (1998) suggests that the challenge for trade unions today is the perception that 
they are too weak to make a difference. He argues that this impacts upon the ability of 
trade unions to convince workers that they will be able to change things in their own 
workplace.  This  in  turn  makes  them less  likely to  be  able  to  make changes  in  the 
workplace therefore reinforcing the original perception.
Kelly’s approach has strengths in its starting point of injustice and exploitation rather 
than  employers  agendas  and  its  focus  is  how  employees  define  their  interests  in 
particular ways (Edwards 2003).  For the group of workers that I will be considering, 
this starting point is especially interesting as when compared with other workers they 
can be seen as being disadvantaged.  The current literature considers primarily ruling 
and subordinate groups identifying managers as the ruling group and a homogeneous 
group of workers as the subordinate, but there is increasing work on the diverse interests 
of disparate groups.
Differences  in  interest  definition may be important  for  agency workers,  particularly 
where the interests of agency workers and permanently employed staff are not always 
consistent and may in fact be conflicting.  In these cases, it may be other workers rather 
than management that resist the achievement of collective aims or the effective outlet of 
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collective voice for agency workers.  This has been observed of both women and black 
workers in the past, as the trade union movement attempted to exclude both groups from 
union membership and employment in general (Heery et al 2004).  
The emphasis  on  social  class  as  the factor  which  unifies  worker  interests  does  not 
account for the experiences of exclusion faced by marginalised groups in the past (and 
present).  Hyman  (1978  1992  2001)  has  written  extensively  on  the  implications  of 
changes in the composition of the workforce for unions.  In particular, and in common 
with  many  scholars,  he  has  noted  the  growing  importance  of  women  workers,  the 
growth in the service sector and the increases in atypical forms of employment.  If 
differentiation  of  worker  interests  as  a  result  of  economic  change  has  undermined 
traditionally dominant worker solidarity founded upon the norm of manufacturing jobs 
done by white  men,  can the diverse interests  of  workers based upon not  only their 
varied social identities but also the multitude of working arrangements and employment 
status be reconciled or overcome to reverse the decline in membership and in perceived 
power? (Heery 2003).  Hyman (2001) suggests that some divisions have always been 
present within trade union development and that there are now new opportunities for 
collective  bargaining  to  reflect  priorities  held  by  these  groups.   He argues  that  the 
introduction of new issues need not undermine the notion that workers have collective 
interests that are separate from those of management and that these interests may form 
the basis of broader class based interests and action.  Nonetheless it must be noted that 
worker interests do not always coincide; it may be in the interests of permanent workers 
for agency workers to be outside the scope of employment protection and the trade 
union if they are to provide a flexible buffer to ensure the job security of the permanent 
workforce as in the core periphery model.  Within a unionised setting, this may mean 
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that the collective agenda of agency workers is subordinate to the agenda of permanent 
employees or pursued only insofar as it is consistent with it.  
It is not only the Marxist view of industrial relations that characterises workers or union 
members as a homogeneous group.  Various theories of collective bargaining assume 
workers  interests  are  equally  represented  and  protected  by  rules  agreed  between 
management and unions.  A range of authors have argued that bargaining agendas and 
collective agreements tend to regulate employment in a way that privileges particular 
groups, generally white men (Colling and Dickens 2001, Cockburn 1983, Phillips and 
Taylor 1980).  While feminist authors have been very influential in this area, gender is 
not  the  only  area  in  which  divergent  interests  have  been  identified.   Demographic 
differences  from  age  through  race,  gender,  and  disability  form  a  basis  for  diverse 
interests but divergence is also noted in relation to different types of employment and 
employment contract. 
The  literature  around  the  growth  in  atypical  work  is  often  linked  to  the  growing 
participation of women in the labour market.  This debate has included the extent to 
which the interests of men and women coincide.  Many authors (mentioned above) have 
argued that there is some degree of divergence between men's and women's interests. 
Such arguments have also been put  in relation to black workers and other minority 
groups.  
The key importance of these debates to this thesis is that worker interests cannot be 
treated as always homogeneous.  Indeed different interests  may not be reconcilable. 
While workers may share some interests across racial, gender and contractual divides 
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such as concern for a safe workplace, others may be divergent.  The arguments on the 
divergence of worker interests come together to suggest that unions must recognise and 
respond to the changing labour market by identifying agendas that reflect the diversity 
of issues that different groups of workers have in order to engage with them.  Unions 
must “identify a collective agenda that is appropriate for potential members in under-
represented groups and make this agenda available in recruiting them” (Waddington and 
Whitston 1997: 516).  Unions have recognised the need to develop new and tailored 
agendas to speak to new groups of workers in their use of self organising strategies.
Beyond interest definition, Kelly (1998) talks about the need for workers to find reasons 
or causes for their sense of injustice, and attribute them to their employer.  The way in 
which workers attribute problems at work has significant consequences for how they are 
expressed. If workers are unable to attribute problems to their employer, or see them as 
unchangeable, they are unlikely to act upon them.
Within mobilisation theory, Kelly (1998) talks about the willingness to act collectively 
as key to union revitalisation. He suggests that some workers see unions as too weak to 
address problems or make a difference. He notes that this perception has changed in the 
past, but that the mechanisms by which it changed are not known. Kelly's (1998) focus 
is on the willingness to act collectively, however mobilisation theory can also be used to 
identify ways in which workers act individually or chose exit.  His theory provides a 
framework  that  identifies  the  stages  that  workers  go  through  before  acting  upon  a 
problem, however at the point of action workers are faced with the exit/voice choice 
laid out by Hirschman (1970).
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Overview
This section has looked at the voice and exit responses to problems at work. Focusing 
on collective voice in the form of union voice it outlines the scale of union decline, and 
membership levels for atypical workers. There is a discussion of agency workers and 
their  interaction  with  trade  unions  concluding  that  while  there  are  pragmatic  and 
ideological reasons for recruiting these workers there are  also significant challenges 
around the nature of their employment and uncertain employment status.  This thesis 
addresses a group of workers for whom collective action through trade unions is not 
accessible because the trade union is unwilling to organise them at the workplace. It is 
necessary to look beyond the ability to act collectively through trade unions and to use 
mobilisation  theory  to  discuss  the  opportunity  of  these  workers  to  act  at  all.   The 
opportunity  to  act  on workplace injustice is  not  confined to  collective  action.   The 
framework offered by mobilisation theory provides the basis for analysing the way in 
which workers address problems at  work both individually and collectively, and the 
extent to which counter mobilisation prevents them from addressing dissatisfaction at 
work. 
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Chapter 3 – Researching temporary agency work
This chapter outlines and reflects upon the methods of obtaining the data to answer the 
research questions.  This is a qualitative study with the primary data obtained largely 
from interviews undertaken within two local authorities ('Met' and 'City') supplemented 
by  a  self  completion  questionnaire.   Additionally,  interviews  were  conducted  with 
representatives  of  trade  unions,  the  employers’  organisation  and  temporary  work 
agencies.  A range of documentary data were collected from all parties.  This chapter 
details and justifies the choice of these methods and outlines the practical difficulties 
encountered  in  researching  this  area.   Included  are  reflections  on  the  practical 
shortcomings and key advantages of the chosen research design, tools and fieldwork 
and their impact on the thesis.  
This thesis focuses on exploring the triangular relationship that agency workers have 
with their dual employers. It looks in depth at the management of these workers, their 
experience of work, and the effect of the triangular relationship on their working lives. 
It offers an insight into the complex relationship that agency workers have with their 
employers and the ways in which this relationship affects the way they define their 
interests, and how they respond to problems at work when they arise.  
The  literature  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter  provided  the  starting  point  for  the 
research. Most previous UK research into agency workers has been conducted as case 
studies (Heery 2004, Tailby 2005, Druker and Stanworth 2004, Stanworth and Druker 
2004, Hoque and Kirkpatrick 2006).  Forde and Slater  (2005) have made use of the 
Labour Force Survey to analyse the nature and extent of agency work in the UK and 
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Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2003) have used the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) to analyse marginalisation of professional agency staff.  While surveys are able 
to describe institutions and structures it is more difficult to establish information about 
social processes because of the necessary crudeness of the survey method (Kelly 1998). 
In the last  chapter I discussed the limitations in the existing survey data on agency 
workers and the concerns of a number of authors (Edwards 2006, Arrowsmith 2006 
amongst others) that the Labour Force Survey data does not necessarily give a clear 
picture of the level of agency working in the UK.  Self completion surveys present 
problems where worker status is confused and even workers themselves may struggle to 
appropriately self identify.  This difficulty presents a major practical impediment to the 
use of the survey method in investigating agency work.
While there has been analysis of the position of agency workers in the labour market, 
and  of  the  attitudes  of  trade  unions  towards  agency  workers,  there  has  been  little 
research into the views of agency workers themselves.  We know little about how these 
workers experience work, and how they come to define their interests. We know little 
about  the  effect  of  the  having  an  employment  relationship  with  two  separate 
organisations on the experience of work, and the experience of voice at work. 
The literature on the position of agency workers in the labour market, the use of agency 
work  as  a  bridge  to  permanent  employment,  and  the  access  of  agency  workers  to 
training all provide a helpful background to this thesis. They provide a starting point 
and informed the selection of case study sites.  This thesis presents data from within the 
triangular  relationship  to  illuminate  the  research  questions  posed.  It  offers  a  deeper 
insight  into  how  agency  workers  and  their  employers  experience  the  triangular 
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relationship  and  the  challenges  it  poses  to  existing  employment  assumptions.  It 
contributes to knowledge of agency workers because few studies have sought to engage 
with all  three parties to the agency worker-user organisation-agency relationship.   It 
engages with mobilisation theory to explore the ways in which these workers define 
their interests, and how they come to accept or reject collective resolutions when faced 
with problems that they attribute to the agency or user organisation. 
The research questions are suited to in depth, qualitative study.  The data required to 
address  the  questions  are  detailed  and  the  questions  are  exploratory  in  nature; 
quantitative  methods  are  therefore  not  appropriate  (Yin  1994).  This  study develops 
detailed  descriptions  of  the  interrelationship  between  agency  workers  and  their 
employers in the 'real world' and relates the findings to previous research into atypical 
workers, social movement theory and the voice/exit literature. The research seeks to 
describe and explain the complexity of the triangular relationship and its  impact  on 
agency workers. It is an investigation of a social phenomenon and is ideally suited to 
using qualitative methods within a case study research design. 
“The case study can be defined as a research strategy or design that is used to  
study one or more selected social phenomena and to understand or explain the  
phenomena by placing them in the wider context” (Kitay and Callus 1998: 103)
The primary research rests on case study design for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the 
context is key to understanding the research themes.  Contextual factors that may affect 
the management of agency workers, their experience of work and their ability to access 
voice at work could explain some of the research findings.  Secondly, the area is under-
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researched  and  therefore  an  exploratory  approach  should  be  adopted,  meaning  that 
primarily qualitative methods should be used.  A significant strength of a qualitative 
approach is that it allows previously undiscovered issues to come to light.  Yin (1994: 1) 
argues that “in general,  case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions are being posed...and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with 
some real-life  context.”   As the  central  focus  of  this  thesis  is  how agency workers 
experience work and how they voice problems at work, such questions are well suited to 
case study research.  The goal was to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues posed 
in the research questions within these particular environments.  
Research Sites
In identifying potential  research sites I  sought a context  with a higher than average 
proportion of agency workers, a higher than average level of unionisation and agency 
workers  located  in  teams  primarily  made  up  of  permanent  workers  to  reflect  my 
particular research questions. 
Prior to selecting a sector for study, I reviewed a variety of material including published 
academic  work,  Labour  Force  Survey  statistics,  Workplace  Employment  Relations 
Survey, government consultation papers and responses on agency work, and websites 
relating  to  agency  work  (referenced  in  the  bibliography).   This  gave  me  an 
understanding of the variety of sectors and the range of occupations in which agency 
workers were deployed.  Eighty percent of agency workers in the UK are located within 
the service and public sectors (ETUC 2005) so it was important to consider these areas 
in  more  detail.   In  some settings,  agency  workers  are  employed  in  large  numbers, 
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notably  call  centres.   While  this  setting  would  provide  a  large  number  of  agency 
workers it would not allow for comparisons between different occupational groups, and 
the  level  of  unionisation  within  this  sector  is  comparatively  low.   In  addition,  the 
majority of agency workers in the UK work within teams dominated by permanently 
employed staff;  this  is  important  because the  experience  of  work and propensity  to 
unionise may be different when agency workers are working predominantly with other 
agency workers.  For these reasons it was considered beneficial to research a sector 
where agency workers were employed across the occupational spectrum and where they 
are dispersed through the organisations in teams mostly comprised of directly employed 
staff.  
Local government has a higher than average level of unionisation as detailed in the 
previous chapter (WERS 2004).  There are also proportionally more agency workers 
employed within local authorities social care than in the economy as a whole; social 
care employs around 5.8% of its staff via agencies while the level of agency work in the 
economy as a whole is around 4% (Sisson and Marginson 2003: 167, Social Care report 
2005).   As with the labour market more broadly, agency workers in social  care are 
generally located in teams dominated by fixed term and permanent local authority staff 
(figures in Chapter 4).  These factors make local government social care an ideal setting 
for this research.  Another key reason for choosing local government as the sector for 
this research is the occupational and functional diversity of the workforce encompassing 
a range of staff from professionally qualified occupational therapists and social workers 
through to residential and home care workers (LGPC 2002).
This means that within local government there is significant scope for investigating the 
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impact  of  job  characteristics  on  the  experience  of  agency  work.   Conley  (2000) 
investigated temporary workers directly employed by local government organisations 
and identified that workers experience temporary work differently according to their 
demographics.  This may also be true of agency workers as both demographic factors 
and the level of choice when undertaking agency work may influence its experience. 
Agency workers are used in professional, health and personal care and administrative 
roles allowing comparisons to be drawn between different types of worker within the 
same workforce.
Having identified social care within local government as an interesting and appropriate 
setting,  I  conducted exploratory interviews with the Improvement  and Development 
Agency  for  local  government,  the  Local  Government  Employers’ Organisation  and 
Unison,  the largest  union in  the  sector,  at  national  level.   I  also reviewed websites 
relating to agency work in this sector and collected documentary material about agency 
work  in  local  government  (referenced  in  bibliography),  including  the  agency 
arrangements used by local government employers, and statistics and reports on the use 
of  agency labour  in  social  care.   The documentary  data  and exploratory  interviews 
helped me to establish a broad understanding of the use of agency work in the sector 
and Unison's response to it.  Analysis of the information also assisted me in identifying 
local authorities that would make appropriate case study sites.
 
This research could have been conducted either in a single local authority or in a small 
number of authorities.  While a single authority may reduce problems of accessing the 
organisation,  the numbers  of  agency workers  employed may be too small  to  access 
sufficient agency workers.  In addition there may be very different experiences within a 
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small unitary or metropolitan borough and a larger county council.  For these reasons I 
initially decided to undertake research in three sites; one outer London metropolitan 
borough (Met), one unitary authority (City) and one county council.  I anticipated that 
the different challenges faced by each authority and their recognised trade unions would 
illuminate  the  issues  in  the  research.   Within  social  care,  London  and  inner-city 
authorities tend to have higher numbers of agency staff (LAWSG 42-43: 2005), though 
their recruitment and retention problems tend to differ.  County councils tend to have 
fewer recruitment and retention problems in social  care (exploratory interviews with 
two county councils,  LAWSG 2005) and fewer agency workers; the workers that they 
do have tend to be more dispersed throughout the organisation which is  itself  more 
geographically  dispersed.   I  hoped that  the differences  between a local  authority  in 
London, a city authority outside of London and a county council would offer diverse 
settings for agency workers and may offer insight into their varied experiences.  
Exploratory gatekeeper interviews were conducted with five local authorities and local 
Unison, Unite and GMB representatives.  I gained research access to three of these local 
authorities.  I subsequently decided not to proceed with the county council case study as 
the authority was in the midst of a serious financial crisis and had made the decision not 
to employ any agency staff in social care and furthermore to finish the contracts of those 
agency staff currently in employment.  Even before the financial problems, interviews 
with managers suggested that there was a much lower proportion of agency workers to 
permanent workers within county than in the other two authorities.  Relatively small 
numbers and access problems led me to drop this potential research site but the initial 
interviews provided some useful general information, as did exploratory interviews with 
managers in two other local authorities as potential research sites.
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The selection of case study sites was influenced in part by the practicalities of obtaining 
access to local authorities with sufficient agency workers for the study to be viable. 
Two county councils  considered for  research access  had a  very small  proportion of 
agency workers.  This supports the general argument that agency workers in social care 
tend to be predominantly based in urban local authorities. Both county councils reported 
very few recruitment and retention difficulties, and this supports the argument that most 
agency workers in local authority social care are employed as a result of recruitment and 
retention problems.  The research sites finally selected are, broadly speaking, indicative 
of the sites within which most agency workers in public sector social care work. They 
are both urban, both experience significant recruitment and retention problems and both 
use agency workers across the occupational spectrum. Although generalisation can be 
problematic from case study research the findings from this study are likely to reflect 
the experience of agency work across the local government social care sector. 
A fuller overview of the local government sector and details of the research sites called 
'Met' and 'City' follow in the next chapter.
Research Methods
A mixed methods approach was taken for this investigation.  The main method of data 
collection  was  by  semi-structured  interviews  with  key  informants.   In  addition, 
documentary data were collected and self completion questionnaires were administered 
to agency and permanent workers within both local authorities.  Within Met these were 
administered by post or e-mail for self completion but within City they were given out 
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face-to-face in team meetings and at the workplace.  
Documentation
Documentation  was  used  throughout  the  research  process.  Initially  documents  were 
collected to inform the selection of the case study sites as discussed above, but later in 
the  process  a  variety  of  documents  were  collected  to  supplement  interview  and 
observation data.  A list of the documents reviewed is provided as secondary sources. 
Once  the  case  study  sites  were  selected  documents  were  collected  from  published 
sources  like  the  National  Audit  Office  and  also  internal  organisational  material.   I 
obtained confidential  unpublished information from both sites on the use of  agency 
workers  within  social  care  including  staffing  reports,  workforce  plans,  research  on 
encouraging agency workers to take permanent positions, HR and procurement advice 
to  managers,  demographic  data,  minutes  of  council  meetings,  proposals  on  future 
procurement of agency workers, tender documents, agency contracts and agency spend 
data.   Some  documents  were  provided  purely  for  background  purposes  with  the 
agreement  that  I  would  not  make  them  publicly  available,  other  data  was  simply 
unpublished.  Many of these documents were collected during or following interviews 
with senior managers within the organisations.   Others, particularly from City, were 
collected shortly after the fieldwork, when consultants were working to introduce new 
agency arrangements.  I was not allowed access to some documents which may have 
been  useful  such  as  the  tender  documentation  for  the  master/neutral  vendor 
arrangements at Met nor the Adecco tool kit for managing agency workers.
Interviews
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Interviews  are  a  valuable  means of  data  collection  as  they  provide  a  “flexible  and 
adaptable way of finding things out” (Robson 2002: 272).   They have a number of 
advantages over other research methods including the opportunity to clarify possible 
misunderstandings, the ability to use probing questions, and the ability to build rapport 
and trust between the interviewer and interviewee (Ibid).  The semi-structured interview 
allows some questions to be predetermined but also allows for answers to be probed and 
for the interviewer to use her discretion in omitting or adding questions and following 
up interesting responses (Robson 2002).   This  is  a  significant  advantage over more 
structured techniques like surveys because it allows the interviewer to explore avenues 
that arise out of the interviewee’s answers and to consider areas that may not otherwise 
have been discussed.
Interviews were  the  main  method of  primary  data  collection.   A total  of  sixty-nine 
interviews were carried out, comprising of ten interviews with union representatives, 
two interviews with representatives of the British Association of Social Work (BASW), 
eighteen line managers, two Human Resource officers and two procurement consultants, 
six agency managers, and twenty-nine agency workers.  The union representatives were 
a  mix  of  national  union  officials,  regional  officials  and  local  union  conveners  for 
Unison, Unite and GMB.  Because the majority of agency workers that I interviewed 
were  social  workers  I  felt  that  it  was  important  to  meet  with  their  professional 
association and so interviewed a professional officer and a member of the BASW advice 
and representation team.  The British Association/College of Occupational Therapists is 
the equivalent body for occupational therapists, however as few occupational therapists 
took part in this study I felt that it was appropriate to focus on BASW.
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BASW  is  different  to  some  other  professional  associations  that  have  workplace 
representative structures and engage in collective bargaining in that it  has sought to 
differentiate itself from the trade union movement.  Its primary focus is to “campaign 
for, and defend, the values and ethics of social work” (BASW 26/04/2003, 72), and 
unlike  trade  unions  it  does  not  engage  in  collective  bargaining,  nor  does  it  have  a 
structure for workplace representation, though individual members are offered advice 
and representation from a centralised function.  
I interviewed managers at all levels of the case study organisations from the Service 
Director of Adult and Community Services through to first tier line managers.  Each of 
these interviews consisted of both a substantive data collection exercise and a further 
research access negotiation.  In both organisations it was necessary to negotiate access 
at various organisational levels.  Within Met the first interview was conducted with the 
Director  of  Adult  Social  Care  as  both  a  gatekeeper  discussion  and  a  substantive 
interview.  He identified managers across his service at first, second and third tier line 
management for me to meet with who in turn identified colleagues that managed agency 
workers.   Within City, I  was given access to the organisational  structure and phone 
details  for  staff;  I  selected  and  contacted  managers  and  some  of  the  second  tier 
managers indicated teams with high proportions of agency workers as appropriate to 
contact.  Interviews with managers were used both for data collection and as gatekeeper 
meetings to access agency workers within their teams.  The managers that I initially 
selected  and  interviewed  then  gave  me  details  of  colleagues  who  managed  agency 
workers and in one case a manager who was an agency worker.  I approached a total of 
twenty seven managers, three refused my request for an interview because they were 
too busy or did not manage agency workers, and another six did not respond to e-mail 
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and telephone requests.  Of the eighteen managers interviewed five either had no agency 
workers for me to interview or said that their agency workers would not be available to 
meet with me, generally because they had just started a placement or were about to end 
a placement.  
The agency arrangements for both local authorities were complex.  Both had internal 
agencies,  sometimes referred to as banks,  with administrative and care staff directly 
employed by the local authority on casual contracts being deployed on placements from 
one day to six months.   In addition both local authorities used commercial external 
agencies  to  supply  agency  workers  across  the  occupational  spectrum  from 
administrative and care staff to occupational therapists and social workers.  During the 
research  I  interviewed  three  internal  agency  managers  and  three  external  agency 
managers.  The former worked managing care and administrative internal agency staff 
and the latter administrative workers and social workers.  It was very difficult to arrange 
to speak to external agency managers and despite many attempts to do so it was not 
possible except where it was arranged by the local authority or, in one case, an agency 
social worker.  
The  twenty  nine  agency  workers  that  I  interviewed  were  a  mix  of  fourteen  social 
workers,  one  senior  social  work  practitioner,  two  social  work  managers,  two 
occupational  therapists,  six  care workers  and four administrative workers.   I  sought 
interviews with thirty three agency workers and received no response from four; these 
four were e-mailed as there were no telephone contact details available and it is possible 
that the e-mail details for them were incorrect.  Once contact was made with agency 
workers, arranging to interview them was generally straightforward; however getting 
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contact details for these workers was far from straightforward, particularly at City.
Figure 3.1 Interview subject breakdown
Interview Subjects Number
Agency workers
Agency Social Workers 14
Agency Senior Practitioners 1
Agency Social Work Managers 2
Occupational Therapists 2
Internal agency care workers 3
External agency care workers 3
Internal Agency Administrative workers 4
Management
Line Managers 18
Human Resource Managers 2
Procurement Consultants 2
Union
Unison 6
Unite 2
GMB 2
BASW 2
Normally if a manager had been interviewed they would ask the agency workers that 
they managed whether they would be willing to speak to me.  It was most difficult to 
arrange to speak to care workers, and two of the interviews with care workers lasted 
only twenty minutes because the managers were unwilling to allow them to speak to me 
for any longer in paid work time.  It was not possible to speak to either of these workers 
outside of work time.  On average interviews lasted a little over an hour, the longest was 
two hours and twenty minutes with an external agency manager and the shortest was, as 
noted, twenty minutes with a care worker.
At the beginning of each interview, I outlined my area of research, gave confidentiality 
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assurances, asked whether they would allow me to record the discussion and confirmed 
that  interview  subjects  were  happy  to  take  part  in  the  research.   Three  of  the 
interviewees did not want their interviews to be taped and in those cases detailed notes 
were taken.  Difficulties in meeting face-to-face resulted in three of the interviews being 
conducted by telephone; these interviews were recorded and transcribed.  Ideally, these 
interviews would have been conducted face-to-face as observing 'body language' is an 
integral  part  of  interviewing  because  it  gives  the  interviewer  cues  and  allows 
opportunity  to  prompt  where  appropriate.   As  it  was  impossible  to  conduct  these 
interviews face-to-face telephone interviews were preferable to losing the opportunity to 
speak  to  these  interview subjects.   The  interviews  themselves  were  semi-structured 
using  interview  schedules  that  provided  a  check-list  of  areas  to  be  covered  (copy 
interview schedules found in Appendix A-C).
The main areas of questioning related to the research questions and themes identified in 
chapter 1. The questions for agency workers began with a discussion of how and why 
they  had  taken  agency  work.   These  questions  were  informed  by  the  literature  on 
voluntary/involuntary agency work and the bridges and traps view of agency work.  I 
moved on to questions about the differences between agency work and permanent work 
in terms of pay, status, rights and responsibilities, to look at different agency workers’ 
perceptions  of  how being  an  agency  worker  affected  their  experience  of  work.   A 
number of  questions  were asked about  whether workers had considered raising any 
problems in their current or previous employment or whether they had decided to move 
on when they had experienced problems at work.  The purpose of these questions was to 
discuss  the  sort  of  problems  that  agency  workers  had  at  work,  and  the  kinds  of 
responses that they had to them; these questions were informed by mobilisation theory 
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and the voice/exit literature.  Agency workers were asked about their interaction with 
trade  unions  to  establish  the  level  of  trade  union  engagement  and  the  workers’ 
perceptions of trade unions in the workplace.  It was important to determine workers’ 
views on the visibility of the unions, the relevance of unions to agency workers, and the 
main  incentives  and  disincentives  to  membership.  These  questions  were  central  to 
determining the desire of agency workers for representative voice through trade unions 
and their perceptions of the availability of trade unions in the workplace.
Managers were asked about the make-up of their workforce, and the changes to this 
over time, to get an idea of the level of experience that managers had in dealing with 
agency  workers  within  their  staff  group.   They  were  also  asked  about  the  local 
authorities’ policies on recruiting agency workers and the role of unions.  This was to 
determine whether managers had a shared understanding of the policies of the local 
authorities  and  implemented  them in  similar  ways.   Questions  about  the  length  of 
engagement,  conditions  of  work,  and  general  management  of  agency  workers  also 
contribute to understanding how these workers are managed differently to permanent 
staff.  These questions are informed by the fragmented work literature which identifies 
that  workers  with  triangular  relationships  often  have  complex  management 
arrangements, and they seek to explore the different ways in which managers deal with 
the complications of this triangular relationship.  The literature relating to the reasons 
that organisations engage atypical workers informed questions for managers about why 
they used agency workers and the associated advantages and disadvantages of doing so. 
The interviews with trade union representatives explored the unions interaction with 
agency workers at political, national and workplace level. Initially questions about the 
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number of agency workers within the branch and local authority were to establish how 
informed union representatives were about union policy and local practice when dealing 
with agency workers. Later questions were to establish the level of interaction between 
agency workers and unions, and to understand the strategy that was taken at branch and 
national level.
The interviews were transcribed and loaded into Nvivo, they were then coded.
Figure 3.2 Coding 
Agency workers Managers Unions/BASW
Experience of agency work
 recruitment
 training
 job security
 advantages
 disadvantages
 management
Managing agency workers
 recruitment
 discipline
 grievances
 training
 support
Union
 National policy
 Branch policy
 interaction
 hostility
 inclusion
 vulnerability
Dealing with problems
 dissatisfaction
 grievance
 exit
 voice
 support
Trade Union 
 contact
 opinion
 rejection
 support
The data within each of these headings was then reviewed to draw patterns and themes. 
Having reviewed the data on the reasons for taking agency work it  was possible to 
identify links between workers with similar reasons for selecting agency work, these 
links carried through in many cases to perceptions of job security and broad experience 
of agency work.  Analysing the data in this way allowed me to identify a typology of 
agency workers  that  reflected  differences  in  reasons  for  taking  agency work  which 
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offered some insight into the experience of different types of workers.  Five of the six 
types of agency worker were drawn from the data in this way and then taken back to 
some agency workers to validate. 
Four agency workers and two managers agreed to speak to me again should I have 
further  questions.   I  was  able  to  take  concepts  like  the  agency  worker  typology  I 
developed from my research back to such workers to check that they resonated with 
them.  This was a useful device and resulted in the addition of the category of 'donkeys 
and misfits',  a group frequently described by managers and workers.   One manager 
suggested that most agency social workers were “the donkeys and misfits that can't keep 
a proper job”, this description offered the label for the group.  Agency workers talked 
about their belief that they had to overcome the general view of permanent staff that 
they fit in this category, and managers reported having managed workers of this type. 
While this category did not reflect the direct experience of the workers within this study 
it  was  noted  by  workers  and managers  alike and therefore  included to  reflect  their 
views.  The positive response of these workers and their ability to identify themselves 
and their colleagues in my descriptions, and to suggest alterations, was a valuable part 
of the research process.  The workers themselves appeared to appreciate the opportunity 
to ensure that my research reflected their actual experience of work.  These discussions 
did not take the form of formal interviews, rather they were telephone discussions and 
e-mail exchanges as well as one informal meeting.  
Self Completion Questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed to allow me to form a general picture of how social 
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care workers feel about their work, whether they join unions, why they join, and how 
they are represented by their trade union.  It was designed to compare the views of 
agency  workers  with  their  permanently  employed colleagues.    The  rationale  for  a 
survey was to directly compare the attitudes of agency workers and their permanent 
colleagues  on issues  such  as  their  perceptions  of  job  security,  job  satisfaction,  pay, 
flexibility, control over work, and attitudes to trade unions.  It also asked workers for the 
reasons for joining or not joining trade unions.   The part of the questionnaire which 
focused on the attitudes of workers to trade unions was informed by questions in the 
surveys  used  by  Kerr  (1992)  and  Waddington  and  Whitston  (1997)  because  they 
covered the issues researched in this part of the project.
The questionnaires  were  intended to  compare  agency workers  with  their  permanent 
colleagues across a range of attitudes to their employer and to trade unions.  When the 
research was designed, it was intended that the self completion questionnaires would 
identify potential interview subjects.  It was also intended that the broad themes from 
the questionnaire would inform the interviews by identifying areas of similarity and 
difference between the perceptions of agency workers and their permanent counterparts. 
This was not possible in practice.  Met had detailed information on the location of its 
agency workers and assured me that all workers had e-mail accounts.  The questionnaire 
was sent out by e-mail but there were technical problems and the few responses that 
were received had to be ignored.  Further work ensured that it was possible to send the 
questionnaires out again by email.
At City, access for sending out the questionnaire was more complicated.  Whilst at Met 
most agency and permanent staff (excluding care workers) were comfortable using e-
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mail and word processing, the same was not true at City.  It was clear that it would be 
necessary to send the questionnaires out in paper form.  Additionally, whilst Met had 
detailed information kept centrally about its agency workers, City had no central list of 
agency staff.  In some areas, Heads of Service did not have a list of the agency staff 
working  in  their  areas.   At  the  time  of  the  research,  there  was  an  attempt  to  get 
centralised information as a stepping stone to rationalising procurement of these staff so 
some limited information was available; however it tended to be out of date.  The list 
that  was  produced  was  based  on  financial  information  rather  than  line  manager 
identification.   There  was  great  variation  regarding  what  individual  managers  were 
willing to tell me about their agency staff, from those willing to give me names and 
work addresses, to those willing to take questionnaires for their staff but not to divulge 
any personal information.  
Fig 3.3 Questionnaire response rates
Met City
Sent Returned Response 
rate (%)
Sent Returned Response 
rate (%)
Permanent 
employees
160 54 36% 100 32 32%
External 
agency 
workers
30 6 20% 31 10 32%
Internal 
agency 
workers
0 0 N/A 50 34 66%
The response rate to the survey was very low. Few agency workers participated in the 
survey. These facts mean that this research does not rely heavily on the results of the 
survey. The majority of the thesis relies on data gathered at interview. 
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The  option  of  sending  questionnaires  to  agency  workers  via  their  agencies  was 
investigated; however the agencies themselves were very reluctant to participate in any 
way in the research.  The few interviews that I conducted with agencies were at the end 
of the research and access to them was facilitated by the local authorities themselves.  
Within  both  research  sites  it  was  very  difficult  to  arrange  to  administer  the 
questionnaire.  This  lead  to  most  of  the  questionnaire  data  being  collected  after  the 
interviews had been carried out rather than providing a basis for interviewing.  The 
problems encountered in administering even a small questionnaire within this study are 
indicative of the types of difficulties that would have been faced if trying to conduct a 
survey of these workers as part of a quantitative research design.  Employers may not 
have the information about who these workers are and where they are located within the 
organisation, and agencies may be reluctant to support a survey of their staff.  While 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (2004)  and Labour Force Survey glean some 
valuable  information  in  the  area,  such  large  scale  surveys  are  expensive  and,  as 
discussed in the last chapter, may not identify agency workers accurately.  
Observation
During  the  research  the  opportunity  arose  to  directly  observe  interactions  between 
agency workers, their permanent colleagues and managers, and between agencies and 
the user organisation.   The extent to which observation came to be used was not part of 
the original design but emerged as a research method during the course of the study and 
had  particular  benefits  in  terms  of  giving  me greater  understanding  of  context,  the 
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opportunity  to  build  relationships within the  organisations,  and the ability  to  gather 
additional data.
I was keen to pursue close links with both local authorities to follow up any and all 
leads that presented themselves.  As such, over the course of the research I felt that it 
was important to maintain regular contact with gatekeepers and to seek involvement 
with developments relating to the use of agency workers within the local authorities.  I 
attended four presentations by agencies to local authority employers which offered me 
the opportunity to make personal contact with the agencies and to gather information 
about the services that they were offering to the local authorities and their means of 
marketing.  One was a master vendor (MV) presentation to managers on how the new 
arrangements would work and how they would be affected by their introduction.  The 
others were presentations by three administrative agencies to a group of representatives 
from  local  authorities  about  the  contracts  they  had  negotiated  and  the  benefits  to 
authorities of accepting them as sole or preferred suppliers.  Within City, I was able to 
attend  and  observe  meetings  with  HR,  managers  and  consultants  discussing  the 
problems with agency workers and the current arrangements in social care and possible 
future options.  In arranging interviews and distributing questionnaires I was able to 
observe  staff  in  team meetings  and  at  work  and  see  team interactions.   This  non-
participant  observation  was  unstructured  and  offered  me  unique  insights  that  both 
broadened my understanding of the background to the case study sites and gave me an 
opportunity to focus on some aspects of the interaction between agency workers and 
their colleagues to discuss at interview (Punch 2003).  
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Strengths and limitations of the research
During fieldwork, sufficient data were collected to address the research questions posed. 
The  in-depth  interviews  in  particular  offered  very  interesting  primary  data  on  the 
perspectives of a variety of agency workers.  While a wide range of data sources were 
used and significant data were collected there are areas in which additional interviews, 
questionnaires and documentary data would have improved the research.  
Access to organisations in which to conduct this research was problematic.  In Met, 
Children's and Young People's Services refused to participate, meaning that the research 
was solely based in the Adult Services Division.  In City, the picture was more complex 
and  the  organisation  delegated  decision  making  over  access  to  lower  and  lower 
organisational units.  This resulted in a patchwork of different areas of social care being 
involved with  others  refusing or  not  responding.   The result  of  having to  negotiate 
access  with  many  different  managers  within  City  was  that  negotiations  were  time 
consuming and the fieldwork took much longer than was initially intended, although 
this has lead to its own insights.  
In addition to accessing agency workers via local authorities I attempted to access them 
through their agencies.  Within Met, the master vendor was very resistant to the idea of 
allowing me access to the list of agencies from which it drew social care staff making it 
impossible  to  make contact  with  them.   Within City I  was  able  to  access  a  list  of 
agencies that had been used but it was not possible to identify which agencies were in 
use at the time of the research.  Nonetheless I was able to contact three of the listed 
agencies  all  of  whom were  unwilling  to  speak to  me.   I  attempted  to  contact  two 
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additional agencies and was unable to speak to the appropriate person despite trying to 
make contact  on  several  occasions.   I  was  able  to  speak  to  two internal  and  three 
external  agencies  during  the  research  when  agency  workers  or  senior  managers 
introduced me and assisted me with access.  The internal agencies were helpful in terms 
of  distributing  questionnaires  and  arranging  meetings  with  their  staff;  however  the 
external  agencies  felt  that  it  was  more  appropriate  for  interviews and questionnaire 
access to be agreed with the user organisation.  
The access problems I experienced in researching agency workers are indicative of the 
types  of  issues  that  unions  may  have  in  identifying  and  contacting  these  workers. 
Within City Unison periodically pays for a list of all new starters, which is all new pay-
rolled  staff.   Clearly  agency  staff  would  not  be  on  this  list,  however  there  is  no 
alternative agency worker list  available should they wish to unionise these workers. 
The poverty of information available would make organising difficult, particularly with 
a group like agency workers in social care where they are generally found in teams 
made  up  of  permanent  staff.   Agency  workers  within  both  local  authorities  were 
virtually invisible at organisational level. Few senior managers were aware of agency 
workers within their structure.  The difficulties that I encountered in accessing agency 
workers and their  invisibility  within the organisations are indicative of the kinds of 
barriers that there are to such workers accessing voice within the organisations.  Thus 
the research difficulties in themselves have become part of the findings underscoring the 
marginalisation that agency workers experience.  
This research would have benefited from additional interviews with agency workers, in 
particular short-term care workers and administrative workers, as the majority of agency 
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worker interview subjects were social workers.  One of the key aims of the project was 
to explore the terrain between the absolute models found in the literature of agency 
workers.  Whilst agency social workers were themselves diverse in a variety of ways 
explored in the following chapters it would have been helpful to have interview subjects 
that  were  more  representative  of  the  whole  social  care  workforce.   Care  and 
administrative workers enjoyed less autonomy than their social work counterparts who 
were generally able to decide for themselves how long they wanted to speak to me. 
Given that the social care sector was chosen because of the diversity of staff present it is 
unfortunate that  despite  my continued and varied approaches it  was  not  possible  to 
identify  and  interview  a  more  occupationally  diverse  group  of  agency  workers. 
Nonetheless it was possible to interview a variety of agency workers and to gather data 
from a group whose  voice is  rarely heard.   Whilst  difficulties  were  encountered in 
accessing these workers it was possible to gather sufficient detailed data to explore their 
experience of work and voice at work.  
Despite  the  limitations  of  this  study  the  methods  used  are  appropriate  means  of 
gathering  data  to  answer  the  research  questions  posed.   They  have  produced  data 
sufficient to address the research questions.  The research is situated in sites within the 
local government social care sector where agency workers are most commonly found 
and the findings can be generalised across the sector.  The public sector is a major user 
of agency workers, and the local government social care sector has a particularly high 
proportion of agency workers. Other forms of the triangular relationship are also found 
in this sector such as outsourced services and contractors.  If innovation in dealing with 
triangular employment relationships is to be found one would expect it to be in a sector 
such as this one where triangular relationships are found in a number of forms (agency 
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workers, outsourced workers, teachers). 
The agency workers in this study are not representative of agency workers within the 
UK  labour  market.  Most  are  agency  social  workers  who  are  highly  qualified, 
professional workers.  They are in a relatively privileged labour market position because 
of the current shortage of qualified workers in social work.  The administrative and care 
workers interviewed were more broadly representative of agency workers in terms of 
pay,  qualification,  labour  market  position  and  job  type.   Whilst  acknowledging the 
privileged position of  most  of  the research participants  it  is  possible  to  draw some 
conclusions about agency work in the UK from their experiences. 
In engaging with the literature it is also possible to generalise on a theoretical basis and 
to  draw  links  with  other  groups  of  workers  engaged  in  triangular  employment 
relationships.  In order to build good theory it is necessary to compare the results of the 
study  with  existing  literature  (Eisenhardt  1989).   Case  study  research  can  extend 
existing theory by applying it to new situations or groups and investigating whether 
existing  explanations  provide  an  adequately  account  for  research  findings.  Where 
findings  contradict  established  literature  the  research  can  be  probed  to  explore  the 
reasons for the conflict and this process offers the opportunity to establish emergent 
theory. An example of this from this study is the discussion around the use of 'exit' for 
agency workers. Stanworth and Druker (2004) argue that for the workers they studied 
easy access to exit was obscured and possibly even illusory, a large number of workers 
in my study reported the opposite, that exit was an easy and readily available option. 
This forced consideration of the kinds of workers in both studies that noted the different 
access to exit as a response to workplace problems.  It is possible to generalise on a 
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theoretical level about the opportunity of agency workers to act in response to problems 
at  work.  This is one example of an area in which my thesis engages with existing 
literature to make a theoretical contribution that is relevant outside the arena of local 
authority social care. 
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Chapter 4 – Temporary agency workers in local 
government social care
This  chapter  presents  background  information  on  local  government.  It  begins  by 
outlining the pressures within the sector that have precipitated a move towards the use 
of agency workers in social care, and reviews the numbers of agency workers within 
social care in the UK, their roles and the reasons given by local authorities for their use. 
How local authorities use temporary work agencies to provide workers is described, 
outlining the different available options, and the advantages to them of using agency 
workers, and the different ways in which they are recruited and deployed, are discussed. 
Finally  it  provides  a  brief  outline  of  unions  and  professional  associations  in  local 
government. 
The local government sector
This research is based in local government which forms part of the wider public sector. 
Unlike many of our European neighbours, public sector employees in the UK do not 
enjoy special privileges, for example job security conferred by statute,  nor are there 
specific legal restrictions (apart for police, armed forces and prison officers) on the right 
to join a trade union or take part in strikes.  “Although some parts of public service 
employment had been viewed, in practice, as a lifetime career with predictable patterns 
of promotion and high levels of job security, such expectations were not established by 
statute, nor explicitly recognised in common law” (Bach and Winchester 2003: 286).  
Local government is a very diverse branch of the public sector with responsibility for a 
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variety of front line services including housing, planning, transportation, education and 
social  care to  name a few.  The sector  comprises  468 local  authorities in  England, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, employing over 2.5 million workers, a figure that has 
remained stable over the last twenty years (LGPC 2003). Local authorities are not a 
homogeneous group; there are significant differences between various types of authority 
most notably between single tier authorities offering a full range of services and two tier 
authorities where responsibilities are divided between metropolitan, borough and county 
councils.   There  is  great  diversity  in  the  geographical  size  of  local  authorities,  the 
number and types of staff employed, the number and type of services offered, the social 
and  economic  status  of  the  area  and  the  political  considerations  linked  to  elected 
representatives.  Nonetheless there are a number of general features.  In its analysis of 
the sector the LGPC (2003) noted the high proportions of women workers, comprising 
75% of the workforce, and the high level of part time working arrangements, stating 
that over 40% of local government employees are women part time workers.  
Local  government  also  features  a  higher  than  average  proportion  of  older  workers 
(LGPC 2003).   It  has proportionately slightly fewer Asian workers and more Black 
workers than the rest of the economy.  Much of the sector is highly labour intensive and 
as a result employment related costs make up a substantial proportion of variable costs.  
Almost 50% of funding for local government comes from central government and a 
further 25% comes from non-domestic rates, such as business rates, which are regulated 
by  central  government  (LGPC 2003).   The remaining  25% of  funding comes from 
council tax, the level of which is decided locally, though national government does have 
the power to limit rises.  The implications of the reliance on central government funding 
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will be discussed later in the chapter.  
This research focuses on staff within Social Care departments.  Within local authorities, 
Social Service departments or directorates (SSDs) were established in 1971 to assess 
social care needs and provide or commission services for different client groups within 
a  given  geographical  area.   In  September  2006,  there  were  149  SSDs  in  England 
employing  217,  020 staff  in  adults  social  care  and 55,060 in  children's  social  care 
(LAWIG 2007a&b).  Recent changes in provision of services for children have meant 
that social care provision for children has been combined with education services to 
make up newly created Children’s Services departments within local authorities.  
While the local government workforce as a whole is predominantly female, social care 
is even more so.  Over 80% of the social care workforce are women and just over 50% 
work part time (LAWSG 2006: 5).  The proportion of the social care workforce over 
fifty  years  old  varied  from  25-50%  depending  on  occupation.   Workers  in  these 
departments  were  occupationally  diverse,  ranging  from  occupational  therapists  and 
social workers through to residential care workers, home care workers, and managers. 
Client groups range from children to elderly people and include people with physical, 
and learning difficulties and mental health problems.  
Recruitment  and  retention  problems  in  social  care  existed  across  the  occupational 
spectrum.  Having increased for three consecutive years, the overall vacancy rate in 
2005 fell to 10.5% across social care jobs.  For the fourth consecutive year, staff turn-
over fell  and now stands at  11.6% (LAWSG 2006). Local authorities identified that 
occupational therapists and social workers, particularly in Children's Services, were the 
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most difficult to recruit.  
Staffing in local government
The public sector is an important area for the study of agency workers.  In the main this 
is because the public sector uses proportionately more agency workers than the private 
sector.  The pressures on public services and local government in particular provide 
some explanation for the growth in agency work and it is helpful to note the particular 
circumstances that have been the backdrop to the growth in agency work in the public 
sector.  
Local government, as with other state employers, was seen as a model employer in its 
espousal  of  policies  such  as  Whitleyism  with  its  extensive  national  and  local 
consultation and negotiation machinery and its recognition of trade unions.  It has also 
been associated with the provision of secure employment and desirable employment 
benefits, if not high levels of pay (Farnham 1993).  
It would, however, appear that this is no longer the case; a number of authors (Morgan 
et  al. 2000,  Webb  2001,  Whit eld  2001,  Conley  2002)  have  commented  on  theﬁ  
perceptions and realities of insecurity that exist within the local government workforce 
as  well  as  the  growing  use  of  temporary  contracts,  with  their  intrinsic  insecurity. 
Beyond this there is increasing use of triangular employment relationships both in terms 
of high levels of agency workers and high levels of contracting out.   Incomes Data 
Service (2003) has reported on the increasing use of agency labour in local government. 
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Two authorities have reported that 10% of their workforce is made up by this type of 
worker.  
It is important to briefly mention the recent history of industrial relations in this sector. 
I have already outlined the wide remit of local government and the significant numbers 
of  staff  involved  in  delivering  those  services.   Local  government  is  a  very  large 
employer  within  the  public  sector  and  has  been  one  of  the  primary  political  and 
industrial battlegrounds of the 1980 and 1990s.  There were significant legislative and 
finance  administration  changes  during  the  1980’s  and  early  1990’s  put  in  place  by 
central  government (Cochrane 1993, Colling and Ferner 1995, Farnham and Horton 
1996).   New  Public  Management  (NPM)  came  to  describe  a  group  of  ideas 
implemented within the UK public sector and abroad drawing some aspects of private 
sector  management  into  the  public  sector;  their  introduction  marked  the  increasing 
marketisation of public services.  Hood (1991) offers a discussion of the main threads of 
NPM but it is important to note that the concepts were introduced by the Conservative 
governments  of  the  1980s  with  a  focus  on  extracting  economy,  efficiency  and 
effectiveness from the public sector.  Entwistle et al (2007) identify how the Labour 
governments from 1997-2007 have changed the face of new public management but 
emphasise the ongoing role of marketisation, targets and regulation.  
Some  of  the  changes  introduced  under  the  heading  of  NPM  were  policies  like 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), Best Value and most recently the efficiency 
agenda  requiring  year  on  year  savings  that  is  the  outcome  of  the  Gershon  report 
(Gershon 2004).  CCT was introduced in 1980 and extended through the 1980s and 
1990s, it required local authorities to procure services by competitive tender.  Internal 
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departments  were  able  to  bid  against  external  competitors,  however  to  be  awarded 
contracts  they  must  have  submitted  the  lowest  cost  bid  and meet  return  on  capital 
specifications (Entwistle and Laffin 2005).  Its introduction saw large-scale outsourcing 
of services and meant that delivery of many local government services was taken into 
the private sector.  Best Value replaced CCT in 1999 mandating that local authorities 
continuously  improve  the  way  they  exercise  their  functions.  Local  authorities  were 
required to  produce a  Best  Value performance plan,  record progress against  various 
performance indicators and comprehensively review services and functions over a 5 
year period (Entwistle and Laffin 2005).  In 2004 the efficiency agenda was introduced 
with  the  intention  of  focusing  scrutiny  at  the  political  and  managerial  level  on 
improving productivity and optimising resource use (Quirk 2005).  It required year on 
year savings and the redirection of resource from back office functions to the front line. 
These changes have combined to alter the way in which public sector managers need to 
operate and have changed how employees are managed within this area of the public 
sector.  The pressures on finance have encouraged the increased use of non-standard 
employment contracts including higher use of temporary, casual and agency workers 
within this traditionally secure workforce.  
There  has  been  a  significant,  centrally  applied  pressure  for  restructuring,  largely  to 
outsource services rather than to provide them directly.  This policy has at its centre cost 
reduction.   Savings  have  been  made largely  by  reducing  terms,  conditions  and job 
security  of  public  employees  (Colling  1993).   Ackers  (1996:  15)  argues  that  “the 
'efficiency' gains of privatisation and commercialisation appear to be predicated on the 
weakening of union organising, clearing the path for the adoption of non union, private 
sector employment norms”.  Within social care departments have increasingly moved 
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from direct provision to administrating a contracted out service leading to triangular 
relationships  between  the  local  authority,  the  service  provider  and  the  individual 
workers  carrying  out  the  work  that  must  then  be  assessed  by  the  local  authority 
(Fairbrother 1996).  The workers actually providing services are engaged in triangular 
relationships.  Whilst  most  of  these  workers  will  be  the  direct  employees  of  the 
contractor, they will in many cases be subject to the standards and control of the local 
authority, and ultimately their continued employment will be based on the continuing 
willingness of the local authority to purchase their services.  The use of such contractors 
means  that  local  authorities  evade  responsibility  for  the  workers  that  provide  their 
services.  While  retaining  significant  control  over  the  hours  and  mode  of  work,  by 
outsourcing services local authorities are able to avoid the consequences of being the 
legal employer.
Where it has not been possible to outsource services due to statutory duties or political 
sensitivity the terms and conditions of directly employed public sector workers have 
been challenged by the use of casualised forms of employment like temporary contracts, 
flexible contracts and agency workers (Conley 2002).
The use of agency and temporary employees is in line with the above pressures but this 
has  implications  for  local  authorities  in  terms  of  recruitment  and  retention.   Local 
government has struggled with recruiting and retaining some categories of staff for a 
number of years.  In some areas agency workers are engaged not out of any desire for 
flexibility in staffing but because it is not possible to recruit directly employed staff 
(LAWSG 2006).  Attracting staff is a pressing concern for local authorities, there are 
also concerns about the ageing workforce across certain occupational groups; with 25% 
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of local authority workers due to retire over the next decade and just 8% being under 
twenty five (Llewellyn 2005: 8).  This must, of course, be tempered by the recent age 
discrimination  legislation  and the  possibility  that  some of  these  workers  may work 
beyond retirement age.  In addition to having an ageing workforce the above-mentioned 
pressures have lead to difficulties in retaining staff within the public services.  This has 
meant  acute  staff  shortages  in  some areas.   The Audit  Commission  (2002)  cite  the 
following key  factors  to  explain  why many staff  are  now choosing to  leave  public 
employment:  “the  sense  of  being  overwhelmed  by  bureaucracy,  paper  work  and 
targets”, “insufficient resources”, “unmanageable workloads” and a growing sense of 
‘reform fatigue’.  Conley (2002) notes that in teaching and social care the shortages 
were  particularly  acute  with  teaching  facing  a  15.8%  annual  resignation  rate  and 
vacancy rates in some authorities of up to 46% among social care staff, and suggests 
that employees may be ‘voting with their feet’.
Use of agency workers in local government
It is important to identify and understand the advantages for employers of using agency 
labour.   The chapter  two dealt  with  old  and new rationales  for  the  use  of  atypical 
workers generally and specifically agency workers.  
The London Centre of Excellence1 (LCE) produced a comprehensive report based on 
the use of agency workers in local authorities across London detailing the reasons for 
the  use  of  agency  workers  in  local  government,  the  risks  of  unmanaged  agency 
1 An organisation comprising membership from all London boroughs with the role of information 
sharing, encouraging collaborative working across London and keeping stakeholders up to date with 
the procurement, improvement and efficiency agenda's.
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procurement  and the options for managing agency procurement  (LCE 2005).   They 
argue  that  agency  workers  are  used  in  local  government  for  a  variety  of  reasons 
including flexibility, covering absence, covering vacancies while recruiting, for seasonal 
work, where immediacy is important in achieving a project or business need, where they 
are a cheaper option and where it is not possible to recruit permanently (LCE 2005). 
Whilst  they  note  the  use  of  agency  workers  because  of  recruitment  and  retention 
problems, they also argue that the use of agency workers can be a positive choice in 
many areas.  The LCE report (2005) notes both new and traditional reasons for using 
agency workers but gives no details of which reasons are most commonly offered by 
local authorities.  
Within social care the local authority workforce survey group (LASWG) reports on the 
reasons  for  using  agency  workers.   As  noted  earlier  recruitment  and  retention  of 
permanent staff in social care have lead to particularly high levels of agency workers in 
this  setting,  particularly  within  social  work  and occupational  therapy roles.   Whilst 
recruitment and retention problems do push SSDs to use agency workers, there are also 
other drivers.  Figure 4.1 reports on the reasons SSDs have given for using long-term 
agency (over one month) staff:
120
Fig 4.1 Reasons for using long-term (over 1 month) agency staff 
Percentages of 
local authorities 
with long-term 
agency workers
Reasons for using long-term (over 1 month) agency staff
Cover for 
vacancies 
Cover for 
absence 
Replace 
permanent 
employees 
short-term 
assignments 
Other 
reason 
Eastern 71 100 14 43 14
East Midlands 100 100 0 60 0
London 87 80 13 53 0
North East 75 75 0 0 0
North West 100 86 29 43 14
South East 100 83 33 38 0
South West 88 88 13 38 0
West Midlands 100 71 29 14 14
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
89 78 22 22 0
Englan
d
2001 98 82 16 52 10
2002 95 75 17 49 8
2003 92 64 13 52 7
2004 96 82 18 56 6
2005 90 84 18 40 6
Source: (LAWSG, 42: 2006)
Fig 4.2 Reasons for using short-term (under 1 month) agency staff 
Source: (LAWSG, 41: 2006)
Local  authorities  report  similar  reasons  for  the  use  of  long  and  short-term  agency 
workers.   As shown in Figs  4.1  and 4.2 2005,  90% of  local  authorities in  England 
reported using short and long-term agency workers to cover vacant posts, slightly fewer 
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Percentages of 
local authorities 
with short-term 
agency workers
Reasons for using short-term (under 1 month) agency staff 
Cover for 
vacancies 
Cover 
for 
absence 
Replace 
permanent 
employees 
short-term 
assignments 
Other 
reason 
Eastern 71 86 14 71 14
East Midlands 100 100 0 20 0
London 100 94 12 47 12
North East 33 100 33 33 0
North West 100 88 38 75 0
South East 83 100 33 33 0
South West 100 100 14 71 14
West Midlands 88 88 13 63 0
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
90 60 20 70 0
England 90 89 18 56 6
reported using agency workers for covering for absent staff, 84% used long-term agency 
workers and 89% use short-term agency workers for this reason.  The same source notes 
that in the five years from 2001-2005 at least 90% of local authorities reported using 
long-term agency workers to cover vacancies in social care, though under 20% reported 
using agency workers to replace permanent employees.  These figures suggest that the 
preference of employers in this sector is for permanent employees, with agency workers 
being used to 'plug holes' if it is not possible to recruit permanent employees or while 
such workers are recruited.  Within this staff group agency workers are still employed 
for primarily traditional reasons.  Whilst agency workers are employed in some local 
authorities  to  do  jobs  previously  done  by  permanent  employees  far  more  local 
authorities use agency workers to cover absence, vacancies or for short-term projects.  
Fig 4.3 Agency staffing figures
Source: (LAWSG 42-43: 2006)
Figure 4.3 shows the extremely high level of use of agency workers particularly within 
London authorities.  There is no breakdown within the ‘Rest of England’ for county 
versus city or metropolitan authorities to suggest which have the greater percentage of 
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Area Total direct 
Staffing 
Level (FTE)
Agency 
Staff 
(FTE)
Agency 
staff as % 
total 
staffing
% of staffing 
spent on agency 
staff
Short-
term 
agency
London 25,680 1,836 7.1 1.7
Rest of England 190,700 3,766 2.0 1.3
England - total 216,380 5,602 2.6 1.4
Long-
term 
agency
London 25,680 3,465 13.5 13.7
Rest of England 190,700 3,460 1.8 2.2
England - total 216,380 6,925 3.2 4.2
Total 
agency
London 25,680 5,301 20.6 15.4
Rest of England 190,700 7,226 3.8 3.5
England - total 216,380 12,527 5.8 5.6
agency workers.  It is also notable that whilst for long-term agency staff the percentage 
of payroll costs exceeds the percentage of headcount the same is not true for short-term 
agency staff.  The figure below goes some way to explaining the differences.
Fig 4.4 Location of agency staff in social care
Percentage of staff Long-term 
(2004)
Long-term 
(2005)
short-term
Field social workers (children) 31 30 3
Field social workers (other) 19 20 1
Occupational therapists 4 5 0
Home care organisers 1 0 0
Home care staff 9 6 26
Interim managers 1 1 0
Residential homes (children)
-Managers and supervisors 3 0 1
-Care staff 6 5 8
Residential homes (elderly people)
-Managers and supervisors 0 0 1
-Care staff 16 4 49
Residential homes (other adults)
-Managers and supervisors 0 0 1
-Care staff 10 3 5
Other
Administrative staff * 14 3
Other  types  of  staff  not  included 
above
* 12 3
Source: (LAWSG 44: 2006)
It  appears  from  Figure  4.4  that  professional,  administrative  and  non-professional 
workers are used in different ways by local government social care employers.  For 
professional and administrative workers, agency work appears to be typically long-term. 
Care workers, whether they are engaged as home care or within residential homes, are 
used for short periods.
Forde and Slater (2005) and Kirkpatrick and Hoque (2003) amongst others comment  on 
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the poorer pay and conditions of many agency workers.  However, within the social care 
workforce many professional agency workers enjoy substantially better pay than their 
permanent counterparts.  There is a true division within the social care workforce both 
on the grounds of pay levels and also as previously discussed with the duration of the 
contracts  as  professional  and  administrative  workers  tend  to  work  on  long-term 
contracts  whilst  care  workers  are  generally  engaged  on  a  short-term  basis.   The 
differences of pay and professional status and length of placement will allow me to 
consider a variety of factors that may affect issues of voice.
IDS (2003) reported that nationally agency workers made up a relatively small part of 
the Local Government workforce, and most agency workers were found in clerical and 
administrative roles as well as Social Work and care work. They found that wages were 
higher for professionally qualified workers than for their permanent counterparts, but 
that manual workers were paid at around the same rate as directly employed workers. 
They  suggested  that  all  workers  fared  worse  in  terms  of  pension  and  holiday 
entitlement.  Most Local Authorities were unable to make an assessment of the relative 
cost of agency staff compared with permanent staff; they were also unable to assess the 
impact of the use of agency workers on service delivery.  One third of Local Authorities 
were  unable  to  provide  figures  of  the  actual  number  of  agency  workers  that  they 
employed. 
IDS  (2003)  identified  the  difficulty  in  accessing  information  on  the  use  of  agency 
workers  in  Local  Government.  The  research  was  conducted  using  a  survey  and 
interviews at six case study Local Authorities.  Difficulties arose because decisions to 
recruit and terminate agency workers were made by local line managers and no data 
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were collected across the local authority by HR.  Four of the six local authorities that 
they interviewed were unable to even provide an assessment of how the cost of using 
agency workers compared with permanent employees.  These problems are indicative of 
the difficulties involved in researching this group of workers and reflect some of the 
challenges that were faced in undertaking the research for this thesis. The paucity of 
information held centrally by local authorities on agency workers makes them difficult 
to identify and research, it would also make it problematic for trade unions to identify, 
recruit and represent these workers.
The information that is available for the use of agency workers in Local Authorities 
points to their increased use in key professional roles (LAWSG; 2005, 2006).  While 
some of the growth in the use of agency workers in such roles is likely to be demand 
-ide  driven,  including  employers  wanting  to  cover  sickness  absence  and  short-term 
vacancies,  supply side reasons also figure highly as employers are unable to recruit 
permanently  to  some  key  posts.   This  research  indicated  that  some  managers  felt 
compelled to use agency workers because despite repeated recruitment efforts they had 
been unable to  recruit  any permanent  staff.  A key feature of  the  increased level  of 
agency workers in Local Government Social Work is the desire of managers to recruit 
permanently and the supply side pressure to continue to use agency workers. 
In summary therefore, agency and casual workers are employed in local government 
across the occupational spectrum for reasons ranging from reduction in cost for many 
non-professional roles to labour market shortage and high staff turnover for social work 
and occupational therapy jobs.  
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Procurement of agency workers in local government
Traditionally agency workers in local government have been recruited by line managers 
directly contacting agencies with their requirements on an ad-hoc basis.  LCE (2005) 
argue that this is an uncontrolled approach and that there are significant problems with 
this method of procurement.  With ad-hoc use of agency workers it can be challenging 
for an organisation to calculate its agency spend, to manage the risk of workers accruing 
employee status and to assess the added value that these workers bring to a functional 
unit.  The lack of high-level management information poses three types of challenge: 
Firstly it is not possible to get a full picture of organisational staffing without knowing 
the extent of agency working within an authority.  Secondly, it is impossible to assess 
whether  there  are  equalities  issues,  such  as  gender  or  race  discrimination  on  an 
aggregate  level  for  agency  workers.   Thirdly,  it  becomes  impossible  to  manage  an 
effective strategic approach to intertemporal recruitment at best and basic staff cover at 
worst.  There may also be varied terms from the agencies involved, including whether a 
‘temp to perm’ fee is charged, the level of the fee and also the level of commission for 
the agency.  It may be difficult to audit the checks on workers done by agencies, which 
may  be  particularly  problematic  for  checks  that  are  legally  mandated  like  work 
eligibility  and  CRB2, especially  where  many  workers  are  supplied  by  a  variety  of 
agencies.  Furthermore it can be challenging and costly to manage procurement of these 
workers  or  to  ensure  that  managers  within  organisations  comply  with  corporate 
purchasing guidelines and recruit from contracted suppliers.  Eastern Shires Purchasing 
Organisation (ESPO), an organisation bringing together a number of local authorities to 
consolidate procurement, noted a variety of issues experienced by its local authorities in 
the use of ad-hoc procurement of agency workers:
2 Criminal Record Bureaux checks to exclude people that are unsuitable for working with children and 
vulnerable adults due to a criminal conviction
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 Temporary  agency  workers  have  not  possessed  appropriate  qualifications  or 
knowledge / experience to meet the person specification specified; for example 
in terms of workers having suitable skills.  
 Agencies have been unable to source certain categories of staff i.e. Professional 
or Technical staff.
 Agencies have charged high rates of commission across the board, regardless of 
job category.
 Agencies have attempted to charge introduction fees to the authority when a 
Temporary  Worker  has  applied  for  a  vacancy  via  the  Participant’s  equal 
opportunities procedure
 There are high internal costs relating to both transaction processing and overall 
contract management.
(Eastern Shires Purchasing Organisation 2006)
Despite the many concerns about the ad-hoc approach, it has often been the way agency 
workers have been procured by local authorities.  A variety of alternative arrangements 
exist from the provision of preferred suppliers' of agency workers, with contracts and 
service  level  agreements,  to  master  vendor  arrangements  that  effectively  take 
responsibility for procurement of all agency staff.  Since the late 1990’s there has been 
increasing use of a third party to co-ordinate the procurement of agency staff as well as 
the  growth of  dedicated  centralised procurement  functions within local  government. 
LCE identifies four options for a managed service procuring agency workers: vendor 
neutral, master vendor, internal solution and partially outsourced human resources.  
Vendor  neutral  solutions  mean  that  staff  are  not  provided  directly  by  the  vendor. 
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Agencies are tiered based on a variety of factors but performance is often cited.  The 
vendor  manages  the  procurement  process  by  sending  out  the  person  specification 
initially to the first tier of agencies.  They manage the procurement process and act as a 
single point of contact for line managers.  Managed vendor services are similar, but they 
also  supply  agency  workers  directly.   These  approaches  share  common  advantages 
including  reduced  cost,  better  quality  of  staff  and  checks,  better  management 
information  and  improved  vacancy  fill  rates.   (Matrix  2006) 
(http://www.matrixmanage.com website, 24/7/06)
An internally  managed service is  essentially  the same as  the neutral  vendor option. 
However it involves the creation of a department to choose suppliers and manage the 
process of procuring agency workers.  LCE (2006) note that the cost of doing this may 
be impractical, particularly where an out-of-hours service is needed and that the local 
authorities may not posses the expertise to run the operation effectively.  
Partially  outsourced  human  resources  is  potentially  the  most  radical  option  as  it 
involves  outsourcing  all  recruitment  for  permanent,  temporary  and agency staff.   A 
master vendor is appointed to manage all recruitment and advertises permanently for 
some  positions  whilst  filling  others  with  through  the  normal  MV  process.   This 
approach is less common than the MV and NV options.  
In addition to the options identified above many local authorities use internal agencies 
to  supply  certain  groups  of  workers.   The  five  local  authorities  that  I  interviewed 
mentioned such arrangements in relation to library staff, care workers, administrative 
workers and teachers.  These agencies are sometimes referred to as 'casual pools' or 
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'banks'.   Workers  normally  work  under  causal  contracts  meaning  that  they  are  not 
obliged to accept work and nor is the organisation obliged to provide it.  These staff are 
not referred to in the LCE (2005) report, nor are they mentioned in other documents on 
agency workers.
Unions in local government
From the beginning of the twentieth century local government employers have viewed 
trade  unions  as  important  and  legitimate  organisations  for  assisting  workers  in 
articulating their  interests.   Local  government  employers generally  have encouraged 
unionisation and joint regulation of terms and conditions of employment.  The trade 
union with the largest membership in local government is Unison.  It was created out of 
merger between three public sector trade unions, the National and Local Government 
Officers  Association  (NALGO),  National  Union  of  Public  Employees  (NUPE)  and 
Confederation of Health Service Employees (COHSE) in 1993 (Terry 2000).  Until the 
creation of Unite from the amalgamation of Amicus and T&G in 2007 Unison was the 
United Kingdom's largest trade union.  It has  1.3 million members across the public 
sector  and  in  private  sector  organisations  that  provide  public  services  (Unison, 
17.10.2007).  It has over 1200 branches throughout the UK and 13 regional offices.  
The  unions  that  came  together  to  form  Unison  had  different  membership  bases, 
organisational  structures  and  political  affiliations.   Within  local  government  both 
NALGO and NUPE had representative structures that were amalgamated into a single 
structure within each local authority.  Whilst union membership is still split between 
GMB,  Unite  and  Unison  in  most  local  authorities  Unison's  share  of  members  is 
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massively larger than the other two trade unions.  
In addition to Unison, both Unite and GMB have members within some parts of local 
government.  Neither union has a significant presence in social care.  Because Unison is 
the union that represents most workers in local authority social care, particularly within 
my case studies, this thesis primarily looks at its role in facilitating voice for agency 
workers in this context with limited consideration of the policies and practices of GMB 
and Unite.  
 
Whilst  the UK system of  collective bargaining is  primarily  based at  the workplace, 
within local government collective bargaining is conducted at national level.  Separate 
collective bargaining arrangements exist for different staff groups.  The largest of these 
is the Local Government Service National Joint Council (NJC).  There are also national 
bodies to deal with Craft, Youth and Soulbury employees and separate arrangements for 
Teachers and Fire fighters.  
The vast majority of social care staff fall within the local government Service NJC.  It is 
comprised  of  local  government  employer  representatives  and  representatives  from 
Unison, Unite and GMB.  It was formed in 1997 and covers most local government 
employees, and is the largest bargaining unit in the UK.  There is also scope for local 
level bargaining,  the incidence of which has increased in recent years.   The present 
system for NJC staff rests on national level framework negotiations with local flexibility 
for  detailed pay rates  and conditions.   Not  all  local  authorities  are  members  of  the 
Employers' Organisation, and therefore bound by the collective agreement, however the 
two local authorities presented within this thesis are. 
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Professional associations also exist within the public sector.  Some of these, like the 
teaching unions, represent workers at the workplace, in pay setting through pay review 
bodies and at a professional level.  Others like the British Association of Social Work do 
not engage with employers in collective bargaining, preferring to focus on professional 
matters.   Within  social  care  there  are  two  professional  associations;  one  represents 
social workers and the other occupational therapists.
Membership of BASW is open only to professionally qualified social workers.  Benefits 
of  membership include access  to  the advice and representation service,  professional 
indemnity cover, personal injury insurance, access to training courses and conferences 
at  discounted rates,  subscription to the association's  monthly magazine discounts on 
other  publications.   In  addition  BASW  facilitates  a  wide  variety  of  branches, 
committees,  special  interest  groups and international  contacts  to  provide  forums for 
different types of people to gain support from other social workers.  These services are 
not premised upon the assumption of direct employment.  
Whilst the UK trade union movement is clearly focused upon the workplace, BASW 
undertakes  little  workplace  representation.   It  does  have  a  small  advice  and 
representation  function  but  this  is  certainly  not  the  major  focus  of  its  activity.   It 
explicitly  advises  members  to  also join Unison.   BASW members that  are  not  also 
members  of a  trade union are not  officially entitled to advice and representation in 
relation to  service conditions  or  problems at  work.   Union members  are  entitled to 
support if union representation has been inadequate.  This naturally limits the level of 
representation on workplace issues.
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Chapter 5 – Outlining City and Met
This chapter offers a broad background to both local authority case studies. It identifies 
that  most  agency workers  in  both  local  authorities  are  employed for  the  traditional 
reasons  of  covering  vacancies  and  absence.  The  arrangements  in  place  for  the 
procurement  of  agency  workers  are  reviewed,  outlining  the  internal  and  external 
agencies used by both authorities, and the advantages and disadvantages that managers 
identify  in  using  agency  workers  are  then  discussed,  broadly  finding  that  agency 
workers provide valuable cover where vacancies cannot be filled, and in some cases are 
a  lower  cost  option.  For  most  managers  these  positives  are  outweighed  by  the 
performance problems associated with the use of agency workers primarily arising from 
their impermanence. 
Background to City
City covers a small  geographical  area with a population of just  over 230,000.  The 
number of people living in the area covered by City is declining mostly as a result of 
outward  migration  and  little  inward  migration  and  the  birth  rate  is  declining  more 
quickly than average.  The area has a significant industrial heritage but its traditional 
industries  have  suffered  major  decline  which  is  visible  throughout  the  area.   The 
industrial history of the area is important to unionisation; many council workers have 
previously been employed within mining and manufacturing that had significant trade 
union presence.  The area experiences high levels of deprivation.  Around one in four of 
the  population  live  in  areas  that  are  in  the  10%  most  deprived  areas  of  England. 
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Average household income is more than 25% below the national average and levels of 
income support are 50% above the national average.  
City employs 12,000 staff.   A recent and ongoing restructuring makes it  difficult  to 
assess the number of social care staff and particularly within Children’s Services.  City 
has retained all its older people’s care homes and staffs them internally.  For this reason 
they employ more staff in Older People’s Services than other authorities.
The staffing situation for social workers was very problematic with many teams being 
under resourced.  The lack of qualified social workers was noted in City’s Joint Area 
Review (2006) which pointed to a lack of suitably trained and qualified staff dealing 
with  looked-after  children.   The corporate  assessment  report  (2006)  cited  persistent 
failures  to  address  recruitment  and retention  problems in  social  care.   In  interview 
human resource officers alluded to 25% vacancy rates in some social work teams in 
Children’s Services, though the rate in Adult's Services was much lower.  
The recruitment and retention problems experienced by City have resulted in a reliance 
on agency social workers in Children’s Social Care.  Adult's Social Care made a whole 
service  decision  in  early  2006  not  to  use  agency  workers.  Those  interviewed  were 
amongst the very few remaining and all of them were in the process of converting to 
permanent contracts or leaving the authority.  Managers reported that the key reason for 
discontinuing the use of agency workers in social work roles was budgetary.  Agency 
social workers were used primarily to cover vacant posts because no permanent workers 
could be recruited.
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At the time of the research, the decision to fill a post with an agency worker was taken 
by the line manager along with their  head of service.   Line managers then decided 
which agencies to use and how to recruit agency workers. Because agency workers were 
recruited in this way and there was no central  reporting,  there was no management 
information  available about  the  agency  workforce  within  City.   No  centralised 
monitoring took place on the length of placements, demographics of the workforce or 
cost of individual agency staff.  Second and third tier managers generally kept track of 
the number of workers and some details, but this information was not centralised nor 
was it generally up to date.  Management consultants were in place to review the agency 
situation in City; when they requested a list of all agency workers within the authority 
they received different information from each directorate.  
There seems little consistent understanding on the part of managers at all levels of what 
an agency worker is and whether or not consultants, interim managers, casual workers 
are included.  The local authority's finance department was able to produce accounts for 
departmental spend on agency workers broken down by agency; however they believed 
that the information was very questionable and that the actual spend could be up to 
100%  more  than  what  was  reported.   This  uncertainty  led  to  problems  with  my 
contacting  agency  workers  within  City  and  difficulties  in  arranging  for  my 
questionnaire to be sent to agency staff.  
The difficult accessing managers and agency workers is exemplified by the failure of 
the  Human Resources  department  to  put  together  standards  for  the  recruitment  and 
employment  of  agency  workers.   For  a  period  of  over  12  months  HR  had  been 
attempting to speak to line managers and heads of service to formulate standards to give 
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to agencies and line managers in order to standardise the treatment of agency workers, 
primarily focused on agency social workers.  At the time of the research the project had 
been shelved as no managers had been willing to meet with the HR department. 
Agency care and administrative workers were also used within City.  They were used 
for three main reasons; firstly care workers were used for short-term cover for absence, 
annual leave and staffing shortages in care homes.  Secondly, both administrative and 
care workers were used to cover vacancies during recruitment.  Finally administrative 
workers were used to cover projects and roles when there was a recruitment freeze. 
These workers were supplied by a variety of external agencies and the two internal 
agencies.  Managers requiring administrative and care workers were expected to use the 
internal agencies as a first port of call and to use external agencies only when workers 
were not available internally.  There were no processes in place to define which external 
agencies should be used.   The authority was aware of the problems associated with 
agency  workers  accruing  employee  status  through  repeat  contracts;  in  fact  within 
Children’s Services an agency worker had submitted an employment tribunal claim for 
unfair  dismissal.   This  awareness  had  not  translated  into  guidance  for  managers  or 
training  and  other  than  financial  controls  there  were  no  constraints  on  managers 
selecting the workers that they wanted.
City had two internal agencies, one managing teaching and administrative staff and the 
other managing care workers.  They operated quite differently from each other.  Both 
recruited  through  the  council’s  normal  recruitment  procedure.   The  internal 
administrative agency placed staff for periods of around twelve weeks and then required 
that they have a break in service of at least a day before their next placement.  They 
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allowed staff to have up to two consecutive placements with the same work unit.  The 
internal agency for care staff operated very much like an external agency offering staff 
in very short-term placements.  Managers contacted the casual care pool to fill shifts 
within older people’s care homes, often they provided a list of shifts up to two weeks 
ahead that they need to be filled but they also requested people at very short notice. 
Their  staff  included  people  that  worked  within  the  council  and  wanted  to  work 
additional hours and external candidates that had been appointed only to do internal 
agency work.  Occasionally applicants that were unsuccessful for permanent care work 
with the council were referred to the internal agency for casual work.  In both cases, the 
authority believed that the costs involved in using casual staff were lower than those for 
external agency staff filling similar roles and the council felt that, as these staff had been 
through the rigorous recruitment process and an induction, they are better  placed to 
meet the needs of the authority.  In a recent review of spending on internal agency 
clerical workers the authority came to the view that they ceased to provide the most 
economical option and were therefore expanding the use of two external agencies to 
provide clerical and administrative staff.  
It is helpful here to outline the conditions of service for these workers.  Both internal 
agencies ‘employed’ workers on a casual basis, these staff were not considered by City 
to have employee status with the local authority and were not entitled to sick pay.  They 
had recently been given access to the local government pension scheme.  They were 
engaged in a triangular relationship and were recruited and inducted by the internal 
agency and placed by them in suitable postings.  Whilst within these postings they were 
managed  by  the  workplace  manager  and  most  training  was  at  the  local  manager's 
discretion.  This relationship was very similar to the relationship for external agency 
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workers  with one important  difference,  both the agency manager  and the  local  line 
manager  were  ultimately  agents  of  a  single  ‘employer’.   This  may  have  two 
consequences, firstly it may be more likely that these workers are considered employees 
and secondly, it may allow workers a greater opportunity to challenge workplace issues 
via the internal agency managers who would not have a merely commercial relationship 
with the organisation.  
Background to Met
Met's Corporate Assessment Report (2007) notes that it is a medium sized outer London 
borough with a population of 250,000.  The community is ethnically and economically 
diverse.  Its Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) community stands at 36.5%. 
There are huge disparities between the wealthiest and poorest sections of Met.  One 
ward is in the 5% least deprived in England with an unemployment rate of 1.4%, with 
another ranking in the top 11% of the most deprived wards in England with a staggering 
8.1% unemployment.  These figures contrast with a UK average unemployment of 3.4% 
and an outer London average of 3.5%
The local authority reports that while it is representative of its community with regard to 
black and white workers, it  struggles to be representative of Asian workers.  Within 
older people’s services the authority employs eight hundred people but it has outsourced 
significant parts of its function including 81% of home care and it only retained one 
care home in house.
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Both  GMB and  Unison  have  full  time  representatives  supporting  social  care  staff. 
Tension during the Unison merger meant that a substantial number of long standing 
union  members  within the social  care workforce transferred  their  membership  from 
NALGO to GMB.  Unison and GMB both report around 25% density.  Social workers 
and occupational therapists also joined their professional associations.  
Like other London boroughs Met has recruitment and retention difficulties within social 
care particularly with social  workers and occupational therapists.   It  has launched a 
campaign to  recruit  in  this  area  and has  increased both  financial  and  non financial 
rewards.  Agency social workers are used primarily to fill vacant posts that managers 
are unable to fill on a permanent basis.  Agency workers are also used in administrative 
and care roles.  Agency care workers are used for three main reasons, firstly to cover 
absence and holidays in day care centres and care homes, secondly to fill posts on an 
ongoing basis when there is a recruitment freeze and finally to cover a finite piece of 
work such as when a service user needs additional assistance for a set period.  While 
there are severe recruitment and retention problems in social work, the same is not true 
of care work.  Most permanent care workers are long standing members of staff and 
vacancies  are  rare.   Agency administrative  workers  are  also used to  cover  sickness 
absence and holidays, projects and where recruitment freezes are in operation.  
Met  is  part  of  the  London  Contract  and  Supplies  group,  a  procurement  group 
encompassing local authorities in the Greater London area as well as other public sector 
bodies.  Its  purpose  is  to  jointly  negotiate  purchase  contracts.  It  has  recognised  the 
potential cost savings and organisational benefits of the Managed Vendor approach and 
has two negotiated contracts that can be implemented by its members.  The first contract 
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is for administrative and clerical staff where a local authority has negotiated agreements 
with  three  agencies,  Select,  Adecco  and  Spring  personnel, to  introduce  common 
standards, reduce costs and administration and create savings by aggregating demand 
(http://www.lcsg.org/site/about.htm, 17/7/06), though Met has chosen to use Adecco as 
its sole supplier.  The second is a master vendor arrangement where another authority 
has negotiated a contract with a master vendor for technical, professional and care staff. 
In addition to its external agency partners, Met has its own internal agency for care and 
administrative workers that is set up to operate like external agencies.  Workers are 
recruited  locally  though  normal  council  recruitment  procedures  on  casual  contracts. 
The intention is that these workers do not accrue employee status and they are informed 
that they do not have to accept work, nor does the council have an obligation to provide 
any.  Managers are able to call the casual pool to fill roles either on a day by day basis 
or for longer periods.  Managers are expected to try to use the casual pool in the first 
instance where possible rather than using an agency.  
Within Met,  one external and one internal agency are used to supply administrative 
staff.  For all other staff, a master vendor arrangement was in place.  This meant strict 
monitoring of the use of agency workers, co-ordinated by an external company.  As 
noted  in  line  with  the  national  figures,  Met  experiences  recruitment  and  retention 
difficulties.  Its Social Care & Health Adult  Services Joint Workforce plan candidly 
notes:
“Social care roles are in general relatively low paid and stressful and the nature  
of work is demanding.  Time pressures create conflicts, especially in domiciliary  
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care where there are often anti-Social Working hours.  Personal security issues  
and the levels of violence, threats and abuse, especially in residential and day  
care  settings,  contribute  to  the  recruitment  difficulties  experienced  in  this  
sector...The demand for all levels of staff outstrips the supply” (2006: 12)
In the last chapter the national trend to an ageing workforce was noted.  This is also of 
concern to Met.  In line with the national trends, 20% of the permanent workforce is due 
to retire in the next ten years and less than 10% are under thirty.  For home care staff, 
the figures are even more stark; almost half of home care staff are due to retire within 
the next ten years.  The highest levels of vacancies at the time of the research were 
amongst  social  workers  (21%),  followed  by  day  care  (15%),  domestic  (13%)  and 
administrative (13%) staff (Social Care & Health Adult Services Joint Workforce, 26 
2006).  Whilst there were clear staff shortages in many areas, not all agency workers 
were  in  place  due  to  the  inability  to  recruit  permanent  staff.   There  was  some 
uncertainty about the future of the day centres at Met and this resulted in vacancies 
being covered by agency care workers rather than being advertised as permanent roles. 
Some agency workers were also taken on for projects, to cover for sickness absence and 
holidays.  
The highest levels of agency staff are found in social work and occupational therapy. 
Since appointing a master vendor and a single agency for administrative staff Met has 
monitored the demographics of its agency workforce in a similar way to its permanent 
workforce  and  detailed  information  was  available  on  ethnicity,  age,  disability  and 
gender.
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Met  has  recognised  the  scale  of  its  recruitment  and  retention  problems  and  has 
undertaken research to see what might encourage workers to take permanent roles.  This 
has  included labour  market  research leading to  increased pay  for  social  work  staff. 
Other  ideas  under  consideration were the  possibility  of  very  flexible  contracts  with 
workers being offered six months on and six months off or term time only work, the 
opportunity to take a long leave of absence if requested, and the possibility of rotating 
through  departments  to  get  varied  experience.   Each  of  these  has  been  considered 
following discussions with agency social workers within the local authority about the 
benefits of agency work, questionnaires, exit interviews and preliminary feedback from 
this research.  
The master vendor arrangement for the procurement of agency workers at Met means 
that  an  external  organisation  co-ordinates  the  recruitment  of  agency  staff  in  care, 
professional and technical roles.  Managers supply the role specification and the master 
vendor requests that suppliers from a preferred supplier list provide people meeting the 
specification.  The manager is then given a fixed number of curriculum vitaes meeting 
the specification within the cost  parameters to  review and decide who to interview. 
Master and neutral vendors market themselves as efficient; a way of reducing agency 
spend,  minimising  management  time  recruiting  agency  workers  and  reducing 
transaction costs  by single  invoices  and electronic  time sheets.   For  managers,  this 
arrangement  means  that  there  is  a  single  point  of  contact.   Master  vendors  do  not 
become  an  intermediary  in  the  employment  relationship  and  are  not  involved  in 
resolving  workplace  issues.   The  master  vendor  accepts  a  job  specification  from a 
manager, sends on to the list of preferred suppliers, collates their responses and checks 
that  they meet  the job specification and then sends an agreed number of  candidate 
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profiles to the manager.  Once MV returns candidate profiles to managers, they become 
involved only in the administrative and financial aspects of appointment.  Managers are 
expected to make recruitment decisions.  Whilst the rate paid to the worker is variable, 
the agency mark-up is agreed with each supplier.  The major savings accrued by the 
master vendor solution at Met are in the reduced level of mark-up, meaning reduced 
cost without any additional risk of receiving less experienced or lower quality staff.  
At Met, officially, procurement of all administrative and clerical agency staff should 
have been via Adecco from April 2006 all other staff should have been recruited through 
the master  vendor.  At  the time of  the research,  most  agency workers at  Met were 
employed prior to the master vendor arrangements being finalised.  Generally, managers 
individually contacted their agency of choice (usually from the preferred supplier list 
prepared by HR) and recruited via them.  
The  detailed  management  information  held  by  Met  on  agency  workers  allows  the 
authority  to  identify  agency  workers  who  they  consider  to  be  at  risk  of  accruing 
employee status because of their length of service. Where an agency worker has been in 
a  single  placement  for  nine  months  managers  are  informed,  and  they  are  asked to 
contact employee relations before termination of contract.  Managers are expected to 
dismiss  before  the  twelve  month  mark.  However,  there  was  no  monitoring  of  the 
‘cycling’ of agency staff where they are used repeatedly by different departments within 
the authority with no break in service.  
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Advantages and disadvantages of using agency 
workers
Agency workers were used at Met and City for four key reasons.  Firstly both Local 
authorities had severe recruitment and retention problems in social care and were unable 
to fill permanent posts.  Agency workers were used to fill such vacant posts either while 
recruitment campaigns were ongoing or long-term (months to years).  Secondly, both 
Local authorities used agency workers as short-term cover for holidays and absence 
(usually  on  a  shift  by  shift  basis)  in  care  homes  to  ensure  that  minimum staffing 
requirements  were  met.   Thirdly,  administrative  and  care  staff  were  used  to  cover 
vacancies  and projects  normally  lasting  up  to  six  months.   Finally,  at  Met,  agency 
workers were used in day care centres primarily because there was some uncertainty 
about the future of the service, so no permanent posts were being filled.  Managers in 
this setting also said they thought agency workers were a helpful part of their staffing 
structure because they were cheaper and offered more flexibility.  
Traditional reasons for using agency workers were cited as the primary reasons by most 
managers, agency workers were most commonly used to cover absences and vacancies. 
Only Met used agency workers in a strategic manner replacing permanent employees to 
add numerical flexibility and to protect core staff from changes in the structure of the 
organisation.  
I have categorised the advantages and disadvantages of using agency workers into three 
areas: financial, labour market and performance.  
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In the main the advantages and disadvantages are two sides of the same coin.  The 
Director of adult and community services at Met cited the advantages as:
 “Flexibility, immediacy, the experience is more diverse, they take less time to recruit…
[and] in the short-term they can be cheaper”
But the flexibility and immediacy in terms of getting people into the organisation is 
mirrored by the speed with which they leave.  The variety of experience that workers 
have often means that they have not stayed long in a role or area to get the depth of 
experience some placements need.  The savings in the short-term are not sustained when 
these  workers  remain  in  role  for  long periods.   The  following  section  will  expand 
further on these areas.
Financial
Agency workers could be cheaper than their permanent counterparts in a number of 
ways.  For some agency workers, generally care workers and administrative workers, 
the direct payroll cost was lower even when accounting for the agency mark up. Agency 
workers  can  be  recruited  without  expensive  advertising  and  lengthy  recruitment 
processes which means a saving of management time and advertising costs.  Agency 
workers do not present additional costs for sickness, pensions, annual leave, and have 
reduced  costs  for  management  and  training.   The  county  local  authority  gave  line 
managers a breakdown of the total cost of employment of their permanent staff which 
included pay, pensions, management and accommodation costs s that they were able to 
compare the cost of agency workers with the total cost of permanent staff.  The three 
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managers at County reported that using this costing agency social workers were not 
significantly  more  expensive  than  their  permanent  counterparts  and  that  some were 
cheaper.  Some managers cut costs further by excluding agency workers from team 
meetings and briefings so reducing their working hours.  While in many cases agency 
workers  are  cheaper  than  permanent  workers,  a  number  of  managers  reported  that 
agency  social  workers  were  substantially  more  expensive  than  their  permanent 
counterparts. 
Labour market
The significant recruitment and retention problems facing both Met and City mean that 
an advantage of using agency workers was simply the ability to cover critical work. One 
manager said that recruitment had been an 'arms and legs count' and that essentially the 
state of the labour market meant that any social worker that they could recruit, even an 
agency social worker, was a win.  While the recruitment and selection process in local 
government is long-winded, agency workers can be recruited very quickly:
“For me it is very simple,[using an agency worker] gives you an immediate stop 
gap.  If I look at the employment process from the point that a worker leaves the  
team to having a permanent employee in post filling that post, if everything goes  
well I am probably looking at six months.  For me I can pick up the phone and  
have somebody in post within, if I am lucky, a couple of days but being realistic  
probably a week.   It  is  a very very attractive benefit  to cover work.” (MHT  
Manager, Met)
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For care workers in residential homes the main benefit of the use of agency workers was 
the ability to meet statutory obligations for staffing levels quickly and easily.  In day 
care centres,  the speed of recruitment  was helpful  but  they also found agency staff 
cheaper than permanent staff.  Managers in the day care service also anticipated changes 
in structure so agency workers were used to reduce the potential  for redundancy of 
permanent staff and as a workforce that was 'disposable' in case of future changes in 
structure and reductions in staffing numbers.  This use of agency workers as a buffer to 
protect permanent staff is in line with the core/periphery model, but this accounted for 
only a very small proportion of agency workers employed. 
Performance
It  is  clear  that  the  use  of  agency  workers  in  some  respects  enhances  performance 
because it means that there are workers in post doing critical work where recruitment 
and retention difficulties are such that no permanent workers can be recruited. Agency 
workers also allow for quick adjustments of staffing levels and cover for absence at 
short notice which some managers noted enhanced performance.  That said the majority 
of  managers  felt  that  agency  workers  impeded  performance  because  of  their 
impermanence, the effect of their higher pay levels on morale and the potential for them 
to be poor quality workers. 
The labour market advantages of flexibility in terms of the speed of recruitment are 
mirrored by performance problems that were attributed to the impermanence of agency 
workers.  The impermanence of these workers meant that it could be difficult for them 
to establish relationships with service users and colleagues, and they could leave at very 
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short  notice.   These  observations  were  made  mainly  by  managers  of  agency  care 
workers and social workers for whom personal relationships are an important part of 
their working lives.  
 “I think on a short-term basis they don’t have time to get to know the service 
users properly because it is a long process” (Day care manager, Met)
Social  work  managers  noted  that  it  was  inevitable  that  they  would  spend  time  in 
supervision  and  training  developing  all  their  staff  including  agency  workers  which 
would offer fewer rewards due to the more limited tenure of agency workers:
“you invest in your staff, in their careers and career planning, that’s lost on 
agency workers.” (Director, Met)
 
The  cost  of  agency  social  workers  was  a  major  concern,  not  just  because  of  the 
budgetary strain but also because of the effect on morale.  
“it has an impact on the team because from their point of view, people come in  
newly qualified, earning the same as a senior practitioner, earning more than  
they are, with no responsibilities and no commitment... It still stings a bit with  
some members of the team because agency workers say, I am having a day off  
tomorrow, right ok, whereas they can’t” (Adults’ social care Manager, City)
Some managers suggested that deficiencies in the performance of agency workers might 
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not be discovered until they left and someone else took over their case file.  One of the 
big disadvantages of using agency workers was the fact that they could leave at very 
short notice, and as a result may not have up to date files on service users.  
“If a social worker is cutting corners or hiding things, when they have only been  
here for a few months at a time, it isn’t until they have gone that you find out all 
the things that they have not done.” (Adults’ social care Manager, City)
The speed with which agency workers enter the organisation is mirrored by the speed at 
which they can exit, and most managers at City identified that at least some of their 
previous  agency workers  had  left  unfinished  work  without  a  handover.   What  was 
characterised by the director at Met as ‘weaker ties to the organisation’ was routinely 
cited by managers as the biggest problem when using agency social workers.  It must be 
noted here that all the social work managers that I interviewed wanted permanent staff 
rather than agency because their focus was upon the needs of the user for continuity, 
particularly where the service user was a vulnerable child.  Managers suggested that the 
weaker organisational ties that agency workers had with the user organisation impacted 
on service delivery, morale, continuity, professional development and their ability to 
effectively  manage  workers,  particularly  where  there  was  a  problem  with  their 
competency or conduct.
Within  residential  care  establishments,  one  manager  identified  that  an  agency  had 
provided workers that could not lawfully work in that establishment because of their 
age.  He mentioned that some agency workers did not arrive to do the work themselves 
and sent a friend or family member instead.  Clearly the problem in workers doing this 
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is the lack of training and control.  The authority has not approved these workers, there 
is no guarantee that they are CRB checked and no references have been taken.  When 
these staff are working with vulnerable people it is of real concern.  As a result of these 
problems the manager believed that the agency sending these workers was discontinued. 
Other  managers  identified  it  as  an  agency  that  was  still  used.   The  manager  who 
identified the concerns with CRB checks decided to agree measures to prevent future 
problems with unsuitable agency workers being placed.  He agreed a ‘passport’ scheme 
with an agency for their care workers, which meant that they would have photo ID with 
their CRB number and name.  This agency had grown to become the largest external 
provider of agency care staff within the authority.
All managers were clear that given the choice they would recruit permanently because 
the  disadvantages  of  using  agency  workers  outweighed  the  advantages,  except  for 
filling  a  short-term  staffing  gap  for  example,  whilst  a  recruitment  campaign  was 
ongoing. While some care managers felt that having a section of the workforce made up 
of agency workers on an ongoing basis was helpful, they were generally concerned that 
the posts that these workers occupied may be cut from the permanent structure if the 
authority faced financial problems because they were not occupied by permanent staff. 
The main reasons that these managers thought that agency workers were a helpful part 
of their workforce was that they were cheaper to employ and could be used in a more 
flexible manner.  Other managers were more concerned about the shortcomings of using 
agency workers in terms of team morale, budget, performance and continuity for service 
users.   Some  managers,  particularly  of  social  workers,  felt  that  there  were  more 
disadvantages than advantages even taking into account the speed of recruitment and 
flexibility that agency workers offered.  
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Chapter 6 – Management of agency workers
This chapter addresses the management of agency workers, looking at the role of the 
user  organisation  and  the  agency.   It  outlines  the  diversity  of  treatment  of  agency 
workers both within and between Met and City.  In so doing it will provide an analysis 
of  the  management  of  agency  work  within  the  case  study  context  and  also  give 
sufficient background to set up the themes addressed in subsequent chapters.  It argues 
that the management of agency workers is diverse and that their experience of work will 
vary not only between organisations,  but also within the same organisation between 
managers.  It demonstrates the lack of formal arrangements for dealing with disciplinary 
or capability problems, and the varied approaches to the management of these workers. 
The involvement of both the user organisation and the agency in the management of 
these workers is discussed and the difficulty in identifying who is responsible for which 
aspects of management is highlighted.   It offers insight into the areas in which agency 
workers are able to have influence on the organisation of their working lives, such as 
negotiating pay, flexible working and taking leave at  short  notice.  It  also highlights 
those  areas  where  they  have  little  access  to  voice  such  as  where  disciplinary  or 
competency problems arise, in accessing the grievance policy, the lack of appraisals, 
being excluded from team meetings and briefings and staff surveys.  This discussion 
provides the background to understanding how agency workers come to view issues at 
work and their ability to participate in organisational decision making. 
Managing agency workers
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The view of the Director of Community Services at Mets on the management of agency 
workers was:
“We  expect  that  agency  and  permanent  staff  are  taken  through  the  same 
rigorous process for recruitment and induction.  The expectation is that there  
aren’t differences in the treatment of agency workers and permanent staff.  There  
is an induction check list that should be completed for both groups.  Unless you  
have insider knowledge you shouldn’t be able to tell in a team who is and isn’t 
an  agency  worker…  It  is  explicit  that  agency  workers  are  managed  in  
accordance with our policies by our managers.” (Met Director, interview)
Despite this clear statement of expectation, the reality for managers at Met and City is 
that they manage agency workers differently; arguably as a result of the lack of training 
and  information  on  what  is  expected  by  the  authority.   This  chapter  highlights 
similarities and differences both within and between the case study sites in terms of 
recruitment, training and general day to day management.  Workers receive different 
treatment from managers in both authorities, with some treating them as if they were 
permanent staff and others regarding them as a disposable resource with commensurate 
treatment.   The  triangular  employment  relationship  and  particularly  the  limited 
employment  protection  afforded  to  these  workers  allow  such  treatment.  Views  on 
agency workers also vary, some managers seeing them as more highly skilled than their 
permanent counterparts in certain professional roles, to others viewing them as the poor 
quality  workers unable to get  permanent jobs.   The diversity  in the management of 
agency workers found in both sites supports the view that agency worker treatment is 
very  much  at  the  discretion  of  the  organisation  and  the  manager.   Management  of 
151
agency workers is reviewed in three general areas:  recruitment and selection, training, 
and general management.  
Managers do not receive training on the management of agency workers at either Local 
authority.  At Met, Adecco (an external agency) provides a 'management tool kit'  to 
inform managers how their agency workers should be treated and what issues should be 
fed back to them.  However, only managers that have Adecco staff will be given this 
document.  When the MV arrangement was introduced, all managers received training 
on the new recruitment process, however these sessions did not cover the management 
of agency workers.  There is no guidance available to managers on which policies to 
use, how to manage problems as they arise or on what issues should be fed back to 
senior  management  or  HR.  In  contrast  a  full  set  of  policies  was  available  for  the 
management  of  directly  employed  staff,  with  management  training  available  to  all 
managers of directly employed staff.  
Fairness in recruitment and selection
Recruitment of agency workers is dealt with in two stages; the agency in recruiting 
workers onto its books and then the user organisation recruiting agency workers into a 
post in their organisation.  It is helpful to identify the role that agencies are seen as 
performing by both the workers and user organisations.  Their role was succinctly put 
by an agency social worker:
“from what I can gather many years ago there was such a shortage of social  
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workers so recruitment agencies popped up everywhere thinking it would be a  
good  money  making  machine  and  it  has  proven  to  be.   These  recruitment  
agencies  find  positions  that  are  available  across  the  country  and  they  have  
rosters  of  candidates  that  are  looking  for  work,  and  they  sort  of  pass  out  
resumes and set up interviews.  Basically the local authorities and the candidate  
do the rest of the work.” (Agency social worker, City)
Recruitment of agency workers differs somewhat depending upon both occupation and 
geographic location.  Internal agencies confined themselves to the local labour markets 
and either did not advertise (relying on word of mouth to attract workers) or advertised 
only in local job centres.  External agencies had a variety of ways of recruiting workers. 
For care and administrative roles, most workers were recruited by answering adverts in 
the local news paper, seeing posts advertised at the job centre or on-line.  The majority 
of workers in these groups were local.  Social work agencies recruited far and wide with 
some workers being recruited from overseas.  Some social workers that I interviewed in 
both authorities were expatriate workers from Canada, USA, New Zealand and Nigeria. 
Some of these workers were recruited in their home countries, others had joined an 
agency upon arriving in the UK. 
Internal agency workers and managers agreed that the internal  agencies within both 
authorities took all workers though the standard ‘fair recruitment’ process used in both 
local authorities for all directly employed permanent and temporary appointments.  The 
‘fair  recruitment’ process  consists  of  applications,  short-listing  based  on  the  person 
specification,  and  panel  interviews  where  set  questions  are  scored  by  each  panel 
member  with  the  highest  scoring  candidate  being  appointed  subject  to  satisfactory 
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references.   Adecco  reported  a  somewhat  similar  recruitment  process  including  an 
interview, a series of job related assessments and referencing. The external agency for 
social  work said that it  used personal recommendations and telephone interviews as 
well as references for recruitment. 
External agency workers themselves said that they were not always interviewed before 
being placed by a new agency:
“I didn’t have a formal interview, I sent them my resume and I filled out an 
application package and did all that sort of stuff.” (Agency social worker, City)
All  the agencies said that they received references before sending candidates out  to 
interview.  Many said that it was sometimes difficult to get references and that a bad 
reference did not always mean that a worker would not be placed:
“Yes,  this  is  another  grey  area;  references,  because  unfortunately  you  have  
managers  who  take  personal  dislikes  to  people.   A  couple  of  times  I  have 
experienced it. I had a girl where I worked before her manager gave her ...a  
terrible reference.  And basically probably any normal person would not have 
employed  her  but  I  had  been  speaking  to  her  and  I  couldn’t  see  that  this  
reference was for the same person I had been speaking to, it just didn’t gel.  So I  
phoned the manager and said to her OK you are saying you have got concerns  
with this woman's practice and she was working for you permanently so can you  
tell me how many disciplinaries has she had, well she didn’t have any.  OK can  
you tell me how many warnings she has been given, well she didn’t have any 
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warnings.  So you are telling me I shouldn’t place her because you have got  
concerns with her practice but while she was working permanently for you you  
were quite happy for her to run amok amongst your children and families and  
you never called her to task on anything.  So for me that is not a true reference,  
that reference stunk, and basically I then spoke to the social worker and she had  
an assessment that had been done on her four months before and the assessment  
was all excellent.  So basically what I did I managed to place her because I  
phoned where she was hoping to be placed  and said this is the reference I have  
been given but  I am also going to fax you over the assessment that was done 
four months previous to the reference, and you interview her and make up your  
own mind.  It is a difficult one.” (Social work agency manager, City)
In this case the agency manager said that she sent the reference to the user organisation 
but  managers  interviewed  were  not  always  confident  that  upon  receiving  a  poor 
reference for a worker that an agency would pass it on.  
Having been recruited by an agency, workers have then to be recruited into the user 
organisation.  How the local authorities procure agency workers was outlined in the last 
chapter, this  section is  concerned with how managers make the decision to select a 
particular agency worker.  Although the Met Director said: “We expect that agency and 
permanent staff are taken through the same rigorous process for recruitment” no line 
managers or other senior managers within Met believed that this was the case.  In fact 
with  the  exception of  the  Director  at  Met all  managers  I  interviewed in  both local 
authorities agreed that the ‘fair recruitment’ process was always followed for directly 
employed staff and that it was never followed for appointing external agency workers.  
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Line managers tended not to have relationships with a single agency, and as such where 
more than one agency worker was employed within a team they had normally been 
sourced from different agencies. Within Met most teams that had agency workers had 
only one or two.  Within City some teams were  made up almost  entirely  of agency 
workers.
Rather than using the ‘fair recruitment’ process a plethora of practices were in place to 
recruit  these workers within both local  authorities.   There were differences between 
recruitment  of  administrative  and  care  workers  working  for  short  periods  (up  to  a 
month) and those working longer term.  Some managers of short-term agency workers 
requested workers for a particular shift or fixed period without looking at profiles or 
checking any details.  Within City this was prevalent when managers were using the 
internal  agencies.   For  workers  that  were  going  to  be  in  place  for  longer  periods 
generally  managers  wanted to  consider  profiles  and normally to  meet  with workers 
before  appointment.   For  administrative  workers,  generally  managers  requested  a 
worker and soon thereafter one arrived.  Sometimes they would send through a person 
specification and ask for someone with particular skills, however this was not always 
the case.  There would generally be no interview by the manager.  For care workers, 
when the internal agency was used mangers would simply supply shifts and the pool 
would fill them with available workers, externally managers may look at a profile but 
no interviews would take place.
Once  managers  had  contacted  the  master  vendor  at  Met  or  the  agencies  that  they 
individually wanted to use at City they received personal profiles from the agency about 
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individual  candidates.   Once  profiles  are  received  some  managers  made  selection 
decisions simply on the information contained within them:
“What I do, I ask for profiles from the agencies.  We get that through and I have  
a look at it and I can make a judgement from the profile on the member of staff.”  
(Residential home Manager, Met)
Most  line  managers  said  that  they  would  interview agency  staff  but  this  generally 
consisted of no more than a ‘chat’ to see whether they would fit in with the team, others 
did not and made a judgement on the basis of a CV or profile:
“I always interview them.  I look that they have done the work before and I kind 
of go with a gut feeling.  You know sometimes, you meet somebody and you know 
instinctively they are going to do the job well.”(Day care Manager, Met)
“We wouldn’t go through the [formal interview process], there are no formal  
questions, it is just come and meet me, I’ll take up your references or I will have  
a look at your CV and make a decision.  There have been times when we have  
been so desperate for workers that basically it is an arms and legs count, you  
know but happily we have got passed that.” (Adults’ social care Manager, City)
Others identify quite formal interviews with two managers present.   All  agreed that 
agency workers  were  not  subjected to  the same process  as  permanent  staff.   Many 
managers indicated difficulties in recruiting agency workers.  These generally included 
having  insufficient  candidates,  having  candidates  that  did  not  have  appropriate 
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experience and of having few candidates actually turn up for their interviews:
“personally I have been trying to employ an agency worker since doing this job  
which is about three months and I cannot find one for love nor money.  Just an  
experienced social worker to come in and pick up cases and run with them, I  
cannot find one.  I have interviewed people and they have told me they can only 
do half the time I want them to do, or they don’t turn up for interview, or there is  
just nobody about.  It is a mine field trying to employ a social worker.” (Social  
work Manager, City)
Managers generally acknowledged that the less rigorous recruitment process employed 
for agency workers had its drawbacks, primarily in terms of confidence in the quality of 
CRB checks  and referencing.   Permanent  staff  are  appointed  subject  to  satisfactory 
references  and  CRB and  generally  do  not  start  work  until  both  are  received.   All 
managers  thought  that  agencies  would  only  send  CRB  checked  and  referenced 
candidates. Nearly all managers insisted on copies of CRB checks and references, with 
some personally following up for further verbal references from the previous employer; 
many noted a lack of trust in the transparency of the agencies.  One manager had never 
requested a copy of a CRB or reference.  Within City some managers were particularly 
concerned,  one  mentioned two teachers  in  one  of  the  authority’s  schools  that  were 
recruited  via  an  agency,  who  were  eventually  found  not  to  be  qualified  and  were 
dismissed  and  prosecuted  (also  reported  in  local  press).   No  managers  identified 
anything similar happening in social  care,  although many managers were concerned 
about the fact that it could occur, and would not necessarily be identified.  For most 
managers,  though  not  all,  these  concerns  meant  that  they  required  documentary 
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evidence of qualification and CRB checks and most received written references from 
the agency and in a few cases verbal references directly from previous managers.  
There was some scepticism about the accuracy of CVs of agency workers and most 
managers identified recruitment agents exaggerating the skills and experience of their 
agency workers.  Longer serving managers with networks of colleagues in neighbouring 
authorities  tended to  make informal  contact  with  people  to  ascertain  the  quality  of 
workers  being  sent.   Most  managers  had  concerns  about  how thoroughly  agencies 
checked workers: 
“I had an agency contact me concerning my name given as a reference but 
within their CV they had stated that they were employed in my service.  This  
person had never been employed in my service but I was aware of them having 
worked in another part of the service and that they had been dismissed for gross  
misconduct.  Now clearly they had used the knowledge of a grander service and 
put down a legitimate bit of that service as what they had done because they  
didn’t want where they worked contacted.  Now fortunately the agency smelt a  
rat for some reason, I don’t know why but they contacted me.  I wouldn’t have  
enormous confidence that every agency acted in that way or may not be aware  
of it, and that is the risk.  One relies on agencies to act in a professional way 
and by that I mean being thorough in checking out references but I cannot, and I  
might be wrong but I can’t push aside my view that that is their business.  They  
earn  money  by  providing  staff  and  the  most  difficult  aspect  of  professional  
agency staff is getting those staff and there is sometimes a conflict of interest  
there I think, or potentially a conflict.  How close are they going to look, some I  
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am sure extremely thorough some may be not.” (Social work Manager, Met)
Another manager had an illegal worker sent through an agency:
“because they have not gone through the route of interview, and because our HR  
haven’t done their CRBs and references and things like that, I have been in the 
situation where police have wanted me to identify somebody by photograph as  
having two national insurance numbers and they are actually working illegally.  
There are those sorts of things you get yourself into which I think would be less  
likely through somebody who was recruited on a permanent basis.” (Day care 
Manager, Met)
Managers gave accounts of having workers that were not appropriate for a variety of 
reasons: poor references when they eventually arrived,  illegal working practices and 
others  who  were  behaving  in  very  odd  ways.   One  agency  worker  expressed  his 
religious belief that his service users should have been drowned at birth rather than 
received the care he was employed to offer.  Managers suggested that the lack of checks 
by the agency lead to unsuitable agency workers being placed and that the recruitment 
process for permanent staff would be unlikely to lead to the direct employment of such 
staff.    Some managers stated that irrespective of the process they went through the 
quality of the workers would be lower because they were agency workers.
Managers acknowledged that while there were benefits to the very rapid recruitment 
process for appointing agency workers, there were also drawbacks.  Employers were 
concerned about the quality of agency workers, and suggested that broadly speaking 
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agency workers were of poorer quality than permanent staff.  They also argued that that 
the lack of formal  interviews coupled with minimal  reference checking may add to 
suspicions about agency workers, as did the possibility of CRB checks not having been 
carried out. 
To avoid some of the recruitment problems with using agency workers some managers 
developed long standing relationships with some individual agency workers and would 
personally  recommend a worker  to  managers  in  other  divisions.   As a  result,  some 
agency  workers  remained  with  both  authorities  for  a  number  of  years,  circulating 
around different departments.  
“We have had people come back and ask for more work.  One worker was in the  
Borough  and  worked  various  places  and  then  he  went  agency  and  then  he  
phoned up and asked if we had any jobs.  He has kind of come and gone and 
come back again and then he phoned and asked me if I had got any other work  
but at the time I didn’t.  So yes we do have people who will phone up and say, I  
have worked there before have you got any work.” (Day care Manager, Met)
“I have had an agency who has come in and gone out in the sense that he is a  
chap who has retired, a social worker, and we have taken him in as an agency to  
cover posts.  So it wouldn’t be one post he is covering, he would cover a post, we  
fill that post, he will go off, and then we will have another vacancy for whatever  
reason and he will come back.  As an individual we have used him quite a lot  
over  a  fairly  long  period  of  time  but  that  has  been  covering  a  number  of  
posts.” (MHT Manager, Met)
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Most of the managers noted the benefits of workers returning both to the authority and 
to their particular centre mainly in terms of their proven track record and tacit skills. 
Such workers were used to the practices within Met and where they returned to the 
same centres they may have knowledge of service users.  In addition using workers that 
have  been  used  elsewhere  in  the  organisation  helps  to  avoid  the  problems  with 
recruiting agency workers outlined above.  Informal relationships also existed to the 
extent  that  some agency workers would contact  their  previous managers when they 
became available again to look for further work.  In short there were no formal ‘fair 
recruitment’  practices  in  place  when  procuring  the  services  of  these  workers  and 
recruitment practices were often informal.  
A full time Unison representative within City noted that the process of applying for a 
role though an agency could be attractive to some workers as the application form for 
working directly for the local authority was intimidating (at 7 pages long, plus equal 
opportunities monitoring form and occupational health form) and the process was long-
winded.  A number of years ago there was an initiative to get more applicants for care 
posts within the City.  At that time Unison at City was involved in assisting local and 
migrant  workers with literacy and found that the application form itself  put a large 
number of potential  applicants off applying for roles that they were qualified to do. 
Instead  these  workers  would  get  roles  through the  external  agencies  where  lengthy 
forms were not necessary. Unison felt that the fact that the same form was used to apply 
for  the  role  of  care  assistant  as  was  used  for  very  senior  organisational  roles  was 
problematic and a barrier to direct employment for many workers with poor literacy or 
for who English was their second language. 
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A number of managers identified that rigour in the recruitment of agency workers was 
less  critical  than  it  was  for  permanent  workers  because  of  the  nature  of  their 
employment. Managers identified the shorter tenure of agency workers generally and 
suggested  that  as  a  result  of  this  less  time  should  be  spent  on  recruitment.  Many 
managers also identified the ease with which agency workers could be dismissed and 
suggested  that  recruitment  practices  may  be  more  lax  because  workers  proving 
unsatisfactory did not have to be a long-term problem. 
Subsidised training of agency workers
Training  appears  to  be  an  area  of  shared  responsibility  between  agency  workers 
themselves, temporary work agencies and user organisations.  There is variation across 
the agency worker spectrum, however agency workers in this study generally receive 
less access to subsidised training than their permanent counterparts.  
Permanently employed staff in both local authorities were expected to have a corporate 
induction where basic training was provided on a variety of areas.  These included an 
introduction to the local authority, health and safety at work, discipline and grievance 
procedures, harassment and bullying procedures, fire safety and an introduction to the 
local union representatives.  In addition to the corporate induction, they were expected 
to have a local induction with their line manager to help them to settle in to their new 
role, to handover work, and to identify any training needs.
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However the amount of internal and external training received by agency workers at 
both local authorities is very much at the discretion of their individual manager and 
agency.  Inductions generally occur, at  least  to cover the basics like hours of work, 
where the toilets are and what to do in the event of a fire.  Some managers go well 
beyond this but it was rare and only one line manager reported giving agency workers 
the same inductions as permanent staff.  Most long-term agency workers were offered 
training related to their role where necessary to meet statutory requirements or to learn 
in-house systems.  Career development training was more mixed with most opportunity 
being offered to social workers for whom the training was necessary to keep up their 
professional registration.  Most managers and agency workers agreed that training was 
more limited for agency workers than it  was for their permanent counterparts.   The 
exception to this was for external agency care workers within Met where managers 
believed that  they  received less  training than  their  counterparts  but  agency workers 
themselves reported higher levels of training. The agencies that supplied these workers 
were required by the procurement arrangements to be part of the 'skills for care' agenda 
and provide  career  development  training  to  their  care  workers.  This  resulted in  the 
agencies  providing  training  access  to  up  to  NVQ 3  courses  for  their  workers,  and 
requiring them to attend frequent refresher and basic training. 
Many of the professionally qualified agency workers in this study reported that they did 
not have the same access to training and development opportunities provided by the 
workplace as their permanent colleagues. The results reflect what was found by Hoque 
and  Kirkpatrick  (2003)  when they  found that  both  full  and  part  time  non standard 
professionals had poorer access to training and development opportunities than their full 
time  permanent  comparators.   My research  findings  support  the  view expressed  in 
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Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2003) that being professionally qualified does not prevent non-
standard  workers  from  experiencing  marginalisation  with  respect  to  training  and 
development opportunities. 
General day to day management
The day to day management of agency workers is almost exclusively down to the user 
organisation.  Agencies have very little involvement except with regard to paying these 
workers  or  where  managers  from the  user  organisation  or  agency workers  reported 
problems to them.  Even annual leave is agreed first with the user organisation and then 
the agency.  The agencies on the whole agreed that the day to day management was all 
done by the user organisation:
“When  [agency  workers]  are  on  [Met’s]  premises  they  are  totally  the  
responsibility of [Met] so their line manager, or whoever, would induct them on  
day one with health and safety and that sort of thing.  Everything that happens  
to them on site is the responsibility of [Met]” (Agency Manager, Met)
Workers within social care work to an array of policies from those applying to most 
workers, like disciplinary and grievance, annual leave and dress code, to those specific 
to  social  work  roles  like  policies  around  working  with  service  users.   For  directly 
employed staff, all of the local authority's policies apply but for agency workers some of 
the applicable policies may belong to the user organisation and others to the agency. 
Identification of the policies and procedures that applied to other agency staff and the 
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people supposed to operate the policies was problematic.  It was generally agreed that 
policies like those on dress code, health and safety and working with service users were 
in place at the user organisation and should be followed by agency workers.  There was 
more  difficulty  over  policies  that  were  considered  generic  ‘personnel’  policies,  in 
particular those governing discipline, grievance, competency and absence.  Adecco were 
very clear that the personnel policies that apply to their agency workers are their own, 
not those of the user organisations.  It was their view that issues should be fed back to 
the agency and not dealt with by managers.  This was a view shared by HR within Met, 
however it was not the view of the Director at Met:
“It is explicit that agency workers are managed in accordance with our policies  
by our managers…We do have difficulties with agency workers when there is a 
disciplinary issue, there is a greater risk of complacency, people can move on 
quickly, before discipline.  We have tried to take the view that we need to take 
these issues though to their logical conclusion.” (Met Director, interview)
Once again, the high level view was not completely consistent with the understanding 
of first line managers.  Like the Director, most line managers felt that workers should 
adhere  to  all  local  policies,  however  their  views  on  the  need  to  actually  discipline 
agency  workers  who  had  committed  an  offence  were  more  varied,  in  the  main 
suggesting that such workers would be asked to leave rather than face Met’s disciplinary 
policy.  On the one hand managers in the main tended to believe that agency workers 
should work to local authority policies:
“While they are here I expect them to adhere to workplace policies.  I don’t  
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know what policy agencies have with them but while they are working in this 
building  they  have  to  adhere  to  our  rules  and  regulations.”  (Social  work  
Manager, Met)
“When they are working for us then they will follow our policies.  So we still  
have an expectation that an agency worker will contact us if they are not going 
to be in that day.  We would prefer they contact us and they should contact their  
agency but we don’t want them to contact their agency first and they tell us two 
hours  later.   Our  policies  around  working  with  service  users  it  is  our  
expectations that they will follow.”(Senior Manager, Met)
But  on  the  other  hand they  were  not  always willing  to  enforce  policies  with  these 
workers:
“I think I would go back to the agency personally, because capability or things  
like that are usually with your permanent staff.  Whereas if I had a problem...  
with agency you can get rid of them, why would you keep someone who was  
causing you problems?  Just go back to the agency and say this person is no  
good you deal  with  it,  because I  wouldn’t be keeping someone on who was  
causing me grief.”(Social care Manager Met)
“We are quite clear that we are not happy with an agency member staff,  we  
inform that member of staff and also tell them we are telling the agency and we  
will say we don’t want that person back again.” (Senior Manager, Met)
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The most accurate assessment of whether Local authority or agency policies were in use 
when dealing with agency workers appeared to be:
“I should think it is a bit of both” (Residential home Manager, Met)
And
“Do you know something, I wouldn’t even know the agency's policies, I am sure  
if I did something that went against their policies I am sure they would tell me.  
But as far as I am concerned I take people on explicitly that they will be abiding  
by  the  policies  of  the  recruitment  agencies  and  the  Trust  and  the  local  
authority.” (MHT Manager, Met)
The confusion by managers about  the policies  that  should be used and who should 
manage them is a feature of the triangular employment relationship,  and part of the 
confusion of broader management roles.   Rubery et al (2003) report on similar issues 
dealing with contracted workers in a multi-agency environment. They noted that the 
presence  of  multiple  organisations  assuming some measure of  control  over  workers 
could result in confusion on the part of both workers and managers over lines of control 
and job roles.  They found that 'non-employers' felt the need to take on some of the role 
of the employer and in doing so introduced the possibility of workers being subjected to 
the control of an individual or organisation that had no accountability for them (Rubery 
et al 2003).  Similarly within this case study the role of the 'employer' is problematic. 
Even  where  a  legal  employer  can  be  identified  as  in  the  case  of  Adecco's  agency 
workers, some of the role traditionally performed by the employer is still taken on by 
168
the workplace manager.  Some of the policies that the agency worker is subjected to are 
the policies of the workplace and not the agency employer.  This places the worker in 
the position of being exposed to at least two sources of control: the agency and the 
workplace. 
Performance management was an area in which the agency and workplace managers 
were both involved. All agencies reported moving workers as a result of performance 
issues, however the social work agency also identified offering practical support for a 
newly qualified worker with minor performance issues.  Where workers were moved as 
a result of performance problems the agency managers indicated that most were offered 
different and often less challenging placements:
“Say there were just wrong for that role we would call them in and say sorry it  
didn’t work out, you weren’t right for that job…We would make sure that next  
time we put them into a booking that was maybe less demanding for them.  And  
you learn  about  people’s capabilities  from experience,  it  doesn’t happen too 
often I am pleased to say.  But that wouldn’t be a reason not to use someone  
again.   If  it  was consistent, and we did have one lady who was a delightful  
person and we had lovely reports about her but she was consistently not able to  
do the job.  Unfortunately we couldn’t put her into too many things but it is not  
something we would discipline  over  either, we would tell  her  that  it  is  very  
difficult to place her in these certain jobs because they were very demanding.  
We would keep her on our books and we would fully intend to give her work if  
something suitable came up.  We would also say to someone like that spread 
your net and look at other agencies don’t just rely on us because sometimes the 
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work isn’t forthcoming.  We certainly wouldn’t discipline them if their attitude  
was right but their capability wasn’t great, we’re not there to make people feel  
bad.” (Agency Manager, Met)
Only the  agency social  work manager  indicated discussing performance issues  with 
individual workers and identifying training and support to assist with problems.  The 
situation was similar for disciplinary issues, with agency managers suggesting that they 
should be involved in disciplinary situations but noting that they rarely were. 
Managers  had  varied  approaches  to  the  policies  under  which  their  agency  workers 
worked.   The  problems  associated  with  managing  agency  worker  discipline  were 
recognised by the Director at Met, however this has not lead to a consistently applied 
approach to disciplinary and capability issues throughout the department.
More than half  of the managers interviewed said that they had managed an agency 
worker who had a competency or disciplinary problem. Most of these managers did not 
use  any  official  performance  or  disciplinary  procedure,  rather  most  terminated  the 
placement and looked for a new agency worker:
“There have been situations where I have had agency staff that just haven’t cut  
the mustard.  We can normally pick it up fairly quickly and then I just say, well I  
don’t think this  is the job for you so goodbye,  do you want me to ring your 
agency or are you going to contact them.” (Day care Manager, Met) 
“Rather than discipline them they would probably just be dismissed.  The cost  
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can  be  prohibitive  with  the  disciplinary  process  when  you  look  at  all  the  
management  time  and  HR  time  spent,  so  we  just  wouldn’t  do  it,  it  would 
probably not be the same for serious professional misconduct though.”(Social  
work Manager, City)
“I can’t say there haven’t been times when a team leader has come to discuss  
with me an issue about staffing and I have turned round and said, well at least  
they are agency.  In other words at least we can move them on, chuck them out,  
we don’t need to have an ongoing problem.” (Day care Manager, Met)
Other managers noted the futility of using disciplinary or other procedures with agency 
workers. They suggested that the employment relationship with agency workers was 
fundamentally different to the relationship with permanent staff. That permanent staff 
could be managed according to their contract and policies in place, and that in the event 
of problems disciplinary action could be taken to effectively resolve them. This was 
seen as far more problematic for agency workers because they could not be made to 
comply with policies and that taking disciplinary action would result in them leaving. 
Managers  indicated  that  there  was  little  point  in  pursuing  any form of  disciplinary 
action short of termination of placement because it was not able to resolve issues:
“Some [agency workers] are reluctant to follow all our procedures, will work  
their own way, what is easiest for them, and it is not easy to discipline people.  
Not that I am a disciplinarian but it is difficult to bring agency people who don’t 
work for you into line sometimes.  Ultimately you have only got one sanction  
haven’t you, go.  Do it my way or go.” (Adults’ social work Manager, City)
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“Permanent staff can be dealt with via their contracts and we can make them 
comply with their contract, that’s not true for agency workers, especially when 
we are desperate, I guess we will put up with more.” (Director, Met)
One manager cited an agency social worker consistently arriving late and leaving early. 
Upon appointment, a standard working week had been agreed, however it was clear 
within the first  month that this worker was not working a full  week.  The manager 
recounted discussing this with the worker who was only claiming pay for the hours that 
she worked.  He was satisfied with the work that she was doing and wanted to retain her 
but also wanted someone full time.  He decided that he couldn’t make her work full 
time hours and that it  was better to accept a good worker for a shorter  period than 
saying she had to work a full week and have her leave.  He was clear that he would not 
have accepted this behaviour from a permanent member of staff, and he would have 
turned down any request for flexible working, however he felt that he had no choice as 
she was an agency worker in a shortage area.  Like other managers he felt that the only 
sanction  available  was  dismissal  when  an  informal  discussion  did  not  resolve  the 
situation.  
A few managers did say that they had dealt with disciplinary or performance problems 
though in the main these were dealt with informally through supervision and additional 
support.   The  disciplinary  issue  involved  a  care  worker  making  racist  and  sexist 
comments.  His manager raised the issue with him and informed him that his behaviour 
was unacceptable, no formal disciplinary action was taken and the issue did not arise 
again. 
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The  performance  issues  mentioned  were  all  related  to  agency social  workers.  Four 
managers  indicated  that  they  had  spent  time  trying  to  improve  the  performance  of 
agency  social  workers.   All  these  managers  said  that  the  reasons  that  they  offered 
additional support were both because they wanted improved performance within the 
current role but also because they felt they had a commitment to their profession. It was 
their perception that terminating a placement may solve the immediate problem, but that 
such  agency  workers  would  simply  become  a  problem  for  another  team  and  that 
ultimately the service users would suffer as a result:
“We had an agency worker who was newly qualified so she wasn’t particularly  
experienced, and wasn’t particularly very mature either, really, and didn’t like  
the client group she was working with and would fall out with service users.  So  
I would be constantly trying to develop her through supervision and I would go  
out to meet her service users, which I would not normally do that, and wouldn’t  
expect to have to do that, with an experienced, qualified social worker.  And my  
team were saying, just get rid of her, she is useless, just get rid of her now, we 
will  cover  the work  ourselves.   My  point  of  view was,  no,  this  woman is  a  
member of our profession, she needs to be developed, she will get another job  
tomorrow like that,  at  that  time,  because there were lots  and lots  of  agency  
workers operating, and we will just move our problem to another team.  So I  
worked  with  that  worker  for  several  months  really  to  help  her  to  develop  
because  I  did  think,  well,  we  have  got  a  responsibility  haven’t  we  to  the 
profession, really, to develop people, whether they are newly qualified people,  
whether they are agency workers, or whether they are employed.  So we did  
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resolve that for quite a while but she did eventually leave because there was one  
particular case that she didn’t want to work with so she left.  But we did work  
with her for a long time to keep her here.”(Adults’ social care Manager, City)
This commitment to professional standards seems to override the managerial concern 
about the cost of supporting such workers and the ease with which their placements can 
be terminated. That said one manager noted that she would be reluctant to offer the 
same level of support to another agency worker in the future because of the level of the 
time taken and the  limited  benefit  because of  the  relatively  short  tenure  of  agency 
workers. 
The triangular relationship that agency workers have with their employers appears to 
shift  the  employment  relationship  towards  significant  informality,  far  from  the 
bureaucratic model of public sector employment relations.  Typically competency and 
disciplinary problems are dealt with by terminating the relationship or letting them slide 
rather than discussion,  sanctions or support.  Neither the agencies nor the workplace 
employer had instigated disciplinary or competency proceedings, though most managers 
had  disciplined  and or  dismissed permanent  staff  for  conduct  or  capability  reasons. 
While some managers had spent time developing the competency of particular social 
workers, they framed this in the context of commitment to their profession rather than a 
sense of managerial responsibility. 
Though some agency workers worked for prolonged periods, managers felt that they 
had looser ties with the organisation because of their status as agency workers.  The 
looser  ties  with  the  workplace  employer  meant  that  managers  often  believed  that 
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disciplinary action was futile either because it was easier to terminate the placement, or 
because the worker would leave if action was taken. The triangular relationship seems 
to fundamentally alter the ease of exit as a response to workplace issues for managers. 
The present legal position of agency workers facilitates their treatment as disposable 
assets, and the opinion that agency workers knowingly 'sold' their employment rights 
was commonplace, particularly amongst social work managers. 
For the most  serious allegations,  such as abuse,  all  managers in City said that they 
would investigate the allegation themselves and inform the agency of the outcome.  This 
approach  was  consistent  across  the  authority  and  applied  to  agency  workers  and 
permanent  staff.   Managers  said  that  they  would  inform the  standards  council  and 
Adults'  and Community Services had a list  of workers that should not be employed 
within the authority.  Despite the informal practices of the authority in other regards, 
there is agreement that this list is considered whenever an agency worker is employed.  
The consistency at City is not mirrored at Met.  Most managers at Met believed that 
they would discuss with the agency how to proceed.  In the main this would mean 
immediate termination of the contract but an investigation may ensue.  Others felt that 
such  serious  allegations  would  automatically  mean  that  the  local  authority’s  policy 
would “kick in”, including full investigation and referral to the professional standards 
body if appropriate.  One manager believed that the authority would tell him to just 
terminate  the  contract  and  take  no  further  action.   Others  felt  there  would  be  a 
partnership approach with the agency:
“A lot of  times we may work in partnership with the agency and do a joint  
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investigation  because  ultimately  it  would  be  no  good just  getting  rid  of  the  
member of staff without looking at it, because that member of staff could go to  
[a  neighbouring  authority]   and  do  exactly  the  same.   So  we  do  have  an  
expectation that agencies will work with us as well.” (Senior Manager, Met)
When asked whether  it  would  be the agency or  the authority  that  dealt  with  gross 
misconduct one manager said:
“My view would be that I am not the direct employer, although I would be the 
person who has evidence of that gross misconduct.  I think it would therefore be 
my responsibility to ensure that the professional body as well as the agency were 
aware it happened, so I would be writing to the professional body and informing  
them.  But I would be expecting the agency to lead on the investigation; it would  
need to go through their disciplinary processes.” (MHT Manager, Met)
The most stark statement was:
“Well it  wouldn’t be my responsibility at  the end of the day, it  would be the  
agency's wouldn’t it?” (Day care Manager, Met)
Equally agencies said that it would not be their responsibility:
“I have got no knowledge of the actual problem have I?” (Agency Manager, 
City)
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In case of gross misconduct, most managers were convinced that even if they were to 
try to follow some sort of disciplinary process that agency workers would escape it by 
moving on before the investigation was complete.  They saw agency status as a way of 
evading disciplinary and competency action which in many cases made them suspicious 
of all agency workers.  
Given  the  concerns  raised  earlier  about  the  vetting  of  candidates  by  agencies,  the 
minimal attention paid to the policies by which these workers should be managed seems 
problematic.  The common theme outlined by these managers is that they decide what to 
do  about  problems  with  these  workers  depending  upon  their  previous  experience, 
personal beliefs and the underlying knowledge that if things get difficult they “do not 
need to have a long-term problem” because they can just get rid of the agency worker. 
Given the  extreme vulnerability  of  some client  groups  with  whom social  care  staff 
engage, the speed with which incompetent and dangerous staff can be removed is of 
limited comfort.  The Daily Mail (25.2.08) recently reported an incident in a care home 
where an agency care  worker  allegedly took out  her  mobile  phone and filmed two 
elderly  residents  of  a  dementia  unit  fighting  rather  than  attempting  to  resolve  the 
situation.  Doubtless many other similar situations have been reported, and it is unlikely 
that agency workers are responsible for all of them, however the fact that fewer checks 
are  done,  that  agency  status  can  be  used  to  evade  disciplinary  action  and  that 
management of these workers is uneven may contribute to placing already vulnerable 
service users further at risk.
Many managers of care and social workers cited the difficulty in disciplining staff as a 
problem when employing agency workers.  Broadly speaking they cited two distinct 
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reasons for avoiding disciplinary action with agency workers; firstly that it was costly 
and time consuming and that terminating the placement was an easier option, secondly 
that because of the relationship with agency workers it was difficult to take action and 
that if action was taken they would be likely to leave.   While for directly employed 
staff managers discuss options like disciplinary warnings and retraining, and identify 
that  they  are  able  to  access  support  in  making  decisions  from  HR,  they  do  not 
acknowledge  that  these  options  are  available  for  agency  workers.   The  difficulties 
appear to stem from the desire to have consistent staff working with vulnerable client 
groups.  Dismissal has been noted as a relatively easy option for these workers, however 
there are often occasions where disciplinary action is contemplated in relation to issues 
that  are  not  serious  enough  to  consider  dismissal,  particularly  where  a  worker  is 
otherwise performing well.  In such circumstances, managers struggle to balance the 
seriousness  of  the  offence  with  the  desire  to  retain  the  worker.   Most  managers 
suggested that if disciplinary action was on the cards then agency workers would leave 
and  find  a  new  job  rather  than  face  a  disciplinary.   This  leaves  managers  with  a 
dilemma, which is particularly acute where there are severe recruitment and retention 
problems.  It appears that managers are more reluctant to dismiss in areas where there 
are recruitment and retention problems like in social work, however some managers in 
the day care setting where recruitment and retention problems are not found are also 
reluctant to dismiss staff for poor performance or minor disciplinary offences.  While 
the ability to discipline and dismiss workers quickly was noted by many managers few 
had actually asked any agency workers to leave.  
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Participation at work
There are a variety of ways that employees may be offered the opportunity to participate 
in  decision  making  at  work.  These  can  range  from  decisions  affecting  individual 
workers like decisions about hours of work, duties, holidays and individual grievances 
to decisions affecting the organisation like corporate strategy.  This section is concerned 
with  the  ways  in  which  agency  workers  are  included  or  excluded  from  direct 
participation at work. 
Within social work, and in some cases for day care staff, supervision is a routine part of 
case management.  It offers workers one to one time with their managers where they are 
able to discuss individual cases. It also offers a direct employee voice mechanism.  All 
the  managers  that  offered  supervision  to  permanent  staff  also  offered  it  to  agency 
workers. This is one area in which agency workers in this environment may find the 
opportunity to engage with managers.
Exclusion from team meetings and briefings is one area in which the reasons for using 
agency workers  appears  to be important.  Where managers  used agency workers for 
traditional reasons such as covering vacancies and absence they were included in team 
meetings and briefings.  Where managers used agency workers for strategic  reasons, 
such as care workers in day care centres at Met they were excluded from team meetings 
and  briefings.  Managers  that  excluded  agency  workers  for  these  meetings  said  the 
rationale for  doing so was solely financial.   All  three external  agency care workers 
mentioned exclusion from team meetings as problematic because it meant that they did 
not have information needed to effectively do their jobs unless a permanent member of 
179
staff remembered to tell them.  One said she thought it was a problem because she was 
not able to be involved in decisions made at team meetings, and on occasions was not 
even informed of them. 
Managers of long-term agency workers were asked whether they offered appraisals. 
None of them did though social work managers pointed out that workers were able to 
discuss training and performance issues informally at supervision.  As discussed above 
agency  workers  were  not  given  access  to  the  disciplinary  process  in  the  case  of 
problems at work and this limits their ability to express their point of view and give 
their side of the story. Like disciplinary procedures, access to grievance procedures was 
problematic as managers,  agencies and workers found it  difficult  to ascertain which 
policy  belonging  to  which  organisation  applies  to  agency  workers.  Most  managers 
stated that they hoped that all employees would feel able to discuss a problem with them 
directly  and  a  few  cited  examples  of  agency  workers  informally  raising  issues  in 
supervision without the necessity of recourse to the grievance procedure. One manager 
at City said that an agency worker had attempted to access the grievance procedure after 
her employment had been terminated. She was refused access to the procedure as she 
was not an employee (or ex-employee); however she was offered the opportunity to use 
the corporate complaints policy.
Social  work managers  noted that  agency workers have  more  say in  hours  of  work, 
working  pattern  and  time  off  than  their  permanent  counterparts.  The  nature  of  the 
relationship between the organisation and these workers is such that managers appear 
reluctant to hold agency social workers to the same standards as permanent staff.  The 
triangular employment relationship appears to give agency workers in a powerful labour 
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market  position  the  ability  to  determine  their  own  hours  of  work,  the  duration  of 
contracts, to take leave when needed. It seems to offer more limited access to workplace 
participation. 
Management of short-term vs. long-term agency 
workers
There were a number of differences in the management of short and long-term agency 
workers that are relevant to discussions of the legal status of agency workers.  This 
section details the manager's and agency's view of the contact between agency workers, 
the  workplace  employer  and  the  agency.  The  following  chapter  will  discuss  the 
perceptions of agency workers themselves. 
Short-term agency workers have their most enduring relationship with the agency. It is 
the agency that spends most time on their recruitment with most workplace managers 
either  looking  at  profiles  or  just  expecting  the  agency  to  send  a  suitably  qualified 
person.  The  agency  provides  access  to  most  training.  For  example  Adecco  offers 
significant web based training for its workers and the internal care agency at City has 
regular training updates for its staff on health and safety and work related areas.  For 
these workers the agency provides appropriate placements and often identifies potential 
training.  Workplace managers direct these workers for the duration of a placement but 
because  the  placements  were  short-term  this  interaction  was  limited.  For  agency 
workers  that  experience  successive  short-term placements  the  relationship  that  they 
have with the agency is far more enduring than with any workplace despite the fact that 
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they take instructions from workplace managers.  It is the agency that determines the 
likelihood of their future employment, and on whom they are most dependant. Most of 
the short-term agency workers that I spoke to, both internal and external, had cultivated 
relationships with their agency manager to enhance their chances of future placements.  
Conversely long-term agency workers often have little contact with their agencies and 
clearly much more contact with the user organisation.   Many of these workers reported 
joining several  agencies in order to maximise chances of finding new work if  their 
placement was due to end, and placed little importance on their relationship with the 
agency.   Some  long-term agency  workers  receive  formal  interviews  before  starting 
work, many receive induction and on-going work related training. All managers of long-
term agency workers reported that they were given supervision if it was offered to their 
permanent colleagues.  Agencies reported very little contact with these workers, and 
suggested that their management was very much down to the user organisation, even 
where they were employees of the agency.  While some agencies offered training for 
long-term agency workers, or acted as a gateway for them to access training themselves 
they rarely funded such training unless it was a requirement of the workplace employer. 
There are in fact major differences between the level of contact and the relationship 
between  agency  workers  and  their  two  employers  which  is  heavily  influenced  by 
whether  their  placements  are  short  or  long-term.  The  nature  of  the  triangular 
relationship is not static; the agency and workplace employer do not play the same role 
in all cases.  Early in a placement the agency is heavily involved in 'selling' workers to 
the  workplace  employer,  and  maintaining  contact  with  the  worker  to  ensure  their 
attendance  at  interview  and  their  acceptance  of  the  post  if  offered.  Once  at  the 
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workplace the agency is far less active. Some workplace managers reported that they 
had not spoken to the agency after the first week of the placement, and expressed scorn 
at the idea that the agency cared about how its staff fared in the workplace.  A couple of 
workplace managers said that they spoke to the agency every month or two about how 
their agency worker was doing. 
The passing of time from the start of a placement strengthens the relationship between 
the agency worker and the workplace, particularly where the placement is expected to 
be long-term.  Over time, where a worker remains in post, the triangular relationship 
changes as the worker has much more contact with and is much more reliant on the 
workplace employer than the agency. The primary focus of effort by the agency is on 
recruitment and placement of workers, clearly the fact that short-term workers required 
more frequent placements and therefore were more often in contact with the agency 
adds to the strength of the relationship between the agency and the workers. Conversely 
some agency workers had been placed in a long-term role some months earlier  and 
agencies reported that the only contact that they had with workers was the submission 
of timesheets.  Workplace managers indicated that they spent very little time with short-
term agency workers,  but  that  they felt  it  was  important to build up a rapport  with 
longer term agency workers.  Managers in Met's day care setting felt that it was up to 
agency workers themselves to ensure that good working relationships were built, while 
other managers felt that it was their responsibility to ensure that agency workers were 
included as team members.
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Overview
Agency  workers  were  found  throughout  social  care  within  both  local  authorities. 
Generally they had little contact with each other, and even when they were located in 
teams  with  other  agency  workers  most  were  not  supplied  by  the  same  agency. 
Variations in the management of agency workers existed in many areas across both 
authorities, not least in the understanding of what an agency worker was.  For the most 
part the agency's role was to recruit agency workers and place them within the local 
authorities.  On the whole, the focus of work for agencies was recruitment of candidates 
and of organisation in which to place them.  The level of contact during placements was 
limited to time-sheets and pay unless there was an issue raised by managers or workers. 
On occasions, workers or their managers in user organisation approached the agency for 
training which was generally provided on request.  Most ongoing management of these 
workers was provided by the user organisation.  
The level of induction given to agency workers varied as some were given long bedding 
in periods and others were expected to ‘hit the ground running’.  Supervision was given 
to  both  agency  and  permanent  workers  but  some  managers  noted  that  they,  on 
occasions,  were  forced  to  give  additional  supervision  or  support  to  inexperienced 
agency staff.  Internal training was accessed by agency workers and many but not all, 
managers offered external training to their agency staff.  Managers noted the difficulty 
in making workers comply with any policies but generally did think that workers should 
be managed in line with local authority policies.  Only two recounted dismissing an 
agency worker and in the main in spite of some agency workers requiring substantial 
support they were kept on even where managers alluded to the ease of hiring and firing 
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agency staff.  
There was some consistency in how serious offences at City would be handled and even 
a register of workers that should not return to work for the authority but there was no 
consistent view on how serious an offence would have to be to have a worker's name 
added to that list.  Managers at Met did not have a consistent understanding of how 
allegations  of  gross  misconduct  against  agency  workers  should  be  dealt  with. 
Responses  varied  from  suggesting  that  the  agency  should  investigate  alone  or  the 
worker should just be dismissed to saying that the authority's policies would kick in and 
that the appropriate standards body would be informed by the authority.
City and Met had substantial similarities in their management of agency workers.  In 
both authorities, how workers are treated from interview through to termination is very 
much at the discretion of the line manager with few exceptions.  The lack of training 
and support for managers appears to have led to this inconsistency and managers were 
not clear about who was responsible for the staff and whether authority wide policies 
applied specifically to them.  The major difference between these authorities was that 
within City there was a consistent understanding of how serious misconduct would be 
dealt  with but  this  was  not  the  case  in  Met.   Met  however,  had clear  management 
information and a mechanism for limiting employer liability which were not present in 
City.  
Some authors  (Kunda 2002,  Kirkpatrick and Hoque 2006)  have  pointed to  workers 
being  attracted  to  agency  work  as  an  escape  from  the  bureaucratic  rigidities  of 
particularly public sector life. It appears that even where agency workers are used for 
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traditional rather than strategic reasons the triangular relationship means that they are 
managed outside the conventions of the typical public sector employment relationship. 
Managers avoid some of the responsibilities typically associated with managing direct 
employees.  The use of agency workers avoids the long processes by which standard 
workers are recruited, and the ease with which contracts can be terminated means that 
managers  avoid  having  lengthy disciplinary  problems.   These  workers  are  typically 
excluded from most employer driven participation at the user organisation, and at the 
time  of  the  research  agencies  appear  not  to  have  participation  forums,  though  two 
reported having previously having open evenings where staff could come in and discuss 
any difficulties. 
The level of variation in the management of agency workers means these workers may 
not  enter  placements  with  fixed  expectations  about  the  treatment  that  they  should 
expect.  The  diversity  with  respect  to  recruitment,  training,  management,  and 
participation has implications for the ability of agency workers within one organisation 
and even one team to share common problems with  each other.  The fact  that  their 
treatment  is  so  different  from their  permanent  colleagues  may  also  undermine  any 
problems being shared with them.
This chapter offered insight into the management of agency workers. It lays out the 
ways  in  which  their  management  differs  and  how  much  their  treatment  can  vary 
depending on their individual line manager.  The treatment of agency workers by their 
organisations  and  line  managers  is  important  to  understanding  how  they  form 
expectations of work, and how they come to see problems at work.  Managers treating 
workers  as  disposable  because  of  their  lack  of  legal  rights  and  their  triangular 
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employment relationship can have a counter-mobilising effect.  It can make it difficult 
for workers to see dissatisfaction at work in terms of injustice because they are working 
within a different set of expectations to their permanent colleagues. Kelly (1998) notes 
that  ruling  groups  can  legitimise  their  actions  with  reference  to  shared  beliefs  and 
conforming to established rules.  By treating agency workers differently to permanent 
staff  in  terms  of  recruitment,  training,  discipline  and  participation,  managers  can 
underline the division between agency workers and permanent workers based on their 
contractual status.  This has two key effects.  Firstly it presents a challenge to the ability 
of agency workers to move from dissatisfaction to injustice as they may not feel that 
their  sense  of  dissatisfaction  is  justified,  effectively  stifling  the  process  of  interest 
recognition.  Secondly it obscures the opportunity to act collectively for these workers. 
The  extent  of  differentiation  in  treatment  based  on  contractual  status  can  present  a 
challenge to  the  capacity  of  workers  to  take  collective  action  across  organisational 
boundaries, as it creates divisions between workers based on their  contractual status 
which clouds their ability to think collectively and make collective links with others on 
different types of contracts, or with different parties to the triangular relationship. 
The way that these workers are managed by two organisations within the triangular 
employment relationship, and the lack of clarity over their management also impacts on 
their ability to mobilise.  Responsibility is shared across two organisations, and beyond 
the contracts between the agency and user, and worker and agency, which are generally 
silent  on  matters  of  management,  there  is  no  explicit  agreement  between  the  three 
parties about their  respective responsibilities.   This can make it  difficult  for agency 
workers to attribute any defined interests to a single party to the relationship, or at all. 
Workers  may  feel  sense  of  injustice,  but  struggle  to  identify  either  employer  as 
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responsible.
The discussion of the varied management of agency workers and its counter mobilising 
effect on agency workers provides the basis for discussing the experience of work for 
agency workers themselves.  How agency workers experience work will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 – The experience of temporary agency work 
in social care
This chapter focuses on how agency workers experience working life within the case 
study organisations, building on the evidence of how they are managed presented in the 
last chapter.  It highlights the fact that different workers have different experiences of 
work.  Rather than the single face of agency work that is often portrayed as universally 
precarious employment blighted by low pay, insecurity, poor promotion prospects and 
without any form of job security this research reveals much greater heterogeneity.  This 
chapter  begins  with  a  discussion  of  what  workers  see  as  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of agency work, followed by their views on the availability of training 
and  the  level  of  job  security  that  they  experience.   The concept  of  job  security  is 
explored to discover what aspects of security are important to different types of agency 
worker.  Job security  is  broken down to look at  labour market,  employer,  post  and 
placement job security, and the ways in which workers come to see their their jobs or 
careers as secure is investigated.  Following on from this is an analysis of how workers 
deal with problems at work.  This consists of a description of the problems that agency 
workers reported, including an outline of how they acted or did not act to resolve them. 
The chapter will then move on to a discussion of how mobilisation theory explains the 
ability of workers to respond to problems at work and how the ways in which workers 
act is influenced by the nature and degree of job security that they feel. 
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Advantages and disadvantages of agency work
Agency workers outlined a variety of advantages and disadvantages of agency work. 
Forde and Slater  (2005) note the voluntary versus involuntary dichotomy in agency 
work.   Others (Kundy et al  2002, Hoque and Kirkpatrick 2006) note the difference 
between 'free agents' and more 'vulnerable' agency workers, though, as discussed earlier, 
the mere fact of professional qualification does not protect certain agency workers from 
marginalisation  in  terms  of  training  and  consultation.   Division  along 
voluntary/involuntary  lines  as  well  as  professionally  qualified/not  professionally 
qualified lines may help to explain agency workers perceptions of agency work.   This 
section will consider the experience of the voluntary agency workers in two groups; 
firstly agency social workers and secondly internal agency care workers.  It will then 
discuss the experience of involuntary agency workers.
Different agency workers, even within the same occupational group, had very different 
views on the advantages for them of being agency workers.  All agency social workers 
identified the higher rate of pay as an advantage and most also identified some kind of 
flexibility offered by agency work.  Some workers felt that agency work gave them 
control over their working lives and allowed them to decide which roles they undertook; 
where they were willing to work and when.  It allowed them to take long periods off 
work if they wished, work a more flexible working week, change specialisms, and be 
geographically mobile.  While agency social workers were well paid they also noted 
that they had fewer benefits than their permanent counterparts
 
“Although I think the perception is that agency workers get paid a lot more and  
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in our hand I suppose we do.  But when you take into account all the back office  
facilities for people employed full time, and the sick pay and the leave, and all  
the other considerations.  I think if you added all of them up and put them next  
to the amount of money I get, which effectively has none of the advantages of a  
pension provided or sick pay or leave pay,...  I don’t think the money I get would  
actually be that far off what it costs to employ a local authority employee.  But  
that is a decision I made.” (Agency social worker manager, City)
Some agency social workers identified insecurity as a problem with agency work, while 
others did not see the work as insecure.  Many thought that they were looked down 
upon by permanent colleagues and managers who expected agency social workers to be 
less  good at  the  job;  some said  that  whether  you felt  valued  as  an  agency worker 
depended on the team and the local authority.  Some workers noted the difficulty in 
accessing training but others did not feel that training was a problem.  As this indicates, 
perceptions  of  the  disadvantages  associated  with  agency  social  work  varied 
substantially between different workers.  
Like the IT professionals researched by Stanworth and Druker (2004), professionally 
qualified workers in my study were attracted to agency work primarily by the premium 
offered for their skilled labour, but the flexibility of this type of work was also a driver. 
There  is  national  recognition  of  the  shortage  of  social  workers  and  the  two  local 
authorities in which I conducted research in were both experiencing recruitment and 
retention  difficulties.   These  were  particularly  acute  within  the  Children’s  Services 
departments.  
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The second group of voluntary agency workers, are internal agency care workers at 
City.  These workers were exclusively women with caring responsibilities outside of 
work.  These workers compared themselves with their directly employed colleagues and 
identified that flexibility over when they worked was the key advantage of agency work 
over permanent jobs for them.  Some of the staff working for the internal care agency 
had fairly short service, but one of my interviewees had been engaged for seven years. 
Each of these workers had been offered a permanent  job in one of the homes they 
worked in and had decided not to take it.  While in many cases the flexibility offered by 
agency work accrued mainly to the user organisation, the workers also benefited.  Work 
was arranged by the agency in ways that took into account the domestic and caring 
responsibilities of agency workers.  Simultaneously the user organisation was able to 
cancel or curtail shifts with little notice and to request additional staff at the last minute. 
In this context both parties benefited from the flexibility because of the way the internal 
care  agency  managed  shifts  and  was  able  to  take  account  of  workers’  home 
circumstances when offering work. 
Internal  agency  care  workers  also  noted  the  many  disadvantages  of  their  status 
compared with their  permanent counterparts  like lack of sick pay, difficulty gaining 
NVQ training, less annual leave and, until recently, inability to join the pension scheme. 
Despite these disadvantages agency work was their preference:
“I think it is best to stop as casual.  I think it is better all round.  Having said  
that, I think perhaps when you have done a couple of years for the [internal  
agency], I think the council ought to recognise you and take you on.  We don't  
have a contract do we or anything? I think that would be nice, to be recognised,  
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because I think sometimes the council don't and you just work.  A lot of people  
don't know about us; I don't think they realise that we work as hard as we do  
with the permanent ones in the homes.” (Internal agency care worker, City)
Internal agency care workers were paid at the lowest rate on the same pay scale as their 
permanent colleagues, so they did not gain the pay benefits of agency work that the 
social workers enjoyed; however they did appreciate the benefits of being able to have 
more control over their working hours.  Accounts from workers, the internal agency 
manager  and other  local  authority managers all  referred to  the flexibility  offered to 
workers by the internal agency and 63% of these workers cited the flexibility over their 
hours as the main reason for deciding to take casual work.  None cited inability to get a 
permanent job, need for experience or desire for a permanent job at the local authority 
as  a  reason  for  selecting  casual  work.   All  the  internal  agency  care  workers  that 
responded  to  the  questionnaire  identified  that  the  flexibility  that  their  working 
arrangements offered was a key advantage.  Only 16% of these workers said that they 
would prefer a permanent job.  Further investigation at interview suggested that both the 
internal  agency  manager  and  some  workers  felt  that  some  kind  of  contractual 
arrangement other  than casual work may be preferable for these workers because it 
would give them more security.  They suggested zero hours contracts  or annualised 
hours contracts would be better, a view echoed by Unison; however they were willing to 
continue to work in this way because of the flexibility offered.  The absence of financial 
compensation for the lack of non-pay benefits due to being agency workers was of 
concern to them but they saw the advantages as outweighing the disadvantages. 
The six involuntary agency workers that I interviewed were made up of three internal 
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agency administrative workers, two external agency care workers and one agency social 
worker.   Only  two  administrative  agency  workers  were  actually  voluntary  agency 
workers because at that point in their lives it was a convenient choice.  For the majority 
of the workers in these groups it was the only work available to them.  These workers 
were  engaged  on  lower  pay  with  fewer  benefits  than  their  permanent  counterparts. 
They did not have access to sick pay and were not paid when they were on annual leave. 
Rolled up holiday pay (i.e. where the holiday pay workers are entitled to is calculated as 
a percentage of their hourly wage and added to their standard pay) is still the norm for 
agency workers despite the ECJ ruling that it does not comply with the Working Time 
Directive (Caulfield v Hanson Clay Products Ltd).  For many of these agency workers 
the disadvantages related to agency work were the same:
“I don't  get paid if  I'm sick,  I  can't  carry flexi  over weeks,  I  don't  get  paid  
holidays, well, I do get paid holidays but it's within the wage to a certain extent.  
I'm not quite sure how the holiday thing works, it always seemed to me that you  
only get paid holidays if  you work every day in the year and don’t take any  
holidays.” (Internal agency admin, City)
In  interview,  most  of  these  workers  expressed  a  preference  for  permanent  work. 
Compared  with  voluntary  agency  workers,  fewer  flexibility  related  benefits  were 
experienced by these workers.  They tended to be employed within the same team in the 
user organisation for at least three months at a time and work a fairly standard working 
week.  Where agency care workers worked part time it was generally at the behest of 
the user organisation which did not want to pay them for non-productive time such as 
attending team meetings:
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“Now when they have a meeting here you are not part of it because you are not 
permanent staff.  Or if anything like that comes to the permanent staff, you are  
agency; you don't have the privilege because you are agency.” (Agency care  
worker, Met)
This was particularly evident for care staff within Met.  The working day was arranged 
so  such  workers  arrived  after  the  staff  meeting  had  taken  place  as  managers  were 
reluctant to pay them to attend and similarly they were excluded from training days.  It 
shows a clear, if unofficial, separation of management styles for permanent and agency 
staff.  
Two of the internal agency administrative workers did note that there were advantages 
to agency work in that they were there to do a job and that no-one expected too much of 
them.  They enjoyed working in roles free of organisational bureaucracy.  Two of the 
administrative  workers  also  noted  that  agency  work  had  helped  them to  get  a  job 
quickly after redundancy; however both still wanted a permanent job.  The involuntary 
agency care workers had been working through an agency for some time and had been 
unable to make the transition from agency work to permanent work.  The questionnaires 
revealed that internal agency administrative workers were evenly split between being 
voluntary and involuntary agency workers with some viewing the variety in placements 
and flexibility over hours as being key advantages that they sought in undertaking this 
work.   Nonetheless,  compared  with  internal  agency  care  workers,  internal  agency 
administrative workers  were  significantly  more  likely  to  prefer  permanent  work  to 
casual  or  agency  roles  (Pearson  correlation,  p  =  0.32,  Sig  =  0.05).   This  may  be 
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associated with the support that internal agency care workers perceive that they receive 
from their agency manager which is discussed later. 
Having  noted  the  differences  between  different  types  of  voluntary  and  involuntary 
agency workers in their perceptions of the advantages/disadvantages of agency work I 
will turn to look in more detail at their perceptions of training, job security and dealing 
with problems at work.  
Access to training
Training  was  discussed  in  relation  to  the  management  of  agency  workers  in  the 
preceding chapter.  A number of authors (Booth et  al  2002, Hoque and Kirkpatrick 
2006, Stanworth and Druker 2004) note that it is difficult for agency workers across the 
occupational spectrum to access training. 
Within  this  study  some  agency  workers  were  able  to  access  training  through  their 
workplace, others through their agency and others independently undertook training to 
maintain professional accreditation.  Many of the latter accessing such training via local 
authorities or agencies but paying for it themselves.  I shall look in turn at care workers, 
social workers and then administration staff.
Care workers in both authorities (supplied by both internal and external agencies) noted 
extensive role specific training provided by their agency to maintain their employability. 
Such workers gave examples of courses that their agencies insisted that they attend.  
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“We do have refresher courses on moving and handling,  meetings  regularly,  
supervisions regularly, and I think that is good.” (Internal agency care worker, 
City) 
Generally the agency provided and paid for the training, however agency workers were 
not paid for the hours that they attended.  Some external agency care workers within 
Met suggested that they got more training than their permanent counterparts.  This was 
because their agencies provided external training and they were sometimes invited to 
attend training conducted by the local authority.  However they also noted that in some 
cases they were excluded from full training days as managers did not want to have to 
pay them and pay for the training.  Internal agency care workers mentioned that some 
training was available to them only once it had been given to all the local authorities 
permanent members of staff, even when agency workers had a more pressing need for 
the  training.   One  worker  cited  the  example  of  training  to  deal  with  people  with 
dementia;  this  training  was  offered  first  to  all  permanent  staff  and  later  to  agency 
workers.  She said that most permanent staff did not work in care homes housing people 
with dementia,  while many internal  agency care workers  did frequent  shifts  in  care 
homes designed for the care of dementia patients.  She suggested that it would be better 
to train the people that routinely worked with people with dementia first and then the 
remainder of the workforce and felt that it was unfair to base priorities on employment 
status rather than contact with the affected client group.  The use of employment status 
as a determining factor in arranging training for workers rather than assessing contact 
with the affected client group has implications for the health and safety of both the 
workers concerned and their colleagues, and the service users. 
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For agency social  workers and occupational therapists  the picture was more mixed. 
They were invited to attend some workplace training where it was essential to do their 
job.  Some had been offered internal and external training by the local authority, others 
were specifically excluded due to their agency status, yet others were offered a place but 
told that they would not be paid for the training hours.  Some expressed concern about 
their  ability  to  meet  the  training  requirements  to  maintain  their  professional 
accreditation due to the demands of their jobs.  Some workers had external training 
funded by their agency but most were self funded.
The four administrative workers interviewed had little to say on training.  Within City 
they were given an induction, however this was limited.  Adecco provided their agency 
administrative  workers  within  Met  access  to  on-line  training  material.   All 
administrative agency workers were offered job specific  training at  both authorities, 
generally in terms of internal social care systems; this mainly consisted of short courses 
and on the job training.   Few workers had received training (except for on the job 
training) that was specific and necessary to their existing role and none suggested that 
there were areas in which training was needed.
As a general rule, training for each group consisted of what was necessary to complete 
their role but did not extend to professional development.  Agency social workers were 
expected  to  maintain  professional  accreditation  but  they  would  not  necessarily  be 
provided  with  training  to  assist  them.   However,  they  would  not  automatically  be 
excluded should such training assist them with their role.  We also see an interesting 
development where agencies are aware of the importance of certain qualifications for 
the provision of service and have taken on a more proactive role than their traditional 
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one of hands-off labour provider.  Purcell et al (2004) note that a selling point of some 
agencies is the provision of skill development packages and career management, and 
some agency workers in this study identified the role of their agencies in providing or 
sourcing training to retain professional status. 
Job security
Perhaps the clearest  difference between agency and permanent work,  other than the 
complications of two managers and managing organisations, is the difference in the job 
or employment security of agency jobs compared with permanent or fixed term direct 
jobs.  Chapter 2 discussed the insecurity inherent in agency and casual work.  It is by its 
nature impermanent. The problematic employment status agency and casual work gives, 
and  its  accompanying  lacuna  of  employment  rights,  allows  quick  hiring  and  firing 
decisions.
Traditional conceptions of job (in)security relate to the probability that a worker will 
cease to work for their current employer, or their perception of the same (Guest 2004). 
Using this understanding, the contractual arrangement that agency and causal workers 
have may be particularly problematic.  Limited legal protection may mean that these 
workers  can be  dismissed with little  concern for  procedural  or  substantive  fairness. 
Even the term employer can be very challenging; in the triangular relationship agency 
workers have it may refer either to the user employer or to the agency.  A cessation in 
work for one is sometimes but not always synonymous with cessation of work for the 
other  as  workers  move  between  workplaces  and/or  agencies.   Agency  workers 
themselves varied in who they saw as their employer with many seeing both the agency 
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and the local authority as employers.  Some agency workers may perceive their ‘job’ to 
be secure despite the end of one assignment, others may not.  
Much of the literature about the contingent workforce in general and in agency workers 
in particular points to insecurity inherent in non-standard working arrangements.  The 
traditional concept of ‘job security' is based upon the assumption of permanent or fixed 
term direct employment.  For agency workers, the perception of job or employment 
security or insecurity can differ vastly; it is dependant not only on their security in their 
current  employment but  also the prospects  for  future employment.   The contractual 
insecurity may be mediated by the labour market situation of workers or employment 
arrangements.   The  traditional  definition  is  too  narrow  to  understand  how  agency 
workers  perceive  their  own  job  security  so  it  is  important  to  look  to  expand  this 
definition  in  order  to  fully  understand  different  types  of  agency  worker  and  their 
differing perceptions of job security.  
Charles and James (2003), in their investigation of job security, note the complex way in 
which their interviewees conceptualised job security and job insecurity.  They use the 
concepts  of  post,  employer  and  labour  market  security.   For  agency workers  these 
categories are helpful but the concepts of post security and employer security are both 
problematic.  Post security for temporary agency workers is difficult to conceptualise 
because of the often transitory nature of agency work.  Such workers will be occupying 
a  post  within  the  organisational  structure  of  the  local  authority  that  exists  on  a 
temporary or permanent basis.  Whilst an individual worker's role may be ‘casual care 
worker’ or ‘agency social worker’, the post that they are occupying may be specific to a 
particular workplace and shift pattern.  Thus while these workers have a defined  role 
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that does not change, their  post may change on a day by day basis.  For this group of 
workers 'placement' security may be the clearer way to understand their perceptions of 
their own security.  That is to say how secure they perceive the placement that they are 
presently undertaking to be.  
Equally,  employer  security  is  problematic  because  of  the  triangular  nature  of  the 
employment relationship.  It is helpful to divide the concept of employer security into 
‘agency employer security’ and ‘user employer security’.  This division allows separate 
consideration of whether agency workers perceive the user organisation or the agency as 
providing them with job security.
Within this thesis, there are a number of potential comparative dimensions for example 
between agency workers and permanent workers, workers at City and workers at Met, 
between  different  occupational  groups;  and  between  the  types  of  agency  worker 
(professional/non professional, internal/external, voluntary/involuntary).  There appear 
throughout this thesis few differences between agency workers based at Met compared 
with those based at City.  Rather, differences emerged based mainly on occupation and 
type of worker.  Some individual workers within occupational groups did have different 
experiences  of  work  and  job  security;  however  this  tended  to  relate  more  to  their 
individual line manager than the end user organisation that they worked for.  I will deal 
with in turn first internal agency care workers and administrative workers, then external 
agency care workers and social workers. 
There was a dichotomy between internal and external agency workers.  Internal agency 
workers generally only signed up with the local authority agency and saw that agency as 
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their  employer.   The  external  agency  workers  I  interviewed  were  all  on  long-term 
placements; these workers identified with the user organisation rather than the agency. 
Most had signed up with a number of agencies to give themselves the best chance of 
getting work before their current placement and most intended to do so again at the end 
of it.
Of  all  the  agency  workers,  internal  agency  care  workers  within  City  had  the  most 
frequent changes of placement; many changed work location every shift, though some 
worked on a longer term basis to cover long-term sickness.  Whether these workers 
were  legally  continuously  employed is  difficult  to  judge,  though some had worked 
through  the  internal  care  agency for  over  seven years.   They worked varying  shift 
patterns, which were flexible, to meet the needs of the care home that they worked in 
and their own personal situations.  They worked a non-standard week in every sense, 
with the number of hours worked, the times of shifts and the place of work varying day 
to day.  These workers had all made a positive choice about working in this way.  One 
left a permanent job to take her current role and the others had started to work as agency 
staff many years earlier because they needed a job and had made a positive choice to 
remain internal agency workers because it fitted in with their commitments outside of 
work.   Despite  the  high  level  of  placement  insecurity  that  they  experienced,  they 
perceived the lowest level of agency employer insecurity of all the workers interviewed. 
They were generally confident that they would continue with their agency employer 
with very little chance of long periods of unemployment despite contractually having no 
guarantee  of  work.   The  experience  of  these  workers  was  that  work  was  almost 
continuously available:
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“I can’t see how they can do without us because I know how many hours I do a  
week  and we  are  always  in  demand so  I  would  have  said  they  couldn’t  do 
without us really.” (Internal agency care worker, City)
Another  worker  referred  to  everyone’s  jobs  being  insecure  and  suggested  that  her 
position was really no different to her colleagues on permanent contracts:
“I don't think that anyone’s job is secure these days but no, I don't think that I  
am more likely to lose my job than the girls in the care homes.  They will always  
need us to cover sick and holidays…yeah, I’m sure the work will still be here for  
us in twelve months time.”(Internal agency care worker, City)
In short, post and contractual insecurity experienced by these workers did not lead to 
perceptions  of  agency,  employer  or  labour  market  insecurity  because  of  the 
circumstances of their employment.  They saw the role they performed as essential to 
their agency and user employer.  They were well aware of the statutory requirements for 
the minimum staffing of care homes and believed that their services would always be 
needed to meet those requirements.  These workers relied on the internal agency rather 
than individual posts or care homes, to provide them with job related security.  They 
were very loyal to the internal agency; none of those interviewed said that they would 
consider working for another agency, and it was the internal agency that they considered 
to be their employer.  In this way, despite their contractual status, they perceived a high 
degree of agency employer security.
Internal  agency  administrative  workers  provide  a  contrast  to  internal  agency  care 
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workers.  The majority of these administrative workers had taken agency work because 
no other work was available.  These workers tended to stay in a single placement for a 
period of months, with some being in the same placement for up six months.  These 
workers were very aware of placement insecurity; some felt secure up until the end of 
their current placement but very insecure following it:
“As a casual there isn't really job security as such…I know exactly how long this  
placement is lasting, I have a month to go and my job is secure until the end of  
it, but after that I don't know.” (Internal agency admin, City)
For them, the end of a placement meant labour market insecurity.  Most of the internal 
agency administrative workers I interviewed indicated that they had experienced long 
periods (weeks to months) of no work between placements and the agency managers of 
administrative staff indicated that there was no guarantee of work with many workers 
being inactive between placements.  Internal agency administrative workers tended to 
see the internal agency as their employer.  They were not allowed to remain in one 
placement for beyond twenty six weeks and so they were reliant on the internal agency 
to find them work at the end of that placement.  Their links to the workplace employer 
tended to  give them a perception of  user  employer  security  for  the  duration of  the 
placement, but the fact that they were required to change placements after 13 or 26 
weeks with no guarantee of another placement being available meant that this security 
was short lived.  
One of these workers provided an interesting contrast to the rest.  He did not rely on the 
agency to provide him with work following the end of a placement, but went to several 
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agencies. He felt some degree of labour market security because of the level he was 
working at, suggesting that there were lots of poor quality, poorly paid administrative 
jobs available and that therefore he was at little risk of being out of work. His case 
demonstrates  that  labour  market  job  security  can  arise  not  only  from  possessing 
valuable and rare skills in a tight labour market, but also from the perception of ready 
availability of jobs equivalent to the workers existing one, even where this is low paid 
and low skilled. 
The experience of placement insecurity was very different between internal care and 
administrative agency workers.  The high level of placement security experienced by 
internal agency administrative workers can be contrasted with the very low levels of 
placement  security experienced by internal  agency care workers.   A newly engaged 
administrative worker would be confident that they would be working at the same place, 
for the same hours, for three or six months with little chance of being dismissed.  In 
contrast a care worker could find herself in five different placements across the user 
employer's care homes throughout the week, any one of which may be cancelled or 
changed.  Internal agency care workers could be sent home from a shift if they were not 
needed,  and they could be cancelled or called up at  the last  minute;  they had little 
placement security.  In contrast, internal agency administrative workers had a great deal 
of placement security, they were confident that they would work out the remainder of 
their work placement with the user employer.  
They also provide a contrast in terms of user and agency employer security.  Internal 
agency care workers relied on the agency employer to provide them with security; they 
had an ongoing relationship with the agency and were confident in its ability to provide 
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them with ongoing work.  Internal agency administrative workers were confident that 
for the duration of the placement they had user employer security (as much as you can 
for six months anyway).  However they were not confident that the agency would find 
them work at the end of their current placement.  
Contractually, the positions of internal administrative and care agency workers were 
very similar, being engaged on the same terms with the same ‘employer’, albeit working 
in different roles and environments.  Their employment status was certainly the same; 
both  groups  were  employed  on  an  ‘as  and  when  needed’  basis.  However  their 
perceptions  and experience  of  employer  security  were  very  different.   Internal  care 
agency workers perceived that the agency, coupled with the demands of the care homes, 
offered them a high degree of employer security.  In contrast, administrative workers 
experienced user employer security during a known term placement but were not at all 
confident that they would remain in work beyond the current thirteen or twenty six 
week placement.  Internal agency administrative workers had a high level of placement 
security but very low levels of agency and employer security, while in contrast care 
workers  had  a  low  level  of  placement  security  and  much  higher  levels  of  agency 
employer security.  
For  external  agency  workers,  post  insecurity  was  synonymous  with  user  employer 
insecurity as a change of post nearly always meant a change of user employer.  The big 
division  here  was  between  professionally  qualified  workers  and  those  without 
professional qualifications (primarily care workers).  
While all the external agency workers expressed feelings of post, employer and labour 
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market  insecurity,  the  degree  of  insecurity  they  felt  depended  largely  on  their  line 
manager and his/her communication with the worker.  Some workers were told on a 
weekly basis about the finance for their jobs and its likely duration, others were given 
information in monthly supervisions.  Some said that their managers had told them that 
they would be given between one and four weeks notice.  Workers who were regularly 
updated on the likely length of their engagement perceived their positions to be more 
secure than those that were told that they would be given a number of weeks notice 
even, where these workers were aware of ongoing recruitment campaigns to fill  the 
posts that they occupied.  
Like the internal agency workers discussed earlier, external agency workers were aware 
of  their  placement  insecurity.   All  acknowledged  that  as  agency  workers,  the  user 
organisation  could  replace  them  should  it  wish  to.   External  agency  care  and 
administrative workers were concerned about their security in their present placement:
“[My job] is not secure…I am working here but they might decide they don't  
need me any more and there is nothing I can do about it because I am only  
agency.  But if I am permanent staff my job is secure… I do worry because you  
have to start from scratch again.” (Agency care worker, Met)
“Because you are agency if people don't like you they are going to bring in  
someone else, especially if you say there is a problem.” (Agency care worker,  
Met)
Two of the three external agency care workers said that they were taking agency work 
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in order to get a permanent job and were concerned about having to prove themselves 
all  over again with a new employer if  they were no longer required,  as well  as the 
problems associated with finding work.  Most internal agency administrative workers 
and external agency care workers noted the ease with which they could be dismissed 
and that it could be difficult to find alternative work.  
Social  workers  and occupational  therapists  were in  high demand at  the  time of  the 
research, though for occupational therapists this situation was changing as NHS trusts 
were  making  redundancies.   The  external  agency  social  workers  and  occupational 
therapists  interviewed had each assessed their  future employability based upon their 
professional qualifications and the current state of the labour market.  Their assessment 
was generally that there was plentiful work available in their sector and that they would 
not be out of work for long, most indicated that they could get a new job within a week. 
Even managers of these workers felt that while placements were not always secure, the 
state of the labour market meant that work was available:
“[Agency workers] are secure in terms of work.  They are not secure in terms of  
location I don't think, because if my agency worker finished tomorrow she could 
get a job somewhere else Monday because there is a lot of work out there.  So  
they are secure in terms of work but I don't think they are so secure in terms of  
where they work.” (Social work Manager, Met)
This concern about the temporary nature of roles was expressed by many agency social 
workers but few expressed feelings of labour market insecurity.  
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“I do worry about the transient nature of [agency work] sometimes, but that is  
counter  balanced  by  the  climate  at  the  moment.”(Agency  social  worker  
Manager, City)
“I suppose my biggest fear in coming in to agency was that it was temporary in  
nature and you could be gone at a moments notice, and at the end of the day I  
have still got the bills to pay and the mortgage to pay.  However looking at the  
market and the demand for agency workers, I thought 'I am not going to be out  
of work.  Even if I get sent on my way one week I can find a job within a few 
days with the way the market is at the moment.'  So I am not concerned I will be  
out of work and so financially I know there is going to be an income.” (Agency 
social worker Manager, City)
“If  it  was to finish tomorrow it  wouldn't  make any difference.  Agency work  
gives you more options.  I have been asked here to be a team manager. I have 
also had calls from agencies with different positions.  Various posts have been 
offered to me.” (Agency social worker, City)
In  fact,  the  agency consultant  I  interviewed who provided City  with  agency  social 
workers  said  that  recruitment  for  these  workers  worked  backwards  from  standard 
practice of the recruitment industry.  In general, for other areas of agency work a role 
was identified and then workers were selected from a pool that may be interested in the 
role.  In the case of social work, if an agency worker became available a number of 
posts would normally be open to them.  This view was backed up by managers at both 
authorities,  who cited the  difficulty  in  recruiting  good agency social  workers.   The 
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difficulty was normally in identifying workers and not posts, which is a measure of the 
tightness of the labour market.
For  professionally  qualified  workers,  the  state  of  the  labour  market  in  both  local 
authorities meant that concerns about job insecurity only related to remaining in the 
same post or with the same user employer rather than being able to find a job.  As it is 
clear that agency social workers do not rely on the user organisation to provide job 
security one may expect that they relied on agencies instead.  This was not the finding 
here.  Agency workers generally expressed little loyalty to the agencies that found them 
work and paid them.  In the main, when a placement was ending they would register 
with at  least  three agencies with a view to finding a new job.   Social  work agency 
workers relied on neither the agency nor user organisation to provide them with job 
security, instead it was their own skills, the tightness of the labour market, and their 
ability to sign up to multiple agencies gave them a perception of job security.  None of 
the social  workers and occupational therapists  interviewed were concerned that they 
would experience long periods of unemployment.
Many  agency  social  workers  clearly  weighed  up  the  various  advantages  and 
disadvantages  of  agency  work  and  in  particular,  the  insecurity  related  to  being  an 
agency worker.  Most saw the insecurity and lack of benefits  of agency workers as 
significant disadvantages.  The insecurity in terms of the individual role and employer 
was,  for  these  skilled  professionals,  to  a  very  large  degree  counterbalanced  by  the 
perception  of  security  within  the  wider  labour  market.   For  the  most  part  they 
considered the biggest disadvantages to be the lack of sick pay, pensions and annual 
leave and saw these as impacting on their level of personal financial security.  These 
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workers were relying on their skills and qualifications as well as tightness in the labour 
market  to  ensure their  future employability.   Rather  than seeing  job security  in  the 
traditional way, they regarded employability as key and conceptualised security in a 
way that focused on the likelihood of continuing to work within their field and, in many 
cases, the future likelihood of being able to pay the mortgage and bills.  They were 
primarily  interested  in  occupational  and  labour  market  security  as  opposed  to  job 
security that related to a particular employer or role. 
It is important to note that the employability assessment of agency social workers and 
occupational therapists was not just based around their possession of skills but also the 
level of demand for their skills.  One agency occupational therapist provides a case in 
point in this regard.  He was in the process of transferring to permanent work.  He 
thought that there were fewer agency jobs available as a result of funding problems in 
both the NHS and local authorities and he wanted to be in a secure job.  He said that he 
would have been happy to continue as an agency worker if he had been sure about 
always finding a new job once a placement ended, however he no longer felt able to be 
sure that was the case.  The premium paid for his labour as an agency worker was 
attractive to him for as long as he perceived the risk of being unemployed between 
placements as low.  However, as he perceived the labour market to be loosening and the 
risk  of  labour  market  insecurity  to  be  rising,  the  balance  shifted  for  him  and  a 
permanent job became more attractive.  For this worker, traditional understandings of 
job security are not sufficient to understand his actions.  His agency placement was as 
secure as all  previous agency placements,  however by understanding the differences 
between role,  employer and labour market security it is possible to understand how 
labour market security can impact upon his selection of employment status.
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One agency social worker explicitly acknowledged the difference between agency and 
permanent work in terms of job security.  She suggested that her job was less secure as 
an agency worker on the whole but that she had more control over the work that she 
would and would not take.  Like the workers studied by Kunda et al (2002) who used 
agency work to escape the degradation of bureaucratic work, this worker used agency 
work to regain control over her career.  She thought that as a permanent member of staff 
within City, facing reorganisation, your employment was secure but that your post and 
salary were not.  Her colleagues were concerned about being placed in different teams 
that they did not like, with work they did not want to undertake.  City was in the midst 
of a major reorganisation following on the heels of an earlier reorganisation that was not 
completed.  Permanent staff were not always aware of their place in the organisation, 
nor whether it would change in the immediate future.  As an agency worker she felt that 
she did not need to share their concerns as she could move on to a new role very easily.
“They're frightened of the reorganisation.  They can potentially be on teams that  
they don't want to be on, they can be placed in an area they don't want to be in…
If I didn't want to go I wouldn't have to.  I could find work elsewhere.  And I  
know you could do that with the Council but you have still got to give them four-
weeks notice, whereas as an agency worker if they want you to work tomorrow,  
you can go, can't you?” (Agency social worker, City) 
Like managers within Met, she referred to the weaker organisational ties that agency 
social workers had with the local authorities in which they worked.  The impermanence 
of  agency  work  afforded  these  workers  some  degree  of  'distance'  from  the  user 
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organisation  in  terms  of  the  necessity  to  buy  in  to  operational  strategy  and  their 
willingness to put up with unfavourable operational changes.  Her view of agency work 
as escaping the constraints of organisational bureaucracy is consistent with the work of 
Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) and Kunda et al (2002).  She articulates using agency 
work to free her from the constraints of working within a permanent role in the public 
sector.  Whilst acknowledging the insecurity inherent in agency work, this worker felt 
she had some control over her working life that her colleagues lacked.  As such the 
insecurity she experienced was on her own terms, and fitted in with her priorities. 
The division of the concept of job security into placement, employer and labour market 
security  allows the perceptions  of  agency workers  to  be  understood.   The fact  that 
contractually these workers have similar levels of job (in)security belies their diverse 
perceptions and experiences.  When agency workers and job security are discussed the 
characterisation tends to depict them as vulnerable workers that do not possess any form 
of  job  related  security.   Within  this  study,  administrative  and  external  agency  care 
workers did fit into that category.  For those workers, the vision of vulnerability, poor 
pay, limited legal protection and insecurity that is depicted as the norm for agency work 
does apply.  That is certainly not the case for the other agency workers for whom post 
insecurity is not always synonymous with other forms of job related security.  Internal 
agency care workers and agency social workers both experienced much higher levels of 
job related security albeit arising from different factors.  Professionally qualified social 
workers  and  occupational  therapists  who  had  limited  role  and  employer  security 
nonetheless felt secure within the labour market where their skills were in short supply. 
Internal agency care workers experienced a high level of post insecurity but perceived 
that they had a high degree of employer security because of the level of demand linked 
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to statutory staffing requirements and the fact that there were rarely periods when no 
work was available.  
It seems that part of the attraction of agency work for workers in professional roles is 
that  the  risk of  being  out  of  work  associated  with ‘temping’ is  much lower.   Such 
workers  have  little  post  and  employer  security  but  they  have  the  safety  net  of 
marketable  skills  in  a  tight  labour  market.   A key  disadvantage  of  agency work  is 
generally the financial insecurity that can result from being given very little notice of a 
placement ending and difficulty in finding a new placement.  This disadvantage does 
not apply to either occupational therapists or social workers in the current labour market 
climate because they believed that a new job would be easy to find, particularly if they 
were geographically  flexible (which nearly  all  the social  workers that  I  interviewed 
were).  Paradoxically whilst these workers said that they had chosen agency work and 
that they believed that they would be able to get a permanent job if they wanted to, 
nearly all of them said that in the long run they would prefer a permanent job.  
Guest  (2004) suggests  that  ‘knowledge’  workers  may  be  less  concerned  with  job 
insecurity than lower skilled temporary workers.  This does not appear to be the finding 
from this research for the professionally qualified workers I interviewed.  Rather than 
having  less  concern  for  insecurity  than  lower  skilled  workers,  they  conceptualise 
security and insecurity in a way that gives them confidence in their long-term work 
prospects.   They take a wider  view of security  based on the prospect  of  remaining 
employed within their profession.  It is employability rather than a narrow ‘role based’ 
job security that appears to be how these workers understand the security of work.  As 
such, they have valuable skills that make them highly employable and they face less 
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labour  market  insecurity  than  workers  without  professional  qualifications.   Such 
workers recognise the necessity of maintaining professional status, and ensuing up to 
date  skills,  by accessing appropriate  professionally  accredited training,  because it  is 
their occupational and professional status that offers them labour market job security.  
Agency worker typology
Agency workers are a diverse group and the divisions described above are primarily on 
the basis of their job type.  This section moves on to look at broader characteristics of 
agency  workers  and  how  they  impact  on  the  reasons  for  taking  agency  work  and 
experience of it.  To do this I have developed the following categories to capture the 
diversity  of  agency  workers  in  my  research  expatriate  agency  worker,  convenience 
short-term agency worker, income boosting agency worker, long-term career  agency 
worker,  job  seeker  and  'donkey  and  misfits'.   These  categories  were  developed  by 
coding the reasons that agency workers took agency work and discussed in Chapter 3. 
Expatriate agency worker
These workers tended to be from Commonwealth countries or the USA.  They tended to 
be young (twenty to forty years old) and had no dependants.  In general, they had taken 
agency work because the agencies assisted them in gaining their visa or because they 
wanted to be able to take long breaks to return on leave to their  country of origin, 
something that they did not think was possible as a permanent member of staff.  Others 
intended to work in the UK for a fixed period of time before returning home and did not 
see permanent jobs as an option because of the level of commitment required.  These 
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workers tended to see agency work as an ideal way of working in the UK for a period of 
time, few intended to stay in the UK long-term and so the impermanence of agency 
work tended not to count as a particular disadvantage for them.
For them, agencies were used to facilitate work permits and to get recognition for their 
overseas qualifications.  They felt that agencies were the most straightforward and cost 
effective route for arranging this.  Agencies had experience of assisting workers with 
work permit and professional exemption and often picked up the bill for doing so if 
workers committed to a period of agency work with them.
Convenience short-term agency worker
Some workers had chosen agency work because it was convenient for them at the time. 
Few of these workers intended to stay agency workers for very long periods; rather 
agency work was convenient for them at this particular point in their life.  This group 
was diverse in terms of  age,  gender,  race,  marital  status,  and level  of qualification. 
Excepting 'income boosting agency workers' detailed below, these workers tended to be 
early on in their careers, some had young children, but most did not have dependants.  
The diversity of characteristics linked to their diverse reasons for agency work being 
convenient, from individuals needing more money and seeing agency work as the way 
of getting it, to workers looking to pursue a different career path and using agency work 
to maintain their professional qualifications and income while making those changes. 
Some pointed to their personal circumstances changing which precipitated a move to 
agency work, others just found it convenient at the time.  When asked why they had 
decided to become agency workers many said it was because of the flexibility:
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“Flexibility for the most part, being able to come and go as I pleased.  If I got  
tired of an assignment I could leave without feeling obligated.  I didn't want to  
feel a sense of duty to stay.  Also agency workers tend to get paid more than  
permanent staff, and benefits aren't as much of an issue to me” (Agency social  
worker, Met)
For some workers, agency work was a lifestyle choice because it offers the option to 
take time out as and when required:
“[As an agency worker] you've got  more freedom…I mean I  work the same 
hours as everybody else but if I wanted to take three months off I could.  I might  
not have a place to come back to here but if I was in the council I would have to 
hand in my notice and leave for 3 months.  It just seems a little bit more official  
when you've  got  a  permanent  contract  doesn't  it?”  (Agency  assistant  social  
work, City)
Another had taken agency work because he had set up his own business; he could fit it 
in during slow periods and in doing so keep up his social work registration.  Some were 
using temping to explore careers that they thought may be of interest, for example one 
agency care worker was thinking of care or social  work for her career and decided 
agency work was a low commitment way of finding out whether she liked it.  Another 
had taken her first 'permanent' social work job with a Young Offenders Team and had 
hated the team and the work.  She decided to resign and also decided that she did not 
want to take another permanent job in case she also did not like the new one.  Instead 
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she decided that agency work would allow her to experience a few different areas of 
social work without her CV looking fragmented and uncommitted.  She thought that as 
a  permanent  worker,  frequent  changes  of  employer  would  be  a  problem but  as  an 
agency worker it was expected.  At the time of the research, she had elected to join Met 
as a permanent member of staff because she had found a team she enjoyed working 
with, it  was convenient for child care and she felt that she wanted the stability of a 
permanent role with its benefits.  
Agency work has been seen as a bridge to permanent employment, with many authors 
(Purcell  et  al  2004,  Gray 2002)  noting that  it  is  increasingly difficult  for  some job 
seekers to access direct employment opportunities, rather they are pushed to seek jobs 
through an agency in order to attempt to access permanent work with an employer of 
their choice.  Forde and Slater (2005) note the use of agency contracts to test workers 
before offering permanent employment. In a similar way workers may use agency work 
to explore not just different areas of social work but also different employers.  Local 
authorities in tight labour markets may be pushed to use agency workers who are then 
able to test them out as prospective permanent employers.  In this way the use of agency 
workers may provide a bridge to the recruitment of permanent staff in areas of skill 
shortage. 
Other workers said that they would have been happy to take roles on a permanent basis 
if  the  local  authority  was  willing  to  allow them to  work  part  time.   Many agency 
workers worked three or four days a week and said that local authorities would only 
allow permanent staff to work full time or half-time.  The rigid and bureaucratic way in 
which work in the public sector was organised was set against the flexibility that agency 
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work offered these workers.  For many workers flexibility over hours of work, location 
of work, specialism, holidays and duration of placements were critical to the decision to 
be agency workers at a particular point in their lives that they were at.  In response to 
this finding Met enhanced its flexible working policy for permanent staff, introduced a 
policy of team swapping to gain more varied experience for new and established social 
workers that requested a change of specialism and enhanced opportunities for part year 
working.
  
Income boosting agency worker
This group was made up primarily of very experienced individuals who had spent the 
vast majority of their careers as local authority social workers.  These agency workers 
referred to their stint as an agency worker as a career break or limited period away from 
local authority work:
“Effectively it was a short-term decision to take 3 to 5 years out in an agency, or  
through an agency, earn some money, pay off debts, put my family back on an 
even keel in order that we might be able to afford to do what other families  
living around us seem to be able to afford to do.  Then at some point after that  
five years have another look at it  and think about coming back into a local  
authority.  That was a five year plan to try and get things sorted.”  (Agency 
social worker manager, City)
They saw their current position as lasting a finite period during which they would earn 
more money.  Some rationalised this period as the part of their careers where they put 
themselves first, rather than the local authority and their client group.  Some felt deeply 
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uncomfortable about their decision to be agency workers; two said that it made them 
feel 'dirty'.  These workers saw permanent roles as superior to agency work in general, 
even accounting for the difference in pay, but for a variety of reasons needed or wanted 
additional money at that time in their lives.  
“I would rather have the security of  working in a local authority but at  the  
moment I need to try and make hay while the sun shines.  It might sound quite  
mercenary of me but I have worked for local authorities long enough and not  
got a great deal out of it personally.  When you give such a lot of yourself you  
need  to  get  something  out  at  some  point.   So  I  can’t  really  see  massive  
advantages,  the  principal  thing for  me is  money  and that  is  the  over-riding 
consideration.  It wasn't because of flexible hours or anything like that it was  
just I need more money and this was the best way of going about it.” (Agency  
social worker manager, City)
One income boosting agency worker I interviewed was about to return to permanent 
work because he had found a team he liked working for and he had been able to secure 
funding for professional development by becoming permanent.  It had always been his 
intention to return to permanent local authority work but he did note the difficulty in 
doing so because of the drop in wage.
long-term career agency worker
These  workers  enjoyed  being  temporary  agency  workers.   They  tended  to  have 
significant experience as agency workers and/or intended to remain agency workers. 
There was variation in age, marital status, dependants and whether these workers were 
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the  main breadwinner.  Most  career  agency workers  were  women with children and 
raised them either with their partner or as a single parent,  and many were the main 
breadwinner.  This group of workers was made up of both social workers and internal 
agency care workers.  Some of these workers had started out as convenience agency 
workers but had enjoyed the way of working enough to decide to make a career of it. 
One started out fifteen years earlier as an agency worker because she knew she would 
be moving around: 
“Because of my husband's job and we moved, I didn't want to take a permanent  
position  as  I  knew  we  were  moving  and  it  wasn't  fair,  so  I  went  with  an  
agency.” (Agency social worker Met)
But she had remained an agency social worker because of the various advantages to her 
including the pay and flexibility over her hours of work.  The reasons for their decisions 
to be career agency workers were varied but they tended to enjoy the variety of work 
and workplaces.  
“I have been an agency social worker for fifteen years now, I like it because it  
allows me to live in different parts of the UK, I stick a pin in the map and call  
the  agency  and  tell  them  that  I  want  to  work  there  and  they  find  me  a  
job.” (Agency social worker, Met) 
Some enjoyed the convenience of being able to take long periods of leave, while others 
enjoyed the flexibility that agency work offered over their working hours.  
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“When my children were ill I used to have to lie and say I wasn't well.  And I  
used to think 'I am supposed to be a social worker and you trust me to go out  
there and look after other people's children.  How can you expect me to leave my  
children in a state while I go and see someone else's child?'  With agency work I  
don't have to go to work; if I don't go in I don't get paid.  I like the flexibility, it  
suits me.” (Agency social worker, City)
This worker had substantial experience as an agency worker with now adult children but 
preferred to  remain  an agency worker.   She  spent  ten years  with her  previous  user 
organisation as an agency worker, seeing many permanent  colleagues come and go, 
underlining the fact that in some cases agency workers can be long serving members of 
staff.
 
For the internal agency care workers in this group the primary benefit appears to be the 
flexibility over working time: 
“It suits me best [to work for the internal care agency] because … we can work 
our way round our families and I do look after my mum who is eighty so it suits  
me that  does.   She has  a lot  of  hospital appointments  so obviously  if  I  was 
permanent in a home it wouldn’t be fair to keep asking to swap my shifts and for  
somebody else cover for me if I have got to take mum hospital, or what have  
you.” (Internal agency care worker, City)
“It fits in with my daughter, I have a daughter who is ten, and my mother.  I lost 
my father two years ago and since then my boss has been brilliant.” (Internal 
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agency care worker, City)
These workers used agency work to manage their own work life balance so that they 
could meet their family commitments.  Both of the care workers that I interviewed who 
fell into this group had dependant children or parents which meant that they perceived 
particular benefits from the way that the agency assisted them in working around their 
family commitments.  Their agency manager was very conscious of their reasons for 
working through the agency and kept detailed notes on their commitments outside of 
work so she could usually offer them work only when it fit in with their home lives. 
Care workers tended to work varied shift patterns, there was a mutual flexibility in their 
work and both the manager and workers noted the flexibility was beneficial for both 
parties.  This meant that workers could and did work in ways that fit in with their home 
lives; they perceived that a permanent job could not offer this level of flexibility and 
were thus content to remain agency workers.  Both of these workers had been offered 
permanent  jobs  by  care  homes  and  both  had  declined  them,  despite  them offering 
additional holidays and sick pay because they wanted to continue to work flexibly.
In  addition  to  factors  pulling  career  agency  workers  towards  agency  work,  some 
workers  cited  reasons  that  they  did not  want  to  take  permanent  jobs.   One worker 
referred to the fact that as an agency worker she did not have to buy in to the corporate 
culture.  She had reservations about the local authority and in particular the way she felt 
it  treated service users and employees.   She felt  that  as an agency worker she was 
somewhat removed from that but that as an employee she would have to agree with 
their position:
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“If I was working for the council I feel that I would have to agree with some of  
the things that they said and I wouldn't agree with them really.  It's  hard to 
explain really.  You want to work for somebody because you agree with what  
they say and the direction in which they are going… [as an agency worker] you 
can stay a little bit more detached, it's not less commitment but it's less involved 
with  all  the  protocols  and  the  way  things  are  moving  forward.”  (Agency  
assistant social worker, City)
Job seeker
This group just wanted a job.  They took agency work involuntarily because it was the 
best or only work available at the time:
“It is the easiest way to get a job nowadays because you can't get a direct job.  
You have to start work through an agency and then from there you look for a  
permanent job.” (Agency care worker, Met)
These workers most consistently expressed using agency work as a bridge to permanent 
employment.  Büchtemann and Quack (1989) have suggested that atypical work can be 
viewed as either a bridge to 'secure' employment or a trap in which workers are caught. 
There is certainly some evidence that involuntary agency workers within this study felt 
that  they  were  trapped  in  agency  work,  particularly  those  administrative  and  care 
workers that were looking for permanent roles but had been unable to access them, even 
through repeated agency placements.  
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These workers tended to be male, though one of the six was a woman and were all but 
one  were  either  external  care  workers  or  administrative  workers.   The  only  social 
worker who placed herself in this group was a black migrant worker who said it was 
difficult to get a permanent job; it was her intention to convert to permanent as soon as 
possible.  Like her, most of these workers had taken the agency position with the hope 
of  getting  a  permanent  job  either  with  the  user  organisation  or  through  gaining 
experience that would assist them to get a job elsewhere.  While most were at the very 
start of their careers a couple had much more experience.  
“Donkeys and misfits”
Other categories were identified by analysis of the experiences of agency workers and 
the reasons that they offered for taking agency work. This category was identified by a 
number of workers and managers at interview, and its omission was identified as a gap 
by the agency workers and managers that  I validated the other categories with. The 
name is taken from an interview with a senior manager at city who referred to agency 
social workers as “the donkeys and misfits who can't get a proper job”. 
These workers were described as  the people who are unable to get  permanent  jobs 
because they have committed acts of misconduct in the past, are incompetent, or cannot 
legally work (illegal immigrants or possibly people who have unsatisfactory criminal 
records with offences that would mean they could not normally get work with children 
or vulnerable adults).  Agency workers referred to these workers as the people that made 
managers and permanent colleagues look at all agency workers with suspicion.  They 
were of the opinion that fewer agency workers than implied were actually members of 
this group because they suggested that, once agency workers leave, everything that later 
226
becomes a problem is blamed upon them.  However a number of them had worked with 
'poor quality' agency workers.  Many managers said that they had personal experience 
with this group of workers as discussed in the previous section.  Experiences of this 
group ranged from workers that were arrested, or those whom managers were asked by 
police  to  identify  as  suspected  illegal  immigrants,  to  those  that  were  simply 
incompetent.  Some managers had found out that a previous local authority worker that 
had been dismissed for gross misconduct had returned some time later as an agency 
worker.  Unsurprisingly none of my interview subjects placed themselves in this group. 
Figure  7.1  shows  the  distribution  of  the  interview  subjects  amongst  the  above 
categories.  
Fig 7.1 Agency workers in this study   
Expatriate Convenience Income 
Boosting
Career Job Seeker
Social worker 4 6 2 4 1
Occupational 
therapist
- 2 - - -
Internal care - 1 - 2 -
External care - 1 - - 2
Admin - 1 - - 3
Voluntary versus involuntary agency work
A superficial analysis of this 'typology' of agency workers may suggest that only 'job 
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seekers' are involuntary agency workers.  However I would argue that this is not the 
case.  It is easy to categorise job seeking agency workers as involuntary agency workers 
and it is equally straight forward to categorise expatriate agency workers as voluntary 
agency workers.  The other groups of agency workers are more difficult to categorise in 
this  binary  manner.   The  choice  to  become  an  agency  worker  for  many  of  the 
individuals interviewed was a constrained one.  The availability of roles that allowed 
(typically  female)  workers  to  balance caring and work obligations often lead to the 
selection of agency status.  For others, the conditions of permanent employment in their 
most recent role pushed them to leave 'standard' employment and look for an escape in 
agency work.  Some of the factors around the degradation of work and the desire for 
disengagement from the local authority that Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) found were 
also described by agency workers in this study.  For some, agency work was a means of 
maintaining income while they left social work by retraining for a new career, but for 
others it was a means of remaining in social work but disconnected from the political 
considerations of the local authorities, with a quick escape route if the pressure got too 
much.  
 
Resolving problems at work
A key area in which the triangular employment relationship affects the experience of 
work  is  in  resolving  workplace  problems.   There  seem to  be  important  differences 
between varied types of agency worker in terms of dealing with problems at  work. 
While some deal with issues by speaking directly to the agency or user organisation 
about a problem, others exit one or both organisations, and others put up with problems 
at work.  Some of these differences are accounted for in the level of labour market and 
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employer security agency workers feel.  What follows is a discussion of how particular 
workers dealt with problems at work ranging from grievances that affected them and 
their colleagues, to general dissatisfaction. This leads into a discussion of the way in 
which mobilisation theory explains the way that workers act and do not act on problems 
at work. 
This  thesis  uses  the  framework  of  mobilisation  theory  as  outlined  by  Kelly  (1998: 
27-38).  It is used here to illuminate the ability of these workers to respond to perceived 
problems at work.  For mobilisation to occur workers must have a sense of injustice and 
perceive that injustice has a collective dimension.  For this to happen they must attribute 
the injustice to a dominant group, generally management, though in the context of a 
triangular employment relationship this may be management from either organisation, 
and they must have some form of social identification.  Kelly (1998: 38) claims his 
theory provides a framework for considering the absence of collective action, as well as 
its presence and it is used here to explain the reasons workers act individually rather 
than collectively.  
Within  the  triangular  employment  relationship  there  are  a  number  of  challenges  to 
workers  mobilising.  This  section  will  first  discuss  the  evidence  offered  by  agency 
workers of problems at work, followed by the perceptions of agency and workplace 
managers as to how agency workers deal with problems.  It will then consider in turn 
injustice,  attribution,  the  opportunity  to  act  and  social  identification  including  the 
elements of counter mobilisation that affect how these workers respond to problems at 
work. 
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Evidence of how workers respond to problems at work
While most agency workers reported that they had not experienced problems in their 
present placement, many of them reported dissatisfaction with the conditions of work, 
and  most  reported  problems  with  previous  placements.  This  may  arise  from  their 
unwillingness to  report  problems to me as a  researcher  for  fear that  they would be 
reported to the organisation and that their employment may be affected. It may also 
reflect the unwillingness of many agency workers in this study to remain in employment 
where there was an ongoing workplace problem. Because agency workers have two 
employers, they have the opportunity to raise problems at  work with either, both or 
neither employer. 
Several agency workers had raised issues in their current placement, and many more 
described leaving previous placements because of problems at work.  Two of the thirty 
agency workers interviewed had been involved in raising informal grievances directly 
with the user organisation.  Three agency workers reported being unhappy with the level 
of agency mark up to the user organisation, they did so with the intention of changing 
agencies but remaining with the user organisation.  One internal agency care worker 
raised a grievance via her agency about the treatment of agency, casual and remote 
workers.  Almost half of the agency workers I spoke to reported that in the past they had 
dealt with problems at work by being moved by the agency or leaving both the agency 
and the user organisation.  What follows is an outline of the issues that workers faced 
and the ways in which they dealt with them. 
Both informal issues were raised individually at the workplace.  The first was raised by 
an external agency care worker at Met.  She was unhappy about how she had been 
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spoken to by a permanent member of staff.  She said she raised it with her workplace 
manager  but  was  quite  prepared  to  move on  if  it  was  not  resolved  properly.   Her 
manager spoke with the other worker who apologised and said she had not meant to 
cause any upset; everyone was apparently satisfied with the outcome.  The manager 
later met with all the newly recruited agency workers to discuss integrating with the 
permanent  staff  more  as  she  felt  that  some of  the  communication  difficulties  were 
caused by lack of integration.  However, she did not include agency workers in her 
weekly team meetings, daily team briefings or external training.
The second agency worker that raised an issue with her agency was an internal agency 
care worker at City.  She noticed on one of her shifts that agency, casual, and remote 
staff were being treated very badly in one care home.  This treatment included being 
spoken to  in  a  demeaning manner,  being laughed at,  being made to  wait  excessive 
periods for completion of time sheets,  being singled out for unpleasant tasks,  being 
given vague, incomplete and misleading instructions and generally being bullied by the 
home manager and her management team.  The internal agency care worker spoke to 
her  agency  colleagues,  and  to  other  workers  at  the  home to  ascertain  whether  this 
treatment was a one off or whether it was a consistent problem.  She found that some of 
her colleagues were extremely distressed by the treatment and that it was a consistent 
part of working at this home which particularly affected the remote workers who were 
based in the home but providing domiciliary care in the community.  She discovered 
that the issue had been around at the home for some time before she worked shifts there 
but thought others were reluctant to raise issues because of the potential consequences: 
“I think people were frightened to say anything.  You see, rather than somebody 
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complaining they probably would just say 'I  am not going to work there any  
more, I don’t want no more shifts there'.” (Internal agency care worker, City)
The agency worker was not a member of a trade union, though she had attempted to join 
Unison who had told her to join when she got a permanent job.  Nonetheless, she asked 
the Unison representative for advice which was duly given.  She raised the issue on 
behalf of herself and her colleagues with the internal agency manager offering specific 
examples  of  what  had  occurred  that  she  had  collected  from  other  internal  agency 
workers and remote workers.  Her manager took the matter very seriously and engaged 
support from the local authority's HR department in pursuing the matter as a collective 
grievance using the local authority's grievance procedure.  Both the agency worker and 
her manager reported that the issue was resolved quickly.  She reported no concerns that 
she would face any negative repercussions as a result of raising the grievance, though 
she commented that external agency workers probably would not have felt the same. 
She had a great deal of faith in her manager’s ability to resolve the situation, which was 
apparently well placed, and in the local authority’s policies for dealing with managers 
that treated staff in this way.  At her request she was not placed in that home for six 
months after the grievance; there was sufficient work elsewhere that she was able to 
maintain her hours. 
Within this study agency workers also looked to the workplace employer to resolve 
problems in the relationship between themselves and the agency.  The limited contact 
that agency workers had with their agencies meant that problems were generally to do 
with rate of pay, or promptness of payment.   One agency social  worker referred to 
changing agencies in response to problems with pay:
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“The reason I left Swift,[was] I was going away on holiday and they hadn't paid  
me so I went to the bank on Friday and there was no money.  So I said where is  
my money and they said where is your time sheet and I said I sent it, this is after  
8 years of working and every week sending in my time sheet.  We worked out  
that there was a postal strike in London which we didn’t know about here so they  
didn’t know when they would get the time sheets.  I said I have worked for you 
for eight years and every week you have my time sheet, except when I have been  
on holiday, why can’t you trust  me? ...It  was just  at  the  time when [my old  
agency manager] ...  said would you like to change agencies, I decided yes I  
would.” (Agency social worker, City) 
Another agency worker complained to his manager that he was unable to access training 
though his agency, and the intervention of his manager meant that the agency paid for 
the training he needed.  Three agency social workers discussed having changed agencies 
while remaining with the user organisation because they were dissatisfied with the level 
of mark-up charged by the agency.  In each case the change was negotiated with the 
workplace manager and changing agencies in each case resulted in the user organisation 
paying less to the agency, and the worker being paid more:
“one agency worker, we did change her agency to get a better deal for her.  I  
phoned an agency, I suppose the ethics of it were questionable but I phoned up an  
agency and said, this woman isn’t being paid a very good rate of pay, although I  
was paying quite a lot of money for her, will you work a better deal out for both of  
us, which this other agency did,  paid her more and charged us less.” (Adults  
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social care Manager, City) 
In  two  of  the  three  cases  there  were  no  problems,  however  one  worker  had  her 
employment terminated as a result of the change.  The agency found out that she was 
continuing to work for the local authority though a different agency and demanded the 
payment  of  a  finder's  fee.   The  local  authority  refused  to  pay  it,  and  the  agency 
threatened legal action.  To avoid conflict the agency worker was dismissed despite the 
fact that she had sought and received permission to change agencies.  
One external agency care worker discussed an issue at work that she had not raised with 
her  manager.  She had been working with a  service user  who was racially  abusive 
towards her.  A colleague witnessed the incident, but turned away and left the room, 
leaving her to deal with the service user who was continuing to use abusive and racist 
language.  She said that she was upset by the incident, mostly because of the lack of 
support offered by her colleague.  I asked her whether she felt that the reaction of her 
colleague was due to her race or her agency status.  She felt that they were somewhat 
related,  stating that  most  permanent  care staff  seemed to  her  to  be white  and most 
agency care workers she had worked with were black but that on the whole it  was 
probably due to her being an agency worker.  She thought permanent staff saw them as 
people that were there one day and not the next so they did not want to waste time on 
them.  She suggested that other workers thought that it was unacceptable to treat people 
differently because of their race but that they were fine with treating people differently 
because they were agency workers.  It was her view that they were all at work to do a 
job, and that your status as an agency worker should not mean that you are treated with 
less respect and dignity at work, though in her experience, at times, it had meant that 
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she was.  She had not reported the incident because she didn't think that doing so would 
change anything. 
Her views on the racial profile of agency workers in some parts of Met was supported 
by a day care centre manager who recognised that agency workers tended to be black. 
In one centre, the manager said that I would be able to tell which workers were agency 
because they were all black and mostly men.  It should be mentioned here that there was 
some concern about the future of the day care service; no permanent roles were being 
advertised or filled.  Rather agency workers were appointed and for most vacant roles 
being male was a genuine occupational requirement as intimate care of male service 
users was a part of the job.  The managers reported that the male agency staff were the 
successful  candidates  from an agency recruitment  exercise  and that  the  majority  of 
candidates that agencies sent were black.  There appeared to be no racial difference 
between workers within City which was much less ethnically diverse than Met and 
where nearly all workers irrespective of status were white.  
A number  of  workers  had  looked  to  their  agency  to  move  them  from  a  previous 
placement when they had experienced problems at work, suggesting that this would be 
easier than confronting issues:
“I would have thought that if I had difficulty with a manager I would want to be  
moved if it came to that.” (Internal agency admin, City)
“I have left jobs twice because of the way the staff treat you” (Agency care  
worker, Met)
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“I  don't  [raise  problems]  because  there  is  no  point,  because  I  can  tell  the  
agency who move me.” (Agency care worker, Met)
Some said that raising an issue would most likely result in you being asked not to return 
to work:
“I speak from experience; if you have got a problem with where you are actually  
working at you could not be there tomorrow.  You could get a phone call that  
says for some reason you are out, that is because the organisation has phoned  
the  agency  and  said,  we  don’t  want  that  person  back”  (Internal  agency  
administrative worker, City)
“Because you are agency if people don’t like you they are going to bring in  
someone else, especially if you say there is a problem.” (External agency care  
worker, Met)
These workers suggested that raising a problem could only really be done when leaving 
a placement and that it  would be very unlikely an agency worker would be able to 
remain in a post having raised a problem with a manager or colleague.  Most said if it 
came down to their word against a permanent workers word, they would lose out and 
that  the  outcome would be  them leaving,  whether  they  raised the  issue  or  just  left 
straight away.  These workers indicated that rather than voice a problem at work or 
leave the placement they would put up with a problem unless it was making their life 
really miserable.  
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While most agency staff did not report having to deal with problems in their current 
placements  they  were  not  generally  very  optimistic  about  the  level  of  support  they 
would be likely to receive if problems arose:
“I haven’t come across any situations where I have had to go begging the help  
of the local  authority, and I  know I wouldn't  get  it  as an agency worker.  I  
suppose I  am prepared for  the  reality  of  it.  It  would be nice to  have  a few  
comfort zones to rely on but you don't have those as an agency worker.” (Agency  
social worker Manager, City)
Some thought that they would get help but only because their  current  manager was 
good:
“My experience so far is this: if I said that there was a problem [my manager]  
would  take  it  seriously,  but  I  think  that  it  depends  a  lot  on  the  local  
manager” (Agency social worker, City)
Others suggested that if they had a problem with a permanent member of staff, that it 
would be impossible for the situation to be resolved in their favour:
“I think if there were a clash between an agency worker and permanent worker 
it would be the agency worker that would go.  That isn't to say that you would be  
bullied at work, I wouldn't be bullied.  But I think that now I have been doing it  
a long time, yes I work for money but I work for fun as well.  If there was a 
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serious problem then I would just go.” (Agency social worker, City)
Many workers expressed a reluctance to challenge workplace problems and were not 
confident that they would receive much support if they did so. This was not always 
considered a problem by agency workers. Some agency workers at both local authorities 
expressed the belief that the major role of their agency was to find them work and that 
they were much less concerned with getting their support whilst they were at work: 
“For me the agency’s job is to get me the job in the first place, you find your  
support elsewhere.” (Agency social worker, City)
“I am not unhappy with my agency but they don’t do an enormous amount for  
me...they don’t offer anything in terms of support or training...The support they  
would offer would be well we will find you another job which I suppose is there  
principal function so that is fine.  I think when I signed up to the agency there 
was a degree of I am going to have to do this on my own so I suppose I was  
prepared for that.  So no I don’t think they would [support me], some agencies I  
think would purport to support people more, hence the justification for taking  
that greater amount of money.” (Agency social worker Manager, City)
Such workers were generally voluntary agency social workers, who had selected their 
agency on the basis of the amount of money the agency skimmed from the hourly rate. 
They  had  chosen  agencies  that  offered  little  in  the  way  of  support,  training,  and 
involvement as they believed that they would be able to find that elsewhere.   Such 
workers often saw greater advantages to membership of their professional association to 
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access some of the benefits that their agencies did not offer such as access to training 
and professional services.  
Around half of the professionally qualified workers suggested that they would contact 
the agency if they experienced a problem at work that they thought the agency could 
assist with.  Most of the administrative and care workers said that if there was a problem 
at work they would look to the agency for support if they were unable to resolve it 
themselves, though most said the resolution would be to move on to another placement. 
“I think that the agency would care more about the company than me, when you  
are working at this level you are always replaceable” (Agency care worker, Met)
This was a view echoed primarily by agency care and administrative workers within 
both local authorities.  
Most agency social workers said they may informally challenge a problem at work but 
that if it was not sorted out on that basis, they would leave because it 'wasn't worth the 
hassle'.  An agency social worker reported a problem with her manager in a previous 
role.  Her manager was behaving in an aggressive and demeaning manner; this problem 
was shared by her team and they together decided to approach the union and raise a 
collective grievance.  The agency worker reported that the union did not do anything. 
She subsequently decided that she did not want to work with that manager any more and 
moved on to a new placement.  She noted that the ability to resolve problems at work in 
this way was a particular benefit of agency work.   Despite her status as an agency 
workers, this worker felt able to pursue a collective resolution to the problem alongside 
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her  colleagues  who  were  permanently  employed.   This  demonstrates  that  agency 
workers can identify with their permanent counterparts where issues are shared, and that 
some agency workers are willing to seek collective resolutions to problems at work. 
Despite the willingness of some agency workers to raise problems; either individually 
or as part of a group, the majority said that they would leave rather than raise issues:
“I would have moved on,  it  is  not worth the hassle,  especially like I  say in  
today's  market  place  when  you  can  pick  up  another  job  relatively  
easily”(Agency social worker, City)
“The whole idea of being an agency worker is to use it for your benefit, not to  
let people take the piss out of you, if there is something that you don't want to  
deal with you just move on” (Agency social worker, City)
Migrant agency workers and Income boosting agency workers in particular stated that 
they would just move on rather than tackling issues at the workplace.  The view that 
tackling workplace problems was more hassle than it was worth echos managers' views 
on  disciplinary  processes  for  agency  workers.   As  discussed  in  the  last  chapter, 
managers  suggested  that  if  problems  were  not  resolved  informally  agency  workers 
would exit (either at management request or of their own volition) rather than face a 
formal disciplinary.  
Most  agency  social  workers  believed  they  would  not  have  access  to  the  normal 
grievance procedures, and some said even if they did, the length of time these can take 
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in a local authority meant it would be easier to leave.  Many social workers said that 
they had left organisations when they had had a problem at work or just got 'fed up'. 
Most of the workers who said that they had left following a problem said that in future 
they would try to sort it out before doing so again but that they would not hesitate to 
leave the organisation if it was not resolved.  For these workers high levels of labour 
market  job  security  may  mean  that  the  labour  market  itself  provides  employment 
protection of sorts. 
Agency workers discussed a variety of ways in which they acted and did not act in 
relation to dissatisfaction at work.  Different workers offered examples of raising issues 
with their manager at either the workplace or the agency, exiting one organisation with 
the support of the other or leaving both the agency and the user organisation.  This 
demonstrates that the opportunity for agency workers to act upon problems at work is 
not entirely absent, but that problem resolution can take different forms to permanent 
employees.  The  triangular  employment  relationship  offers  some  agency  workers 
different opportunities to act, such as ceasing employment with only one party to the 
relationship rather than having to exit employment altogether. 
Managers views on how agency workers respond to problems at work
Agency  managers  reported  that  where  workers  raised  problems with  them workers 
normally wanted to be moved rather than addressing them within the placement.  In 
some cases, agency workers did not want to discuss the issue, but rather wanted to move 
to a new placement.  In other cases, workers would inform the agency of the issue but 
would not want to pursue it other than to move.  Agency managers reported that there 
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were  occasions  when  a  succession  of  agency  workers  asked  to  be  moved  from 
placements as a result of problems at work; in these cases agency managers generally 
tried to persuade workers to challenge the issues.  They suggested that few workers 
were willing to do so:
“Yes, it is easier [for them to move on] because it is very easy to turn round and 
say, oh don’t bother doing anything about it and just leave.  But at times I do try  
to ask them if I can, because  future people have got to go in there and it might  
be  something  that  will  affect  them as  well”  (Internal  agency  administrative 
Manager, City)
Internal agency managers were willing to move workers where they were experiencing 
problems at work:
“What we usually do [when a worker has a problem] is arrange for them to  
come here and meet me on a one to one basis, so we can chat through how they  
feel and why they feel like that.  Then I basically ask them what they want to do  
and in most cases people don’t want to make it more formal, they really just  
want to move and I think I have got to respect their decision on that and do  
that.” (Internal administrative agency Manager, City)  
The internal agency manager said that some workers did request that they not be placed 
in particular homes because of workplace problems but this did not lead to exit from the 
agency itself.   The agency manager  for  these workers  indicated that she had minor 
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complaints from workers on a weekly basis and where appropriate assisted the workers 
to resolve them.  She suggested that some of the problems were of the 'ruffled feathers' 
variety where workers perceived that they were being spoken to harshly, ignored or not 
treated with sufficient respect and that they were minor enough to just want someone to 
listen to their complaints.  She thought that these problems were normally as a result of 
either the worker themselves or their colleague/manager having a bad day and things 
being taken the wrong way.  Where a worker felt an issue was more serious it would be 
dealt  with by informal  discussion with the home manager  or  through the grievance 
policy.  She said she took her cues from the worker themselves by listening to their view 
of the problem and asking them what they wanted to do.  These workers effectively had 
access to the local authority processes because their manager acted as their advocate and 
where relationships were damaged with one care home she provided them with work in 
the remaining homes in the City.  In the cases of the two workers that formally raised 
issues with her (the one referred to earlier about bullying of agency, casual and remote 
workers, and the allegation of abuse) one returned to the home in which she had raised 
the issue the following day and the other did not return to that home for six months.  
Internal agency managers felt that they were in a better position to assist their workers 
than external agencies would be.  In particular they felt that their access to local policies 
and HR support would allow them to raise issues on behalf of their workers without 
concern for the commercial relationship between the agency and user organisation being 
damaged.  Both external agencies had, in the past, arranged events where workers could 
meet with the agency to raise any problems.  Within Met the agency said that these had 
occurred when they supplied a large number of workers to the local authority.  They 
said that very few workers attended the event and that no issues had been reported at 
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Met.  Some problems had been raised by agency staff working for other local employers 
and in one case the agency had taken a view on the seriousness of the allegations and 
had ceased to supply the individual manager with workers.
Line managers commented on the difficult  position that  the agency may be  in  if  a 
worker has an issue with a manager at the user organisation:
“I have been approached by an agency representing a worker where there was 
an issue with a manager.  Agencies won’t play hard ball, they want to keep the  
customer but they will enter a discussion.  If there is an issue the worker will  
probably bugger off.” (Director, Met)
Other managers felt that agencies were not likely to act in the interest of their workers:
“Agencies are crap,  you don’t actually  believe that  the agencies give a toss 
about the people they place do you?” (Day care Manager, Met)
An external agency manager and a line manager cited a number of cases where agencies 
had provided representation or refused to place workers with a manager because of a 
history  of  poor  treatment  of  agency  workers.   One  manager  identified  an  agency 
approaching  him about  a  grievance  that  a  worker  had about  the  termination of  her 
contract.  There had been some teething problems in her placement and they were not 
confident about her competence.  The local authority had a funding shortfall toward the 
end of the financial year and said that all agency workers had to go, so he terminated 
her contract.  She thought that her termination was because they were not happy with 
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her performance and that she had not been given time to get used to the job but he 
insisted that  it  was  budgetary.  The agency made a  complaint  on her  behalf  to  the 
manager's line manager and when he confirmed that it was for budgetary reasons, the 
agency accepted the explanation.  The worker herself took the complaint through the 
corporate complaints process (not the grievance process because the organisation said 
she  was  not  entitled  to  access  it  as  a  non-employee)  and  was,  at  the  time  of  the 
interview, waiting for a meeting with elected members.  
While  agencies  did  on  occasion  represent  workers  to  the  user  organisation,  this 
representation  was  often  limited  by  the  commercial  relationship  they  had.   Both 
managers of the user organisation and agency workers themselves were conscious of the 
effect  that  this  may  have  on  the  ability  of  the  agency  to  represent  to  the  user 
organisation. 
Mobilisation theory and explaining worker action and inaction
The way in which workers respond to problems at work is a central area of research in 
industrial  relations.   How  workers  define  their  interests  and  come  to  see  them  as 
individual,  semi  collective  and  collective  is  critical  to  understanding  how and  why 
workers act in response to problems at work.   This thesis uses the framework offered by 
mobilisation theory to  analyse  the ways that  the  triangular  employment relationship 
affects  the  mobilisation  of  agency  workers,  particularly  in  how  they  define  their 
interests, to whom they attribute issues, and in their ability to act on their interests. 
Agency workers are an example of a group of workers with a triangular employment 
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relationship.   Some of  the  ways  in  which  the  triangular  relationship  offers  agency 
workers  different  opportunities  to  act  are  shared  with  other  workers  in  triangular 
relationships.  This study does not support the common portrait of agency workers as 
victims, a group that is universally vulnerable, silent, and marginalised by their labour 
market and legal position with no opportunity to act.  This was found to be the position 
of only a minority of agency workers in this study; many more workers found and made 
use of resources available to them. 
This  study engages  with  mobilisation  theory  to  look  at  the  ways  in  which  agency 
workers come to view dissatisfaction at work in terms of injustice, how they attribute 
problems and crucially the ways in which different agency workers are able to act upon 
problems at work.
Injustice
Many  agency  workers  interviewed  as  part  of  this  study  identified  that  they  were 
currently dissatisfied with some part of being an agency worker; either the conditions 
under which they worked, their pay or their management.  A greater number noted that 
they had been dissatisfied with one or more of these things in a previous placement. 
Many of the areas of dissatisfaction were discussed earlier in relation to the perceived 
disadvantages of agency work.  These included dissatisfaction with the low level of pay, 
exclusion from team meetings and training, being treated unfavourably by colleagues 
and managers, the lack of sick pay and holiday pay, the high mark up the agency was 
charging for them, and the lack of financial  security, amongst others.  A number of 
agency workers said things like:
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“The only thing I don’t like is that there is no holiday pay, no sick pay, and the  
money is not very good.” (Internal agency administrator, City)
“In  my  team  yes,  there  is  always  the  joke  that  agency  are  crap  social  
workers.” (Agency  social worker, City)
“In my last job it did appear that the agency workers were working harder than  
the permanent workers.  We were getting more cases put on us, more difficult  
cases. Sometimes that is just how it is as an agency worker.” (Agency social  
worker, Met)
They  also  identified  ways  in  which  they  were  being  treated  differently  to  their 
permanent colleagues:
“When you are working in a place as an agency worker they look at you as if  
you  are not  capable,  or  somehow worse  than them.” (External  agency care  
worker, City)
“They see you as different, they see you as inferior.” (Agency care worker, Met)
Workers offered examples of being dissatisfied with a variety of issues that they had not 
raised  with  their  employers.   Kelly  (1998)  notes  that  dissatisfaction  itself  is  not 
sufficient to make the workers speak out as they may be dissatisfied with a measure, and 
yet still feel it’s fair or appropriate.  For a sense of injustice to arise a worker must also 
believe that their dissatisfaction is related to something that is wrong or illegitimate. 
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Kelly states:
“It is not enough for employees to feel aggrieved: they must also feel entitled to  
their demands and that there is some chance that their situation can be changed  
by 'collective agency'.” (Kelly 1998: 29)
In many cases the reason that workers did not raise issues with their employer was 
because they did not see their employer's actions as illegitimate.  Workers were unhappy 
about being excluded from team meetings, briefings and training; however, they did not 
see this in terms of their employer acting in an illegitimate way.  They accepted that 
their  employer  was  entitled  to  treat  them  less  favourably  than  their  permanent 
counterparts  because  of  their  status  as  agency workers.   Many saw less  favourable 
treatment, exclusion and precarious employment as an expected part of agency work. 
Job seeking agency workers in particular viewed lack of holidays, low pay, little support 
and exclusion as unchangeable and intrinsic to agency work. 
Counter  mobilising  factors  are  particularly  important  in  blocking  the  move  from 
dissatisfaction  to  injustice.   These  include  factors  both  internal  and  external  to  the 
organisations.  Legislation is a factor that is external to the organisation and is important 
because it shapes both employer and employee perceptions of what is legitimate.  The 
lack of legal support, compounded by different treatment in the workplace by managers 
and colleagues, was a significant impediment to workers moving from dissatisfaction to 
injustice.  Agency workers themselves considered somewhat less favourable treatment 
to be legitimate and expected.
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Employers can seek to undermine a sense of injustice by arguing that their behaviour is 
in  line  with  established  rules  (Kelly  1998).   In  the  case  of  agency workers  this  is 
particularly  important  because  the  legislative  framework  is  so  uncertain.   While 
permanent employees see the law as legitimising their interests, agency workers have no 
such legal support. 
There is clear evidence from Burchell (1999) and detailed work on the Labour Force 
Survey that it can be difficult for workers with atypical employment relationships to 
identify the form of their employment.  For this reason a number of authors (Edwards 
2006,  Arrowsmith  2006)  suggest  that  the  Labour  Force  Survey  data  seriously 
underestimates the number of agency workers in the UK labour market.  If workers 
themselves are unsure of the nature of their employment, it is difficult for them to gain 
an understanding of their legal rights.  Even where agency workers are clear about their 
employment  relationship,  the  law is  unable  to  offer  a  definitive  answer  about  their 
employment status. The triangular employment relationship is legally problematic; the 
court of appeal in  James (2008) noted that it was impossible to perfectly predict the 
decision  of  a  tribunal  on  the  employment  status  of  agency  workers.   This  leaves 
employers  and  workers  in  a  very  difficult  position,  unable  to  determine  with  any 
certainty  whether  an  individual  possesses  employee  status  and  the  additional 
employment protection it offers.  Within this study most agency workers noted the lack 
of legal rights inherent in agency work, and some managers referred to agency workers 
selling their rights. 
Legislation is important to employees in two key ways.  It offers the opportunity for 
workers to seek legal redress when their employment rights have been infringed, giving 
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them the opportunity to act on perceived issues beyond the workplace.  It also provides 
a source of external validation for perceived problems at work.  Legal rights underpin a 
worker’s perception of the reasonableness of challenging an employer in relation to a 
perceived  problem at  work  (Kelly  1998).   Where  issues  are  challenged  by  agency 
workers the lack of legal support gives employers a counter-mobilising argument. 
It  is  clear  from  the  earlier  discussion  that  legal  remedies  for  agency  workers 
experiencing  problems  at  work  are  minimal.   While  they  are  protected  by  some 
employment  law  in  practice  it  can  be  difficult  to  access.   In  complaints  of 
discrimination, for example, the comparator must be another person working for the 
same employer.  Therefore an agency worker could not compare their treatment with the 
treatment of either another agency worker employed by a different agency, nor with a 
direct employee of the user organisation.  This will often mean that agency workers 
struggle  to  find  appropriate  comparators  and  are  forced  to  rely  on  a  hypothetical 
comparator.  In such cases the organisation may argue that the agency worker is treated 
differently on grounds of agency status rather than any unlawful discrimination. 
A further issue for agency workers is the widespread perception that they have chosen 
to work as in that way, and to accept the contractual insecurity that it entails.  It may 
therefore be difficult for them to challenge workplace issues that they perceive to be as 
a result of their status as agency workers.  Accepting agency work knowing that it offers 
less security and significantly less legal protection can have the effect of preventing 
workers from making the move from dissatisfaction to injustice that is an important part 
of mobilisation theory. 
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While  many  agency  workers  in  my  study  expressed  dissatisfaction,  few  of  these 
workers thought that it was reasonable to raise issues about which they were unhappy. 
Most of these issues resolved around holiday pay, time off, low pay, or minor incidents 
with colleagues.   All three black external agency care workers raised the issue of race. 
It was raised tentatively by two of the agency workers, both of whom simply noted that 
all the agency workers were black and most of the permanent staff were white.  They 
put forward the explanation also offered by the council saying that they realised that 
they were the most recent members of staff, and that there were no permanent jobs.  The 
third  agency  worker  said  she  did  not  know why there  seemed  to  be  such  a  racial 
division between agency workers and permanent staff. 
Attribution
Employees must not only feel a sense of injustice, they must also be able to attribute the 
injustice to their employer rather than uncontrollable forces or events.  Kelly (1998: 30) 
argues that there are three dimensions to causality; internal v external, stable v unstable 
and  controllable  v  uncontrollable.   The  way  in  which  workers  attribute  grievances 
affects how they feel about and act upon them.  If workers attribute the dissatisfaction 
that they feel to extraneous factors they are likely to feel impotent to change things. 
Like the previous step in mobilisation theory, the triangular relationship has an impact 
on the ability of agency workers to attribute their sense of injustice to their employer. 
Rather  than  identifying  one  of  the  parties  to  the  relationship  as  responsible  for 
problems, agency workers may see the problem as inherent to agency work, or shared 
between their employers. 
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The  triangular  employment  relationship  offers  particular  challenges  in  relation  to 
attributing issues to an employer.  The division of employer responsibility across two 
organisations  leads  to  confusion as  to  which  employer  has  responsibility  for  which 
aspects  of  the  employment  relationship.   Control  and  responsibility  is  divided,  and 
workers  expressing  dissatisfaction  may  attribute  it  to  their  employment  position  as 
agency workers, rather than a particular employer. 
Pay is one area where it is challenging for agency workers to attribute the issue to a 
single employer.  The rate of pay that they receive is affected by how much the agency 
is paid by the workplace employer, and the amount that the agency deducts from that 
rate as its fee.  Many agency workers noted dissatisfaction with pay, but few were aware 
of the rate charged by the agency or its mark-up.  There were three examples in the 
research of  workers  acting  on the  information when they  became aware  of  the  fee 
charged and perceived the agency mark-up as excessive. 
Social Identification
Social  identification  is  critical  to  workers  mobilising  collectively.   Agency workers 
being treated differently to their permanent colleagues by managers and being viewed as 
suspicious  by  permanent  colleagues  undermines  a  sense  of  identification  with 
permanent staff.  The fact that few workers worked in teams with other agency workers, 
and rarely got opportunities to interact with other agency workers limits the opportunity 
for these workers to socially identify with each other.  Even where they are located 
together there are few cases where workers share both agency and user organisation. 
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The  difficulty  agency  workers  have  in  identifying  with  their  colleagues  presents  a 
challenge to these workers acting collectively in response to workplace problems.  It 
also presents a challenge to these workers unionising.
The only case within this study of agency workers mobilising was amongst internal 
agency care workers.  While these workers rarely had any long-term contact with each 
other they were brought together by the agency manager for meetings and training, 
therefore  providing  some  contact.   The  agency  workers  involved  in  bringing  the 
collective grievance were also in the rare position of sharing the same user and agency. 
The  situation  in  this  case  was  particularly  conducive  to  mobilisation  and  social 
identification, and, critically, an individual took on a leadership role and was able to 
frame  the  issue  in  a  way  that  encouraged  identification  across  different  types  of 
workers. 
If social identification between agency workers is problematic, what about identification 
with  permanent  local  authority  staff?   Many  agency  social  workers  referred  to 
permanent staff being generally suspicious of agency workers and considering them less 
capable.  A couple said that prior to becoming agency workers, they themselves had 
often viewed agency social workers in this way.  Many workers suggested that they had 
to overcome this general perception early in a placement:
“I know some agency workers that deserve the reputation.  But I know a lot that 
don't, and we have to work twice as hard and be twice as good because you are 
seen as suspicious from the outset.” (Agency social worker, City)
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Most suggested that once they had worked in the same team for a while their agency 
status became much less of an issue and they were generally considered just another 
team member.  While this may assist long-term agency workers, people in successive 
short-term placements rarely spend enough time in a workplace to integrate with the 
team in this way. 
Many agency workers thought that it was legitimate for permanent staff to be suspicious 
of them, because they felt that some agency workers deserved the reputation.  They also 
suggested that the temporary nature of agency work meant that people didn't remain in 
post long enough for colleagues to feel it  was worth getting to know them.  Where 
workers were in placements for long periods of time many felt they overcame both the 
distrust and the distance, however in some cases they thought that they never really 
became as integrated as permanent staff even if their tenure was longer.  One career 
agency worker indicated that she had been in a team at her previous local authority for 
seven years.  In that time she had seen permanent colleagues come and go, but felt that 
she was not  accepted as part  of  the team in the same way as new permanent  staff 
because she was an agency worker. 
The workers with the greatest social identification were internal agency workers.  These 
workers identified with both agency colleagues and permanent staff in similar roles. 
They suggested that they experienced very similar treatment, conditions of employment 
and problems at work as their colleagues, and viewed a number of issues as collective. 
Amongst these issues was the implementation of the single status agreement, which was 
being widely discussed at the time of the research.  The level of social identification for 
these workers was, in part, due to the fact that all these workers had the same agency 
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and user employer, and that their pensions, conditions of service and pay were at similar 
rates to each other and to permanent staff.  
Stanworth  and  Druker  (2004)  argue  that  the  transient  situation  of  agency  workers 
reduces both job security and the prospect of their identifying with a union representing 
workers in  a  user organisation.   For  some workers,  like nurses,  teachers and social 
workers,  even where  they  move user  organisations  frequently  they  remain  within a 
single sector and may identify with a single union despite their frequent moves.  They 
may identify with a union or professional association beyond the individual workplace 
if  they  feel  that  membership  is  transferable  on  grounds  of  its  relationship  to  their 
occupation.  This applies in a narrow band of occupations but nonetheless it is relevant 
where it does apply.  BASW is an association premised on representing the social work 
profession.  It appears in this research to be relevant to agency social workers because 
its base is not at the workplace and because it provides professional services that may be 
especially  useful  to  agency  workers,  such  as  access  to  training  and  professional 
indemnity cover.  
Opportunity to act
The  opportunity  to  act  refers  to  a  workers'  ability  to  take  action  in  relation  to  a 
perceived injustice that they have attributed to their employer.  This action may take the 
form of seeking expression, either individually or by representative voice, by exiting the 
organisation,  or  by expressing dissatisfaction through more  subtle  acts  of  resistance 
such as withdrawing good will.  Workers within this study referred to issues with their 
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present  and previous employers,  and offered wide ranging examples of the ways in 
which they had acted on perceived injustice in the workplace that they attributed to one 
of their employers.
Kelly  (1998)  argued  that  each  person  can  think  and  act  both  individually  and 
collectively.  Within this study a number of agency workers have sought both individual 
and collective resolutions  for  problems at  work.   The way in which they sought  to 
address these problems, when they had a developed sense of injustice and had attributed 
them  to  something  changeable  within  the  control  of  their  employer,  was  highly 
dependant on their perception of labour market and employer job security. 
Unlike employees within a standard employment relationship with a single employer 
who have the  voice, exit loyalty options laid out by Hirshman (1970), agency workers 
have  a  triangular  employment relationship which  makes  the  options  for  them more 
complex.  The various ways agency workers both act and do not act on problems at 
work has been outlined above.  These consist of voicing issues either with the user 
organisation or the agency and exiting  one or both organisations.  Voice at work, in 
terms of articulating views,  presenting problems and getting them addressed can be 
individual or collective.  The most obvious form of collective voice is through trade 
unions,  but  a  variety  of  potentially  non-union  collective  voice  may be  available  to 
workers,  such  as  professional  associations,  works  councils  and  employee  forums. 
Mobilisation theory suggests that such workers could also form groups themselves to 
engage in collective voice.  For agency workers the agency may provide a channel for 
individual or collective voice (for example one agency refused to send workers to an 
organisation  when  several  workers  complained  about  sexual  harassment  from  a 
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manager).  Individual voice can be facilitated by organisational policies set up to assist 
workers with raising problems at work.  Some agency workers within this study were 
confident of their access to such policies whilst others were unaware of them.
Freeman and Medoff (1984)  suggested two main reasons  that,  in  the  work  context, 
collective  rather  than  individual  voice  is  necessary.   In  the  main,  changes  in  work 
environment or conditions accrue to the work group and not just the individual; they 
suggest that collective organisation is important to provide such changes.  They further 
argue that individual workers voicing workplace problems may face termination, while 
unionised workers may be protected by their trade union. 
Exit was a commonly reported response to encountering a workplace problem.  For 
permanent workers exit means ending the employment relationship with their employer. 
Because agency workers have a triangular employment relationship they can leave one 
of the parties to the relationship without necessarily leaving their relationship with the 
other.  For agency workers placements are generally precarious, with little long-term 
security, and therefore they rarely have a long-term and stable 'three way' employment 
relationship with an agency and user employer.  More often these workers have stronger 
ties with one of their two employers, and where there is an issue with only one party to 
the relationship they may choose to retain their relationship with the other party.  For a 
significant number of agency workers within this study substitution was used to resolve 
a problem by only ending the employment relationship with the party with whom there 
was a problem.  
Making  use  of  substitution  in  this  way  can  significantly  reduce  the  risk  of 
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unemployment normally associated with exit.   Workplace employers can continue to 
provide employment for workers through a different employment agency.  Agencies are 
able to provide workers as well as employers with a fairly fast and easy way of finding 
new employment; rather than having to endure a rigorous recruitment process agency 
workers are often placed quickly with a new employer, thus bypassing the bureaucracy. 
This limits the costs involved in finding new employment that resorting to exit normally 
bring, and many agency social workers cited this as a particular advantage of agency 
work.  Three agency social workers stated that they had been worried before starting 
agency work about the insecurity and the potential difficulty in finding a new job when 
they were used to permanent work.  However, since becoming agency workers, this 
anxiety had gone altogether because of the number of offers of work they had received. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984: 9) suggested that “in a world in which workers could find 
employment at the same wages immediately the market would offer adequate protection 
for the individual but that is not the world we live in”.  Within the case study contexts it 
is, in fact, exactly the world in which some interviewees live.  Agency social workers 
detailed at length the ready availability of alternative work, particularly where workers 
were geographically mobile.  In contrast most administrative and external agency care 
workers  perceived  their  labour  market  positions  to  be  very  precarious  and  did  not 
believe that another job would be immediately available.  For these workers the threat 
of unemployment was such that they would only very rarely consider exit in response to 
a problem at work.  
For some workers agency work changes their perceptions of both the cost of exiting an 
organisation, and its attractiveness as a resolution to workplace problems.  This presents 
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a significant challenge to engaging these workers in the exercise of collective voice. 
However, while a number of workers perceived exit as an attractive option in light of 
problems at work many others were reluctant to consider it.  In determining whether 
workers are likely to exit,  voice problems at  work or simply put up with them, the 
nature and level of job related security appears to be important. 
Raising problems at work with either the agency or the user organisation was an option 
for some agency workers, though this was not without risk.  Unlike a customer who will 
normally be able to continue to use a service even after a complaint is made, a worker 
may suffer  continuing  adverse  consequences  of  their  decision  to  make a  complaint 
against  their  employer;  the  most  serious  of  which  is  termination  of  contract.   As 
mentioned above, a colleague of one interviewee was dismissed shortly after making a 
complaint of sexual harassment.  One of the interview subjects had a problem with her 
agency during her placement; she got agreement from her workplace to change agencies 
during her placement but when she did so the workplace ended her contract because the 
first  agency wanted to charge the local authority an introduction fee.  In both cases 
workers were dismissed because they raised or tried to resolve a problem at work.  Each 
of the workers in this study who raised a problem at work indicated that they would 
have terminated their relationship with the party with which they had a problem if it had 
not been resolved to their satisfaction.  They all decided to raise problems in the first 
instance, and in each case exit from the relationship with the offending party was a 
secondary option. 
Employees  with  over  twelve  months  service  may  have  the  right  to  claim  unfair 
dismissal  as  a  result  of  such actions.   However,  agency workers  are  unlikely to  be 
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considered employees and are often in placements lasting under twelve months, thus 
they are unlikely to be sheltered by the law in this way.  As mentioned above some 
workers  may  feel  that  the  labour  market,  or  their  relationship  with  their  particular 
agency or user employer, offers such security.   For those workers who perceive a high 
degree of labour market job security voicing individual problems at work may be less 
difficult because of the recourse to exit and the ease with which another job is available. 
Equally for those workers who perceive a high degree of employer security with the 
agency, it is the agency's support and their ability to offer work outside the affected 
workplace may make raising problems at work less difficult.  For workers without the 
benefit of either employer or labour market security there are problems with both the 
individual voice and exit options.
Earlier in this chapter the differences between types of agency workers were detailed.  It 
defined these workers not only in terms of their occupation, but also in terms of the 
other differences that they have brought to agency work.   Some agency workers in 
powerful labour market positions view exit as the most appropriate means of acting on 
workplace grievances.  Expatriate agency social workers offered the clearest example of 
this kind of worker.  They tended to have weak links with the agency, and fairly weak 
links with the workplace employer.  When discussing previous issues these workers 
rarely considered other options.  They often expressed their opinions in a similar way to 
managers, saying that they would not want to put up with a long-term problem.  For 
these workers the opportunity to act by leaving the organisation, in the knowledge that it 
would not be difficult to find other work, provided an effective means of resolving their 
workplace problems.  Other agency workers with stronger links with key individuals 
within the workplace or the agency may use leverage with that individual to resolve 
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problems at work with the other employer.  The results here are similar to Druker and 
Stanworth  (2004)  who  identify  that  the  agency  may  be  a  channel  used  by  agency 
workers to attempt to access voice in the workplace.  The strategies used to achieve this 
were  diverse  within  this  study.   Workers  across  the  occupational  spectrum reported 
using contact with either the agency or the user organization to continue in employment 
while severing ties with the other party.  The ability to do so is unique to the triangular 
employment relationship, and specific to agency work.  This was a widespread reaction 
to problems in previous workplaces, or with previous agencies. 
Drucker and Stanworth (2004) identify evidence of agency workers seeking the support 
of their agency to assist with voice at work. They note the financial interest that the 
agency has in maintaining the continuity of a placement. They argue that the agency can 
meet the need for representation felt by agency workers on an individual basis and may 
preclude the need for other forms of representation. This research points to workers 
utilising their relationship with the agency to voice problems in some circumstances, 
however  this  does  not  always  remove  their  desire  for  union  representation.  While 
Drucker and Stanworth (2004) argue that workers have no 'independent representative' 
to mediate with the agency if the agency is the source of the problem, this research 
identifies that the user employer has taken on this role in some cases, raising issues 
about  pay  (or  agency markup),  holiday  entitlements  and training.   The workers  for 
whom the workplace employer acted as a representative in resolving problems with the 
agency were generally long term agency social workers who had built up much stronger 
relationships with the workplace than the agency.  It may be that workers within the 
Drucker and Stanworth (2004) study had much stronger relationships with the agency 
than the workplace, or were much more reliant on the agency than the workplace to 
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provide them with future work.  Within this study short term and lower skilled agency 
workers  were  much  less  likely  to  ask  their  workplace  employer  to  act  as  their 
representative with the agency than their professionally qualified  and long term agency 
worker counterparts. 
Drucker and Stanworth (2004) identify that the occupational and labour market position 
of agency workers influences the degree to which the agency will nurture relations with 
its workers.  Within this thesis it appears that both the agency and agency workers have 
a role in determining the nature of the relationship between themselves and the agency. 
Factors influencing the relationship include the nature of the relationship between the 
agency  and  client  organisation,  the  labour  market  position  of  workers,  the  workers 
commitment to agency worker (see the differences between expatriate agency workers 
and career agency workers) and the reasons that they have taken agency work. Similarly 
in this study it became clear that some agency social workers had strong relationships 
with their workplace employer while others did not.  Again this appeared to be the result 
of a number of factors, but one key factor affecting the relationship was the workers 
commitment  to  being  an  agency  social  worker.  Where  workers  were  career  agency 
social workers their relationships with the workplace appeared strongest,  where they 
were expatriate agency workers or income boosting agency workers the relationship 
(and their integration with the local authority) appeared the weakest. 
Differences between workers unquestionably impact on the need and desire for voice 
and protection and the way in which workers act in response to problems at work.  For 
example internal agency care workers who feel that they have employer security may 
wish to be represented to their agency employer on issues affecting their continuing 
262
employment.  Agency social workers on the other hand, who feel that their security is 
provided by their  position  in  the  labour  market,  may be  less  concerned with  being 
represented to their agency employer.  Rather than only being affected by occupation 
and job security, the desire for protection and voice can be expected to vary by the type 
of agency worker concerned.  For example, expatriate agency workers reported little 
interest in resolving problems in the workplace, while long-term career agency workers 
suggested that they would try to resolve workplace issues and only consider leaving 
after this proved to be unsuccessful.  This section will look in more detail at how the 
differences between categories of agency workers affect their opportunity to act.  
Fig 7.2 Agency worker response to problems at work
The major factors that influenced workers' decisions on whether to voice problems at 
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work or whether to leave the organisation were the degree of labour market job security 
that they experienced and the degree of employer security, coupled with the strength of 
their relationship with a key individual at either the agency or workplace.
Workers with little labour market or employer job security reported feeling powerless, 
they were likely to have little access to voice at work, and in many cases such workers 
reported that they felt  that the outcome of raising problems at  work would be their 
dismissal.  These workers also felt  unable to exit employment because of their weak 
labour market position and the risk of unemployment.  In the main job seeking agency 
workers were in this position.  They reported that they would be likely to put up with 
problems at work unless they became particularly severe.  They suggested that most of 
the problems that  they had,  such as  low pay, lack of  leave entitlement,  lack of job 
security,  and  exclusion  from  team  meetings  and  training,  were  because  they  were 
agency workers.  They appeared to see these problems as being unchangeable - fixed 
and beyond their influence or control.  Such workers were very resistant to the idea of 
voicing  problems at  work  because  they indicated  that  their  placement  may well  be 
terminated if they caused a problem.  They were equally resistant to the idea of exiting 
the organisation because of the threat of unemployment, and having to start over again 
with a new employer.  These workers made up a small part of this study, and a much 
larger part of the agency workforce.  They fall within the TUC (2008) definition of 
vulnerable workers because their work is precarious, pay is typically very poor and they 
are at risk of continuing injustice as a result of the imbalance of power.  These workers 
are the agency workers typically portrayed by the media, and for whom legal regulation 
offers the best opportunity for improving the level of job security, and their access to 
redress in the case of injustice at work. 
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Agency workers with weak labour market security but high employer job security can 
use voice with one of their employers to resolve the situation with the other, or they can 
seek the support of one party to the triangular relationship to substitute a problematic 
party with a new 'employer'.  This is primarily a voice response to problems at work 
because the worker uses voice with the party to the employment relationship with whom 
they have the greatest relationship capital and the greatest perception of job security to 
realise changes in their employment situation to resolve workplace problems. Whilst 
this response incorporates exit from one of the parties to the employment relationship it 
is not truly and exit response as the triangular relationship continues but the problematic 
party is replaced by a new 'employer'.  Some agency workers are thus able to jettison 
one party to the relationship with minimal risk of unemployment normally associated 
with exit.  
Workers that favoured this response were most often agency care workers who were 
career or convenience agency workers, particularly career internal agency care workers 
who had frequent contact with their agency due to the number of short placements they 
took and the fact that their agency provided their training.  These workers had reported 
problems to their agency, and to their workplace employer, in the knowledge that their 
agency would support them to resolve issues.  They had used the agency to assist them 
with  resolving  problems  and  to  substitute  workplace  employers  where  they  had 
problems with a user organisation.  For these workers two relationships were key: the 
relationship  between  themselves  and  the  individual  agency  manager,  and  the 
relationship between the agency and the workplace.  Where the relationship between the 
agency and the user organisation was commercial  it  did not offer these workers the 
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same capacity for representation as where the agency was internal to the organisation. 
Internal agency care workers felt in a particularly strong position as their agency did not 
have a commercial relationship with the organisation.  It could offer them access to the 
organisation’s personnel policies such as its grievance and harassment policies.  The 
manager  in this  setting was a key individual  who had strong relationships with her 
agency workers;  they  were  placed in  many short  placements  so she  had significant 
contact  with  them,  and  she  personally  ran  training  and  inductions  for  them.   She 
encouraged workers to come to her with problems at work, and had tried to arrange for 
Unison to meet and recruit her agency workers.  Internal agency care workers that were 
career and convenience agency workers were the most likely to be willing to voice 
issues at work both individually and collectively.  The example offered of collective 
mobilisation in  response to bullying of agency and other  non-standard workers  was 
facilitated by the supportive management style of the internal agency manager, and the 
access that she offered workers to the corporate grievance procedure.  The perception 
that she would be supportive also assisted these workers in reporting problems that were 
not personal grievances such as the allegation of abuse that was made.
Workers with a strong sense of labour market security but little employer security tend 
to exit  very quickly in response to problems.   Expatriate agency workers all had a 
strong sense of labour market security and none of these workers reported high levels of 
employer job security.  These workers all reported that they would leave employment if 
problems arose at work,  and all  of  these workers reported that they had done so in 
previous  placements.   Two  had  substituted  a  problematic  workplace  employer  on 
previous occasions, but all these workers had also exited both workplace and agency 
when problems arose within a placement.  For these workers agency social work was an 
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instrumental short-term choice.  They expressed little loyalty to their agencies, often 
joining more than one agency to secure future positions.  Equally they did not make 
strong connections at work with their managers and colleagues.  While these workers 
did not always exit both organisations in response to a problem at work, they generally 
did not see either the agency or the user employer as facilitating exit from the other, 
they tended to view their labour market position as providing sufficient guarantee of 
future employment.   These workers  were the most  unlikely to  consider a  collective 
resolution to workplace problems, and saw exit from the organisation as a simple and 
effective solution.  The biggest difficulty that these workers experienced with exit was 
the problem with getting references from previous managers.  BASW recognised this 
difficulty and their Advice and Representation Unit reported this as the primary issue 
on which agency workers asked for support.  A few of these workers noted that BASW 
was a useful organisation to be a member of for individual reasons because it offered 
access to training and individual advice and representation.
Agency  workers  with  both  a  strong  sense  of  employer  security  and  labour  market 
security  often  suggested that  they  would voice  problems at  work  with  one  or  both 
employers and use exit if they were not resolved.  In some cases these workers used 
substitution to resolve problems relating to only one party to the triangular relationship, 
in other cases they exited from both the agency and user.  Most agency social workers 
that  were  career  agency  workers,  convenience  agency  workers  or  income  boosting 
agency workers  fell  within this  category.   These  workers  indicated that  in  the  first 
instance they would try to raise the issue with either the agency or workplace, and that 
they may exit the workplace and/or agency of the problem was not resolved.  There was 
variation in  the  level  of  employer  labour  market  security  between workers  in  these 
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groups.  Some of these workers cultivated strong working relationships with the agency 
or workplace and those that had done so tended to perceive high levels of employer job 
security with that employer, while others did not see this as necessary.  Workers were 
more likely to use voice or substitution if they had high levels of employer security and 
they were more likely to use exit when they had lower levels of employer security. 
Agency social workers with strong links to individuals within their workplace or agency 
and with  high  levels  of  employer  security were  in  the  strongest  position of  all  the 
agency  workers  within  this  study,  however  they  still  on  occasion  experienced 
termination of placement in response to raising problems at work.  This demonstrates 
the opportunity to act for these workers, while present, may not resolve problems at 
work, and may result in undesirable consequences.  The precarious nature of agency 
work,  and  the  lack  of  statutory  rights  for  agency  workers  undermine  the  effective 
expression  of  problems  at  work  because  of  the  ease  with  which  workers  can  be 
dismissed  and  the  limited  recourse  that  workers  have  to  challenging  termination 
decisions. 
The law is a factor in the mobilisation of agency workers both in terms of the ways in 
which they define their interests and how far they see those interests as legitimate, and 
in terms of the ways in which they are able to act upon them. The lack of protection, 
particularly in relation to unfair dismissal, can obscure the opportunity of some workers 
to act.  Other workers make use of the triangular relationship itself, to sever ties with a 
problematic employer (either the agency or the user organisation) while retaining the 
benefits of uninterrupted employment with the other party to the relationship.  Some 
workers  are  able  to  use  their  labour  market  position  to  very  quickly  find  new 
employment opportunities and act by exiting the employment of both the agency and 
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the user organisation, others use leverage with one of their  employers to attempt to 
resolve problems with the other.  While the triangular employment relationship may 
leave workers will  little  legally guaranteed employment security, it  also offers them 
opportunities to resolve work related problems in different ways to their permanently 
employed colleagues. 
Agency workers had more options to consider when acting upon problems at  work. 
Unlike employees within a standard employment relationship with a single employer 
who have the voice, exit loyalty options laid out by Hirshman (1970), agency workers 
have  a  triangular  employment relationship which  makes  the  options  for  them more 
complex.   They may seek  direct  voice  with  either  employer,  they  may  ask  one  to 
represent them to the other, they may substitute one or they may exit both.  Without 
protective employment legislation the costs  of voicing problems at  work for agency 
workers  can  be  very  high.   One  agency  worker  in  the  study  had  her  placement 
terminated  and  another  referred  to  a  colleague  having  been  dismissed  after  raising 
problems at work.  These workers were in strong labour market positions and the one 
that I interviewed had felt she had a strong relationship with her workplace manager. 
While voicing problems may be a more risky option for agency workers, substitution is 
an option open to them that is not available to their permanent counterparts.  Agency 
workers who are unhappy with one organisation can replace that party to the triangular 
employment relationship thereby remaining in employment.   The availability of this 
option  reduces  the  cost  of  severing  the  relationship  with  a  problematic  employer 
because  it  is  unlikely  to  result  in  unemployment.   Kelly  (1998)  argued  that  when 
workers are considering action they weigh up the likelihood that a particular course of 
action will resolve the situation and the costs and benefits of the action.  For many 
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agency workers the costs of voice may be higher, and the risks of exit lower.  This 
fundamentally alters the way in which workers respond to workplace problems.  The 
findings here suggest that agency workers are generally willing to raise problems only 
where they are also willing to exit the employment of at least one of their employers if 
the problems are not resolved. 
While  agency  workers  have  few  legal  rights  underpinning  their  ability  to  act  on 
perceived problems at work, most workers in this study were able to take action.  Many 
reported having done so in their current placement or a previous placement, and some 
gave examples of friends that had done so.  The triangular employment relationship 
offers an additional dimension to acting on problems at work.  It offers workers some 
opportunity for representation within their  employment relationship and it  offers  the 
ability to exit from one organisation while retaining ties with the other.  Despite this, 
until agency workers are able to seek legal redress for dismissal arising from raising 
issues at work it is unlikely that they will be able to move beyond reliance on labour 
market or employer security to offer them the opportunity to act. 
Reporting operational problems
Reporting operational problems at work was a concern for a number of agency workers, 
particularly where they felt that they were reporting an issue that put them in conflict 
with a permanent member of staff whose word would be taken ahead of theirs.  The 
only example offered by an agency worker of reporting an operational problem was an 
internal agency care worker at City alleged that a permanent colleague was abusing a 
service user.  She was very concerned about whether she would be believed.
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“It  was on a night  shift  and there were two hours  until  the  home manager  
arrived  in  the  morning,  and  all  that  time  I  was  thinking  what  shall  I  do.  
Because I thought I am going to go to [the internal care agency manager] first  
because I was scared, she [the alleged abuser] actually worked at the home and  
has got a rapport with all her colleagues and they think she is great.  There were  
all these things going round in my head so I thought am I going to go in the  
office and they [her colleagues] are going to think she is nothing like that, she is  
an excellent worker.  So I thought shall I tell [the internal care agency manager]  
first but I supposed to tell the home manager first, and I thought are they going 
to believe me? A million things went through my head.” (Internal agency care  
worker, City)
This worker decided she could not leave the site without telling the home manager who 
arrived the following morning:
“As I was walking out I thought 'sod it, go in, get it over and done with', and do  
it.  I thought to myself 'if they don't believe me, they don't believe me, I will go to  
[the internal care agency manager] anyway'.  But I am not at work to make  
friends, I am at work to do my job so I thought 'sod it just do it'...  I went into the  
office and burst into tears. I couldn’t get my words out. I was shaking. I did that  
for a little while and then told them what had happened...They got the manager  
for the home to come down and interview me.  It went ahead like that, with the  
police and everything, and they just took a statement.  But there was a lot of  
support from there that made me feel, that while I was scared to actually report  
it, when I did I was glad because I felt 100% backed up and supported.  There  
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were phone calls offering if I wanted any counselling, or if I wanted to speak to  
anybody;  there  was  a  lot  of  support  there,  which  was  nice.”  (Agency  care 
worker, City)
This thesis raises a number of concerns about the ability of agency workers to voice 
problems  at  work  in  relation  to  their  employment,  however  their  ability  to  report 
problems that affect the organisation and its customers are also important.  This issue is 
clearly quite different from those relating to the treatment of workers themselves.  The 
difficulty that this worker had in expressing what she had seen, and her concerns about 
whether she would be believed, illustrates the problems that agency workers may have 
when making complaints about their permanent counterparts.  Where agency workers 
do not have accessible voice channels the impact can be very serious, particularly where 
abuse is suspected and vulnerable service users may be harmed.  This worker felt very 
confident of support from her agency manager and felt that what she had witnessed was 
not something that it was possible to ignore.  Even so she was worried about the care 
home manager's ability to objectively deal with concerns raised by an agency worker 
about a long serving permanent member of staff, and the impact on her relationships 
with other members of staff.  
Difficulties in expressing problems at work apply to agency workers both in respect of 
individual  employment  concerns,  but  also  in  reporting  operational  problems.   The 
implications of workers feeling unable to report this kind of problem because they fear 
that they will not be believed or that they may be dismissed has severe consequences. 
In  social  care,  where  workers  are  dealing  with  vulnerable  service  users,  the 
ramifications of not reporting suspected abuse or concerns over colleague's competency 
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is particularly dangerous as it impacts on the physical and/or mental wellbeing of those 
in often powerless positions.
Implications of lack of voice at work
While some agency workers are  able to voice problems at  work,  many more either 
tolerate issues or choose to leave employment with the agency, the workplace or both. 
The implications of inability to voice problems at  work are particularly  severe in a 
social care environment both in terms of the ability of workers to raise grievances about 
their treatment, but also to raise operational concerns shared with their employer.  One 
of the internal agency care workers cited in the last chapter reported abuse of a service 
user by a permanent colleague.  She felt confident of the support of her agency and that 
she would be able to work outside that care home if necessary.  External agency care 
workers are not in the same position and the implications of not feeling able to voice 
this kind of problem at work are clear.  
Freedman  and  Medoff  (1984)  and  more  recently  Sverke  and  Hellgren  (2001)  have 
argued  that  access  to  union  voice  reduces  the  inclination  of  workers  to  exit  the 
organisation.   In  their  study  Sverke  and  Hellgren  (2001)  found  that  for  temporary 
workers  union  members  reacted  to  job  insecurity  by  expressing  organisational 
commitment, while non union members were more likely to exit or use voice to cope. 
This advantage of unionisation for employers may encourage employers facing staff 
shortages in a tight labour market to negotiate.
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The implications of the perception that exit  is an attractive option for agency social 
workers are striking for both the temporary work agency and the user organisation.  In 
an occupational  labour  market  where social  workers and occupational  therapists  are 
difficult to recruit and retain the lack of voice mechanisms for dealing with problems at 
work  quickly  contributes  to  rapid  turnover  of  agency  workers.   Temporary  work 
agencies  make  profit  from the  mark  up  they  charge  on  the  hourly  rate  of  agency 
workers.  The costs associated with workers exiting employment are the loss of this 
profit margin and the cost of the time associated with them finding the worker a new 
placement  and  carrying  out  further  employment  checks.  The  costs  to  the  user 
organisation  are  higher  in  terms  of  the  continuity  of  service  provision,  often  to 
vulnerable service users, and the non-reporting of serious incidents but also in financial 
terms.  The transactional cost of replacing agency workers is high and in social work, a 
large amount of management time is dedicated to recruiting new agency workers.
The lack of voice at work increases the propensity of workers to exit, and reduces their 
ability to challenge both personal and operational problems.  This presents difficulties 
for  the  employing  organisations  as  well  as  the  workers  involved.  The  provision  of 
effective workplace voice for agency workers offers employers benefits, particularly in 
tight labour markets where they may face particular difficulty in recruiting workers to 
fill vacant posts. 
Overview
Far from there being a ‘typical’ agency worker with a 'typical' experience of work there 
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seems to be a great degree of heterogeneity in not only their professional status and job 
roles but also the reasons for undertaking agency work and their  perceptions of job 
security.  The traditional concept of job security is too narrow to account for the varied 
experience  of  agency  workers,  and  the  ways  in  which  they  perceived  their  own 
positions  to  be  more  or  less  secure.  The  concept  was  divided  into  labour  market, 
employer, role and placement job security to better reflect the diverse experiences of the 
research participants.  This discussion lead to the presentation of broad types of agency 
workers, who differ in respect of their orientation to work, the reasons for taking agency 
work, the likelihood that they will remain agency workers for long periods, and their 
desire  for  permanent  employment.   The six  'types'  of  agency worker  developed are 
utilised in the discussion of the ways in which agency workers respond to problems at 
work. 
The chapter concludes that the triangular employment relationship has an impact on the 
ways in which agency workers are able to respond to problems at work. It presents a 
challenge to the ability of agency workers to move from dissatisfaction to injustice, to 
attribute problems to one of their employers, to identify with their colleagues and for 
some workers it obscures the opportunity to act.  The nature of the relationship that 
agency workers have with their dual employers also provides some opportunities to act 
that are unique to this sort of triangular relationship in terms of partial exit and having 
one employer provide a limited form of representation to the other.  The way in which 
the triangular employment relationship reduces the costs associated with exit for some 
workers, and increases the potential risks of voice has implications for agency workers, 
their employers, and trade unions. 
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The lack of voice at work can make it difficult for workers to raise individual problems 
with their employment, but also to raise operational problems at work.  This not only 
increased  the  likelihood  of  exit  with  its  associated  costs  for  both  employing 
organisations, but also decreases the likelihood of workers reporting serious incidents at 
work, which may have substantial effects on the organisation and its customers. 
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Chapter 8 – Agency worker need for and availability of 
collective voice
The previous chapter identified that voice is an option for a minority of agency workers 
within this study.  This chapter goes on to look at the implications of this for agency 
workers and trade unions.  It begins with a discussion of the impact of heterogeneity on 
the desire for voice before moving to a discussion of the factors affecting unionisation. 
It  looks  at  the individual  and collective barriers  to unionisation and argues that  the 
factors influencing the decision to be an agency worker and the experience of agency 
work also affect the unionisation decision.   It  examines the extent  to which agency 
workers within this study wanted union voice before moving on to review the union 
response to these workers.  It highlights the difficulty in categorising the union response 
to  agency workers  when the  response  varies  at  political  and workplace  level.   The 
British Association of Social Workers (BASW) is discussed both in terms of its response 
to agency workers and their perceptions of it, focusing on the differences between the 
attitude of agency social workers to unions and to BASW.  
Individual decision to unionise
The individual decision to unionise is affected by a variety of factors but it is always 
framed by  the  national  context  and  the  relationship  between the  employer  and any 
unions that it recognises.  In Chapter 4 I described the relationship between unions and 
employers  in  this  sector  which provides part  of  the  background to  the  unionisation 
decision.   Within  both  local  authorities  there  are  very  long  standing  consultative 
arrangements between trade unions and senior managers.  Trade unions are invited to 
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attend corporate  inductions to  address  new staff  and are able  to  buy lists  of  newly 
started permanent employees. 
Within both City and Met no union is looking to recruit agency workers.  The behaviour 
of  the  trade  unions  is  certainly  one  of  the  most  important  factors  in  affecting  the 
unionisation  of  agency workers in  this  context.   Their  lack of  interest  provides  the 
setting for the individual unionisation decision.
Within my research, problems at work were discussed in two ways.  Firstly, workers 
were  asked  what  kinds  of  issues  they  thought  trade  unions  might  be  able  to  assist 
themselves and other agency workers with.  Secondly, they were asked about their own 
problems at work.  In general, most agency workers believed that trade unions would be 
able to assist them with issues that were similar to their permanent colleagues.
Curiously, given the fact that no trade union is recruiting agency workers in City over 
1/3  of  the  internal  agency  care  workers  who  responded  to  my  questionnaire  were 
Unison members.  I was not able to speak to any of these workers so it is difficult to 
speculate on whether they told the union that they were agency workers when they 
joined.  Other workers had been explicitly rejected from membership when they said 
they were agency workers.  This suggests that these workers joined without making it 
clear to union reps that they were agency workers, or perhaps that they had not been 
when  they  joined.   In  total  nine  of  the  fifty  agency  workers  that  returned  the 
questionnaire  were Unison members.   They offered a  variety  of reasons for  joining 
which were consistent with reasons given by their permanent colleagues, and echo the 
findings of Waddington and Whitston (1997) in their large survey of the reasons that 
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people join trade unions.  Most agency workers that were union members cited support 
if there was a problem at work as their main reason for joining, but other reasons were 
because 'most other people at work are members', 'belief in the union movement' and 
because of the 'services offered by the union'.  
It  is  perhaps unsurprising that  most agency workers that were union members were 
internal agency workers for whom membership allowed representation with both the 
agency and the user organisation.  The workers interviewed from this group similarly 
indicated the greatest interest in union membership, and two of the three had raised a 
grievance or concern at work.
Of those forty one workers that completed questionnaires and were not members 55.3% 
had been union members in previous employment.  These workers offered a variety of 
reasons for not currently being union members; many stated that they left membership 
when they changed jobs,  two had not joined because their  previous union had been 
unable to prevent redundancy from their previous jobs, some said they had not been 
asked  to  join  in  the  current  employment,  some  were  unhappy  with  the  quality  of 
representation on offer, and a couple noted that as an agency worker it was difficult to 
join a trade union.  
 The questionnaires sought views on the ability of trade unions to change things at work, 
whether there were advantages to being a union member, whether it would be a problem 
to be a union member, how seriously unions were taken by management,  how well 
unions represented workers like themselves,  how good unions were at  looking after 
their  members  at  their  workplace,  how  supportive  management  was  of  union 
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membership,  and  the  ability  of  trade  unions  to  improve  their  pay.   There  were  no 
significant  differences  between agency workers  and their  permanent  counterparts  in 
their  views on  these.   However,  agency workers  were  significantly  less  likely than 
permanent  staff  to  know how to  contact  a  workplace  union  representative  (p<0.01, 
t=-3.74) and are significantly less likely to find it easy to join a union at the workplace 
(p=<0.01, t=3.82).  When this is coupled with the reasons agency workers offered for 
non membership of the union it appears that the unions are largely invisible to these 
workers.   They are  not  approached by union representatives,  they  are not  aware  of 
whom the union representative is,  and it is not easy for them as agency workers to 
become members.  
Internal  agency  care  workers  perceive  that  their  job  related  security  is  primarily 
provided by the internal care agency.  Most workers have worked for the care agency 
for a prolonged period and see it as their employer.  Issues that affect their permanent 
counterparts (such as single status) also affect them, and two of the three workers that 
attempted to resolve problems at work were in this group.  These workers appear to 
want to be union members, some have joined and others attempted to join and were 
rejected.  Two of my interviewees (one agency worker and the manager of the internal 
agency)  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  get  the  union  involved  with  these  workers  in 
relation to a specific issue and also to attend a meeting to recruit them into membership. 
More than any other  agency workers internal  agency care  workers  at  City  have an 
ongoing relationship with the local  authority.  Whilst  internal  agency administrative 
workers  did  not  report  union  membership  in  the  questionnaire,  they  did  report 
attempting to join at interview.  Like internal agency care workers they were placed 
only within the local authority which appears to make them more likely to seek union 
280
voice.
Agency workers expressed a desire to join the union, and some had actively sought to 
join:
“Well I wanted to [join] when I first came, and I read up the literature and the  
Unison  stuff  said  we  would  rather  not  have  [agency]  workers.” (Internal  
administrative agency worker, City)
“they said ‘no we don’t want you’ which I was a little annoyed about” (Internal  
agency administrative worker, City)
Other  workers  that  were  previously  union  members  when  in  permanent  roles 
experienced a more subtle exclusion:
“I knew the union rep when I was over in [local centre] and we even talked once  
about the union, because he was going for a job as a full time union person and  
leaving social work.  And we were talking about the meeting he had to go to be  
voted on this job and I was saying about coming along and providing my support  
but I couldn’t because I wasn’t in the union.  So he knew damn well I wasn’t in the  
union but he never said to me, 'well why don’t you join?' or 'are you interested in  
joining?'.  He just had the assumption that, as an agency worker, unions were out  
the window.  I was in Unison until I became an agency worker because obviously  
it  is taken out your salary and it  just  sort  of  happened and I didn’t put much  
thought into it, I was in the union and that was it.  Like I say, there is this general  
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feeling you are an agency worker and you don’t belong to a union, you are out on  
your own almost.” (Agency social worker Manager, City)
There was only one union member among the agency workers I interviewed.  She was a 
career agency worker; an Irish social worker who had worked all over the UK for ten 
years.  Agency work gave her the opportunity to be geographically mobile and move to 
areas of the UK where she wanted to live.  Throughout the period of agency work she 
had been a member of Unison because she believed in the value of trade unions, though 
she had never required their support at work.  She found Unison to be inconvenient and 
had the practical problems of paying subscription, so she decided to pay yearly.  She 
also found that moving between union branches required perseverance and patience and 
was the most difficult part of maintaining membership; it was rarely as simple as putting 
a request in either to her current or new local authority informing them that she had 
moved  areas  and  requesting  for  her  branch  to  change.   It  was  the  ideological 
commitment to trade unions rather than any perceived utility or instrumentality that led 
her decision to join Unison and remain in membership.
Another  worker  with  similar  ideological  views  around  the  value  of  trade  unions 
attempted to join before the Unison merger.  She was a long-term agency worker who 
preferred agency work because it accommodated moves with her partner’s job.  She was 
told she could not join on a number of occasions across her fifteen year social work 
career.
“I tried to join NALGO eight years ago and they really couldn’t do the mind game  
about being an agency worker and a union member, they were saying 'where do  
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you work?' well at the moment I am here but I might move.  'Well we wouldn’t  
know who your shop steward would be and we wouldn’t know who this person  
would be.'  In the end it became a complicated issue.  So I did try, I tried very  
hard but they didn’t want me, well it felt very much like that, and I am not sure 
they are geared up to help agency workers really.” (Agency social worker, City)
This particular worker had tried to join Unison in three different branches covering 
three  different  local  authorities  before  giving  up  on  being  a  union  member.   She 
emphasised her belief in the union movement, stating that she had been a union member 
in every role before starting to work as a social worker, and had met her husband on the 
picket  lines  in  the  coal  miners’  dispute.   She  was  very  disappointed  by  Unison's 
rejection of her based on her status as an agency worker.  Despite being excluded from 
membership she did not attend work on days when strike action was called in relation to 
the pensions’ dispute.  For this worker the primary reason that she would have joined 
was an ideological commitment to the union movement rather than the perception that 
they would be in a position to assist her with workplace problems, though she believed 
that unions were in a position to represent agency workers.  
Despite the survey reporting the main reason for non membership as being because 
agency workers  had  not  been  asked to  join  a  trade  union,  there  was  a  widespread 
perception amongst agency workers in this study that unions were for only permanent 
workers:
“The reason I am not joining a trade union is because I will join a trade union  
when I am a permanent member of staff, if anything happens I just talk to my  
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agency.” (Agency care worker, Met)
Many agency workers felt that unions were not in a position to assist them because 
unlike  their  permanently  employed  colleague  they  were  individually  employed  on 
different terms. 
“I suppose the problem is it is very much an individual thing, agency work, isn’t  
it?  If you are in a union then it would always be about representing you as  
individual and I am not sure how geared up unions are to represent you as an 
individual.  To me it feels easier for unions to represent people en masse as a  
workforce if there are disagreements about their pay or conditions or whatever. 
I can’t imagine being represented by unions for just little me who might have an 
individual concern.  Although I know they do represent individuals, they do work  
with  individuals,  something  won’t  connect  in  the  head  to  make  that  a  
possibility.” (Agency social worker, City)
This comment suggests that agency workers perceive that they could not be collectively 
represented on issues that affected all agency workers like access to grievance policies, 
notice  periods  or  pay  for  bank  holidays.   This  assumption  seemed  to  underlie  the 
thinking of many agency workers, particularly social workers.  It may be that the fact 
that these workers were very dispersed through the organisation and very few worked in 
teams containing more than two agency workers impacted in their ability to see issues 
as collective with a potentially collective resolution.  Kelly (1998) argues that within 
mobilisation theory one role of leaders is to facilitate workers to conceptualise problems 
at work as collective issues, attributable to their employer with a potentially collective 
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resolution.  It would arguably be more difficult for leaders to manage this process with 
agency workers; however in the previous chapter two instances were identified where 
workers  did  involve  themselves  in  self  mobilising  groups.   In  both  cases  they 
specifically identified an issue, saw that it affected themselves and colleagues, attributed 
their treatment to a workplace employer and collectively sought some resolution to the 
issue.  In one case the issue involved both permanent and agency staff.  In the other case 
it involved a mix of different types of agency staff, casual workers and mobile workers 
that  were  not  permanently  based  within  the  workplace.   It  was  an  internal  agency 
worker  that  acted as  the  leader  within the  group.   There  was a  pressing workplace 
problem where permanent staff and managers were bullying or ignoring agency, casual 
and mobile workers and it may have been easier to coalesce support for resolving that 
issue than for challenging general conditions of service.  
Other  agency  workers  believed  that  unions  were  in  a  position  to  fight  for  them 
irrespective of status:
“If you have a problem they can take up your matter and fight it for you.  But if  
you are not with a trade union, if you have any problem at your workplace they 
can easily throw you out and nobody will stand up for you, nobody will fight for  
you.   But  when  you  are  with  a  trade  union  they  can  fight  for  you  on  any  
level.” (Agency care worker, Met)
This worker had very positive previous experiences of unionism.  However, he had not 
sought to join a union since becoming an agency worker.  A couple of agency workers 
asked me whether they could join a union at the local authority.  They said that if they 
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could join that they would do so but that they thought then they would not be welcome. 
Others that had previously been union members as permanent workers and intended to 
return to membership once returning to permanent jobs, they could not see the relevance 
of trade unions to agency workers.  
Generally workers did recognise that there may be some difficulties for unions being 
able to represent agency workers or that they might not be keen to represent them. 
Quite a few agency workers, when asked at interview, were interested in joining a trade 
union but all of them recognised that the unions would be able to assist them with a 
more limited range of issues than if they were permanent workers.
Agency workers were also aware that there might be some disadvantages to being a 
union member in terms of their employability:
“I suppose it might depend how my employers might see an agency worker in a  
union, whether there would be any negative connotations from that.  The naïve  
side of me hopes there wouldn’t be but the more cynical side of me says there  
might be.” (Agency social worker, City)
This statement of reservation about whether being a unionised agency worker could 
affect  job opportunities  came from a professionally  qualified worker  who was very 
confident in his ability to find new employment.   If such barriers exist  to relatively 
secure agency workers in tight areas of the labour market they may be more significant 
to workers in insecure jobs.  
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Some workers felt that on the whole the issues that they would want representation on 
would be largely the same as their permanent colleagues:
“It would be the same issues; in my opinion here I go through the same things as  
my colleagues on permanent.”(Agency social worker, City)
Unison representatives at City believed that agency workers would be unwilling to raise 
issues at work because of their insecure status.  However, this has not always proven to 
be the case; within both case study authorities agency workers recounted experiences of 
collectively challenging issues at work.  These workers were in the minority in the case 
study and many other agency workers did say that they would find it easier to exit than 
to raise a problem in the workplace.  Nonetheless it is clear that some agency workers 
participate in collective workplace voice even where the trade union is not involved.  
Different types of agency workers had quite different attitudes to unions.  Expatriate 
agency workers generally did not have any knowledge of unions, and if they were aware 
of workplace unionism they believed that it was for permanent workers and not for 
them.  They had little interest in joining unions.  The reluctance of these workers to join 
unions stemmed from three main factors.  The first was the fact that they intended to 
live  in  the  UK  for  a  finite  period  only  and  they  saw  the  union  as  a  long-term 
commitment.  Secondly they had very little knowledge of the unions, none knew who 
the union representatives were, nor had they been approached with information about 
becoming members.  Thirdly they saw agency work as incompatible with being a union 
member, though they were of the view that they experienced similar issues to their 
permanent counterparts and that unions were in a position to help agency workers.  
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Convenience agency workers were also not very interested in union membership.  Some 
had previous experience of unionisation but did not feel membership would be helpful 
to them while they were agency workers.  Where these workers had considered the idea 
of being a union member they saw the short-term and individualistic nature of agency 
work as incompatible with being union members or believed that the union was not in a 
position to help them.
A couple of agency social workers in this group were generally dissatisfied with the 
quality of the union representation on offer.  One had had problems with the union 
previously and neither would join again:
“My experience of Unison was that I didn’t get support when I was permanent, I  
really wasn’t impressed, I dread to think what they are like for agency workers.”  
(Agency social worker, City)
Another agency social worker who had previously been part of the Fire Brigade Union 
(FBU) did not feel that Unison had the power to change things and that as a result it was 
not really worth joining:
“It’s a waste of money.  I believe in trade unions but unfortunately for the trade 
unions to work they have got to have some sort of clout and there are very few 
that have.” (Agency social worker, Met)
The above two workers had no intention of joining a workplace union whether they 
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were agency workers or permanent staff.  While the former thought agency status would 
make representation worse, the latter did not think that Unison could do much for its 
permanent workers or agency workers.  
Job seeking and career agency workers did indicate interest in unionising.  Most of the 
job seeking agency workers were interested in joining a union and half had attempted to 
join and been rejected; others were reluctant to join because financially they felt they 
could not afford the subscription.  These workers saw agency work as a longer term 
option  and  some  saw  it  as  a  gateway  to  permanent  employment  with  the  user 
organisation.   Job  seeking  agency  workers  felt  that  they  would  benefit  from union 
support  if  they  had  a  problem  at  work  though  few  of  these  workers  indicated  a 
willingness to join.   
Career agency workers were split between those that were not sure about the role of 
unions and those that had experience of unions who said that they would happily join a 
union if given the opportunity.  Of the workers that had knowledge or experience of 
unions, one was a union member and two others had asked to join and been rejected by 
Unison.  When explicitly asked whether they would be interested in joining a union and 
what the unions could do to encourage them to unionise some career agency workers 
expressed interest in joining the workplace union:   
“I will [join] if they will let me.  No one has ever approached me or mentioned it  
and the thought has never crossed my mind.  I wouldn’t mind being in the union  
but I just don’t know if that is possible because I might be gone next week.  I  
don’t know whether the logistics would allow it but if I was able to join as an 
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agency worker then yes I would.”(Agency social worker Manager, City)
All of these workers were keen to unionise mainly because their permanent colleagues 
were union members, they believed in the union movement or because the union could 
help them if they needed support with a problem at work:
“I  think  it  would  just  contribute  towards  my  security  scale.   The  feeling  of  
insecurity you get as an agency worker it would help to readdress a little bit of  
that balance.  Knowing you were in the union and had some representation or  
some rights somewhere down the line should things go wrong.  Even if it is not  
about me, it is about contributing towards other people who are not quite so  
fortunate as I am… it is just that general feeling of security that there would be  
somebody else on my side or that would at least hear my side.” (Agency social  
worker Manager, City)
For these workers the union itself was the biggest barrier to membership because it did 
not  publicise  the  opportunity  to  join,  it  was  difficult  to  identify  workplace 
representatives  and  most  importantly  because  it  rejected  these  workers  from 
membership because of the nature of their employment as agency workers.  Many noted 
that  their  issues  were  similar  to  their  colleagues  and  that  they  would  need  similar 
support, but they also identified that the union may be able to assist them in fewer areas 
because they had fewer employment rights than their permanent counterparts.  Career 
agency workers in particular did not view this  as particularly problematic and most 
indicated they were members or would have joined if offered the opportunity. 
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Income boosting agency workers had all been union members when they had worked 
permanently for local authorities and they all believed that they would return to union 
membership on their return to permanent employment:
“[When I go back to permanent work] I wouldn’t give it  a second thought I  
would just go straight back in [to Unison] again.  I suppose it is because you are 
permanent and it  feels as though there is  an investment  there.  It  is strange  
really because it is just like a feeling, if you are a permanent worker there then  
you need to be in the union and you can have solidarity in the workplace.  As an  
agency worker you do feel a bit of an outsider, you are not expected to have an  
investment in the authority.  You are not necessarily expected to stick around 
very long so I suppose that consideration doesn’t apply.” (Agency social worker  
Manager, City)
These workers had histories of union membership but felt that their agency status was a 
major barrier to unionisation.  Though they had not contacted the union in their time as 
agency workers they believed that agency status precluded union membership. Three of 
the agency social workers in this group identified permanency with commitment and 
saw agency work as lacking in commitment.  They suggested that agency workers had 
less commitment to their colleagues, teams, service users and the local authority.  They 
either implied or stated that agency workers did not deserve solidarity as they had 'sold 
out'.  They suggested that in their period as agency workers they had essentially traded 
their rights at work for additional pay and that they did not expect to be treated in the 
way that they would have as permanent staff, rather they understood that they were a 
resource that could be disposed of easily:
291
“I'm not sure if I think that agency workers deserve the same rights as somebody  
that works here, because if you wanted the job security and those rights then you 
become a permanent worker.” (Agency social worker, Met)
The implication was that these workers were doing something wrong or underhand by 
exploiting local authorities and their service users because there was a shortage in the 
area that they worked in.  One agency workers said that his colleagues and managers 
may look at him and think:
“I am just another agency worker, I am just another leach that is sucking the life  
blood out of...council tax payers.” (Agency social worker, City)
Some balanced this view with their belief that they were underpaid for the work that 
they did and that they needed to get something back.  Taking time out of local authority 
service was a way to achieve higher pay for a period before returning to permanent 
work.  They all viewed permanent work as preferable to agency work, one said that he 
believed that union membership and the sense of worker solidarity that it imbued was 
one of the things that as an agency worker he would not expect.
Many agency workers noted that the union would not be able to represent them in the 
same way as their permanent counterparts.  Most of these workers did not see this as a 
disincentive to membership.  They were of the view that limited representation was 
preferable to no representation.  They were aware that their  status gave them fewer 
rights on which the union could represent them but many also believed that there were 
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many common workplace issues that the union could assist with.  They suggested that 
there would be many issues common to agency, casual, temporary and permanent staff. 
Five  agency  workers  had  been  explicitly  rejected  from  union  membership  when 
attempting to join and many more had contact with workplace union representatives 
who had stated or implied that union membership was not available to agency workers. 
The main reason that agency workers were not union members was that they had not 
been asked to join.  
Access to agency workers is problematic for trade unions.  Even a trade union seeking 
to  recruit  agency workers would have had some difficulty  identifying them.  While 
permanent employees can be accessed at induction training and by lists of new starters 
directly  from  the  local  authority,  agency  workers  tend  not  to  have  full  corporate 
inductions, and lists of workers are rarely contemporaneously available.  As a researcher 
it  was  problematic  to  identify  these  workers  even  with  access  negotiated  and 
organisations  supportive  to  research.   The  problems  of  accessing  agency  workers 
experienced during the  research process were indicative  of  the larger  problems that 
trade unions would face in identifying, recruiting and representing them. 
Trade Union response to agency workers
Whilst initially the research sought to investigate the engagement of unions with agency 
workers in a context of generally high unionisation, the research sites did not provide 
this opportunity, since there was no such engagement.  This section will briefly outline 
the background to unions at City and Met. It will go on to outline Heery's (2004) matrix 
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of union responses to agency workers and seek to identify the ways in which unions in 
social care at Met and City have responded.  It will discuss the reasons offered by trade 
unions for the lack of engagement with agency workers. It presents a picture of at best, 
indifference and at worst total exclusion of these agency workers.  
The  relationship  between  Unison,  GMB and  Unite  with  both  local  authorities  was 
strong.   In  both  authorities  consultative  arrangements  existed,  with  full  joint 
consultative committees meeting regularly and subcommittees meeting more frequently 
to  discuss  policy  and practice.   Each authority  dealt  with  a  number of  agencies  to 
provide a wide range of agency staff, however locally none of the trade unions had 
relationships with these agencies.  
Within City Unison reported 60% average membership density across the board, with 
80% density  amongst  social  care staff.  GMB and Unite  claimed no membership  in 
social  care.  At  Met  both Unison and GMB claimed 25% membership  density  each 
across  the  board.   Both  cases  have  much  higher  than  average  UK  union  density. 
However this has not translated into engagement with agency workers at either site.  
Chapter 2 pointed to the competing pressures trade unions faced in deciding whether or 
not to accept agency workers into their constituencies.  It briefly pointed to the fact that 
different unions have different positions on these workers, and other atypical workers. 
Heery (2004) identifies that the position of trade unions in respect of a variety of groups 
(temporary  employees,  BAME  workers,  women)  has  moved  from  exclusion  to 
engagement over time.  Here I will define the four positions laid out by Heery (2004), 
draw  on  the  case  study  evidence  to  place  unions  in  the  research  sites  within  this 
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framework, and consider the likely implications of this for the unionisation of agency 
workers.
The four positions trade unions took in relation to agency workers and agency suppliers, 
shown in Fig 8.1, were labelled exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement:
Fig 8.1 Typology of union response to agency workers
Agency Suppliers
Rejection Inclusion
Agency 
Workers
Exclusion Exclusion Regulation
Inclusion Replacement Engagement
Taken from Heery (2004: 437).
Exclusion, as its name suggests, refers to unions that reject both agencies and agency 
workers.  Typically agencies are not seen as legitimate employers, “they pose a threat to 
the established system of collective bargaining and seek a portion of economic rent, 
hitherto  shared  between  employers  and  the  directly  employed  workforce."   (Heery 
2004: 435).  Agencies are not the only ones unions denounce from this viewpoint.  From 
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this  position  unions  have  referred  to  agency  workers  as  ‘moonlighters’  and  ‘strike 
breakers’, their needs are not seen as legitimate and they should be excluded from the 
protection that unions give.  They are “condemned for lacking solidarity and conspiring 
with  agencies  to  undermine  trade  union  organisations:  essentially  for  spurning  the 
obligation  of  all  workers  to  act  collectively  and  maintain  hard-won  employment 
standards."   (Heery  2004:  438).   A Unite  rep is  cited as saying:  “The only way to 
organise them…is to kick them out." Heery (2004: 438).  Clearly exclusion is a position 
of  hostility  to  both  agency  workers  and  the  agencies  that  sell  their  labour  to  user 
organisations.  
Following a replacement strategy unions seek to replace agency workers with a less 
problematic form of labour, generally direct employment of some form.  Like exclusion 
there is a rejection of employment agencies as legitimate employers, however this is 
coupled with an acceptance that agency workers are a legitimate constituency for the 
trade union movement.  From this viewpoint unions hope to improve the working lives 
of agency workers by seeking to replace them; in many cases by having individual 
workers taken on directly by the user organisation.  
In contrast regulation refers to unions that seek to negotiate with employment agencies 
to regulate the terms and conditions of work for agency workers in order to protect their 
core members from the potential undermining of their conditions by agency staff.  It is 
important to note that regulation involves engagement with agencies not to advance the 
cause of  agency workers but  primarily  to  protect core (directly employed)  workers. 
Whilst some benefits may accrue to agency workers by this method, these are not by 
any standards the aim of the unions involved; they are excluded from representation by 
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the unions and their needs are at best subordinate.  
Engagement  involves  representation  of  agency  workers  by  negotiation  with  agency 
suppliers.  Both agencies and agency workers are accepted as legitimate.  This means 
that agency workers' needs can be identified and addressed directly with the agency. 
Unions that engage with agency workers in this way offer them a tailored agenda, rather 
than  treating  their  needs  as  homogeneous  with  those  of  the  directly  employed 
workforce.  This differentiation is an important part of this particular approach because 
it means that agency workers can have separate provision where their needs do not have 
to be subordinate to permanent staff.  Rather than bargaining with the user organisation, 
representation occurs with the agency. 
Heery (2004) suggests that in general for non-standard workers, over time, trade unions 
have moved from the exclusion position to inclusion or engagement.  However of the 
groups  he  looked at,  which  included part  time  workers  and fixed  term contractors, 
exclusion was most prevalent for agency workers.  These four types of union interaction 
with agency workers and agencies are ideals, and it is difficult to place unions into only 
one group as some display characteristics of more than one.  National and local practice 
may vary and indeed it  may be  the case  that  different  branches  of  the  same union 
behave  in  different  ways  so  one  may  seem to  be  excluding  agency  workers  while 
another is seeking a replacement response.   The categories outlined above are ideal 
types and in reality unions may be seen to be closer to one or the other without fully 
conforming to the ideal type.
Despite the fact that Unison does not appear to have an ideological opposition to these 
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workers, the national policy is one of exclusion from workplace organisation.  While 
City behaves in line with this policy the same is not true of Met.  I will turn now to the 
local level practice of Unison at City followed by the position at Met.
Within City there appears to be a policy of exclusion.  Managers at City established two 
casual pools as internal agencies as an alternative to using external agencies but these 
workers,  like external agency workers,  are  also excluded from membership.   In my 
interviews it was clear that Unison representatives were aware of the staffing problems 
in social care.  This understanding has led to them being aware of the need for agency 
workers in these roles:
“I think it's a needs must, if you can't get the staff or there isn’t the will there  
we’ve got to staff [the posts] with someone and if agency workers are there we  
would expect the authority to use agency workers in those cases.  Because if we 
don't let that happen then our members are going to be under pressure trying to  
cover vacant posts.” (Unison representative, City)
“I don’t mind agency staff, they serve a purpose but you have to be worried  
when they dictate their own conditions, like here in social work, they get more 
money than our staff and decide what they will do”(Unison representative, City)
It  is  clear  that  both  union  representatives  saw  agency  workers  as  outside  their 
constituency.  Their references to ‘our staff’ and protecting ‘our members’ by covering 
vacant posts with agency labour applies to direct employees who are certainly Unison’s 
foremost concern.  Within City Unison appears to see agency workers as an unpleasant 
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necessity but they do not approve of their long-term use:
“I think our fundamental bottom line is to get people into some real jobs and not  
see agencies as part of the workforce.” (Unison representative, City)
Agency workers themselves were aware that they were viewed in this way by unions, 
one commented:
“A lot of people are preferring to go to work for agencies, the unions haven't  
caught up with that, they don’t acknowledge it do they?” (Agency social worker,  
City)
“[unions] see you as some sort of pariah” (Agency social worker City)
This  would  suggest  that  Unison  may  favour  a  policy  of  replacement  within  City. 
However they appear equally hostile to both internal and external agency providers.  In 
theory a replacement response should seek to replace agencies with more acceptable 
labour market intermediaries.  The internal agencies are not-for-profit and so do not 
‘parasitically’ make gains from the labour exchange.  The internal agency's staff are 
direct reports of the local authority and enjoy some of the benefits that external agency 
workers  do  not,  like  access  to  the  local  government  pension  scheme.   Whilst  the 
employment  status  of  internal  agency  workers  is  still  questionable  as  they  are 
considered casual workers with no contract of employment and who can experience 
substantial job insecurity, the fact that there is no labour market intermediary profiting 
from their employment could make this form of worker more acceptable to the union 
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movement.  Despite this there does not appear to be pressure on the local authority from 
the trade unions to use internal rather than external agencies and there is very little 
awareness  of  the  number  of  agency  and  casual  workers  employed.   One  Unison 
representative had some awareness of the casual pool.  He had offered advice to one 
worker facing problems but he was not aware of the extent of staffing or how reliant 
care home managers were on internal and external agency workers.  By contrast where 
some domiciliary home care services were outsourced to the private sector the unions 
and the local authority agreed that no agency workers could be used by the private 
sector providers, and indeed there is a contractual term in the outsourcing agreement 
that explicitly forbids the use of workers that are not directly employed by the service 
provider.  
Unison does  appear  to  apply  some pressure  for  City  to  replace  agency  and casual 
workers with permanent staff where possible.  The motivation for this primarily appears 
to  be  protection  of  their  permanently  employed  members  rather  than  any desire  to 
improve  the  conditions  of  agency  workers;  however  they  also  suggested  that  a 
permanent or fixed term contract on any basis, be it annual hours or a minimum hours 
contract, would improve the situation for these staff.  Their efforts to encourage the 
authority to move workers to more secure contracts is hindered by the lack of awareness 
of the number of agency and casual staff within the authority and the duration of their 
stay.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the local authority itself is unsure of the 
number of external agency workers so it would be difficult for Unison to have a clear 
idea of numbers and locations.  The same is not true of the internal agency workers 
employed.  Throughout the authority workers placed by the two internal agencies are 
carefully monitored and the authority is aware of number, length of service, and where 
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placements are and have been.  Unison is not aware of this information, mainly because 
it rejected invitations by both casual pools to be involved in induction, attend meetings 
with staff or recruit these workers.  It was Unison’s belief that within City casual and 
internal agency workers were converted into temporary members of staff within four 
weeks.  This was most certainly not the case as described in the previous chapter.  Nor 
was it  the case that all of these workers wanted to be converted to permanent staff, 
though  most  administrative  agency  workers  did.   At  City  Unison  was  under  the 
erroneous belief that they had an agreement with the authority that ensured that casual 
workers (including those placed by the internal agency) were not employed on a long-
term basis.  
Heery (2004) notes that the replacement strategy is often coupled with pressure on the 
user organisation to equalise the wages of agency and permanent staff to reduce the cost 
advantages  of  using  agency  workers.  Here  the  pressure  exerted  to  make  workers 
permanent is not coupled with pressure on City to equalise the wages of agency workers 
and permanent workers as a disincentive to the use of agency staff.  The only mention of 
agency workers within consultation discussions is in favour of permanent staff.  In short 
there is some evidence of a replacement strategy in operation, albeit with inadequate 
information and with a focus on the interests of permanent staff.
Despite the evidence of replacement, Unison locally see their own position as one of 
exclusion.  The stated reasons for excluding agency and casual workers from Unison 
were twofold.  The first was an ideological opposition to agency workers themselves:
“Agency people make good money out of authorities and that’s the risk they  
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take, I don't want to give them a safety net” (Unison representative, City)
The second was more pragmatic:
“We want people with what we would call proper jobs.” (Unison representative,  
City)
“We have got to get people, haven’t we, with some employment rights basically  
so they can't just be got rid of.” (Unison representative, City)
“I suppose some of the real issues about why we don't actively recruit in that  
area is  because of  their  vulnerabilities.   Now if  you’re an agency or casual  
member of staff here on some sort of casual or agency basis of 'there is a job  
there do it', if you kick up a stink and all rest of it you are very very easily got rid  
of.  And so we don't think it's fair really to put them into that point of pressure...
[when they became permanent] we'd come in and see them as legitimately able  
to take a real part in the trade union..” (Unison representative, City)
The pragmatic position seems to be in two parts.  The first relates to the argument that 
legislation provides the lever for bargaining but also allows people to assert basic rights 
without fear of reprisal preventing them from doing so.  Workers unable or unwilling to 
assert their rights can presumably, from this position, receive little support from trade 
unions.  The second part of the unions' views is that these workers will either ‘keep their 
heads down’ or move on to a new employer in preference to raising an issue at work.  In 
these circumstances it would be difficult and unlikely for these workers to take part in 
302
industrial action and if they are unwilling to tackle even individual problems at work 
there may be limited potential for recruitment and representation.  Of course the two are 
somewhat linked; bereft of employment protection agency workers may be unable to 
raise issues for fear of losing their jobs meaning that they either put up with the problem 
or get a new job. 
The notion that agency workers are unable to ‘legitimately’ take part in a trade union 
relates to the view of them as vulnerable workers.  This representative argues that to 
take part in a trade union workers must be able to raise problems at work and to take 
part in industrial action.  During the period of the research there was a national strike 
over changes to the pension scheme.  In addition, locally there were disputes ongoing 
about parking charges and changes in absence management.  The Unison representative 
suggested that the issues in dispute would not be issues of great interest to agency and 
casual workers:
“I don't  know whether they would address [problems] whilst  they’re casual,  
because I think they'd be prepared to ride any sort of problems there if they saw 
at the end of it they were going to get some temporary or permanent job.  I think  
people are like that, I think they're not in an environment where they want to say  
it.  With a casual I think they're looking at some sort of job that has some degree  
of  security.   So  I  think  that  all  these  other  issues  are  peripheral  to  
them.” (Unison representative, City)
This pairing of the fact that they can not take part in union activity with the fact that the 
issues that the union is addressing are not seen as particularly important to this group of 
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workers seems to suggest to Unison that they are not  a group that  would be easily 
recruited,  mobilised  or  represented.   This  representative  suggested  that  it  would  be 
dishonest to try to recruit agency workers with little to offer them, suggesting that he 
would  be  ‘selling  them  air’.   Only  one  of  the  four  Unison  representatives  that  I 
interviewed  at  City  thought  that  Unison  could  represent  agency  workers  but  all 
acknowledged that at the time of the research they did not.  
Whilst it was Unison's position that agency workers would have little interest in the 
ongoing disputes and would be unable to take industrial action this was not universally 
the  case  for  agency  workers  themselves.   Most  of  the  agency  social  workers  that 
mentioned the strike action said that they had decided not to attend work on the days of 
the strikes in support of their colleagues.  Care workers tended to be excluded from the 
industrial action and administrative workers did not mention the strike action.  
At City neither of the other recognised trade unions had membership within social care, 
however for completeness and because these unions may provide some potential for 
future representation I will outline their position.  Both Unite and GMB were happy to 
recruit agency workers.  GMB had members on only one site and indicated that they 
had an agreement with management to the effect that any agency workers employed 
would be paid the same rate as their permanent counterparts.  They were approached by 
one agency worker for membership.  Because of the length of time that this worker had 
been  within  the  organisation  they  entered  into  negotiations  with  management  and 
insisted that he was made a permanently and directly employed member of staff.  Once 
he was permanently employed he became a union member.  Their response to these 
workers  was  certainly  not  one  of  engagement.   They  expressed  distaste  towards 
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agencies and did not bargain with them to achieve better terms and conditions for these 
workers.  Rather they exercised a dual strategy.  Simultaneously they negotiated with 
the local authority to ensure that workers were paid the same as permanent staff to 
remove the cost advantage of using agency workers and advocated the replacement of 
agency workers with permanent staff where they were employed on a long-term basis.  
Unite’s position locally was similar:
“Ideologically unions tend to be against casual labour anyway just because of  
the lack of rights they have but realistically it  is probably going to be a bit  
difficult to stop just with the amount of agency workers.  And until the union 
movement gets its strength back it is going to be difficult.  You try to put pressure 
on the authority to say to them, get your agency to treat them decently or get rid  
of the agency.  We also look at if  they have been there for a period of time  
getting them made up on the company books with the argument 'well you have  
got permanent jobs, there do the right thing for these fellas'.  Those are the two  
ways of looking at it.”(Unite representative, City)
In discussion a Unite rep referred to agencies as ‘a pack of bastards basically’.  But 
simultaneously they were ‘dealing with the devil’ with recognition agreements signed 
nationally with a number of the more reputable agencies and making use of agency staff 
within their branch office for cleaning.  They were organising people within the scope 
of  these agreements  as a  local  branch but  not  within City.  Unite  did not  have the 
agreement that GMB did with City that agency workers should have the same rate of 
pay  as  their  permanent  counterparts.   Like  GMB  they  had  been  approached  for 
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membership by a long standing agency worker.  He joined Unite and they immediately 
undertook representation on his behalf.  His contract was to be ended but they argued 
successfully that his long service meant that he was likely to be considered an employee 
in line with the judgement in Carmichael (1999).  Despite the fact that he joined after he 
knew there was a possibility of his contract ending the union gave him access not only 
to local representatives but they also took legal advice on his behalf.  
Neither GMB nor Unite made separate provision for agency workers, and essentially 
they both responded with a replacement strategy recognising that the workers were part 
of  a  legitimate  constituency  but  not  generally  dealing  with  the  agencies  of  staff 
employed by City.  In the cases that they cited this was successful in moving workers 
from agency to permanent jobs.  This strategy was also in line with their strategies for 
casual and temporary but directly employed staff as they sought to move them to more 
secure forms of employment, ultimately permanent directly employed roles.
This strategy assumes workers want to move from agency to permanent jobs.  In the last 
chapter the reasons that different types of agency workers had undertaken agency work 
were discussed.  Job seeker agency workers, those workers that had taken agency work 
because no permanent  jobs were available,  were in the minority.  For  most  agency 
workers interviewed taking agency work was a genuine choice based upon their own 
personal circumstances and preferences rather than one forced on them by the lack of 
permanent jobs.  While most indicated a desire to return to permanent work in the long 
term,  they  were  not  looking  to  return  to  permanent  work  in  the  near  future  and 
representation aimed at getting them permanent jobs would not have been of assistance 
at the time of the study.  For these staff a trade union committed to assisting them into 
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permanent  jobs  is  not  an attractive proposition;  however  representation of this  kind 
clearly does assist those workers for whom agency worker is not their favoured option.  
The local GMB representative deliberately decided not to recruit members outside the 
site that he worked at, despite pressure from his regional officer, because he felt unable 
to  fully  service  members  outside  this  site.   This  led  to  a  very  high  level  of  GMB 
membership on that site (close to 100%) but very little membership outside that site. 
Unite did recruit throughout the authority.  They did not have large numbers of members 
outside the manual  occupational  groups,  and reported no membership in social  care 
where Unison had very high levels of membership.  
The result of this is that whilst these unions were represented within the authority and 
were part of the consultative arrangements, they were not particularly accessible to the 
agency workers within social care that I researched.  Neither of the internal agencies 
had offered them a place in inducting new starters, though at least Unite would have 
been more receptive than Unison was.  
In terms of recruitment of agency workers, as stated earlier, Unison does not recruit 
these workers, and both GMB and Unite have no targeted recruitment; if recruitment 
occurs it is as a result of ‘normal’ recruitment activity or a reaction to a request.  There 
were  very  few accounts  of  representation  and participation  of  agency staff.   Those 
accounts that were given revolved around these workers seeking permanent jobs and 
becoming members once that  was achieved or general  advice being offered to non-
members  who  were  barred  from  joining  because  of  their  employment  status.   For 
Unison it is clear that the exclusion from recruitment is as a result of the problematic 
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employment status that these workers have and their triangular relationship.  Whilst not 
explicitly  excluded  from  membership  in  GMB  and  Unite  the  unusual  triangular 
employment relationship may nonetheless explain the fact that neither union believed 
that it had agency workers in membership within City.
In short,  within City the union that accounts for 80% density within the social care 
group is Unison.  Its policy of exclusion (mixed in some places with replacement) of 
agency  workers  essentially  means  that  agency  workers  are  unable  to  access 
representation until they become permanent staff.  Whilst the other two representative 
unions are willing to recruit agency workers, their absence from social care means that 
they are not an accessible option for social care agency workers.  Were they accessible 
their agenda would at best reach only those workers that wanted their contracts to be 
made permanent.  In spite of that in the words of one agency worker: “It would be an 
improvement to be represented on anything” (Internal administrative agency worker) so 
the kind of representation offered by GMB and Unite may attract him and others like 
him but equally it excludes those workers for whom agency work is a genuine choice.  
Met provides a contrast to City in two main ways, firstly Unison does not have the same 
density within social care, union members are split almost equally between GMB and 
Unison.  Secondly Unison within Met does not follow the national policy of exclusion 
in relation to recruitment of agency workers.  Within Met local Unison representatives 
expressed distaste at the idea of excluding workers because of their employment status. 
Their position was that the purpose of a trade union was to protect vulnerable workers; 
they saw these workers as being both in need of and entitled to union protection if they 
were union members.  
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“I'm flabbergasted actually  … that they would be discouraging anyone from 
joining.” (Unison representative, Met)
In spite of this ideological position which was held by both full time Unison reps there 
was little knowledge of the extent of agency use within Met beyond the agencies used to 
outsource much of the home care.  Both representatives were of the opinion that the vast 
majority of agency workers had undertaken agency work as a matter of choice: 
“it is about why the individual, particularly for social work staff, wants to be a  
member  of  the  agency  rather  than  apply  for  permanency,  because  I  think  
particularly  at  the  moment  there  is  a  lot  of  scope  for  people  to  apply  for  
permanency and therefore it's about a definite choice they've made.” (Unison  
representative, Met)
Within  Met,  Unison  representatives  believed  that  in  the  main  agency  workers  had 
chosen this employment status, that essentially this status limited their rights, and the 
issues on which they could be represented but that they could join the union and be 
represented.  Whether they made the choice to be an agency worker or were an agency 
worker as no other jobs were available, this branch saw these workers as legitimately 
able to join, participate in and be represented by Unison.  Unison representatives at 
local  level  recognised the different  issues  for agency workers making the choice to 
continue as agency workers, and those who wanted to convert to permanent contracts. 
This recognition was not translated to any tangible action to assist either group.  Unison 
representatives were not aware of any agency workers that were members,  and had 
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never undertaken representation on behalf of agency workers. 
As with City, Met has developed consultative arrangements with its major trade union 
partners.   Unison reps  did not  report  any issues particularly associated with agency 
workers being discussed.  Met undertook a massive procurement exercise to rationalise 
purchasing of agency workers.  These staff are now procured through one of two routes; 
administrative  staff  through  Adecco  and  all  others  through  the  MV  arrangements. 
Unison was invited to be involved in the tender for and procurement of a master or 
neutral vendor. They declined to be involved.   Heery (2004) contends that longer term 
‘relational  contracting’  has  made  agencies  more  attractive  to  unions.   Within  Met 
consolidated purchasing of agency workers has meant longer term relationships with 
agency  suppliers,  however  this  has  not  translated  into  union  involvement  with  this 
group.  One agency supplying administrative staff gives its workers employee status and 
is used by local authorities across the LCSG group.  It is hard to see why workers for 
this agency would be difficult to unionise in circumstances where an agency with long-
term relationships  with  local  authorities  supplies  large  numbers  of  staff  across  the 
London  region  and  whose  workers  are  given  employee  status.   Nonetheless  there 
appears little recognition of this and no action to recruit these workers.  
The ideological inclusion of agency workers by Unison at  Met is  not  coupled with 
action on their  behalf.   For this reason it  is difficult  to place Unison at  Met within 
Heery’s four groups.  There is certainly no ideological exclusion but in practice neither 
does there appear to be regulation, replacement or engagement.  These workers are not 
represented, nor is there a consistent approach by Unison to limit the use of agency 
staff, or to ensure that their wages would not undercut those of directly employed staff. 
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Unison  does  not  have  a  relationship  with  any  of  the  agencies  supplying  Met  with 
workers  so  representation  of  their  interests  does  not  occur  there  despite  one  of  the 
agencies  having  a  number  of  trade  union  partners  and  recognition  agreements 
elsewhere.   Whilst  these  workers  are  not  explicitly  excluded,  there  was no specific 
recruitment or representation of them, nor did general recruitment appear to draw in 
these workers.  Perhaps a further category outside those defined by Heery (2004) could 
be 'apathetic', for unions in this position who in practice at workplace level do not seek 
to engage with the agency workforce but have no ideological opposition to them. 
GMB is the second largest union within Met.  Due to conflict during the Unison merger 
a large number of social workers and social work managers transferred from NALGO to 
GMB.  This historical anomaly has an ongoing impact within this workforce as GMB 
has maintained a presence within this work group.  Most of their members seem to be 
long serving Met employees in social work and managerial roles.  Because of their high 
number of professionally qualified workers GMB has two representatives to support 
members  at  Met,  one  works  with  manual  and  care  staff  and  the  other  represents 
professionally qualified staff and managers.  
Like within City, GMB at Met would not exclude potential union members on grounds 
of their employment status.  In essence they said that they recruited people and not their 
employment status.  This means that there is no specific provision for agency workers in 
terms of recruitment and representation.  Whilst individual interest representation may 
be available,  no collective support  is  available,  like representation to  the agency on 
terms or conditions of work.  
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If Unison were the only union available to agency workers in Met and City it would 
appear that their prospect for collective representation was functionally non existent. 
Whilst Unison branches in City and Met have very different ideological approaches to 
recruitment  and  representation  of  agency  workers,  in  practice  outcomes  for  these 
workers  are  the  same  in  both  authorities.   It  is  this  lack  of  recruitment  and 
representation activity that led to a Unison representative in City saying: “I don't know 
collectively that they have any voice at all.”
The other trade unions are willing to recruit these workers, however this does not appear 
to have translated to unionisation of these workers within these authorities.  Nonetheless 
the prospects for some kind of interest representation of agency workers in social care, 
albeit on an individual basis, appear to be best with GMB within Met and Unite in City. 
Unison has identified agency workers as a particular constituency, with particular needs 
and particular problems.  Nationally they have made a strategic choice to exclude these 
workers, and this policy was acted out in City but not Met.  Unison at Met talks about 
inclusion as it would not be comfortable with excluding on the basis of employment 
status, however in practice they offer no collective agenda tailored to these workers and 
the collective representation offered is only for directly employed staff.  Whilst at an 
individual level representation is offered there is no collective bargaining or engagement 
with agencies on behalf of these workers.  The suggestion that Unison at Met has a 
policy of inclusion appears to be hollow; ideologically there is acceptance that  they 
have the right to representation, however there is no real attempt at representation.  This 
stance is mirrored by GMB and Unite, at local level those unions have not identified 
these workers as different from other workers; this means that they are not excluded but 
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their needs are equally not recognised as differentiated from other staff.  Potentially this 
lack of differentiation in the offer to permanent and agency workers could in itself be a 
barrier to unionisation.  
In Chapter 2 the structure of UK trade union representation was noted as a possible 
barrier to unionisation of agency workers because it is based in the workplace.  Within 
this  sector,  however  collective  bargaining  takes  place  at  sectoral  level  albeit  with 
increasing scope for local level agreements beyond the national settlement.  Nonetheless 
recruitment  and representation  does  take  place  locally  and it  is  both nationally  and 
locally that representatives have excluded these workers from membership.  Even long-
term agency workers experience frequent changes in workplace and agency.  The one 
agency worker that was a union member described the problems with moving branches 
when she moved workplace, and it was only her commitment to trade unions that made 
her persevere.  The structure of representation with its recruitment base at the workplace 
can be problematic  for  these  workers.  The structure of  the  union itself  can prevent 
unionisation of these workers.  Within the case study Unison has a rule that could be 
problematic as workers must be registered with the union for a thirteen week period 
before they are considered members and entitled to representation.  For many agency 
workers this is more than any single placement, and workers may move employers and 
even sectors between placements.  Furthermore their dues are collected from payroll 
from local authorities and this is not possible for many agency workers.  Unison’s dues 
relate to salary level; however agency workers may experience increases and decreases 
in salary levels with each placement,  meaning that for this group the administration 
could be very challenging.  Whilst each of these things could be tackled; for example 
direct debt, which could be fixed rate rather than check off, could be used to collect 
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union subscription, it would take a deliberate effort to change in order to accommodate 
different types of workers.
By  contrast  GMB,  even  without  differentiating  its  offer  to  agency  workers  has  a 
structure that is more accessible to them.  It does not have a strict policy of restricting 
representation to members of over a certain period.  Instead GMB reps have discretion 
and are able to offer representation where they feel that it is appropriate.  In addition 
GMB’s dues are fixed regardless of earnings and it does not collect dues via payroll; 
they are collected using direct debit, meaning that regardless of change of employer and 
salary level.  The major structural impediments present within Unison are not in place 
within GMB.  
The opportunities for unions to regulate the agency work labour market are not confined 
to the workplace.  Rather than dealing with a variety of agencies, unions may deal with 
the user organisation, particularly in sectors with monopsomists; local authorities for 
teachers  and  social  workers,  and  the  NHS  for  nurses  and  doctors  (Heery,  2004). 
Beyond those areas in which specific skilled labour is employed by a small number of 
employers the opportunity to negotiate to regulate agency work, at least in the public 
sector, exists in areas where procurement has been consolidated.  The move from ad hoc 
purchasing  of  agency  workers,  to  consolidated  procurement,  often  undertaken  by 
regional procurement groups, may offer unions a means of negotiating minimum terms 
and conditions on behalf of agency workers across the local authority or procurement 
group by including them in tender documents. This study revealed an example of unions 
seeking to regulate the conditions of workers in triangular employment relationship in 
precisely this way in the tender for outsourced domiciliary care in City.  Unison was 
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able to negotiate for a minimum skills and training guarantee and to ban the use of 
agency workers carrying out the contracts.  
This is important because it  may allow unions in local government to influence the 
treatment of agency workers in negotiation with the local authorities themselves rather 
than the individual agencies the local authorities use.  Because many of the MV/NV 
tenders are  put  together regionally by purchasing consortium like London Contracts 
Suppliers Group and Eastern Shires Purchasing organisation it may be possible for trade 
unions to negotiate regionally rather than locally to secure key conditions for agency 
workers.  Heery (2004) argues that relational contracting between user organisations 
and agencies may make it easier for unions to recruit and represent agency workers. 
While outsourced workers may come from a huge number of different companies (a 
GMB official indicated that one local authority in the south east region was rumoured to 
have over 1000), increasingly agency workers are provided either directly by a master 
vendor, or procured through a neutral vendor.  In either case a single organisation is 
responsible for ensuring these workers meet the standards laid out in the agreement with 
the user local authority.  Agreements with just three Master and Neutral vendors across 
Greater London would cover most agency workers within local authorities in the area. 
Within  the  case  studies  there  was  no  evidence  of  union  engagement  with  the 
procurement of agency workers in either of the local authorities, though in both they 
were invited to be involved in the tendering process.  This is an area in which there is 
scope for future union activity. 
Another  area  in  which  unions  are  able  to  regulate  agency  work  is  though  political 
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campaigning.  Unison,  GMB and Unite have all  campaigned at  the political  level  to 
improve legislative protection for agency workers.  The Labour Government's manifesto 
commitment to drop its opposition to the proposed EU directive on temporary agency 
work has  been attributed to  the  so called  'Warwick agreement'  with  its  trade  union 
sponsors.  Its recent announcement that it would press ahead with domestic legislation 
in light of the agreement between the government, TUC and CBI has come on the heels 
of vocal pressure applied by the unions in their sponsorship of two private members 
bills and direct lobbying. 
Because  trade  unions  act  at  different  levels  (EU,  national,  regional  and  local)  and 
engage in both political lobbying and collective bargaining it is difficult to categorise 
their behaviour at all levels within the framework laid out by Heery (2004).  Unison's 
actions  in  lobbying  at  political  level  and  investing  resources  in  responding  to 
government consultation exercises on agency working is not indicative of a trade union 
that excludes agency workers. 
The strategy of political engagement in respect to agency workers, and in particular to 
pursue equal treatment legislation, shows unions may be looking to overcome the main 
drawbacks of unionising these workers.  Equal treatment legislation reduces the threat 
of agency work undercutting the terms and conditions of permanent employees, which 
is  a  barrier  to  unionisation at  present.   It  also increases  the areas  in  which agency 
workers and permanent employees have common interests.  For example presently pay 
settlements reached on behalf of permanent employees have little relevance to agency 
workers; however with the introduction of the requirement for equal pay after twelve 
weeks a pay settlement reached with a user organisation will also apply to long-term 
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agency workers.  This ability to negotiate with the user employer, particularly in the 
public  sector  where  unionisation levels  are  high,  allows unions  to  act  on behalf  of 
agency  workers  in  the  areas  in  which  equal  treatment  legislation  applies  without 
presenting a differentiated offer to these workers.  While other workers with triangular 
employment relationships providing public sector services, such as outsourced workers, 
may require unions to engage with their private sector employers to negotiate pay and 
conditions,  long-term agency workers  will  have access  to  pay, and some terms and 
conditions, negotiated only with the user organisation.
Unison has undertaken a regulation policy with regard to agency workers, and pursued 
this  primarily  at  political  level.  At  local  level it  has  excluded agency workers from 
membership  primarily because they are unable to take part in collective action, because 
they are particularly vulnerable and have very limited capacity to act and because they 
are most likely to ride out problems or leave the organisation rather than seeking union 
support to challenge workplace problems.   Rather than attempting to recruit agency 
workers Unison has sought to act on their behalf at political level to secure legislative 
change.  It has not done so in the interests of existing members who are agency workers, 
as most agency workers have been excluded from membership. Regulation of the kind 
agreed  between  the  TUC,  CBI  and government  offering  agency workers  with  over 
twelve  weeks  service  equal  treatment  in  respect  of  pay  and  some  conditions  of 
employment does reduce the potential for agency workers undercutting the terms and 
conditions permanent staff.  
Trade unions  in  this  sector  have  applied pressure  for  legislative  change rather  than 
engage in workplace recruitment and representation of agency workers.  They recognise 
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the  oft  portrayed  image  of  these  workers  as  being  in  a  particularly  vulnerable 
employment position and sought to change this by applying pressure for regulation. 
A possible explanation for Unisons' reluctance to unionise these workers can be found 
within Heery’s work.  He suggests that declining unions have sought to recruit these 
workers.   As  a  public  sector  union  Unison  is  in  a  sector  which  has  traditionally 
experienced high membership levels and it has not suffered the vast membership losses 
of unions within the private sector and particularly manufacturing.  Because Unison has 
not suffered the decline of unions in other sectors it arguably has not had the impetus to 
embrace  and  adapt  to  new forms  of  employment.   Alternatively  it  is  possible  that 
Unison  has  focused  resources  on  dealing  with  the  changes  relating  to  CCT.   The 
outsourcing of services has lead to the transfer of staff previously employed directly by 
local authorities to a huge number of private sector employers. 
In contrast both Unite and GMB have experienced significant decline which was more 
pronounced  in  the  private  sector,  both  have  invested  substantially  in  their  own 
Organising Academies and have recognised the importance of non-standard workers as 
a  matter  of  national  policy.   This  embracing  of  atypical  workers  generally  has  not 
translated  into  a  differentiated  offer  or  unionisation  of  agency workers  in  the  local 
authority social care sector but the dominance of Unison in this area may explain this.
The response of the trade unions in the case study organisations to agency workers at 
local and national level has been outlined.  In Unison's case local level regulation or 
exclusion is coupled with political lobbying to increase employment protection for these 
workers.  For Unite and GMB the local level position seems one of indifference to these 
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workers, they do not see their different employment status as a reason for exclusion 
from the union, nor do they specifically engage with these workers and their agencies. 
This behaviour appears to fall outside the categories that Heery (2004) offers and is 
perhaps an extension to the framework he lays out.  Again these unions have applied 
political pressure for legislative change.  The differences between the workplace level 
practice and national level policy makes it difficult to categorise the behaviour of the 
trade unions to agency workers within a single category of response. 
Professional Associations and access to voice
The previous section details the lack of union involvement with agency workers in local 
government social care.  If it  is the workplace union’s view that collectively agency 
workers have no voice at all it becomes important to explore the remaining options. 
For occupational therapy and social work staff professional associations may provide a 
forum for agency workers to seek advice, support and voice outside traditional trade 
unions.   This section explores the role  of the British Association of Social  Workers 
(BASW),  the  professional  association  for  social  workers,  in  assisting  individuals  or 
groups in raising workplace issues.
BASW’s membership is open equally to permanent staff and agency workers.  It has an 
independents  forum,  open  only  to  staff  that  are  not  directly  employed  by  a  local 
authority  and  this  forum  has  a  conference  every  second  year.   This  provides  an 
opportunity for agency workers and other independent workers to address matters that 
are particularly important for them.  This gives these workers a forum for peer support 
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and the ability to discuss issues that they have at work relating to their employment 
status rather than particularly their workplace.  Whilst this does not necessarily offer the 
opportunity for collective representation at the workplace level, it may allow BASW to 
represent workers over some issues at the policy level.
BASW,  as  a  professional  association,  represents  primarily  on  issues  related  to 
professional status.  This is acknowledged by many agency social workers 
I suppose it’s about being a professional social worker, [BASW] support that  
sort of thing, your development and professionalism.  I suppose I don’t really see  
them as a trade union.” (Agency social worker, Met)
The  lack  of  a  workplace  foundation  for  its  organisation  removes  the  problems 
associated with changing branches when you change workplaces as an agency worker. 
Whilst in the main the offer to agency workers is not differentiated from that to directly 
employed  staff,  the  focus  on  the  professional  status  of  social  workers  means  that 
employment status has little  effect  on the impact  of  the agenda of this  professional 
association and its pull to all groups of staff.  As such the needs of agency workers do 
not  come a  poor  second  to  the  needs  of  directly  employed  staff.   The  benefits  of 
membership are equally applicable to both agency workers and permanent staff, with 
some being arguably of more assistance to agency workers.  For example whilst directly 
employed staff have access to professionally accredited training with their employers, 
this option is not always available to agency workers.  In the last chapter it was clear 
that some workers were able to access training though their workplace or their agency. 
For those social workers unable to do so the provision of discounted accredited training 
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may be particularly attractive.  A number of agency social workers pointed to the access 
to training as a reason to consider joining BASW: 
“I  would  consider  joining  BASW  mainly  because  they  put  out  interesting  
material on social work; it’s also a good way to access training.” (Agency social  
worker, City)
Similarly the legal cover offered may be of particular interest to these workers who are 
not protected by a conventional employment relationship.  
Some workers felt that BASW was useful and that membership supported them to keep 
up  with  new  developments,  access  training  and  indemnity  cover  and  be  aware  of 
national issues in their field.  Others felt that the organisation did very little for them 
individually and for social work as a profession.  None cited agency status as something 
that would decide whether or not they were members, or that would change their view 
on the organisation.  A small number of professional social work agency workers were 
positive about the fact that their agency was affiliated with BASW because it gave them 
easier access to training.
Whilst social workers are able to access their  professional association, this does not 
provide a forum for collectively agreeing conditions of work.  The access that BASW 
provides to advice and representation is certainly an improvement on the ability of other 
agency workers to access these functions, however it lacks a workplace collective voice. 
The fact that workplace representation on individual issues is limited to those workers 
that are  also trade union members and whose trade nion has not provided adequate 
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representation provides a barrier to representation even when agency social workers are 
BASW members.  If this is strictly enforced then even individual representation would 
be denied to most agency workers because they are not union members.
BASW representatives in the advice and representation function I interviewed were not 
specifically  aware  of  many  instances  of  representation  of  agency  workers.   Their 
recollection of the issues that they had dealt  with in relation to these workers were 
solely related to the problems associated in getting references from user organisations. 
In the instances noted they were able to provide assistance by providing proforma letters 
to be sent to user organisations and by contacting them directly to push for references.  
As discussed in the last chapter many agency social workers deal with problems at work 
by exiting the agency and/or the workplace employer.  Getting accurate references from 
a previous employer was a frequently cited difficulty with exit.  The fact that BASW's 
advice and representation unit was willing to deal with problems of this nature without 
strictly enforcing their policy of insisting that members seek support from their trade 
union allows agency workers access to support with their chosen method of resolving 
workplace problems.  
BASW offers agency social workers advantages that may be more attractive to them 
than  to  their  permanent  counterparts.  These  include  indemnity  insurance,  legal 
representation, and access to training.  While conventional employees accrue benefits in 
these areas they are arguably of greater interest  to agency and self  employed social 
workers.  At recruitment events BASW were clear that agency, permanent and self-
employed  social  workers  joined  and  that  there  did  not  appear  to  be  ideological 
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resistance on the part of agency workers to membership.
Conclusion
This chapter has reported on the ways in which agency workers and trade unions and 
professional associations interact.  The previous chapter reported that there were serious 
impediments  to  mobilisation  amongst  agency  workers  arising  from  the  triangular 
employment relationship.  It is then perhaps surprising that a number of these workers 
attempted to join a trade union and many more indicated that they would join a trade 
union  if  they  were  asked to.   It  is  less  surprising  that  many other  agency workers 
indicated that they were of the belief that being an agency worker meant that either the 
union was not interested in you being a member, or that the union was not relevant. 
Expatriate  and  short-term  convenience  agency  workers  who  indicated  the  greatest 
inclination to exit in response to a problem at work also indicated the least interest in 
joining a trade union.  They described trade unions as irrelevant to them as agency 
workers.  Job seeking agency workers, and career agency workers, particularly those 
that were internal agency workers indicated the greatest interest in trade unions.  These 
workers  expressed  social  identification  with  agency  and  permanent  colleagues,  and 
many suggested that they would share similar work related issues with other agency 
workers and permanent staff.  
The trade union response to agency workers in local government has been outlined. 
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Unison's exclusion of agency workers at local level in one local authority in line with 
national policy, and indifference to them at the other was contrasted with its political 
lobbying.  GMB and Unite's ideological inclusion was discussed alongside the lack of 
activity  in  the local  authority  social  care setting.   This  chapter  concludes that  trade 
unions  do  not  offer  agency  workers  in  local  government  social  care  access  to 
representative voice.  
The prospects for agency worker voice at work are presently limited. The last chapter 
outlined the impediments to the opportunity to act on problems at work, and particularly 
to act by voicing issues.  This chapter has reported on the representation gap for agency 
workers at the workplace in local authority social care.  Trade unions are taking action 
on behalf of agency workers, but this action is being taken without reference to the 
workers themselves because, at  least  in the case of Unison,  they are excluded from 
membership.   Rather than representing the interests  of members,  articulated through 
union structures, Unison is acting for agency workers to further what it perceives to be 
their interests. 
Agency social  workers  do  have  access  to  representative  voice  in  the  form of  their 
professional association.  The services it offers members are of particular interest to 
agency workers.  It also offers advice and representation, though this is limited.  Advice 
and  representation  was  provided  to  agency  workers  with  getting  references  from 
previous employers, a problem frequently cite by agency social workers in this study. 
Agency workers that expressed resistance to the idea of joining a trade union were more 
positive about joining BASW because of the services it offered and the commitment 
they  felt  it  showed to  their  profession  as  social  workers.   For  many agency social 
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workers these issues were more important than the provision of assistance with 'voice'.
This chapter has established that there is a representation gap for agency workers at 
workplace level.  A number of agency workers sought to join trade unions and were 
rejected by them.  The workers that identified most closely with the user organisation 
and their permanent colleagues were the most inclined to join a trade unions.  This 
supports the view that social identification is a key factor in desire for unionisation. 
Most of the workers that had attempted to join a trade union were administrative and 
care  workers,  and  the  workers  that  expressed  the  greatest  dissatisfaction  at  being 
rejected were job seeking internal agency administrative workers.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter these workers had little access to voice or exit and perceived their 
employment as particularly precarious generally without labour market or employer job 
security.   They  perceived  unions  able  to  offer  any  form  of  representation  as  an 
improvement, even if that representation was necessarily less comprehensive than for 
their permanent colleagues.  Other workers, such as expatriate agency workers, were 
clear that they did not need support at work, and were not interested in any form of 
representative voice.  This is yet another example of the way in which the triangular 
employment  relationship  is  experienced  differently  for  different  types  of  agency 
workers. 
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Chapter 9 – Discussion and conclusion
This concluding chapter highlights the main findings of the thesis.  It summarises the 
diversity in the management of agency workers and their experience of work to show a 
great deal of heterogeneity.  It engages with the literature presenting agency workers in 
binary categories to suggest that these do not offer a sufficiently nuanced understanding 
of the variations between workers, arguing the typology presented in chapter 7 offers a 
clearer  way of  understanding  differences  between agency workers.   It  moves  on to 
discuss the capacity of various types of agency workers to act in response to problems at 
work  and  argues  that  the  differences  between  agency  workers  are  important  in 
determining  their  ability  to  respond.   The  desire  for  protection  and  voice  and  the 
implications  for  union  renewal  are  discussed,  identifying  the  key  role  of  changing 
employment  law as  a  lever  to  the  closer  identification  of  these  workers  with  their 
permanent colleagues, and to their unionisation. 
Inside the triangular relationship
Looking inside the triangular relationship at how workers are managed has established 
the varied approach taken by managers to these workers.  The literature that identifies 
the  split  in  employer  function  and  its  implications  for  the  legal  position  of  these 
workers, the implications of having a triangular employment relationship on a day to 
day basis for managers or workers themselves is rarely considered.  The confusion of 
managers and lack of clarity in how agency workers should be managed is clear within 
Chapter 6.  For managers within the user organisation it appears little support exists in 
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terms of how these workers should be recruited, trained, supported at work, or even 
dismissed.   This  leads  to  divergent  practice  even  within  the  same organisation  and 
department.  The personnel policies used to manage these workers are rarely explicit 
and managers believed that taking disciplinary action against agency workers was futile, 
preferring instead to have informal discussions or ending placements.  Agencies have 
little contact with their staff, even when they are 'employees' of the agency and most 
management activity occurs at the workplace.  Whilst agencies may become involved if 
there is a problem, this is generally limited to moving these workers from their current 
placement,  either  at  the  behest  of  management  or  the  worker.   This  study  found 
managers in the user organisation making decisions about the competency and conduct 
of  agency  workers;  they  assume  many  employer  functions  without  having  legal 
accountability for these workers (except in a small number of areas relating to health 
and safety).  
Management  of  agency  workers  was  divided  across  the  agency  and  workplace 
organisation, but with no clear delineation of which organisation was responsible for 
which aspects of management. Similar results were found in the study by Rubery et al 
(2003: 279) of outsourced workers.  They found that “the presence of multi-agencies 
can result in cross-cutting lines of control, confounding expectations and confusing job 
roles of both managers and employees.”  The triangular employment relationship for 
both outsourced and agency workers leads to difficulties in defining management roles 
and offering workers a clear understanding of how they would be managed and who 
was responsible for them. 
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Understanding heterogeneity in agency work
Agency workers themselves are a diverse group with very different reasons for taking 
agency work.  They commented on the diversity of management practices, the fact that 
their  treatment  was very much at  the discretion of  their  line manager  and,  to  some 
degree,  their  permanent  colleagues.   They  were  aware  of  the  precarious  nature  of 
agency work and the possibility that they could be given very little notice of the end of a 
placement.  Their perceptions of the security of agency work varied a great deal.
The diversity in the management of these staff has important implications.  The quality 
of their management is a very individual concern because few workers work in teams 
with other agency workers.   Because so much of the experience of agency work is 
related to their individual manager workers conceptualise problems with their work as 
individual and relating to their treatment as a single agency worker.  Agency workers in 
this study identify some managers, placements and teams as poor, others as good.  They 
identify this as a feature of agency work and sometimes as a problem with a particular 
placement.  In the main it is accepted as par for the course rather than challenged. 
The  heterogeneity  of  agency work  that  is  introduced  within  the  first  theme carries 
throughout  the  thesis.   The  points  of  comparison  abound,  from  the  voluntary/ 
involuntary  agency  worker  dichotomy  raised  by  Forde  and  Slater  (2005),  through 
occupational differences,  internal versus external agency worker differences,  and the 
typology which was developed in Chapter 7.  The experience of agency work is affected 
by differences between agency workers.  In short, difference matters.  
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Atypical work in general, and agency work in particular, is often portrayed in ways that 
do not recognise the diversity of workers undertaking such work.  Often atypical work 
is  identified  as  poor,  insecure  work;  however  not  all  atypical  workers  experience 
contractual insecurity (for example part time workers are often on permanent contracts) 
and not all atypical workers are poorly paid (some agency workers receive higher pay 
than  their  permanent  counterparts).   Accounting  for  difference  in  atypical  work  is 
challenging because of the wide array of differences that exist even within one category 
of  workers.   Agency  work  is  especially  difficult  because  it  differs  so  much  from 
standard permanent employment.  Nonetheless, a variety of classifications exist, some 
of which present polar caricatures of these workers.  They often present a binary choice; 
either a worker is a voluntary or involuntary agency worker; agency work is either a 
bridge or a trap; agency workers are either highly vulnerable or free agents.  This thesis 
has sought to illuminate the array of shades of grey between the extreme ends of these 
spectra.  It has presented agency workers that do not fit at either end, and in some cases 
do not fit on the spectrum at all. 
Workers can be divided into those who voluntarily select agency work and those for 
whom agency work is not a choice.  This division is helpful because the level of choice 
in  taking  an  agency  job  does  appear  to  change  the  experience  of  agency  work 
considerably.   Forde and Slater  (2005)  found that  ‘voluntary’ agency work was not 
higher  amongst  highly-skilled  workers,  the  young,  women,  or  those  with  children. 
Within my study occupation made a difference in that agency social workers were more 
likely  to  be  voluntary  agency  workers  than  administrative  or  care  workers.   Not 
surprisingly,  satisfaction  with  agency  status  was  higher  amongst  voluntary  agency 
workers than involuntary agency workers.  However the difficulty with the division into 
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voluntary and involuntary agency workers is that it suggests a strict division that is not 
easy to identify in practice.  For some agency workers there is a clear drive to agency 
work, such as the inability to find a permanent job, and for such workers it is easy to 
categorise them as involuntary agency workers.  In contrast, other workers may have 
chosen agency status for a variety of reasons outlined in the literature including being 
able to achieve a satisfactory work/life balance, being able to work part time, being able 
to gain varied experience or to specialise in a particular area.  Still others may be pushed 
into agency workers for the reasons that Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) suggest around 
the degradation of work in the public sector.  
Whilst the agency social workers in my study could be categorised on the whole as 
voluntary  agency  workers,  many  of  the  convenience  agency  workers  had  selected 
agency work because they were unable to find a permanent job that allowed them the 
flexibility that they wanted.  Whilst survey data may suggest that there is a clear line 
between voluntary and involuntary agency work, interviews offer a fuller account of the 
reasons for accepting an agency job that is framed in the context of the workers home 
and work life.  My interviews identified various drivers to agency work that centred 
around making work possible for their personal and family circumstances in a way that 
a  permanent  job  was  unable  to.   The  availability  of  permanent  roles  which  would 
accommodate workers with caring responsibilities or workers that wanted to work a 
non-standard week or year would have allowed these workers more freedom to choose 
between agency or permanent work.  
The current rigidity in public sector employment is a driver towards agency work for 
many workers.  Many use agency work to increase their pay and to take advantage of 
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flexible working hours that  are less commonly available as a permanent member of 
staff.  Rather than accepting established patterns of work, agency workers appear more 
able  to  negotiate  flexible  working that  suits  their  needs.   With the introduction and 
subsequent expansion of the right to request flexible working for permanent employees 
this advantage of agency work may in the future be matched in permanent employment. 
Nonetheless at the time of the research many agency workers counted this as a key 
advantage of agency work. 
Beyond  the  voluntary  or  involuntary  dichotomy there  is  an  element  of  constrained 
choice for some workers that belies the simplicity of these categorisations.  Met had 
successfully recruited a number of agency social workers.  At the time of the research 
they were unable to give precise numbers, but within this study three workers were in 
the  process  of  transferring  to  permanent  work.   The  success  Met  had  enjoyed  in 
recruiting  agency workers  to  join  their  permanent  staff  offers  some support  for  the 
suggestion  that  agency  work  is  a  constrained  choice.   Met  had  recognised  the 
recruitment potential that agency workers offered and had conducted research into the 
critical issues that prevented agency workers from becoming permanent employees.  In 
response to this research they had put in place more flexible opportunities for social 
workers in terms of moving between social work teams and hours of work as well as 
fuller  provision of childcare for permanent employees.  They recognised that agency 
workers may use a period of work with a particular department to decide whether they 
wanted to consider a permanent role, and highlighted the opportunities available within 
the local authority to these workers.  Their ability to capitalise on the trial period that 
agency work offered them in recruiting permanent staff is precisely because they gave 
agency  workers  the  opportunity  to  express  their  preferences  with  regard  to  the 
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organisation  of  their  working  lives.   Taking  account  of  the  preferences  of  agency 
workers and the reasons that they selected agency work gave Met the ability to offer 
these workers some of the non-financial advantages that agency workers valued, and in 
doing so to recruit workers in a very tight labour market.  No agency social workers 
within City were looking to transfer to permanent work.
Agency work has been viewed as a bridge to permanent employment by some authors 
(Buchteman and Quack, 1989, Gray, 2002) and it formed an important part of the debate 
over rights for agency workers.  The Confederation of British Industry (2001) and the 
Recruitment and Employment Confederation (REC) (2002) argue that that agency work 
acts  as  a  bridge  to  permanent  employment  for  many  workers.   The  government 
recognised the role agency work played in assisting people to enter and re-enter the 
labour market and identified the importance of this role when announcing its deal with 
the  CBI  and  TUC  over  agency  workers  rights.   Secretary  of  State  for  Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, John Hutton said the deal would "give people a fair 
deal at work without ... cutting off a valuable route into employment".  A number of 
voluntary and involuntary agency workers in my study were hoping to use agency work 
as  a  bridge  to  permanent  employment.   Some had recently  made the  transfer  from 
agency work to permanent employment. 
Forde and Slater (2005) found that less than half of agency workers in their survey 
made the move from agency work to permanent employment in a twelve month period. 
The positive image of a route into 'secure'  permanent employment portrayed by the 
REC, CBI and Government is rarely coupled with an acknowledgement that sometimes 
agency work provides a trap into which workers fall with little possibility of gaining 
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permanent employment.  Within this study some involuntary agency workers struggled 
to find permanent work and felt trapped in agency placements.  Whilst they had hoped 
in previous placements to access permanent employment through agency work they had 
been unable to and had instead found themselves 'back to square one' at the start of a 
new placement. 
The understanding of agency work as either a bridge to permanent employment or a trap 
preventing workers from finding permanent jobs fails to account for those workers for 
whom agency working is a long-term choice.  In some sectors agency workers find the 
benefits of agency working so attractive that it becomes a career option or at least a 
long-term choice. For these workers considering whether agency work is a bridge or a 
trap does not account for their experience of work, it is an active choice in its own right, 
equivalent to permanent work. 
Agency work may be a bridge for workers to gain permanent employment, but it may 
also be a way of employers recruiting permanent workers in tight labour markets.  It has 
been noted (Purcell et al 2004, Gray 2002) that some workers find it difficult to locate 
direct employment opportunities and that they may be pushed to seek jobs through an 
agency.  Likewise in areas of staff shortage employers may be pushed to make use of 
agency workers where they would otherwise have a preference for permanent staff.  Just 
as Forde and Slater (2005) point to the use of agency contracts to test workers, agency 
workers may use agency placements to test prospective permanent employers.  
Kunda  et  al  (2002)  outline  two  other  perspectives  on  agency  work;  the  employee 
relations and free agent perspectives.  They suggest that the free agent characterisation 
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of agency workers is of highly skilled and mobile workers and the employee relations 
perspective outlines vulnerable workers enduring precarious poor quality employment. 
Whilst  the  employee  relations  perspective  may  explain  parts  of  the  experience  of 
vulnerable involuntary agency workers with its emphasis on the exploitative nature of 
agency  work,  it  does  not  explain  the  experiences  of  voluntary  agency  workers. 
Although it  does identify some of the drawbacks of agency work that most agency 
workers  face  in  terms  of  contractual  insecurity  and  lack  of  access  to  training  and 
benefits,  it  does  not  offer  any  insight  into  the  benefits  that  may accrue  to  agency 
workers.  In contrast, the free agent approach to agency work identifies agency workers 
very differently.  It suggests that such workers have more freedom than their permanent 
counterparts.  However, it also applies narrowly, and fails to recognise the drawbacks of 
agency work.  The former focuses on the powerlessness of the agency worker and the 
degradation of their terms and conditions of employment.  The latter identifies agency 
work as a means of restoring lost  surplus value; however this  is  generally only for 
certain types of agency workers with valuable and rare skills in tight labour markets. 
Both approaches are too narrow to explain the range of experiences of agency workers. 
The diversity of agency workers makes it difficult to make broad statements about their 
experience of work.  
Within this study, agency social workers might appear like the 'free agents' outlined but 
many of  them identified  significant  problems with agency work.   Like the  workers 
studied  by  Kunda  et  al  (2002)  they  are  very  aware  of  both  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages of agency work.  Internal agency care workers provide the best example 
of workers that are certainly lost in the gap between the two categories.  They do not 
experience  the  boundaryless  careers  sketched  out  by  the  free  agency  category,  in 
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particular they do not reclaim some of their lost surplus value, rather they experience 
similar pay but fewer non-pay rewards (such as enhanced holidays, sick pay) than their 
permanent  counterparts.   Equally  they  do  not  fit  comfortably  within  the  employee 
relations  model  of  agency  work  because  they  have,  in  the  main,  selected  it  over 
permanent  work and do accrue  some of  the  benefits  of  flexibility and control  over 
working that some other agency workers do not.  
The  agency  social  workers  within  this  study  reported  a  desire  to  escape  the  rigid 
structures of public sector employment.  Many agency social workers do use agency 
work to escape the bureaucracy of the public sector and to distance themselves from the 
policy decisions of the local authority.  For professionally qualified agency workers in 
tight  labour  markets  agency work can provide an avenue to  escape the control  and 
influence of the traditional  working relationship.   They can use their  labour  market 
power to individually negotiate higher rates of pay and flexible working arrangements 
to  suit  them.   They may also use  agency working to  create  distance  from the user 
organisation  and  to  demonstrate  their  independence  from  their  employer.   These 
findings echo outside the case study organisations and are consistent with other studies. 
These include research by Hoque and Kirkpatrick (2006) who found that the 'free agent' 
perspective does not comprehensively explain the reasons for people becoming agency 
workers; they point to the degradation of permanent employment in a variety of settings 
and argue that it is a factor pushing people to move to agency work.  Similarly the New 
Understanding  of  European  Work  Organization  (NUEWO)  (2003)  found  drivers  to 
agency  work  in  the  scope  to  increase  financial  rewards  and  adjust  working  hours, 
particularly  in  public  sector  nursing.   In  this  and  other  studies  individual  agency 
workers in tight labour markets are able to take advantage of their position to secure 
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higher pay and to work hours that suit them.  They are also able to escape parts of 
public sector organisational life, such as the necessity to specialise and the rigid hours 
of work, and they can use agency work to maintain distance between themselves and the 
organisation. 
While workers in tight labour markets may see advantages to agency work, they do not 
overcome  the  marginalisation  experienced  by  agency  workers.   This  thesis  has 
described limited access to employer sponsored training and workplace voice channels. 
Both  NUEWO  (2003:  131)  and  Hoque  and  Kirkpatrick  (2006)  concur  that  even 
professionally  qualified  agency  workers  are  marginalised  in  terms  of  training  and 
consultation.  Working contingently may be a way to avoid control and influence of 
employers, specialise in a particular field of expertise, create a distance and demonstrate 
independence, but it also exposes workers to unstable employment relationships, limited 
access  to  consultation and training,  and  few legally enforceable  employment  rights. 
While many of the workers in this study enjoyed the benefits of agency work, some 
were unable to access the benefits because of their position in the labour market.  For 
these workers agency work offers access to the labour market on disadvantaged terms, 
without offering the advantages that accrue to other workers.
Beyond dichotomy
Whilst the simplicity of a dichotomy is attractive, and categorising agency workers as 
either vulnerable or not, in need of protection or not, desiring voice at work or not is an 
attractive  prospect,  they are  simply too  heterogeneous  to  fit  such  binary/elementary 
categorisations.  The typology expressed within this thesis is founded on the basis of the 
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workers and their managers that I interviewed and it is difficult to argue that they are 
able to be generalised to the agency worker population in general.  Nonetheless, similar 
themes  run  through  the  literature  on  agency workers,  particularly  in  terms  of  why 
workers decide to become agency workers and their perceptions of the advantages of 
agency status.  My typology captures a broader picture of agency workers and their 
motivations for taking agency work.  
The typology of agency workers offers conceptual categories to assist in understanding 
and  explaining  the  experience  of  agency  workers  within  this  study;  however  its 
contribution to knowledge extends beyond this.  It can be applied to categorise agency 
workers in other studies. Druker and Stanworth (2004) noted that of their thirty two 
interviewees sixteen were looking for a permanent job and fourteen indicated that they 
certainly were not interested in a permanent role at the time of the research.  They also 
noted a group of workers who were planning, engaged in or had just returned from 
travelling; whilst it is not clear whether these workers were expatriate, it appears that 
they would fit into my convenience or expatriate agency worker categories.  Like the 
workers in my study, different agency workers offered different reasons for selecting 
agency status.  They indicated that some were interested in exploring different avenues 
of work and found agency work a convenient way of doing so.  Druker and Stanworth 
(2004:  64)  also  found  other  workers  who “rationalised  their  position  in  relation  to 
personal  preference  or  a  reluctance  to  accept  the  work  disciplines  associated  with 
permanent employment”.  The reasons that they described for these workers selecting 
agency status appear to fit within the job seeking, convenience and expatriate agency 
worker categories.  Tailby (2005) also identified 'bank' nurses in the NHS that fit into 
the convenience worker type of agency worker.   These nurses identified a  range of 
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reasons largely around nurses' ability to mange home and work schedules.  
The fact that agency workers in these studies, in a variety of settings, express similar 
drivers towards agency work, or in some cases away from permanent work, suggests 
that the typology presented may be broadly helpful in categorising agency workers in a 
way  that assists  with understanding their  experience of agency work.   It  provides  a 
framework that may help to explain choices made by these workers with reference to 
the reasons for taking agency work and the particular advantages that accrue to them 
from  doing  so.   They  also  provide  a  basis  for  looking  at  issues  relating  to  the 
management of these workers and their need, desire and opportunity for voice at work. 
The typology presented within this thesis is applicable beyond the primary research and 
provides conceptual categories that can assist with analysing the experiences of agency 
workers. 
Mobilisation theory and explaining worker action and inaction
A key contribution of this thesis has been to engage with mobilisation theory to explain 
the difficulties agency workers experience in responding to workplace problems.  While 
mobilisation theory as laid out by Kelly (1998) is  primarily conceived as a  way of 
explaining collective action, it is used within this thesis to explain both collective and 
individual action in response to problems at work.  It identifies the difficulties that the 
status of agency workers may present for mobilising both collectively and individually 
and discusses the opportunities to act that arise from the triangular relationship that are 
not present within a standard employment relationship. 
338
Mobilisation theory can be used to explain why workers take and do not take collective 
action. Kelly (1998: 27 – 38) notes a number of stages to mobilisation.  Workers must 
move  from  a  sense  of  general  dissatisfaction  to  the  perception  that  they  have 
experienced an injustice.  They must then perceive the injustice as being attributable to 
a dominant group; for agency workers this means one of their two employers.  Social 
identification  with  their  peer  group  is  important  to  workers  viewing  problems  as 
collective,  and leaders  play an important  role  in identifying and framing issues  and 
supporting group identity.  Workers will also make judgements about the likelihood of 
success  or  failure  of  collective  action.   Mobilisation  theory also  offers  a  means  of 
analysing the ways workers come to make decisions about how to react individually in 
response to dissatisfaction at work.  What follows is a discussion of the elements of 
mobilisation theory and how they relate to agency workers within this study, starting 
with injustice, attribution, social identification and moving on to the opportunity to act. 
The  triangular  employment  relationship and its  accompanying uncertain  legal  status 
causes problems for agency workers in moving from dissatisfaction to injustice.  For 
example, while a number of workers were dissatisfied about their exclusion from team 
meetings, they did not view this as illegitimate, rather they understood this as resulting 
from their status as agency workers.  Workers believed that less favourable treatment 
was justified on the basis  of their  being agency workers.   The lack of employment 
rights, and the difference in employment protection for agency workers compared with 
permanent workers, is an external factor shaping workers' and managers' perceptions of 
what is legitimate.  It allows agency workers to be treated less favourably by colleagues 
and managers without believing that such treatment is illegitimate, and this is a major 
counter-mobilising  factor  that  prevents  workers  from  making  the  move  from 
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dissatisfaction to injustice. 
Attribution is also problematic within the triangular employment relationship.  Rather 
than  identifying  one  of  the  parties  to  the  relationship  as  responsible  for  problems, 
agency workers may see the problem as inherent to agency work, or shared between 
their employers. 
Social identification is challenging for agency workers.  This thesis has presented data 
from both agency workers themselves and their managers about the different treatment 
that they receive at work.  These workers were located in disparate teams, throughout 
the organisation.  Most agency workers worked in teams where there were no more than 
two other agency workers.  This severely limits the opportunity for these workers to 
form some kind of social identification with other agency social workers.  The divisions 
fostered by the employer  between agency workers and permanent workers have the 
effect of undermining social identification, as well as stifling interest recognition.  The 
distance  agency  workers  feel  from  permanent  colleagues  may  have  the  effect  of 
undermining  the  view that  collective  action  is  possible  and appropriate.   It  did  not 
always deter agency workers from addressing problems collectively, however it does 
present a serious impediment to group cohesion and social identification. 
Kelly's mobilisation theory is primarily concerned with collective action, however it is 
used within this thesis to explains both collective and individual action.  This thesis has 
presented the ways in which workers acted in response to problems at work.  It argues 
that some agency workers are able to act differently to their permanent counterparts 
because they have a triangular employment relationship.  This offers them additional 
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opportunities to engage with one employer through the other, or to disengage with only 
one  of  their  two employers  while  remaining  in  employment  with the  other.   These 
options  are  in  addition  to  the  typical  exit,  voice  and  loyalty  options  laid  out  by 
Hirshman (1970).  It finds that the degree and type of job security perceived by agency 
workers are important factors shaping the ability of agency workers to act in response to 
problems at work. 
The  contribution  of  this  section  is  to  apply mobilisation  theory to  a  new group of 
workers and to use it to explain their action and inaction.  It looks at the opportunity to 
act and concludes that while some agency workers are powerless to act,  others have 
opportunities to act that are unique to the triangular employment relationship.
Recent developments in employment law on agency 
workers
As of 1st September 2008 the position of agency workers in the UK is problematic.  The 
leading case in the area stated that it was unrealistic to expect “perfect predictability” in 
determinations of employment status and that the nature of the judgement meant that 
tribunals had a “degree of latitude without falling into legal error” (James, 2008).  Forde 
and Slater (2005) note that it is beyond doubt that agency workers are presently one of 
the least protected groups in Britain's labour market.  This thesis described the detail of 
the  management  of  agency  workers  and  their  experience  of  work  within  the  case 
studies.  Most agency workers sign contracts establishing that they are not employees of 
the agency.  Few have any formal contract with the user organisation.  For them to be 
considered employees of either the user organisation or the agency behaviour must be 
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inconsistent with any written contracts in place.
The  workers  in  this  study  had  widely  varying  management  and  treatment.   Some 
managers argued that you would not be able to tell the difference between an agency 
and permanent team member, others suggested that agency workers were treated very 
differently  and  excluded  from team meetings  and  training.   In  spite  of  these  wide 
variations it is unlikely that most agency workers would be considered employees at 
present.  Even those workers who were provided by the user organisation with a work 
uniform,  the  tools  for  the  job,  and  were  treated  in  every  respect  like  permanent 
employees may be held to be behaving in line with the contract between themselves and 
their  agency.   Agency  workers  may  have  great  difficulty  in  establishing  that  any 
treatment is inconsistent with a contract that is silent on points of management.  
As noted earlier  the legal framework is important to the ability of workers to voice 
issues  at  work  and  can  act  as  a  lever  for  unionisation.   The  proposed  legislation 
guaranteeing agency workers equal pay and treatment after twelve weeks does nothing 
to address their lack of employee status. Presently employers, permanent workers and 
agency workers themselves view treating agency workers less favourably as acceptable. 
This  acceptance  has  a  substantial  counter  mobilising  effect  as  discussed  earlier.   It 
affects interest definition, perceptions of dissatisfaction and injustice and the attribution 
of problems at work as well as social identification.  Equal treatment legislation is likely 
to  undermine the present  perception because it  changes  the established rules set  by 
national and EU level regulation.  The philosophy underlying the legislation, suggesting 
that  it  is  illegitimate  to  treat  agency workers  differently to  permanent  workers  in  a 
variety  of  areas  including  pay,  is  likely  to  challenge  the  present  perceptions  of 
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employers and workers alike.   This is  likely to offer agency workers some external 
validation  to  their  feelings  of  dissatisfaction  at  work  that  arise  from being  treated 
differently from their permanent counterparts.  The legislation is, however, unlikely to 
offer  agency  workers  any  protection  from  unfair  dismissal,  which  means  the 
implications for assisting agency workers in a weak labour market position with little 
employer job security to act in response to problems at work are likely to be small. 
Agency workers and trade unions
This thesis has reviewed the opportunity to act on problems at work for various types of 
agency worker.   While  for  some workers  the  opportunity to  act  is  obscured by the 
triangular  employment  relationship,  the  desire  for  voice  at  work  may not  be.   The 
heterogeneity of agency workers matters not only to the experience of agency work but 
also to the desire for protection and voice.  Some workers have little desire to be heard 
within the user organisation or agency, while others reported seeking to join unions in 
order to access representative voice. 
The literature identifies that agency workers are rarely members of trade unions and 
their conditions of work are rarely set by collective bargaining.  Whilst some workers in 
my  study  have  sought  out  trade  union  representation,  they  were  discouraged  from 
becoming members because of their employment status.  Trade union voice was not 
available to the workers in this study, either because of exclusion by the trade union or 
because the unions that accepted agency workers were not visible or actively recruiting. 
Professional associations were available to relevant agency workers; they offered some 
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forms of workplace advice and representation but not collective bargaining.  
Trade unions within this study recognised the powerlessness of some agency workers. 
They reported being unwilling to recruit workers who have few rights on which they 
could  be  represented,  and  whose  position  was  more  likely  to  be  jeopardised  than 
improved by unions acting on their behalf at the workplace.  Nonetheless some agency 
workers attempted to join trade unions. 
This research found some evidence of the ability of agency workers to conceptualise 
problems as collective and to act upon them collectively, even in the absence of trade 
union support.  Issues reported by internal agency care workers to the internal agency 
resulted in  the trade union being invited to  attend  a  meeting of  all  internal  agency 
workers.  The workforce identified that it had collective concerns and key individuals 
identified that the trade union may have a role in addressing them.  The rejection of 
these workers by the trade union is especially difficult to understand in this context, 
where workers were solely working for the local authority, had generally several years 
service, were actively interested in joining the trade union, and were easy to identify via 
the agency manager who was herself an active Unison member and who had invited 
Unison to come to meet them as a group.  
The ability of these workers to identify issues as collective was framed by important 
factors,  including  the  fact  that  these  workers  experienced  high  levels  of  employer 
security,  they worked for  the  primary care  agency for  the  local  authority,  and  they 
attended training together on at least a yearly basis.  They also often had contact with 
each other within the City care homes, as each home often had two or more agency 
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workers on a shift.  The particular relationship that the internal agencies at both Met and 
City have with the local authority would seem to make these workers the most similar to 
conventional  directly  employed  staff,  and  these  workers  expressed  stronger  social 
identification with their internal agency and permanent colleagues than other agency 
workers in this study.  These factors are likely to make these workers easier to organise 
than other agency workers. 
The workers that expressed the greatest desire for union voice were those who, lacking 
both labour market and employer job security, felt powerless to act, as well as internal 
agency workers  who identified strongly with  their  permanent  counterparts  and their 
internal agency colleagues.  While some agency social workers expressed a desire to 
join trade unions this was more often for ideological reasons. 
In the last chapter, I noted the potential advantages to the user organisation of creating 
voice channels that were accessible to agency workers.  These particularly apply for 
agency social workers who are expensive to recruit and difficult to retain.   In addition 
to being able to resolve problems at work early, potentially retaining more agency social 
workers, voice channels may have the added advantage of enabling local authorities to 
understand the reasons that agency workers select agency status.  The  organisational 
view seems to be that these workers select agency status either because they would not 
be able to get a permanent job because they are poor social workers, or because they 
want more money than permanent work offers.  This fails to grasp a key reason that 
some  agency  workers  choose  agency  work,  the  flexibility.   Some  agency  workers 
wanted more control over their work life balance and the ability to take time off with 
their children when they were ill or over school holidays.  Others valued the ability to 
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move between departments and specialisms or the potential to take extended breaks. 
Such workers often viewed permanent work as generally preferable but had been unable 
to find roles that allowed them the flexibility that they required.  
If local authorities are able to understand the desire for flexible working on the part of a 
significant number of agency workers they may be able to organise permanent work in 
such a way that it attracts workers back into permanent work from agency work.  The 
difficulty  is  accessing  the  views  of  a  diverse,  dispersed,  unrepresented  workforce. 
Whilst Met was developing an understanding of the views of agency workers by direct 
communication,  exit  interviews,  surveys  of  agency workers  and  feedback  from this 
project in order to attempt to address its recruitment and retention problems, City had 
nothing in place.  Both the union and local authorities are interested in some workers 
becoming permanent employees and it may be that unionisation of these workers as 
agency  workers  would  assist  in  understanding  their  views  and  moving  them  into 
permanent employment.  
The ability to voice issues at work relates to both personal and collective employment 
concerns as well as organisational issues.  This thesis cited only one area in which an 
agency worker brought an operational problem to the attention of the user organisation, 
other  issues  were  broadly  speaking  complaints  about  the  treatment  of  the  workers 
themselves.  Nonetheless, offering workers the ability to raise workplace issues without 
fear of dismissal offers benefits to employers as well as employees.  Not only does it 
make it more likely that serious issues with potentially serious consequences for service 
users are reported, it also reduces the likelihood of workers exiting the organisation with 
all the costs it entails. 
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The recent literature on union renewal has identified that trade union policies, practices 
and structures all influence the growth and decline of trade unions (Simms 2007, Heery 
and  Simms  2008,  Holgate  2005,  amongst  many others).   While  acknowledging the 
external constraints on organising arising from the context in which unions are acting, 
there  is  little  doubt  that  the  activities  of  unions  themselves  have  an  impact  on 
membership levels.  One way in which unions are seeking to increase membership is by 
engaging with new groups of workers.  
Heery et al (2001) note two types of diversity that unions must confront to adapt to the 
needs of the changing workforce.  The first embraces diverse social identities based on 
age,  gender,  ethnicity,  sexual  orientation,  or  disability.   The  second  is  based  on 
differences arising from different types of employment relationship.  Agency workers 
are one type of atypical worker.  They do not conform to the norm of open ended, full 
time work for a single employer; their employment relationship sets them apart from 
their  permanently  employed  colleagues.   They  pose  particular  challenges  of 
representation  because  they deviate  from the  norm both  in  respect  of  their  average 
length of their tenure and the fact that they have two employers.     
There are a variety of environmental conditions that affect union organising.  Many of 
these  are  beyond  the  control  of  trade  unions,  such  as  the  level  of  inflation  and 
unemployment.   National  industrial  relations  and employment  legislation  is  another 
environmental factor (Freeman and Pelletier, 1990); however it is one that can have a 
different effect on different groups of workers with different degrees of employment 
protection.  The introduction of new legislation can act as a lever for bargaining (Gall 
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2004) and new rights for different categories of workers can offer trade unions new 
opportunities to engage with these groups (Simms 2005). 
While trade unions do not have direct control over the enactment of legislation, they are 
a powerful lobbying voice at national and EU levels.  For a number of years many UK 
trade  unions  (including  Unison,  Unite,  CWU,  PCS)  have  lobbied  for  legislation  to 
protect agency workers, and this culminated in the recent national agreement between 
the UK Labour Government, the CBI and the TUC.  
Unison (amongst other trade unions) has been a powerful political  voice for agency 
workers  pressuring  the  government  to  legislate  to  offer  these  workers  additional 
employment  protection.   It  has  identified  the  difficulties  posed  with  effectively 
recruiting  and representing  these  workers  and appears  to  have  chosen a  strategy of 
political  lobbying.   For  some  of  the  most  vulnerable  agency  workers,  changes  in 
legislation may bring about more significant improvements in their working lives than 
workplace bargaining.  In the UK agency workers earn less than the average worker and 
so it is likely that the introduction of and subsequent increases in the minimum wage 
have affected proportionally more of these workers than those who are permanently 
employed.  The introduction of a minimum of twenty days paid holiday (soon to be 
twenty four days including four days of public holidays) in the working time regulations 
is also likely to have a disproportionate impact on agency workers who prior to their 
introduction may not have been paid for holiday at all.  Because some agency workers 
experience very poor conditions of work minimum standards that apply to all workers 
may improve their situation relative to other groups of workers.  If the agency sector is 
dominated by a large number of small agencies it may be difficult for trade unions to 
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tackle agency work via collective bargaining.  Political lobbying for basic rights and 
further improvements to the minimum wage, ending the opt out of the working time 
directive and increasing the level of paid holiday, coupled with information about rights 
at work for agency workers like the TUC's (2004) 'working on the edge' campaign, may 
prove more effective at improving the working lives of agency workers than attempting 
to collectively bargain for improvements to their terms and conditions or to represent 
them on individual problems.
Heery  et  al  (2005)  recognise  the  difficult  for  agency  workers  in  relying  on  union 
organisation in the user employer; in the main this difficulty stems from the workplace 
unions  focus  on  its  directly  employed  staff  and  the  primacy  of  their  needs. 
Representation may be offered, but in many cases it is to ensure that agency workers do 
not  undercut  permanently  employed  staff.   The  impending  introduction  of  equal 
treatment legislation is likely to align the interests of agency workers and permanently 
employed staff much more closely as collective agreements apply to both groups once 
agency workers have served twelve weeks.  While there are as yet no details of the 
proposed equal treatment legislation for agency workers it will cover the right to the 
same pay and holiday entitlement as workers engaged by a user organisation.  It is not 
yet clear whether one or both employers will have responsibility for ensuring equality. 
This  legislation  reduces  some of  the  problems  outlined  in  Chapter  2  of  unionising 
agency workers.  Agency work, at least for workers in roles for over twelve weeks, will 
not undermine the conditions of permanently employed staff and create divisions within 
the workforce in that way.  In the areas in which agency workers have the right to equal 
treatment they have interests in common with permanent colleagues.  This is likely to 
increase social identification between agency workers and their permanent colleagues 
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and reduce divisions between these workers on the basis of their different employment 
status.   If  equal  treatment  legislation  has  the  effect  of  reducing  divisions  between 
permanent  and  agency  workers  this  is  likely  to  enable  them  to  see  problems  in 
collective  terms  more  easily.   The  legislation  is  also  likely  to  act  as  a  lever  for 
bargaining, giving unions the ability to challenge issues at the workplace with recourse 
to legislation if employers are unwilling to negotiate.  While challenging issues at work 
for individual agency workers is likely to continue to be problematic unless they receive 
protection from arbitrary dismissal in response to raising issues, the changes accrued to 
date are likely to provide some stimulus for the unionisation of agency workers. 
Those unions that have undertaken recruitment of agency workers appear to have done 
it in specific and similar circumstances, although the notable examples are CWU and 
PSU.   In  both  cases,  agency  workers  have  been  located  together  in  call  centre 
environments doing broadly similar work to their permanent counterparts.  Unite also 
recruit agency workers.  At interview a full time official referred to organising migrant 
agency workers that were machine operatives, again located together and doing broadly 
similar roles to their permanent counterparts.  It appears likely that such workers would 
have  a  greater  capacity  for  identifying  with  their  agency and permanent  colleagues 
because of these factors.  TGWU have also undertaken unionisation of agency workers 
within Manpower and Adecco in line with recognition agreements with both agencies, 
though union density is low (Heery et al, 2005).
While indifference to the unionisation of agency workers at  the workplace  may be 
understandable in light of the small numbers involved, the limited resources available 
for organising, and the perception that little is possible at the workplace to improve their 
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situation, it may nonetheless have implications for union renewal.  Chapter 2 laid out 
the composition of the agency workforce, one important factor was the relatively young 
age of agency workers.  For many workers, agency work is used to enter the labour 
market,  and the first  contact that  these young workers have with unions may be as 
agency workers.  They may view the union’s refusal to assist them when they are in the 
most vulnerable jobs with the greatest need for union support, often at the start of their 
careers, as a rejection of them.  This may lead to disillusionment with the principles of 
trade unionism.  For two of the workers interviewed joining the union was an integral 
part of getting a new job, and seeking out the union to join was something that they did 
very early in their employment, as they had in previous jobs.  The rejection of them in 
this  role  is  teaching them about  being non-union,  and about  its  implications.   Such 
workers may learn to be non-union in a highly unionised environment and make future 
decisions about unionising based upon their experiences of union rejection.  While it is 
clear that a small proportion of the labour market are currently agency workers, the role 
of agency work as a bridge to permanent employment means many workers use agency 
work to enter or re-enter the labour market rather than as a long-term option.  Many 
workers are likely to take agency work at some point in their career, meaning that the 
unions position in respect of agency workers is likely to affect large numbers of workers 
at some point in their working lives. 
Changes  in  legislation  are  likely  to  provide  a  lever  for  the  unionisation  of  agency 
workers.  The changes agreed but not yet implemented are likely to have a major impact 
on the ability of trade unions to recruit and represent these workers.  
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Conclusion
This thesis  addressed a central  question in industrial  relations, namely how workers 
define their interests, and how they act upon them.  It does so with reference to workers 
with an unusual triangular employment relationship.  It begins by challenging the often 
portrayed view that agency workers are a homogeneous group, who in the absence of 
protective employment legislation are powerless to act.  Rather this thesis presents a 
picture  of  agency workers as a heterogeneous group, many of which have different 
opportunities to act in response to grievances at work than their permanent counterparts. 
It discusses the variations between workers and the ways in which differences affect the 
experience of work and particularly the ability to voice problems at work, and the desire 
for voice and protection at work.   
It  has offered a  review of the characterisations of agency workers and moved from 
binary concepts to a typology that provide a tool for categorising and analysing the 
experience of agency work in a more detail.  Moving beyond the traditional view of job 
security it considers placement, post, employer and labour market security to offer a 
fuller explanation of the varied experience of job security for different agency workers. 
A more  nuanced  concept  is  presented,  that  allows  for  the  diverse  experiences  of 
different agency workers to be understood.
This thesis has employed the framework offered by mobilisation theory to identify the 
areas in which the triangular employment relationship changes the opportunity to act in 
response to problems at work.  It has recognised its impact on the ability of agency 
workers to move from dissatisfaction to injustice, to attribute injustice to an employer, 
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and to socially identify with other agency workers and/or their permanent colleagues. 
It went on to identify the ways in which different agency workers acted in response to 
problems at work, including particular reference to ways in which agency workers can 
act outside the standard exit/voice choice.
Empirically it offers a rare study of agency workers across the care workforce, many of 
whom  are  seldom  offered  the  opportunity  to  voice  their  opinion  of  their  working 
situation.  The study offers insight into their experiences of work and the issues that 
they feel are relevant to them.
Agency work is a matter of public policy interest.   Very recently an agreement was 
reached  between  the  TUC,  CBI  and  the  UK  government  intended  to  offer  agency 
workers the legal right to equal treatment with their permanent counterparts after twelve 
weeks  in  a  post.   There  are  ongoing  discussions  with  the  EU  about  whether  the 
agreement reached will comply with the proposed directive on agency workers.  This 
study offers some insight into the present confusion that exists around the employment 
status of agency workers and their management.  It demonstrates that the current lack of 
employment protection makes it difficult for agency workers to challenge problems at 
the workplace, unless they are willing to exit the workplace employer if matters are not 
resolved.  It offers insight into the likely implications of equal treatment legislation, but 
concludes that in the absence of protection from unfair dismissal some agency workers 
are likely to remain unable to act on problems at work. 
The practitioner  value of  this  research has been specific  to  the research sites.   The 
research in this thesis offered both City and Met insight that allowed them to alter their 
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approach to agency workers.  City asked for feedback on the management of agency 
workers.  The feedback offered allowed the organisation to understand the inconsistency 
of management of these workers and issue guidance to managers.  It also contributed to 
the production of the tender for an agency partner in administrative work and to the 
tender for a master/neutral vendor.  Met asked for feedback on the reasons that agency 
workers agreed to move from agency work to permanent employment, and the reasons 
that they chose to remain agency workers.  It was most interested in recruitment and 
retention  of  agency  workers,  and  moving  them  to  permanent  contracts.   Human 
Resources found the data from this research helpful in confirming their existing views 
on the flexibility offered by agency work.  They used this data to strengthen and support 
their argument that offering permanent social workers the ability to change roles and 
teams, to have extended unpaid leave and to adjust their working hours would help to 
recruit more agency workers into permanent positions.  Following the research the pilot 
of more flexible working practices was extended throughout the department. 
For trade unions this research confirms that the triangular employment relationship that 
agency workers have with their dual employers presents a challenge to mobilisation. 
While it  rejects the idea that agency workers are disinterested in unionising, it  does 
recognise the way in which their precarious triangular employment relationship limits 
their ability to act and the difficulties involved in unionising this group of workers and 
improving their conditions of work.  It supports the view that legislation is likely to be 
the  most  effective  means of  securing  improvements  in  the working lives  of  agency 
workers, and that it is likely to provide a lever to unionisation.
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Appendices
Appendix A – Agency Worker Interview Schedule
Biographical Data
Name
Sex
Ethnicity
Age
Grade / job title
Length of time in job
Ft/pt
Employer
Work location
Union membership
How did you get your job?
Why did you decide to apply for an agency job?
Would you prefer an agency/temporary/permanent job?
If you are temporary or an agency worker do you think/hope that your role will lead to a 
permanent contract a) within your unit b)within another unit
Do you think that certain groups are more likely to be agency workers?
Do you think that you are paid the same as your permanent colleagues?
Do you have the same rights as permanent employees?
DO you have the same responsibilities as permanent employees?
Do you feel that you have the same status as permanent staff?
Are you treated in the same way as directly employed staff by colleagues and 
managers?
Do you think working as an agency worker affects your performance?
Do you receive the same training as permanent staff (where appropriate)
Have you ever considered raising any issue about your contract or any other aspects of 
your job? – do you know how you would go about this – do you think it would be 
feesable
Have you ever left a job because of a problem rather than trying to sort it out?
trade union
Have you been given the opportunity to join a trade union here? If so which union?
Do you think that Unison and TGWU approach agency workers differently?
If you are a union member how were you recruited?
Do you pay a reduced subscription?
What contact do you have with the union? (workplace representative, workplace 
meetings, branch meetings – do you think this is adequate?)
Do you think that the union could improve communications between themselves and 
agency workers? (special section ect?)
Do you think that the union would help you if you wanted to raise an issue about your 
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agency status?
What issues, if any, would you like the union to take up on behalf of agency workers
Would you consider becoming a representative?
What sort of things would encourage you to join a trade union
What sort of benefits do you think being a member of a union can offer?
Do you think they apply equally to both agency and perm workers?
Do you think that you would be more likely to join a union if you were a permanent 
worker?
Impact on home life
How secure do you think that your job is?
Do you feel being an agency worker has an impact on your home life?
Do you worry about your agency contract ending?
Are there any issues concerning your job that you think are important?
Questions Theme Associated 
Literature
Agency Workers
How did you get your job?
Why did you decide to apply for an agency job?
Would you prefer an 
agency/temporary/permanent job?
If you are temporary or an agency worker do 
you think/hope that your role will lead to a 
permanent contract a) within your unit b)within 
another unit
Heterogeneity Voluntary / 
involuntary agency 
work
Agency work as 
bridge and trap
Do you think that certain groups are more likely 
to be agency workers?
Do you think that you are paid the same as your 
permanent colleagues?
Do you have the same rights as permanent 
employees?
Do you have the same responsibilities as 
permanent employees?
Do you feel that you have the same status as 
permanent staff?
Are you treated in the same way as directly 
employed staff by colleagues and managers?
Do you think working as an agency worker 
affects your performance?
Do you receive the same training as permanent 
staff (where appropriate)
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship 
and 
Heterogeneity
Voluntary / 
involuntary agency 
work
Employee relations 
vs free agent
Have you ever considered raising any issue 
about your contract or any other aspects of your 
job? – do you know how you would go about 
this – do you think it would be feesable
Heterogeneity Voice/exit
Mobilisation theory
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Have you ever left a job because of a problem 
rather than trying to sort it out?
Have you been given the opportunity to join a 
trade union here? If so which union?
Do you think that Unison and TGWU approach 
agency workers differently?
If you are a union member how were you 
recruited?
Do you pay a reduced subscription?
What contact do you have with the union? 
(workplace representative, workplace meetings, 
branch meetings – do you think this is 
adequate?)
Do you think that the union could improve 
communications between themselves and 
agency workers? (special section ect?)
Representative 
Voice
Reasons for joining 
and not joining 
unions
Union renewal
Do you think that the union would help you if 
you wanted to raise an issue about your agency 
status?
What issues, if any, would you like the union to 
take up on behalf of agency workers
Representative 
Voice
Union utility
Would you consider becoming a representative? Representative 
Voice
What sort of things would encourage you to 
join a trade union
What sort of benefits do you think being a 
member of a union can offer?
Do you think they apply equally to both agency 
and perm workers?
Do you think that you would be more likely to 
join a union if you were a permanent worker?
Representative 
Voice
Heterogeneity
Reasons for joining 
and not joining 
unions
How secure do you think that your job is?
Do you feel being an agency worker has an 
impact on your home life?
Do you worry about your agency contract 
ending?
Heterogeneity Job Security
Are there any issues concerning your job that 
you think are important?
Open question 
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Appendix B – Manager Interview Schedule
Biographical Data
Name
Sex
Ethnicity
Age
Grade / job title
Length of time in job
Ft/pt
Employer
Work location
Union membership
Statistical information
How many workers in your department are agency workers - %
Which Jobs? Professional/manual/administrative/care
Average tenure
How does this compare to 5/10 years ago
Deciding how to use agency workers
Who decides when it is appropriate to employ an agency worker?
How is this decision made? – what criteria are used 
Does the authority have a policy on when agency workers can be employed?
Do the trade union have a role in deciding?
Are agency workers used to cover for seconded staff?
Do agency workers cost more or less than directly employed / casual staff?
Are you confident that your agency staff have the appropriate level of skill? How do 
you police this?
Terms and conditions
How long are agency workers normally employed for (long or short-term?)
Are they normally made aware of the expected duration?
Are agency workers given the same training and access to internal vacancies as 
permanent staff?
What happens at the end of the agency contract?
Does the agency charge a fee for permanent placement?
Do you find that the same people are sent out by agencies for the same home/role 
repeatedly?
Management of agency workers
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Have you encountered any problems with the use of agency staff? (recruitment, 
retention, management issues, legal, union opposition, )
What do you think the main benefits of using agency labour are?
What do you think the main disadvantages of using agency labour?
Do you see the use of agency labour increasing or decreasing?
How are agency workers managed?
Are they managed in accordance with council or agency policies?
If an agency worker had a problem at work either with a colleague or manager who 
would they speak to?
Does the council do exit interviews?
Do these apply to agency workers?
Do agencies make contact when their workers have problems at work? 
Can you give me an example of an issue that has been brought to you by an agency 
worker?
Do you think that there is a difference between agency and perm staff in how their 
issues are treated?
Questions Theme Associated 
Literature
Manager
How many workers in your department are 
agency workers - %
Which Jobs? Professional/manual/administrative/
care
Average tenure
How does this compare to 5/10 years ago
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship
Demographic info
Who decides when it is appropriate to employ an 
agency worker?
How is this decision made? – what criteria are 
used 
Does the authority have a policy on when agency 
workers can be employed?
Do the trade union have a role in deciding?
Are agency workers used to cover for seconded 
staff?
Do agency workers cost more or less than 
directly employed / casual staff?
Are you confident that your agency staff have the 
appropriate level of skill? How do you police 
this?
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship
Fragmented work 
How long are agency workers normally 
employed for (long or short-term?)
Are they normally made aware of the expected 
duration?
Are agency workers given the same training and 
access to internal vacancies as permanent staff?
What happens at the end of the agency contract?
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship
Fragmented work
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Does the agency charge a fee for permanent 
placement?
Do you find that the same people are sent out by 
agencies for the same home/role repeatedly?
Have you encountered any problems with the use 
of agency staff? (recruitment, retention, 
management issues, legal, union opposition, )
What do you think the main benefits of using 
agency labour are?
What do you think the main disadvantages of 
using agency labour?
Do you see the use of agency labour increasing 
or decreasing?
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship
Reasons for using 
agency workers
Legal status
How are agency workers managed?
Are they managed in accordance with council or 
agency policies?
If an agency worker had a problem at work either 
with a colleague or manager who would they 
speak to?
Does the council do exit interviews?
Do these apply to agency workers?
Do agencies make contact when their workers 
have problems at work? 
Can you give me an example of an issue that has 
been brought to you by an agency worker?
Do you think that there is a difference between 
agency and perm staff in how their issues are 
treated?
Inside the 
triangular 
relationship
Fragmented work
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Appendix C – Trade Union interview schedule
1) Background data
Name:
Area covered: National, Social workers
Number of employees covered:
Unionisation %
Typical membership (what does a typical  member look like in terms of age, tenure, 
hours of work, gender)
Number of members
2) Agency workers
How many of your members are agency workers?
Have you seen a change in how much Temporary Agency workers are used over the last 
5 years?
What jobs are they mainly used for? (qualified, unqualified?)
Why do you think that people choose to undertake agency work?
Are agency workers often made permanent employees or are they simply used for cover 
ect?
Are roles normally short term or long term?
Do you think that certain groups are more likely to be agency workers?
Do they have the same rights as permanent employees?
DO they have the same responsibilities as permanent employees?
Do you feel that they have the same status as permanent staff?
Are they treated in the same way as directly employed staff by colleagues and 
managers?
Are they managed differently to other staff members?
Do you have a general policy of trying to limit the use of agency workers?
3) Trade Union
Are agency workers able to join?
Do you approach agency workers differently?
Can you actually represent agency workers?
In what areas are you able to represent agency workers and to whom? (IE employment 
issues or professional indemnity)
Have you ever raised an individual issue that has been brought to you by an agency 
worker?
Do you have more difficulty representing Temps than other workers?
Do you have any relationship with the agencies that supply local authority?
Which agencies?
What sort of relationship?
Do you have a contact?
Do you engage in collective bargaining with agencies?
Do you represent these workers as well as standard employees?
4) Critical incident:
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Have you had any requests for representation by agency workers?
W h a t  s o r t s  o f  i s s u e s ,  c a n  y o u  g i v e  m e  s o m e  e x a m p l e s ?
Questions Theme Associated 
Literature
Trade Union
How many of your members are agency 
workers?
Have you seen a change in how much Temporary 
Agency workers are used over the last 5 years?
What jobs are they mainly used for? (qualified, 
unqualified?)
Representative 
voice
Atypical workers 
and union density
Why do you think that people choose to 
undertake agency work?
Heterogeneity
Are agency workers often made permanent 
employees or are they simply used for cover ect?
Are roles normally short term or long term?
Do you think that certain groups are more likely 
to be agency workers?
Heterogeneity
Do they have the same rights as permanent 
employees?
Do they have the same responsibilities as 
permanent employees?
Do you feel that they have the same status as 
permanent staff?
Are they treated in the same way as directly 
employed staff by colleagues and managers?
Are they managed differently to other staff 
members?
Representative 
voice
Legal status, 
Atypical workers 
and union 
representation
Do you have a general policy of trying to limit 
the use of agency workers?
Are agency workers able to join?
Do you approach agency workers differently?
Can you actually represent agency workers?
In what areas are you able to represent agency 
workers and to whom? (IE employment issues or 
professional indemnity)
Representative 
voice
Union response to 
agency workers
Have you ever raised an individual issue that has 
been brought to you by an agency worker?
Do you have more difficulty representing agency 
workers than other workers?
Representative 
voice
Legal status, 
Atypical workers 
and union 
representation
Do you have any relationship with the agencies 
that supply local authority?
Representative 
voice
Union response to 
agency workers
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Which agencies?
What sort of relationship?
Do you have a contact?
Do you engage in collective bargaining with 
agencies?
Do you represent these workers as well as 
standard employees?
Have you had any requests for representation by 
agency workers?
W h a t  s o r t s  o f  i s s u e s ,  c a n  y o u  g i v e 
m e  s o m e  e x a m p l e s ?
Representative 
voice
Union response to 
agency workers 
Union 
representation
385
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Appendix D – Questionnaire For Agency Workers 
 
Section 1 - Job Characteristics  
(Please tick) 
1a) I work Full Time  
Part Time  
b) Length of service 
with the council 
Under 6 months  
Under 1 year  
1-5 years  
5 years +  
c) how long have you 
been working in your 
current role 
Under 6 months  
Under 1 year  
1-5 years  
5 years +  
d) Length of service 
with the agency? 
Under 6 months  
Under 1 year  
1-5 years  
5 years +  
e) Job Type  
 
 
 
 
Administrative  
Care  
Manual  
Social work  
Managerial  
f) Job Title: Social Worker 
g) Who do you think of 
as your employer?  
 
Council  
Agency  
Both  
  
 
Section 2 – What you think 
 
2) I am currently doing agency work because: (please tick one)  
I find working though an agency gives me more flexibility over my hours  
I prefer the work that the agency can offer me  
I like the variety of agency work  
The pay is better  
I was unable to find a permanent job  
I hope it will lead to a permanent job with the council  
I hope that it will help me to get a permanent job elsewhere  
It’s the only way that I could get experience  
It fits in the best with my partners job  
Other ( Please specify)        
 
3) If I had a problem at the council I would: (please tick one)  
Tell my manager at the council and ask them to sort it out  
Approach the agency for their help  
Ask the Trade Union to help me  
Join the Trade Union and then ask for help  
Leave and find a new job  
Start looking for a new job and leave if I found one  
Put up with it  
Other (please specify)        
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Your views on work Stro
ngly
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re
e
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eith
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n
’t
 kno
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4) Management will always try to get the better of 
employees if they get the chance 
      
5) I am dissatisfied with my conditions of work       
6) I am confident that grievances at work would be 
sorted out by my manager at the council 
      
7) I feel that I am adequately paid for the job that I do       
8) On the whole I am satisfied with my job       
9) I feel that I work for a fair council       
10) The people that I work with are generally satisfied 
with their jobs 
      
11) My manager at the council listens to my views       
12) The council listens to my views       
13) It would be easier to leave than sort out a workplace 
grievance at the council 
      
14) I feel my job is secure       
15) I enjoy the flexibility that working through an agency 
gives me 
      
16) I would rather work for the council directly than 
though an agency 
      
17) If I have a problem at work the agency will sort it out 
with my employer 
      
18) I am in regular contact with my agency       
19) I am unhappy about working though an agency       
20) I have significant influence over what happens in my 
area of work 
      
21) I feel like “part of the family” at my workplace       
22) I can decide on my own how to go about doing my 
work 
      
23) I feel a strong sense of belonging to my workplace       
24) The work I do is very important to me       
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Your views on unions Stro
ngly
 Ag
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25) Employees need strong trade unions to protect their 
interests  
      
26) Unions do a good job of looking after their members 
at my workplace  
      
27) Unions represent all workers equally well       
28) Trade unions do not have the power to change 
things where I work  
      
29) Management are supportive of people at my 
workplace joining a trade union 
      
30) I know how to contact a trade union representative 
at my workplace 
      
31) It is easy to join a trade union at my workplace       
32) Trade Unions at my workplace are able to improve 
my pay 
      
33) There are advantages to being a trade union 
member 
      
34) Being a trade union member would be a problem for 
me in my workplace 
      
35) Unions represent workers like me well       
36) Unions take notice of members problems and 
complaints 
      
37) Unions are taken seriously by management       
38) Unions make a difference to what its like at work       
39) Unions only represent permanent staff so there is 
no point in joining 
      
40) The agency wouldn’t offer me work in future if they 
knew I was a union member 
      
41) Unions can’t help agency workers       
42) Agency workers don’t need unions       
43) Are you a trade Union 
member 
 If yes go to page 4 
If no go to page 5 
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Section 3 – Union Members 
 
44) Which trade union are you a member of? (Please tick)   
Unison  
GMB  
TGWU  
BASW  
Other (please specify)       
 
45) How long have you been a trade union member? 6 years 
 
46) Have you joined the trade union since becoming an agency worker?  
 
47) Did you retain your union membership from a previous permanent position?  
 
48) Why did you join your trade union? (Please explain) 
Unfairly treated by a Manager. 
 
(Please tick the option below that is closest to why you joined or rank if more than one 
apply) 
Support if I had a problem at work        
Improved pay and conditions        
Because I believe in Trade Unions        
Most people at work are members        
To gain access to training and education        
Because of the financial services offered       
Because of the professional services offered       
Joined following incident at work        
Other (Please specify)             
 
49) How did you join? (please tick one)  
I was contacted by the union at work  
I was contacted by the trade union by some other route  
I contacted the Trade Union  
I was informed by manager that I should join   
The agency suggested that I should join a Trade Union  
Recommended by friend / colleague  
Other (Please specify)        
 
50) Have you been actively involved in the Trade Union?  
If so please briefly describe the activities undertaken: 
      
 
 
Go to Section 5 (pg 6) 
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Section 4 – non union members 
 
51) Have you ever been a Trade Union member?  
 
52) If you have been then why are you no longer a member? 
 
      
 
53) Have you ever been asked to join a trade union?  
 
54) If asked would you join a trade union?  
 
 
 
56) How do you think a trade union could encourage you to join? 
      
55) Why haven’t you joined a Trade Union? (please tick one or rank if more 
than one applies) 
 
 
I have not been asked to join        
Most of my colleagues are not members        
Union subscriptions are too expensive        
In principle, I would not join a union        
Joining a union could affect my employment here        
Unions support the labour party        
Unions cannot help agency workers        
Unions do not improve my workplace        
Unions are no use to me        
Unions are unnecessary        
Other (Please specify)             
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Section 5 – Final thoughts 
 
57) Have you ever had a problem or grievance at a workplace while you have been an 
agency worker?  
 
If yes please describe what it was and how it was resolved 
Taken off a case due to a complaint from a service user. 
 
59) The answers to the following questions will be used to explore differences between 
groups and will not be used to identify individuals. 
a) Age group  Under 25  
26-50  
Over 50  
b) Do you consider yourself 
to be disabled? 
Yes  
No  
c) Gender  Male  
Female   
Do you have children under 
16 living with you? 
Yes  
No  
e) Ethnic Origin White UK 
d) Marital status  
 
 
I am interested in talking to people about their views, if you are willing to talk to me please put your 
name and contact details below. 
Name: (If you wish to speak to me please contact me via e.mail initially) 
Phone number:       
E-Mail:       
Work Location:       
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Appendix E – Questionnaire for Directly Employed Staff 
 
Section 1 - Job Characteristics  
(Please tick) 
1a) I work Full Time  
Part Time  
b) Length of service 
with the council 
Under 6 months  
Under 1 year  
1-5 years  
5 years +  
c) how long have you 
been working in your 
current role 
Under 6 months  
Under 1 year  
1-5 years  
5 years +  
d) Is your contract Permanent   
(open ended) 
 
Temporary   
(for a fixed term) 
e) Job Type  
 
 
 
 
Administrative  
Care  
Manual  
Social work  
Managerial  
f) Job Title:       
g) Have you worked 
through an agency in 
the last 5 years? 
 h) Have you worked 
as a casual worker 
in the last 5 years?  
 
 
Section 2 – What you think 
 
2) If I had a problem at the council I would: (please tick one)  
Tell my manager at the council and ask them to sort it out  
Ask the Trade Union to help me  
Join the Trade Union and then ask for help  
Leave and find a new job  
Start looking for a new job and leave if I found one  
Put up with it  
Other (please specify)        
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Your views on work Stro
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3) Management will always try to get the better of 
employees if they get the chance 
      
4) I am dissatisfied with my conditions of work       
5) I am confident that grievances at work would be 
sorted out by my manager at the council 
      
6) I feel that I am adequately paid for the job that I do       
7) On the whole I am satisfied with my job       
8) I feel that I work for a fair council       
9) The people that I work with are generally satisfied 
with their jobs 
      
10) My manager at the council listens to my views       
11) The council listens to my views       
12) It would be easier to leave than sort out a workplace 
grievance at the council 
      
13) I feel my job is secure       
14) I have significant influence over what happens in my 
area of work 
      
15) I feel like “part of the family” at my workplace       
16) I can decide on my own how to go about doing my 
work 
      
17) I feel a strong sense of belonging to my workplace       
18) The work I do is very important to me       
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Your views on unions Stro
ngly
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19) Employees need strong trade unions to protect their 
interests  
      
20) Unions do a good job of looking after their members 
at my workplace  
      
21) Unions represent all workers equally well       
22) Trade unions do not have the power to change 
things where I work  
      
23) Management are supportive of people at my 
workplace joining a trade union 
      
24) I know how to contact a trade union representative 
at my workplace 
      
25) It is easy to join a trade union at my workplace       
26) Trade Unions at my workplace are able to improve 
my pay 
      
27) There are advantages to being a trade union 
member 
      
28) Being a trade union member would be a problem for 
me in my workplace 
      
29) Unions represent workers like me well       
30) Unions take notice of members problems and 
complaints 
      
31) Unions are taken seriously by management       
32) Unions make a difference to what its like at work       
33) Are you a trade Union 
member 
 If yes go to page 4 
If no go to page 5 
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Section 3 – Union Members 
 
34) Which trade union are you a member of? (Please tick)   
Unison  
GMB  
TGWU  
BASW  
Other (please specify)       
 
35) How long have you been a trade union member?    
 
 
36) Why did you join your trade union? (Please explain) 
      
 
(Please tick the option below that is closest to why you joined or rank if more than one 
apply) 
Support if I had a problem at work        
Improved pay and conditions        
Because I believe in Trade Unions        
Most people at work are members        
To gain access to training and education        
Because of the financial services offered       
Because of the professional services offered       
Joined following incident at work        
Other (Please specify)             
 
37) How did you join? (please tick one)  
I was contacted by the union at work  
I was contacted by the trade union by some other route  
I contacted the Trade Union  
I was informed by manager that I should join   
Recommended by friend / colleague  
Other (Please specify)        
 
38) Have you been actively involved in the Trade Union? No 
If so please briefly describe the activities undertaken: 
      
 
 
Go to Section 5 (pg 6)
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Section 4 – non union members 
 
39) Have you ever been a Trade Union member?  
 
40) If you have been then why are you no longer a member? 
 
      
 
41) Have you ever been asked to join a trade union?  
 
42) If asked would you join a trade union?  
 
 
 
44) How do you think a trade union could encourage you to join? 
      
43) Why haven’t you joined a Trade Union? (please tick one or rank if more 
than one applies) 
 
 
I have not been asked to join        
Most of my colleagues are not members        
Union subscriptions are too expensive        
In principle, I would not join a union        
Joining a union could affect my employment here        
Unions support the labour party        
Unions do not improve my workplace        
Unions are no use to me        
Unions are unnecessary        
Other (Please specify)             
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Section 5 – Final thoughts 
 
45) Have had a problem or grievance at work in the last 5 years?  
 
If yes please describe what it was and how it was resolved 
      
 
46) Please rank in order (1 highest and 12 lowest or Not a priority or Don’t know) what you 
think the most important priorities are for a trade union should be and what you believe the 
priorities of the union at your workplace are. 
 Your 
Priorities 
Workplace 
union’s 
priorities 
Improving pay -- -- 
Securing pensions -- -- 
Improving gender and race equality -- -- 
Ensuring equal treatment for full time and part time workers -- -- 
Ensuring equal treatment for agency workers and permanent staff -- -- 
Increasing Job Security -- -- 
Tackling low pay -- -- 
Opposing privatization and outsourcing -- -- 
Improving health and safety -- -- 
Political lobbying -- -- 
Representing members at the workplace on individual issues -- -- 
Working with the council to ensure fair policies and procedures -- -- 
 
47) The answers to the following questions will be used to explore differences between 
groups and will not be used to identify individuals. 
a) Age group  Under 25  
26-50  
Over 50  
b) Do you consider yourself 
to be disabled? 
Yes  
No  
c) Gender  Male  
Female   
Do you have children under 
16 living with you? 
Yes  
No  
e) Ethnic Origin       
d) Marital status  
 
 
I am interested in talking to people about their views, if you are willing to talk to me please put your 
name and contact details below. 
Name:       
Phone number:       
E-Mail:       
Work Location:       
